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1SUMMARY
Li Hsiu-chfeng’s deposition (sometimes called an ’autobiography' 
or Confession’) is the longest account of the Taipihg Rebellion 
from the rebel side. Its importance is enhanced by the great 
scarcity of documentation of this nature brought about by the wide­
spread destruction of Taiping documents during and after the 
suppression of the rebellion.
Because of the circumstances in which it was written, because 
the original manuscript was withheld from the eyes of historians 
and the public by Tseng Kuo-fan and his descendants, and in view 
of the known incompleteness of the published versions, the depos­
ition has for several decades been the subject of speculation and 
controversy. Only in 1961, with the publication of a facsimile 
edition in Taiwan, was it possible for historians to examine an 
accurate reproduction of the original document and form their own 
judgement on several important questions, including the authent­
icity of the deposition, its accuracy and reliability. These 
questions have to be resolved in order to assess the value of the 
document as an account of the history of the rebellion and the 
reasons for its failure. Of equal, if not greater value, is the 
light which it throws upon the character of its author, the most 
outstanding military leader of the late Taiping period, who sub­
sequently became a great popular hero. Examination of his career 
as seen through the deposition, his state of mind, and his motiv­
ation for writing it, should help to explain the nature of the 
rebellion itself. Most of these questions are discussed in the 
pages which follow, and the deposition has been translated and 
annotated in considerable detail.
This is the first complete translation into English of Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng’s deposition. It is also the first version in any language 
to show not only the deletions made by Tseng Kuo-fan, but also the 
other cuts made by members of his staff.
2C O N T E N T S
Chapter
I. Introduction. 3
II, The Capture of Li Hsiu-ch! eng and the Origin of the
Deposition, 17
III, Editions and Authenticity. 24
IV, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hsiu-ch1 eng: Background. 41
V. Tseng Kuo-fan and the Pate of Li Hsiu-ch'eng. 54
VI. Tseng Kuo-fan and the Deposition. 68
VII. A Hero Made and Overthrown. 82
VIII. Li Hsiu-ch'eng and his Deposition: An Assessment. 104
128Notes on the Translation.
The Deposition of Li Hsiu-ch1 eng: Translation. 130
Appendix I: Supplement to Li Hsiu-ch1 eng*s Deposition. 256
Appendix II: Chao Lieh-wen's Record of a Conversation with 266
Li Hsiu-ch'eng.
Abbreviations and Dates. 269
Notes. 271
Bibliography. 295
Maps.
3I IHTRODTJCTIOH.
Although it is only a century since the end of the Taiping
X
Rebellion, the student of its history is likely to look with 
envy upon the resources, in terms of contemporary documentation, 
available, to take a roughly comparable instance, to the historian 
of the French Revolution. He does not have at his disposal 
quantities of newspapers or journals in which he may find detailed 
accounts of this or that event, or different shades of opinion 
about them. No such newspapers existed in China in the middle 
of the 19th Century apart from certain China-coast newspapers 
in English. He cannot examine contemporary police records, which 
have been used so fruitfully by some European historians to 
identify the nameless 'mobs' which have from time to time 
participated in the making of history. No such police records 
survive from the days of the Taipings and although there are some 
lists of captured rebels, they usually tell us little more than 
the name, age and native place of the offenders. Nor can the 
historian of the Rebellion draw upon the memoirs of ex-Taipings 
written in the leisure of retirement, because former rebels, even 
if they survived and had the ability to do so, would hardly have 
dared to commit to paper the record of such dangerous activities.
Yet at first sight, source material in Chinese on the 
Rebellion seems quite copious, and in the last fifteen years 
alone some twenty volumes have been published. In addition
there is a substantial quantity of books and articles in western
2
languages. But before 1927, when V.J.Hail's book on Tseng Kuo-
3fan was published, no western work on the Taiping Rebellion made 
use of Chinese sources. The writings of foreign observers in 
China, missionaries, journalists, merchants, diplomatists or 
adventurers, though many are of considerable value and interest, 
and sometimes provide unique sources of information, too often 
give a superficial or misleading impression. A large proportion
4of the Chinese material, on the other hand, consists of, or is 
based upon the memorials of Ch'ing officials engaged in the 
suppression of the Rebellion, who were frequently mendacious, 
nearly always ill-informed, and inevitably prejudiced. There 
are many contemporary accounts and diaries, but the fictional 
or gossipy nature of many of them, and the invariable hostility 
of their authors to the Rebellion, often put their reliability 
in question. Nevertheless, thanks to this material we know a 
good deal about what the literati thought about the Taiping 
Rebellion, and even a certain amount about how they behaved.
But we know very little about what the rebels themselves thought 
about their rebellion, and even less about what the Chinese 
peasants and other inarticulate sections of the population thought 
about it.
The raw materials of the historian are always subject to a 
process of pre-selection before they reach his hands, a process 
in which both accident and consciousness play a part. In the 
case of Taiping history the sifting was done with a deliberate 
ruthlessness which severely handicaps the modern historian. Both 
during the Rebellion and after it, the Ch'ing government attempted 
to wipe out all trace of the Taipings. With the exception of a 
very small number of important documents, some of which have been 
preserved by accident, government commanders and officials 
destroyed everything which came into their hands. After fourteen 
years of continuous military activity only a handful of Taiping 
military despatches has survived, and even fewer private letters. 
Of the twentynine Taiping printed books which are still extant, 
mostly in single copies, only a few were discovered in China; the 
rest came to light in Paris, London and elsewhere. They found 
their way into foreign museums often because of the interest of 
missionaries in the Taiping brand of Christianity. The Taipings 
often handed to foreign missionaries books which they hoped would 
impress them, which would emphasize the similarities between them
5and win their sympathy. Thus a number of Taiping publications 
of a religious nature have survived but little which has a 
bearing on social, economic or military matters.4
The importance of Li Hsiu-ch1 engf s deposition must be seen
5
against this background. It is the longest single document 
from the Taiping side, the fullest and most detailed statement 
by a Taiping leader of his own activities and feelings about the 
Rebellion; as such it has long been the subject of speculation, 
and remains one of controversy. The circumstances of its 
origin, the fact that it was written in captivity in the days 
immediately preceeding the execution of its author, from memory, 
but not 'recollected in tranquility', the fact that there is much 
in it which is unexpected, and that Li Hsiu-ch'eng seems to have 
written for the eyes of his captors with a motive which was not 
not merely a desire to inform posterity, make it necessary to 
study the deposition in detail; not only to verify the information 
which it contains but also to understand the motivation of its 
author. Since Li Hsiu-ch'eng was one of the outstanding leaders 
of the Taiping movement, an understanding of his behaviour and 
attitudes may throw light on the nature of the Rebellion as a 
whole. Before turning to this task however, it is necessary 
to make some introductory remarks about the history of the 
Rebellion itself.
The Opium War, the first clash between the old China and the 
new West, is usually considered to mark the beginning of the 
modem period of Chinese history. The Taiping Rebellion was 
the first major internal event of this period, and one which 
showed how great was to be China's break with tradition, how 
tenacious were her roots in the past and how violent was to be her 
entry into the modem world.
By the Treaty of Hanking in 1842, the Ch'ing rulers hoped that 
they had put an end, at least temporarily, to 'external troubles'
6;&)• But 'internal disorder1 the other twin in that
dreadful concatenation which had haunted Chinese emperors for 
centuries, began almost at once and reached a point of acute 
crisis only eight years later. This is not to imply that the 
Taiping Rebellion was a simple outcome of the Opium War; it was 
the climax to the steady deterioration of Ch'ing administration and 
the general decay of Chinese society. Long before the Opium War 
the Manchu regime had begun to show the characteristic symptoms of 
dynastic decline; the war greatly speeded up this process and added 
entirely new disruptive elements. These naturally affected first 
and most profoundly the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi 
(Liangkuang). No other region of China had quite the same 
coincidence of favourable circumstances and combustible material: 
distance from the capital, a kind of proto-nationalism compounded 
of a long-standing anti-Manchu tradition and 'local xenophobia1, 
economic and social troubles connected with the disruption of trade 
and catalystic contacts with the West, and in addition, drought, 
flood, famine or plague, from which Kwangsi in particular was 
rarely free. The people of Liangkuang were moreover, in the front 
row, so to speak, to watch the ignoble spectacle of their 
government's defeat in the first conflict with the West, in which
7
the famous Manchu military machine was shown up as a paper tiger.
As the result of these factors, Liangkuang in the decade which
preceeded the Taiping rising, was seething with banditry in all its
forms, from the purely destructive to the Robin Hood variety, which
spread and flourished under the eyes of a corrupt and pusillanimous
8local administration. A life of banditry was the only means of 
survival for the unemployed boatmen and porters thrown out of work 
by the disruption of the trade routes which followed the war; 
pirates from the Canton delta, displaced by the policing action of
9British naval vessels, turned their attention to inland waterways; 
troops and militiamen, disbanded after the Opium War, found the 
transition from soldier to bandit an easy and even natural one.
7The traditional secret societies of the south, the T'ien Ti Hui 
(Triads), which functioned as relatively innocuous, though 
somewhat shady mutual-aid organizations for much of the time, 
became transformed into something much more dangerous as life 
became increasingly intolerable for an increasing number of people, 
and the venality and incompetence of the officials more and more 
evident. It was then that the dusty, half-forgotten banners of 
dynastic revolt were unfurled, bearing the somewhat out-dated 
device 'fan Gh'ing fu Ming11 - 'overthrow the Ch'ing and restore 
the King!' After 1840 the slogan had a new appeal to the people 
of Liangkuang who were convinced that the hated officials were 
selling out to the foreigners.
Faced with this widespread lawlessness, the local administration,
unable to maintain order itself, permitted and sometimes encouraged
the formation of local militia, usually under gehtry leadership.
These bands naturally attempted to defend local gentry interests,
including the maintenance of the rural status quo, which they
interpreted fairly narrowly. They saw a threat to their property,
but not yet a threat to the society of which they were the pillars.
They dared not fight against large rebel groups and considered
their work well done if they managed to get them to move into
other districts. An increasing proportion of the population was
armed, if only with swords and spears; for some assembly was now
legal, and not always easily controlled; for others it was illegal
and uncontrollable. As the social and economic crisis deepened,
especially with the famine of 1846-7 in Kwangsi, antagonistic
groups and those with a grievance resorted increasingly to armed
force: destitute peasants against landlords, landlords against
bandits, the unemployed against the officials, the law-abiding
against the outlaws. Famine and local unrest brought latent
hostility between pen-ti (the early settlers) and hakka (the
11later settlers) to the surface, and they too took to arms.
As the gentry and officials came to depend more and more on the
militia (t'uan-lien), the secret societies united the disaffected, 
landless peasants, unemployed silver-miners, boatmen and porters, 
as life became more difficult to sustain.
The seed of a political movement began to grow in this hotbed 
of lawlessness as soon as it was whispered that the Mandate of the 
Dynasty was about to run out. But it could only grow if there 
was a polarization of the social unrest between political stirring 
on the one hand and pure banditry on the other. A rebellious 
organization was unlikely to win the kind of following it needed 
as long as it was burdened with the stigma of banditry; it had 
to prove that it could promise something better than the present 
chaos.
Another side of the polarization process was that the 
distinctions between the militia and the non-political bandits 
became fainter. Not dnly-in the sense that in agrarian societies
12there are often 'landlords' bandits' as well as 'peasant bandits', 
but also because inevitably in such times, the age-old affinity 
between soldier and bandit asserted itself. Moreover, by an easy 
extension of their officially permitted means of raising funds 
the militia groups could encroach upon the traditional preserves 
of the bandits, and exact illegal levies upon trade, gambling, 
prostitution and so on. In 1847 in Kwangsi, wrote a contemporary, 
'the militiamen are bandits (tsei) and the local people are 
bandits too ... they start as militiamen and end up as bandits.'  ^
Bandit leaders, on the other hand, not infrequently threw in their 
lot with the forces of law and order in return for an official 
post and legal recognition for the very military power which had 
forced the government to come to terms with them.^
In spite of their resounding political slogan calling for the 
overthrow of the Ch'ing and the restoration of the Ming, the 
T'ien Ti Hui were never able to curb adequately the indiscipline 
and destructiveness of their followers, although they undoubtedly 
made efforts to do so. The only organization which was able to do
9this was a new kind of secret society.
The original Taiping organization, the Pai Shang-ti Hui or 
Association of God-worshippers, was created by Hang Hsiu-ch *iian 
(1814-1864) and his disciple Peng Yun-shan (1822-1852) in Kwangsi 
in this period of widespread unrest. The story, which is related
in part in Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s deposition, is fairly well-known and
15need not be repeated here.  ^ Though neither Hung Hsiu-ch*uan nor 
Feng Yun-shan are known to have been members of the T*ien Ti Hui, 
it was inevitable thqt their association would be profoundly 
influenced by the traditional secret societies of the south. Like 
them, the God-worshippers sought recruits among the disaffected 
sections of the community, and could ohly attract a following by 
expressing to come extent their collective aspirations, dreams 
or complaints; both the secret societies and the God-worshippers 
emphasized the brotherhood of the oppressed. The Association of 
God-worshippers, as a newcomer on the social scene, naturally 
drew upon the long experience of the secret societies in the 
techniques of clandestine activity. Although little is known 
about the early relations between the two, partly because the Taipings 
seem to have been a little ashamed of this connection once they 
had established their state, it seems reasonable to assume that 
since the Association of God-worshippers grew up in areas where the
T*ien Ti Hui was already strong, they must at least have reached a
 iu" " iLj
modus vivendi.
But the Association of God-worshippers was not just another 
secret society. What distinguished it from the traditional 
organizations of popular revolt was the particular brand of
17Christianity which provided so much of its original dynamism.
Hung Hsiu-ch*uan was a disappointed intellectual, whose failure in 
the examinations frustrated hia ambition to rise out of rural 
poverty into a career of honour and wealth. Like many of his 
predecessors, this personal setback led him to reject the values 
of the society which seemed to have rejected him. Others had
10
taken to mystical Taoism or Salvationist Buddhism as an expression
of their alienation; Hung Hsiu-ch1 iian would have perhaps done the
same if he had been a native of another province. But he sat his
examinations at Canton, and lived only a hundred li from the point
of impact in the first collision between China and the West. It
was the religion of the West, whose representatives had just
humiliated the Confucian empire, which attracted his attention.
This was perhaps the first time that Christianity served in Asia
18to arm a revolutionary movement; it was not to be the last. But 
before this foreign religion could be harnessed to the service of 
rebellion it had to be adapted to the psychological needs, not 
only of frustrated intellectuals, but of all those who had no 
vested interest in the preservation of the Confucian order. It 
was the unstable genius of Hung Hsiu-ch1 iian which effected this 
trans f ormation.
The God-worshippers’ Association started as a purely religious
organization, apparently without political intent. ’Up to this
period (the winter of 1850),* wrote Hamberg, *the worshippers of
God had not stood in any connexion whatever with the robbers and
outlaws of the province. The mandarin soldiers, during their
excursions in search of the robbers, never interfered with the
members of the congregations, or suspected the brethren of having
19any other but religious motives for assembling together,' x But 
the development of the social crisis in Kwangsi, the need for 
self-defence against bandits, the adherence of persecuted Hakkas 
to the association, the hostile motions^of officials and gentry, 
and the growing ambitions of Hung Hsiu-ch*iian and his friends, 
led the God-worshippers more and more into political activity.
Such was the vigour of the movement that in the twenty seven 
months which followed the rising at Chin-t'ien in January 1851, 
the Taipings had broken out of Kwangsi, passed through Hunan and 
Kiangsi into Hupeh, and after a rapid descent of the Yangtse had 
captured Nanking in March 1855 and made it their capital.
n
In 1853 and at several other moments in the decade which
followed, it seemed impossible that the dynasty should survive
the combined onslaught of the Taipings and other rebels. There
is little doubt that in establishing their capital at Nanking
in 1853 at the expense of an all-out effort to seize Peking,
the Taipings sacrificed their first and best opportunity of
20overthrowing the Manchu dynasty.
The temptation of setting up a court with all the trappings
of imperial splendour in the second city of the empire was
evidently too much for them, and sound strategic counsels were 
21over-ruled. Although two armies, under Li K ’ai-fang and Lin 
Feng-hsiang were sent north from Nanking in May 1854 to take 
Peking, a vital year had already been lost; the main Taiping 
armies were needed for the defence of their capital and only 
comparatively small armies under junior commanders could be spared 
for the north. By the time that Northern Expedition reached 
Chihli its strength had been exhausted by an arduous campaign, 
relief was sent, but too little and too late. By March the 
following year the northern armies had been wiped out and their 
commanders captured.
Another important, and for the Taipings, disastrous result of 
the deflection of their forward thrust by the acquisition of Nanking, 
was that it gave time for the transformation of some of the 
ordinary gentry-led militia from local defence and police organ­
izations into a striking force which could operate against the 
Taipings on a national scale. Such a development had not been 
envisaged by the Court early in 1853 when orders were sent to some
forty officials in the provinces to raise militia, or by Tseng
22Kuo-fan himself when he accepted the assignment.
The first major victory for Tseng Kuo-fan*s Hunan Army (i-Isiang- 
chun) over the Taipings was at Hsiang-t'an in May 1854.^ There­
after, especially after another disastrous defeat for the Taipings
12
at Yueh-chou in July 1854 > in which they lost a great number of
boats, the Hunan Army played an increasingly important role in
the fight against the rebellion. In spite of government pressure
Tseng Kuo-fan refused to take his army outside the boundaries of
the province of Hunan until he thought that if ;was ready; then in
October 1854 he crossed into Hupeh and recovered Vu-ch!ang and
Han-yang. In the meantime, regular government armies had
established two great camps near Hanking, north and south of the
Yangtse, called *Chiang-pei Ta-ying' (the Chiang-pei Headquarters)
and fChiang-nan Ta-ying1 (the Chiang-nan Headquarters). Though
they did not represent a very impressive striking force, their
presence was a grave threat to the supply lines of the Taiping 
24capital. In order to deal with this threat it was necessary
for the Taipings to withdraw troops from the western front fighting
against\the Hunan Army. Once this was done, the Taipings had little
25difficulty in routing the Chiang-pei and Chiang-nan forces. ^
This was in June 1856, The blockade of their capital was broken,
but any hope the Taipings may have had of turning and destroying
the Hunan Army vanished when internecine strife broke out in the
26Taiping leadership. As a result of this savage struggle for 
power three of the original leaders, including Yang Hsiu-ch1 ing, 
were killed, and another, Shih Ta-k*ai defected with his whole army 
of some two hundred thousand men. There was an immense loss of 
life and the damage to Taiping morale was incalculable. V/ith the 
final breakdown of group leadership, such as it was, government 
was left in the hands of corrupt and incompetent sycophants, at 
least until the arrival of Hung Jen-kan in 1859! Hung Hsiu-ch*iian 
himself was incapable or unwilling to give the movement coherent 
leadership. The defection of Shih Ta-k!ai, who had recaptured 
Wu-ch*ang in 1855> allowed Tseng Kuo-fan to consolidate his initial 
successes and allowed the Imperial Commissioner Ho-chfun and his 
assistant commander Chang Kuo-liang to recover from the destruction 
of the Chiang-nan H.Q. and organize another siege of the Taiping
13
capital in- the following year.
After the bloody struggle for power new commanders had to be
found. It was then that Ch'en Yii-ch'eng and Li Hsiu-ch!eng were
appointed to important military commands; later they came to be
thought of as the main pillars of the Taiping regime.
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng was bom in T'eng-hsien, Kwangsi Province in 
271823. He came of a peasant family, probably hakka, which also
28burned charcoal as a subsidiary occupation. He did. not join
the Taipings at Chin-t'ien, where the rising occurred, but did so
when the Taipings passed through his village on the way to Yung-an
in September 1851. Between this time and the capture of Hanking
Li Hsiu-ch'eng served as an ordinary soldier, but subsequently,
perhaps because he had received some education, he was appointed
to an administrative position. Soon afterwards he was given a
command of new recruits defending Hanking, rising to the rank of
ohien-ohtin (Army Inspector) He left Nanking in the winter of
1853 and. held minor commands under Shih Ta-lc'ai in Anhwei Province.
Some time before 1856 - the exact date is not known - he was
appointed ti-lcuan-fu-ch'eng-hsiang (a junior minister of state),^
which was the rank he held at the time of the internal strife.
For his achievement in enlisting the support of Hien rebels he was
promoted, and after the defection of Shih Ta-k'ai in 1857 shared
with Ch'en Yu-ch'eng virtual control over Taiping military and
31civil administration. In the spring of 1859 > in circumstances 
which he describes in his deposition, Li Hsiu-ch'eng was given 
the title of 'Chung Wang1, or Faithful Prince. After the death 
of Ch'en Yu-ch'eng in 1862 Li Hsiu-ch'eng became the most power­
ful and famous of the Taiping generals, winning the reputation of
32an able and cunning commander, and a benevolent and honest 
admini s trator.
Both Ch'en Yu-ch'eng and Li Hsiu-ch'eng were talented leaders 
but they were unable to stem the ebbing tide of Taiping fortunes. 
Neither was strong enough as a leader to give direction to the
14
whole movement, they did not have the charismatic vitality of 
Hung Hsiu-ch*uan or Yang Hsiu-ch*ing. When they acted together 
they achieved impressive military successes, hut they were not 
always able to co-operate. The leadership. vacuum at the top and 
the limited military thinking of these men, left the movement 
without far-sighted strategy or political direction. In spite 
of their successes the Taipings remained strategically on the 
defensive.
Nothing shows this more clearly than the difficulty which they
had in dealing both with the siege forces at Hanking and with the
Hunan Army in Hunan and Anhwei. The first major campaign under
Li Hsiu-ch*eng and Ch*en Yu-ch'eng was an attempt to break the
supply-lines of the Hunan Army in Anhwei and to secure those of
the capital* But in December 1857 it was necessary for the Taipings
to turn back and deal once more with the Ch*ing forces which were
threatening Nanking. No sooner had this operation been completed
than the advance of the Hunan Army under Li Hsu-pin brought Gh*en
Yii-ch*eng and Li Hsiu-ch*eng back into Anhwei in a great pincer
movement which culminated in the victory at San-ho in November
1858.^ Again the victory could not be followed up because the
Taiping capital was still under pressure from the Chiang-nan H.Q.,
the complete destruction of which was not accomplished until after
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s remarkable diversionary attack on Hang-chou in 
34I860. In the campaign which defeated the Chiang-nan H.Q. 
several Taiping commanders acted in unison and achieved a great 
victory, which enabled Li Hsiu-ch'eng to extend Taiping territory 
into the Kiangsu delta.
This expansion was probably intended to stabilize their rear
in preparation for a major Taiping thrust up the Yangtse in order
to gain control over this key waterway in face of the steady
35advance of the Hunan Army. It was planned that Ch'en Yu-ch'eng 
should operate on the north bank of the river and Li Hsiu-ch'eng on 
the south, and together they would launch a pincer attack on the
Hunan Array in Hupeh. Although Li Hsiu-ch'eng agreed, according
3 6to Hung Jen-kan, on the importance of regaining control of the 
Yangtse, he did not in the end fulfill his part in the plan.
Ch'en Yu-ch'eng would have prefered a concentrated effort to 
relieve An-ch'ing and Li Shih-hsien wanted to campaign in Fukien 
and Chekiang. Though the plan for a thrust up the Yangtse was 
eventually set in motion, in the subsequent actions of Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng and in the expressed opinions of Ch'en Yu-ch'eng and Li Shih- 
hsien it is possible to detect the evidence of regional pre­
occupations in these commanders which led to their unwillingness in 
the last phase of the Rebellion to co-ordinate their military 
actions. Ch'en Yii-ch 'eng undoubtedly considered Anhwei as his 
special sphere of activity, Li Shih-hsien looked on Fukien and 
Chekiang as his. Though Li Hsiu-ch'eng agreed to the plan, albeit 
unwillingly, he did not complete his assignment because he already 
had his own 'empire' in Kiangsu. If Ch'en Yu-ch'eng played the 
part assigned to him it was perhaps because it did not conflict 
with his own regional interests; but Li Hsiu-ch'eng's failure
to do what he had agreed to do must be considered the main reason
37for the break-down of the operation.
- After the final defeat of the Chiang-nan H.Q. in I860, Tseng
Kuo-fan*s military power was at last confirmed by his appointment
38to a high official position. He then delegated to Tso Tsung-t'ang
the formation of another regional army to operate in Chekiang, of
which Tso was made Governor, and to Li Hung-chang the formation of
the Huai Army, which was transfered from An-ch'ing to Shanghai in
1862 at the urgent appeal of refugee gentry from Su-chou, and began
39campaigning in Kiangsu.
Ey this time the second Opium War had won for Britain and France 
important new commercial and political concessions from the Ch'ing 
government, and they were anxious to see the end of hostilities 
and the stabilization of the dynasty. When the Taipings threatened 
Shanghai in 1862 Britain and France abandoned what had been an
16
imperfect neutrality* and began to co-operate on a local level 
with the government for the defence of the treaty Ports.^
Unofficial western aid against the Taipings started with the
formation in Shanghai of a corps of foreign adventurers in I860,
41 ^under the American P.T.Ward. On his death in 1862 the
British government was sufficiently interested in the potentialities
of this corps to allow the release of C.G.Gordon from the army
in order to command what was then called the 1Ever-Victorious 
42Army'. This was something of a misnomer, and the role of this 
force in the suppression of the Taipings has been greatly 
exaggerated, not only by western writers, but even by Hung Jen- 
kan, who considered that foreign intervention was fthe cause of
A X
all our troubles'.  ^ This judgement was based more on disappointment
at the behaviour of fellow Christians than on a cool appraisal of
reality. In fact the Taiping movement was already beyond recovery
before this intervention started.
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng had a low opinion both of the 'Ever-Victorious
Army* and of Li Hung-chang as a commander;^  nevertheless between
them, and thanks to treachery in the Taiping camp, they succeeded
in capturing Li Hsiu-ch'eng's 'capital', Su-chou, and gradually
recovered for the government the rich rice basin of Kiangsu. The
key city of An-ch'ing had been taken by the Hunan Army under
Tseng Kuo-ch'iian (Tseng Kuo-fan *s brother) in September 1861, and
by the end of June 1862 the last siege of Hanking had begun. Even
the great attack on the Hunan Array by 600,000 troops under Li Hsiu-
ch'eng in October could not break the siege, and the Taiping
capital fell on July 19th, 1864.
Thus, when the mopping-up operations were completed, ended what
has been called the greatest civil war in history. There were few
provinces of China which the Taipings had not penetrated at one
time or another between 1851 and 1864» and six hundred towns had
45fallen to their arms. Ten million troops had been involved and
46probably no less than twenty million people had lost their lives.
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II THE CAPTURE OP LI HSIU-CH'ENG AND THE ORIGIN OP THE DEPOSITION
Li Hsiu-ch*eng was taken prisoner on 22 July 1864 (TG3/6/19),
on the third day after the fall of Nanking, in circumstances which
he describes in his deposition.^ Reliable reports of Hung Hsiu-
2ch*uan*s death had reached the Ch'ing commanders in June, so the 
fate of his heir Hung Yu^fu, and of Li Hsiu-ch*eng, his most
famous general, was a matter of great concern to the court.
3
Chao Lieh-wen, an important member of Tseng Kuo-fan *s 
secretariat, recorded in his diary the events following Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng* s capture, when he was brought before the commander of the 
Hunan Army at Nanking Tseng Kuo-ch*uan, Kuo-fan*s younger brother.
I heard that the false Chung Wang [Li Hsiu-ch*eng] was 
captured and that the Governor [Tseng Kuo-ch*iian] ^ was 
personally interrogating him, having placed an awl and a 
sword before him, with the intention of mutilating him.
When someone informed me of this, I thought of the 
importance placed on this man by the court, and hastened 
over to restrain the Governor with discreet words. But he 
was very angry and jumping up from his seat, shouted, *He 
is nothing but a bandit, why should he be spared or 
presented as a captive?*"^ He cried to the soldiers to 
slash his shoulder and thigh, and the blood flowed. The 
rebel Chung remained absolutely motionless. Shortly after­
wards the false king*s second brother, the Fu Wang Hung Jen- 
ta,^ who had been captured, was brought in and was tortured 
as the rebel Chung had been; he too said nothing. X 
realized that he [Tseng Kuo-ch*uan] could not be restrained, 
and left. After a while the Governor seemed to come to his 
senses suddenly; he ordered [the prisoners] to be locked 
up, invited me to come back, and asked me what should be done. 
He said that the execution of this man could well be post­
poned, and that he feared that there would be a question of
presenting the captive, and so on, which would only
increase the arrogance of the court. I replied that it
was not for us to decide whether the captive should be
presented or not; but he was an important ringleader, and
now that he had been captured alive the correct thing to
do was to ask for a decision from above. If, for instance,
he had been captured by the civil administration and then
executed without authority, would that be permissable?
The Governor had no answer, so he ordered a letter to be
written to the Grand Secretary [Tseng ICuo-fan]7 saying
8that Hsiao Fu-ssu had gone in pursuit and made the
capture. In fact it was the local people of Fang-shan
9
who had taken him.
In the evening of 25 July (TC3/6/20) Chao Lieh-wen went to the
place where Li Hsiu-ch'eng was imprisoned and had a long talk with
him. Chao seems to have been prompted by curiosity, and it was
apparently not a formal interrogation. Where Tseng Kuo-ch'uan's
brutality had failed to elicit any response from Li Hsiu-ch'eng,
Chao Lieh-wen's conciliatory role in that first encounter may
have encouraged Li to speak quite freely when they met on the 
10following day.
On 26 July a wooden cage was made and Li Hsiu-ch'eng was locked 
11in it. This was done in order to facilitate the exhibition of
the prisoner, a matter of some importance to the Tseng brothers,
12as we shall see.
Tseng Kuo-fan, who was in An-ch'ing at the time, received the 
news of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's capture on 26 July (TC5/6/23)^  He 
arrived by boat at Nanking on 28 July,^ and in the evening
1«5
personally interrogated Li Hsiu-ch'eng. No record survives of
what passed between them. On 30 July (TC3/6/27) Tseng Kuo-fan
wrote in his diary: 'Very tired this evening: noted a number of
16points to question Li Hsiu-ch'eng about'. But he did not attend
19
the interrogation himself, which was conducted by three members of 
his secretariat, P'ang Chi-yun, Li Hung-i and Chou Yueh-hsiu. We
do not know when this took place, only that the questioning lasted
1*7 18
all day. A much abbreviated record of this interrogation shows
that the officials had some difficulty in understanding Li's dialect,
which may have been one of the reasons why he was told to write the
deposition.
But there is another version of how the deposition came to be
19written, which is given in several sources. According to this 
account, Li Hsiu-ch'eng turned his back on Tseng Kuo-ch'uan when 
brought before him for interrogation and said, 'What is the point? 
Quickly bring me paper and a brush and I will write. You have 
burned all the records in our Bureau of History and if I do not write 
how can a truthful account be handed down?' Li Hsiu-ch*eng then 
wrote 'from the 17th Bay [of the 6th Month] to the 27th Bay - ten days 
after which he was executed.1 The fictional character of this ver­
sion makes it at once suspect, and the impression is strengthened by 
the mistaken dates: Li Hsiu-ch 'eng was not taken prisoner until the
19th Bay of the 6th Month (22 July). There is, in addition, no 
reason to doubt the veracity of Tseng Kuo-fan's statement that Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng began to write on the 27th Bay (30 July).20
The extraction of a deposition, preferably a confession, which 
would neatly round off a case and fix responsibility once and for 
all for what had occurred, seems to have been a matter of course 
in Chinese legal procedure, especially perhaps in the case of a
rebel, where there was usually no question of having to decide
21whether the man was guilty or not. The depositions of the 
majority of rebels consist of their answers to questions during 
interrogation, written down by an official or clerk. Even literate 
rebels did not always write their own depositions, presumably in 
some cases because they did not want to and could not be forced,
22though often they seem to have been willing to answer questions.
The reason why Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not begin to write his deposition
£o
■until 50 July was probably connected with a rule or convention 
that such depositions were part of the interrogation to be 
conducted by the highest official concerned, in this case
2^Tseng Kuo-fan, who did not arrive at Nanking until 28 July,
Apart from being required for legal purposes, Li Hsiu-ch'eng1s 
deposition was useful to Tseng Kuo-fan in three ways: first, it
provided him with a certain amount of military intelligence, 
though in the event this was of little importance since military 
operations against the Taipings were almost finished and Li Hsiu- 
ch1 eng was more concerned with the past than with the future; 
secondly, it helped to prove to a suspicious court that the rebel 
who had been captured really was Li Hsiu-ch*eng; thirdly, since 
Tseng Kuo-fan took the trouble to publish a copy of it, we must 
suppose that he considered it to have some value as propaganda, 
either against the Taipings or for himself, or both.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng began to write on 30 July, and was seen doing 
so about this time by Chaloner Alabaster, a British consular 
interpreter, who wrote in the following terms in his official 
report
I went to see how they treated the Chung Vang. I found 
him seated on the ground writing his confession. He was 
clean shaved, simply but cleanly dressed and appeared well 
cared for. For safety he had on light leg-irons and a sort 
of open cell, or cage, six feet square had been constructed, 
in which he was confined. Sentries are kept on him day 
and night but I do not think he has any reason to complain 
of extraordinary rigour. I walked in quietly and hoped 
not to have disturbed him, but someone shouting out to him, 
he turned round, stood up and greeted me by name. I was 
therefore compelled to speak and simply asked him if he 
wished anything of me. To this he replied that his sole 
hope was now in heaven - speaking almost cheerfully and
21
causing an involuntary sympathy to he felt for him.-.
On 7 August 1864 (TC5/?/^) Hi Hsiu-ch1 eng was executed, and 
Chao Lieh-wen wrote in his diary:
The false Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch*eng was executed today.
He has written a deposition of fifty or sixty thousand
characters, recounting rebel affairs from the 4th or 5th
Years of Hsien Peng [1854-5] iu some detail. Though it
is not literary the facts are well presented. One
cannot say that he is not the craftiest and the cruelest
amongst the rebels. The Grand Secretary [Tseng Kuo-fan]
is very sorry for him and yesterday personally examined
him again. He seemed to beg for pardon and the Grand
Secretary replied that he awaited the Imperial Decree,
For days he had hesitated about this matter, but he would
give him an answer as soon as a decision had been reached.
Today Li Mei-sheng was sent to tell him that the law
cannot be evaded and he could not be acquitted. Li [Hsiu-
ch* eng] said, *The Grand Secretary’s kindness will be
engraved and not forgotten. I have been at error in this
life, but will try to repay in the next one,* and so on.
At dusk he was taken to the execution ground. He wrote
a valedictory poem of ten lines, without rhyme and
ridiculously crude, which he handed to the supervisor of
25the execution, P'ang Hsing-san, in which he stated that he
26had been loyal to the end. Then he was executed.
In his memorial to the throne of TC5/7/7 (8 August 1864) Tseng
Kuo-fan stated that he had commanded Li Hsiu-ch*eng to write a
deposition, which *does not very well follow the rules of
writing, but the facts are true and accurate. It has been
27copied and sent for the perusal of the Grand Council.* On 
the same day Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in his diary:
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s deposition has been copied by eight
or nine people. Altogether it amounts to 13Q pages, 
each with 216 characters. It has been bound, punctuated 
and divided into sections, marked with red paper slips.
It has been sent to the Grand Council for examination.
28Memorial despatched at the Yu Hour [5-7 P*m.].
A few days later, on 11 August (TC3/7/IO) Chao Lieh-wen checked
the copy to be sent to An-ch'ing to be printed. 'The Grand
Secretary asked me to look at Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1s deposition again
and divide it into sections; it will then be sent to the 
29engraver.1 '
The imperial edict of TC3/7/14 in reply to Tseng Kuo-fan*s
memorial of TC3/7/7 giving information about the deposition has
caused a certain amount of suspicion among scholars because it
contains the words, 'the Commissioner [Tseng Kuo-fan] is moreover
ordered to send Li Hsiu-ch* eng's deposition ... to the Grand
30Council for inspection.1' Because of this, the historian
Hsieh Hsing-yao, writing in 1935 > assumed that after making up
a packet containing his memorial of TC3/7/7 and the copy of the
deposition, Tseng Kuo-fan had had second thoughts about the
wording of the latter, had recalled the courier and removed the
deposition from the packet, letting the memorial only be taken to 
31Peking. This theory would seem to be confirmed to some extent
by a subsequent memorial from Tseng Kuo-fan dated TC3/7/29? i&
answer to the imperial demand for the deposition to be sent. In
this memorial Tseng Kuo-fan wrote, *1 do not know how it can have
happened that the memorial should have arrived but not the
32communication and the deposition. *■'
Lo Erh-kang has pointed out however, that the copy of the 
deposition must have arrived in Peking, because the Grand 
Councillor Li T'ang-chieh wrote in his diary on TC3/7/17 (18 August 
1864) that he had read it on that day.^ The edict of TC3/7/14 
demanded the original manuscript of the deposition, but since the
23
arrival of the copy is not mentioned, the wording is somewhat
ambiguous. It is clear from a later edict, that of TC3/7/23*
that the court wanted an unexpurgated copy fwhich need not be 
.34shortened.'
It is difficult to believe that Tseng Kuo-fan really thought 
that the deposition had somehow got separated from the memorial 
and had never reached the Grand Council. His subsequent unwilling­
ness, indeed his refusal, to send up the original manuscript, in 
spite of repeated orders from the court, supports Lo Erh-kang’s 
theory; which is that Tseng Kuo-fan took advantage of the ambiguity 
of the edict to pretend that he did not understand that it was the 
original which the court wanted. In his memorial of TC3/7/29 
Tseng Kuo-fan wrote, after expressing wonder that the copy should 
have gone astray, ’However, since there are a great number of 
people who read rebel depositions, your minister has already 
published [it as] a volume, which I now send with the memorial 
to the Grand Council for inspection. ' ^
This was not what the court wanted and another edict was
36sent demanding an accurate copy. To this Tseng Kuo-fan did not
reply until TC3/12/13, when he wrote that he was now sending up
37fthe ten requests, ten errors and other remarks.1 We know that
this arrived, first, because some sort of document containing
the ’ten requests and ten errors* was found in 1951 in the Ming
38and Ch’ing Archives by Chin Yu-fu, and secondly because the
imperial edict of TC3/12/20 (17 January I865) tells Tseng Kuo-fan
to check a point with Li Hung-chang about the the fate of Li Shih-
hsien *s family, a demand which could only have been provoked by
39the reading of the third of the ’ten requests.’
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III EDITIONS AND AUTHENTICITY
Since 1864 a number of versions of the deposition have 
appeared, varying to a considerable extent in their content. 
Although, since the publication of a facsimile of the original 
manuscript, we now have a reliable version, it is necessary to 
list the more important editions which have, until now, been 
key documents in the history of the Taiping Rebellion.
A. The Grand Council Copy.
This v/as made at Tseng Kuo-fan*s order and was probably sent
by him to Peking on 8 August 1864; but it has not been found in
the Ming-Ch'ing archives. According to Tseng Kuo-fan it amounted
1to 28,080 characters.
B. The An-ch'ing Edition.
On 12 August 1864 (TC3/7/H) Tseng Kuo-fan sent the draft of the
deposition revised by Ohao Lieh-wen, to his son Chi-tse in An-
ch'ing, who was presumably responsible for its printing and
2
publication at the Hunan Army headquarters. The printing must
have been completed in the early part of September because Li
Hung-chang wrote from Su-chou to Tseng Kuo-ch’uan on the 16th,
(TC3/8/17), saying that he ’had seen yesterday at a friend’s a
3
copy of Li Hsiu-ch’eng's deposition.'^ The An-ch'ing Edition is 
now extremely rare; I only know of one copy in existence, in 
Taiwan. According to Yang Chia-lo it contains 27,888 characters.^
C. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.
The original date and place of publication of this edition is 
not known. It is based on the An-ch’ing Edition and is almost 
equally rare. A copy exists in the Library of Peking University, 
and this was reproduced in facsimile in 1936* Though it is said 
to be an exact copy of the An-ch'ing Edition, it has 27,810 
characters; but this slight discrepancy may be the result of 
different methods of counting - whether or not blank spaces in 
the text were counted for instance.
% %
Al}. subsequent editions up until 1933 were based either on 
the An-ch'ing or on the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition. They are all 
corrupt to some extent, some being careless copies, some 
fictionalized versions. In general they are of little value and 
it is unnecessary to list them here.
D. Lu Chi-i's Hand Copy.
Until 1944 the original manuscript of the deposition was held
by Tseng Kuo-fan fs descendants at their home in Hunan and was not
6open to examination by scholars. But in the early 1940's 
material on Taiping history was being collected for a new 
provincial gazeteer of Kwangsi, and Tseng Chao-hua, the great 
grandson of Tseng Kuo-fan, who held a post in the customs 
administration of Kwangsi at that time, agreed to put the manu­
script at the disposal of the historians who were compiling the 
gazeteer. In 1944 therefore, Lu Chi-i, who was secretary of the
gazeteer bureau and an acquaintance of Tseng Chao-hua, was sent
7
to Hsiang-t'an in Hunan to fetch the manuscript.
When he arrived there he was told that the manuscript had been 
sent away for safety 'because of the military situation in northern 
Hunan.' He understood from this that the members of the Tseng 
family had changed their minds about showing him the manuscript, 
but managed to persuade them to send someone to bring it back by 
threatening to remain there until they did so. There was now 
clearly no question of being allowed to take it back with him to 
Kweilin, and he was obliged to examine it under the watchful eyes 
of members of the Tseng family who took turns in sitting over him. 
This must have been very disquieting for Lu Chi-i for, as we shall 
see, his work was very carelessly done.
He had brought a photographer with him, but there were only 
fifteen plates for the camera. With these he took a photograph of 
the outside cover of the deposition, of some representative pages, 
and of some of the pages which seemed to have been greatly
tampered with. Lu Chi-i then went through the manuscript,
copying the parts which Tseng Kuo-fan had deleted in red ink,
into the margin of a copy of the 1936 facsimile of the. Chiu Ju 
8T'ang Edition. He copied, according to his own count, some 
5,620 characters which, added to the 27,810 characters of the 
Chiu Ju T*ang Edition,giving a total of 53,450 characters. Lii 
Chi-i*s work was carelessly and hastily done because, as we now 
know, the manuscript which he was shown consisted of 36,244 
characters; he had therefore overlooked ?,8J4 characters which 
were missing from the Chiu Ju T’ang Edition. The main reason 
for this omission is that Lii Chi-i only copied out the parts in 
the manuscript which were deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan in red ink 
(ocassionally missing some), but did not take note of parts which 
had not been so deleted but which nevertheless had been omitted 
from the Chiu Ju T*ang Edition.
When Lii Chi-i returned with his copy to Kweilin, some of his
colleagues considered that since the deposition in its new form
contained *so much that was self-deprecatory, * more research
should be undertaken before this version be published as the true
one. Others, in view of the importance to historians of the
newly discovered material, advocated publication as soon as
possible. The arrival of the Japanese armies put a stop to the 
9
discussion. But Lo Erh-kang, who was a member of the team 
compiling the gazeteer and had already been working on the 
deposition, was appointed to study the corrected version and find 
out if it was genuine.*^0
In spite of the shortcomings of Lu Chi-i *s hand copy, it 
remained the basis for the editions and studies of the deposition 
done between 1944 and 1961. He was the first historian to 
examine the manuscript in detail and give his opinion as to its 
authenticity. His edition remained the most complete one available 
until the publication of the facsimile of the manuscript in 1961;
27
it had also restored the highly important 'ten requests and ten 
errors' which had been omitted from all previous editions.
Lii Chi-i himself did no . further work on the deposition and
his copy was not published until 1961, when a facsimile and a
11typeset edition appeared in May and November respectively.
E. Lo Erh-kang's Studies.
The result of Lo Erh-kang's prolonged study of the deposition 
was first published in 1951 under the title Chung Wang Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng tzu-chuan yuan-kao chien-cheng (Commentary on the Auto­
biography of the Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng) - a rather misleading 
title, since Lo Erh-kang had never seen the original mansucript 
(yuan-kao) and was working only with Lii Chi-i!s somewhat inaccurate 
copy and a few photographs. Since then, three other editions of 
this work have been published, another in 1951 > in 1954 and 1957* 
The fourth edition (1957)> of which I have made extensive use in 
this thesis, is the most complete. This study is based on Lii Chi- 
i's hand copy, but does not indicate which parts were suppressed 
by Tseng Kuo-fan and his staff. For the preparation of the first 
three editions Lo Erh-kang only had access to four of the 
photographs, including one of the cover of the manuscript, which 
Lii Chi-i had brought back from Hsiang-t'an; it was not until the 
publication of Liang Hu-lu's edition in 1954 (see below) that Lo 
Erh-kang became aware that fifteen, not four, photographs had been 
taken.
The fourth edition contains a fairly long introduction 
explaining the necessity for a new edition, followed by a study of 
the deposition, its origins and editions. Some 55 pages are 
devoted to the evidence as to the authenticity of the manuscript 
which was seen by Lii Chi-i. Then follows the text of the 
deposition, punctuated and annotated in some detail. The record 
of the interrogation of Li Hsiu-ch'eng is given in the appendix, 
also punctuated and annotated. Like the Lii Chi-i copy on which it
38
is based and the errors of which it reproduces, the text of this
edition has been superseded by the publication of.the original
manuscript in facsimile. The annotations however, and much of the
12introduction, remain of considerable interest and value.
Liang Hu-lu's Edition.
Liang Hu-lu, who also worked in the Kwangsi Gazeteer Bureau,
obtained from Lii Chi-i a set of the photographs and published
them under the title Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch!eng tzu-ohuan chen-ohi
in 1954. In 1958 he republished this and added the text of the
13deposition which he had copied from Lii Chi-iTs copy in 1944.
There is a short introduction but no notes, and the text does not 
show which parts had. been suppressed.14
G. The Taiwan Facsimile.
Although Kuo Mo-jo, in his preface to the published edition of
Lii Chi-i*s copy, suggested that the original manuscript had
13probably perished in an air accident, the anxieties of historians
were dispelled by the publication in the summer of 1961 in Taiwan
of a facsimile edition of the manuscript, which had been taken to
16Taiwan by Tseng Yueh-nung.
The facsimile shows that the deposition was written in black
ink in the vertical-lined account books of Tseng Kuo-bh1 tian's
Chi-tzu '4?) Battalion; on several pages there are additions
in the top margin. Tseng Kuo-fan's delations, corrections and
occasional comments or interpolations, were made in red ink.
According to a note in the facsimile, in which the margins have
been slightly extended, the size of the original pages*, is 17.3cm
by 27 cm. The characters ^  H  (Chi-tzu Battalion H.Q.) are
printed over the leading edges of the folded pages (yeh). The
deposition, as it stands, was evidently written in two account
17books, the first containing 50 yeh and the second 24 yeh.
There is no introduction, but a short postscript by Tseng Yueh-nung.
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II. LayTs Translation.
An English translation of the An-oh1 ing or the Chiu Ju T’ang
10Edition by W.T. Lay appeared in Shanghai in 1865* Since the 
translation, which is not very accurate, is of a corrupt edition, 
its value is limited.
* * *
Ever since the publication of Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s deposition for
the first time in 1864 > doubts have been expressed as to its 
19authenticity. ' We who have only the facsimile edition to judge 
by can hardly express an opinion on the authenticity of the 
deposition without first satisfying ourselves that the Taiwan 
facsimile is a genuine reproduction of what Lu Chi-i saw at Hsiang- 
t’an in 1944, since it is against this version that the most 
serious accusations of forgery have been levelled. Fortunately 
this is not difficult to do, thanks to the photographs which Lu 
Chi-i took. The fourteen of these (excluding that of the outer 
cover of the manuscript) are identical with the corresponding 
pages of the facsimile. Allowing for the parts overlooked by Lii 
Chi-i, it is equally clear that it was from the original of the 
Taiwan facsimile that Lii copied down the passages deleted by Tseng 
Kuo-fan. This is sufficient to identify beyond all doubt the 
Taiwan facsimile with the manuscript which Lii Chi-i examined in 
1944* It remains to discuss whether this manuscript was written 
by Li Hsiu-ch’eng or is a forgery.
Before the publication in 1951 of lo Erh-kang *s version of Lii 
Chi-i*s copy, doubts about the authenticity of the deposition in 
the form in which it was generally known, were justified first by 
Tseng Kuo-fan*s published statement that he had suppressed parts 
of the manuscript, and secondly by the unwillingness of his 
descendants to release the original. With the publication of Lo 
Erh-kang*s study, which claimed to be a faithful reconstruction
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of as much of the original manuscript as still existed, a new or 
at least greatly accentuated cause for suspicions appeared: the 
manifest contradiction between Li Hsiu-ch'eng’s reputation as the 
most heroic, pure and loyal of the later Taiping leaders, and the 
generally unheroic tone of the deposition now that certain passages 
had been restored to it.
At least one Chinese historian resolved this apparent contra­
diction by accusing Tseng Kuo-fan of having forged the deposition.
In an article written in 1956, M e n  Tzu-min sought to prove a case
of forgery first by a comparison of handwriting and secondly, by
20other evidence. His argument is summarized below.
(i). Handwriting. M en Tzu-min compared three documents said to
be in Li Hsiu-ch’eng's handwriting: A, the manuscript in question;
B, Li Hsiu-ch’eng*s handwritten answers, see Appendix I page 256,
21and C, his letter to Li Chao-shou. After consulting handwriting 
experts at the forensic research department of the Ministry of 
Justice, M e n  Tzu-min concluded that A and B are in the same hand, 
but that C is not. He claimed that A and B were forged as 
mutually corroborative evidence in case the court at Peking should 
demand proof of the identity of the prisoner. M en Tzu-min 
also assumed, without presenting any proof, that C, the letter to 
Li Ghao-shou, is in Li Hsiu-ch’eng*s hand, because it was written 
long before Li Hsiu-ch’eng was captured. The handwriting experts 
were however, unable to give an unqualified opinion because C is 
written in a more or less ’k ’ai-shu* (regular) calligraphic style, 
while the manuscript (A) is in a mixture of this and the ’hsing-shu’ 
(cursive) style.
(il) Other Evidence. Unlike some protagonists of the forgery 
theory, who say that Tseng Kuo-fan destroyed the real deposition and 
forged another, Men Tzu-min denied that Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote a 
deposition at all. His argument is as follows:-
a. There is a note in Tseng Kuo-fan*s diary for 29 July 1864
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(TC3/6/26) which reads ' which M e n  Tzu-min
takes to mean, Obtained the false Chung Wang1 s detailed deposition,1 
He concludes therefore that the deposition must have been completed 
before this date, although Tseng Kuo-fan, in the colophon to the 
printbd edition states that Li Hsiu-ch*eng only started writing on 
30 July (TC3/6/27).
b. The entry in Chao Lieh-wen*s diary for 3 August 1864 (TC3/7/2) 
contains the words, *.. ^  (’after the Grand Secretary
recorded his [Li Hsiu-ch * eng1 s] testimony1) M e n  Tzu-min 
interpreted this to mean that previous to that date there was no 
deposition, only Tseng Kuo-fan*s record of the interrogation.
c. Men Tzu-min argues that both the fact that Li Hsiu-ch*eng
had been wounded or tortured, and his lack of formal education would
have made it impossible for him to have written such a document,
especially at the speed Tseng Kuo-fan claimed for him, 7000
24
characters every day.
d. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was a hero and could not have written such 
ignoble words.
e. Taiping conventions, such as the use of certain abbreviated 
characters, the elevation of certain characters as a mark of respect, 
were not always observed.
f. The deposition does not give in detail accounts of the 
principal battles between the Hunan Army and Taiping units under Li 
Hsiu-ch* eng's command; but concentrates on secondary engagements or 
on the period when Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not hold high command.
g. Both Li Hung-chang and Shen Pao-chen, according to M e n  Tzu-min, 
doubted the authenticity of the deposition.
Lo Erh-kang, the leading Taiping specialist in China, has
answered Men Tzu-min and other protagonists of the forgery theory
25
in considerable detail, and seems to have entirely silenced them.
His arguments are divided into two sections, dealing with (i) form, 
that is, calligraphy, vocabulary and so on, and (il) content.
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(i). Of the fifteen surviving documents (excluding the 
deposition) emanating from Li Hsiu-ch1 eng, only one, Lo Erh-kang 
argues, is known for certain to he in Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1 s own 
handwriting# This is the page entitled 1 Chung ¥ang*s handwritten
2answers* in the manuscript known as 1 Chung Wang ta-tz *u shou chuan*
which came to light in 1937 at a literary exhibition at Su-chou.
It had been kept by P*ang Chi-yun, one of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s
interrogators, and by his descendants until that time; it is now
in a museum in Shanghai# It consists of seven sheets comprising
the questions put to Li Hsiu-ch*eng and his answers. The first
page is in Tseng Kuo-fan* s handwriting, the second is * Chung Wang's
handwritten answers.* These are replies written by Li Hsiu-ch*eng
to two specific questions about the names of two Taiping leaders
when the interrogators had difficulty in -understanding his Kwangsi 
27dialect. There are no grounds for supposing that this is a
forgery. We know from other sources that P’ang Chi-yun and Li
Hung-chii were appointed by Tseng Kuo-fan to interrogate Li Hsiu- 
28ch*eng, and that Tseng prepared some questions to ask him.
The first sheet is recognisably in Tseng Kuo-fan*s handwriting. 
Moreover, the authenticity of the manuscript is born out by the
fact that certain information given in it by Li Hsiu-ch*eng is
included in Tseng Kuo-fan*s memorial of TC3/7/7*^ In addition, 
as Lo Erh-kang points out, had the manuscript been forged, the 
contents would have been made to serve the interests of the forgers, 
instead of which certain of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s answers contradict 
what Tseng Kuo-fan told the court. For instance, when Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng was asked, *How many people remained in the capital when it 
was taken?* he replied that there were but no more than
10.000 rebel troops# But Tseng Kuo-fan had told the court that
30100.000 had been killed by his troops in Nanking.
Having established the authenticity of this document, Lo Erh- 
kang then compared the handwriting with that of the photographs of
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the Hsiang-t'an manuscript. In spite of the brevity* of the first 
document it is quite clear that they are both in the same hand.
Lo Erh-kang strengthens his case against the forgery theory by 
pointing out that several expressions in dialect which appear in 
the deposition would only be known to someone from Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s 
particular part of Kwangsi. We may well take Lo's word for this 
since he is himself a native of Kuei-hsien in Kwangsi and speaks 
the same dialect as Li Hsiu-ch'eng did, that of the Hs un-chou, 
Wu-chou District.
(il) On the question of content Lo Erh-kang is on much more 
shaky ground, as can be seen by his later intellectual acrobatics 
on this subject. In brief, he argues that the deposition was 
obviously written by a loyal and heroic Taiping leader, who spoke 
always of *us' and 'our state', who refuted enemy calumnies and 
usually observed Taiping literary conventions. If he did not 
always do so, it was because he was writing under difficult 
conditions. Lo Erh-kang's attempt to resolve the fundamental 
contradiction - between an heroic life and an ignoble testament - 
is dealt with at length in Chapter VII*
Lo Erh-kang points out that had the deposition been a forgery,
Tseng Kuo-fan would not have needed to change or falsify what was
allegedly Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s account of certain events, particularly
the account of his own capture, and the last of the 'ten errors'
31which led to the failure of the Rebellion.
Like M e n  Tzu-min, Lo Erh-kang uses Li Hsiu-ch' eng' s letter to 
Li Chao-shou as corroborative proof. He claims that the handwriting 
of this document, though different from that of the deposition, 
which is in a more flowing style, Is nevertheless of the same person. 
In this he rebuts in considerable detail, and in my opinion convinc­
ingly, the judgement of the handwriting experts consulted by Men.
He accounts for the difference in handwriting by emphasizing the 
very different circumstances in which the two documents were written,
34
one in comfort and confidence, the other in discomfort and
32mental distress. This too would account for the fact that
Taiping conventions are not always observed. He compares the style
of the two documents, especially the frequent occurrence in both
of reduplicated characters (lit i'M ) such as ^  1, ’A  Jk ’,' A, A. ».
There are 66 such examples in the deposition and 6 in the short
letter to hi Chao-shou. A similarity can also be found in the
in the rather uncertain use in both documents of wen-yen particles.
Lo Erh-kang argues that the letter could not have been written by
a clerk because it reflects too faithfully the feelings of Li Hsiu-
ch1 eng about the defection of a ’favourite commander.1
In answer to Men Tzu-min*s second point Lo Erh-kang shows that
the notes in Tseng Kuo-fan*s diary at the end of a day’s entry are
in order to remin him to do something. ^  ’ is imperative,
’[Remember to] obtain Li Hsiu-ch*eng’s deposition.’ He similarly
challenges M e n  Tzu-min* s interpretation of the note in Chao Lieh-
wen's diary, which like that of TC3/7/21,^ does refer to the
Chung Wang ta-tz*u shou-chuan, the record of the interrogation, but
my no means proves that the deposition itself did not exist.
Li Hsiu-ch’eng was not so seriously injured by torture, Lo Erh-
kang argues, to prevent him from having a long conversation with
34Chao Lieh-wen on the day after his capture. Hor are there any
grounds for supposing that Li Hsiu-ch’eng, who had received three
years* schooling, was incapable, after years of studying on his own,
35of writing such a document as the deposition. ^
Lo Erh-kang answers Men Tzu-min*s points (d), (f) and to a 
certain extent (e), by formulating the theory that Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
had a 'political motive’ in writing the deposition and that these 
apparent lapses were deliberate. This theory is discussed in 
Chapter VII.
Against M e n  Tzu-min’s final point (g), Lo Erh-kang shows that 
when Li Hung-chang in his letter of TC3/9/6 ^  to Tseng Kuo-ch’uan 
wrote that the deposition was not ' (a true record of the
35
facts), he was referring to Li Hsiu-ch1 eng fs remark in the
deposition that Li Hung-chang used the rich revenue from the
37Customs to hire foreigners to fight the Taipings. Li Hung-
chang's remark was intended to show Tseng Kuo-ch’uan, who was
asking for money, that he did not have an inexhaustible source
of funds, whatever Li Hsiu-ch’eng might say. As to Shen Pao-
chen, there is no evidence that he doubted the authenticity of
the deposition. We only know that he showed a copy of it to Hung
Jen-kan, who was his prisoner, and that Hung wrote a criticism 
38of it. This was sent to the Grand Council but unfortunately 
it has never come to light.
The publication of the Taiwan facsimile will certainly put 
an end to whatever doubts remain about the authenticity of the 
deposition. It is unthinkable that Tseng Kuo-fan, Tseng Kuo- 
ch’uan or anyone else should have gone to all the trouble to 
forge a document of over 37*000 characters, full of realistic 
literary mistakes, of expressions in authentic Kwangsi dialect, 
and of detailed inside accounts of battles; that they should have 
taken the trouble to correct and falsify their own forgery, only 
to leave it secreted in their family archives for almost a 
hundred years - unless of course it was a very clumsy forgery, 
and that it certainly is not.
There is still a case however, though not a strong one, for 
saying that even now we do not have a reproduction of the complete 
original manuscript, and that part of it has been destroyed.
There are two grounds for this suspicion. First, the manuscript as 
we know it, both from the facsimile and from Lu Chi-i’s copy, 
breaks off in the middle of a sentence, but at the end of a page.
It. can reasonably be assumed that Li Hsiu-ch’eng had written more, 
since it is unlikely that he would happen to have been disturbed 
at the end of a page. But there is nothing to indicate that a great 
deal is missing at the end; it would have been quite possible to
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round off the sentence with four characters. Nor is there any 
reason to suppose that Li Hsiu-ch*eng had anything more to say; 
on the contrary, he was already repeating himself. It seems 
likely that there were only a few characters or a few lines on 
the final page, and that this became detached and lost. The 
photography of the front cover reproduced in the facsimile shows 
the manuscript to have been much handled.
The second reason for supposing that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written 
more than appeared in the Hsiang-t'an manuscript was that there were 
widely differing estimates of the number of characters he wrote:
(i) In the colophon to the printed edition Tseng Kuo-fan stated 
that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had started to write on TC3/6/27 and finished 
on TC3/7/6, the day of his execution; ^  that is to say he had 
written for eight or nine days. At the same time Tseng Kuo-fan 
mentioned that Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote at the rate of J,000 a day, 
which gives us a total of between 56,000 and 63,000 characters.
(ii) At the end of the 50th yeh (double page) of the manuscript 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that he had already written 37,000 or 38*000 
characters. He had come to the end of the first account book and 
now asked for more paper and a new brush. ^  After this point 
there are 24 yeh before the end of the facsimile.
(iii) Tseng Kuo-fan in his diary wrote that the deposition 
consisted of about 40,000 characters.^
(iv) In a letter to his son Chi-tse, Tseng Kuo-fan wrote that
42it contained 'as many as 50,000 characters'.
(v) Tseng Kuo-fan in letters to P'eng Yun-ch'in, Ch'iao Ho-
chai, Yang Hou-an, ^  and to Shen Yu-tan (Shen Pao-chen)^ gave
30,000 + ) characters as the figure.
(vi) Chao Lieh-wen in his diary wrote that the deposition
45contained 50-60,000 characters.
It can be seen that a great deal of confusion existed. Two
more figures must now be thrown in: the Taiwan facsimile in fact
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contains 36*244 characters and the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition Edition 
contains 27,810 characters. These are the only figures of which X 
can be absolutely sure, having counted them; the others are all 
very vague.
To make matters worse, Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in his diary for 
TC3/7/6 (7 August 1864):
I have been reading Li Hsiu-chfeng1 s deposition; there 
are about 40,000 characters and I have been editing it 
character by character. Today X edited only 20,000 + 
characters. The previous 8 pages I already edited yesterday, 
the following 10 pages remain to be edited.
In the absence of any other mention in the diary of editing the 
deposition, this might seem to imply that Tseng Kuo-fan was 
referring to the whole manuscript. This would therefore consist 
8 yeh, plus about 20,000 characters (at an average of 242 
characters per page this would be about 41 yeh), plus the final 
10 yeh - a total of 59 yeh. If we subtract the first 8 yeh 
and the last 10 yeh from the total of 74 yeh in the facsimile, 
we are left with 56 yeh. These 56 yeh contain a total of 27,595 
characters, which could still, at a pinch, be called *20,000 + 
characters1.
An additional complication is that at the end of page 62 
(yeh 51) Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in red ink in the margin ^  9 M  1 
('read on the 4th Day'); but there is no mention in his diary for 
that day (TC3/7/4) or in his entry of TC3/7/6 quoted above of his 
having read any of the deposition oh TC3/7/4. Although this is 
rather curious, it cannot be taken as evidence of further 
chicanery.
On three different pages in the deposition Li Hsiu-chfeng 
himself noted the number of characters he thought he had written 
to date. On page 62 (yeh 31) ke wrote * “■* M ?y' '
('to this point a total of 18,000'). In fact the total to this
38
point in the facsimile is 16,030. On page 80 (yeh 40) he 
wrote the figure.28,500, though in the facsimile the count to 
this point is 20,260* Li Hsiu-ch' eng*s last record is on page 
100 (yeh 50), at the end of the first account hook, he stated 
that he had written 37,000 or 38,000 characters. The count to 
this point in the facsimile is 25,156.
In spite of the considerable discrepancy between Li Hsiu-ch'eng’s
figures and my count of the facsimile, this is by no means a proof
that parts of the manuscript were destroyed. The key to the
mystery may be in the often repeated statement that Li Hsiu-ch’eng
47wrote at a speed of 7>000 characters a day. It seems highly 
unlikely that in the situation in which he found himself Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng would have counted his output. The estimate, whether his 
own or his captors ’, was probably based on the approximate number 
of characters he wrote on the first day. If this is the case, 
when he arrived at page 100 (yeh 50) after writing for five or six 
days, he obtained the figure of 37-58,000 by assuming that he had 
been writing 7,000 a day. Chao Lieh-wen's estimate of 50,000 
to 60,000 may have been based on the same assumption. Lo Erh-kang 
argues that Chao Lieh-wen must have been telling the truth because 
his diary was not intended for publication and he had nothing to 
hide. This cannot hold water, because if there had been any 
serious question of concealing the original number of characters, 
Tseng Kuo-fan would not have publicly announced in the printed 
edition a figure greatly in excess of what he was publishing.
An entirely different set of figures appears in the margin
48on various pages of the manuscript, and on the cover. These are 
written in Chinese commercial figures (&§ ). They clearly refer
to the number of characters in the text, though it is very difficult 
to find any correspondence between them because it is not obvious 
where each count begins and ends. Sometimes it is possible to 
guess what they mean; for instance, on page 42 (yeh 21) there is
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the figure 3 >555* Counting back from there one arrives at the
end of page 29 (yeh 15)> a total of 3>595 characters; but there
is no apparent reason why this section should be counted and not
others. On the outer cover there is the figure 5*450, which may have
something to do with the number of characters Tseng Kuo-fan deleted,
475?594 by my count. If this is so, then these figures were not 
written by Li Hsiu-ch*eng himself, but by some member of Tseng 
Kuo-fan*s staff, which I think is more likely.
It remains to examine the deposition to find out whether there 
is any internal evidence that parts are still missing. I have 
only been able to find one place where there is such a possibility. 
This is after the end of page 68 (yeh 34)* The grounds for 
suspicion are: (i) pages 69 and 70 (yeh 35) were entirely and 
unaccountably missed by Lii Chi-i when he was copying out the parts 
cut by Tseng Kuo-fan, and they do not appear in the printed edition. 
Had these pages not been marked in red ink such an omission would 
have been understandable, but in fact every line is marked at the 
beginning and the end with a bold brush-stroke in red, and there 
are several deletions in the middle of lines. It might be thought 
that the fact that Tseng Kuo-fan seems to have marked each line for 
deletion and then to have crossed out his deletion, could be a
reason for Lii Chi-i having passed them over. But it is difficult
*
to believe that his attention would not, on the contrary, have been 
attracted to this passage, if only to find out why Tseng Kuo-fan 
should have changed his mind about deleting it. (ii) It is not 
impossible that the two final characters on page 68 (yeh 34) were 
added by another hand than Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s in order to round off 
the page. A slight difference in the density of the ink can be 
detected. (See pages 191 and 192 ). If there is a possibility that 
this yeh was missing when Lii Chi-i examined the manuscript, then 
it is also possible that more than one page was missing. (The pages 
are numbered until page 80 (yeh 40) in Chinese commercial numerals,
but not necessarily in Li Hsiu-chf eng1 s hand, and not necessarily 
done at the time). In spite of this I think that it is unlikely 
that anything is missing here, no break in continuity can be 
detected and no hint of a subject which could have been particularly 
embarrassing to anyone.
We must conclude therefore that in the Taiwan facsimile we 
have an accurate reproduction of the original manuscript, from 
which there do not seem to be any substantial or significant 
omissions.
IV. TSENG KUO-FAN AND LI HSIU-CH’ENG: BACKGROUND.
If the document which Li Hsiu-ch’eng wrote in captivity is
a 'deposition1, in the sense of a testimony presented to a
judicial authority, then Tseng Kuo-fan*s action in revising it
might be called ’falsification of evidence.*^ However, Li Hsiu-
ch* eng* s fate did not depend on this testimony; his guilt was
not in question, and in any case, he had already been executed
before the revision of the deposition was completed. Tseng Kuo-
fan did not tamper with the deposition in order to change the
judicial verdict on Li Hsiu-ch’eng; he was concerned primarily
with his own interests, and spught to win the approbation and
avoid the censure of a suspicious court.
In order to understand Tseng Kuo-fan's actions it is necessary
to examine " ■ some of the considerations which governed his
attitude to Li Hsiu-ch'eng and his deposition.
In 1852 Tseng Kuo-fan, a junior Vice-President of the Board
of Ceremonies, was at home in Hsiang-hsiang, Hunan, observing
the customary period of mourning for his mother, when he received
2
an imperial order to organize a militia force in his province.
This was to be done by uniting and reorganizing two existing 
militia groups, the Ch’u Yung (ft it ) under Chiang Chung-yuan, 
and the Hsiang Yung (M % ) under Lo Tse-nan.^
The difficulties which Tseng Kuo-fan encountered in getting his 
army started reflected the hesitations and ambiguous attitude of the 
Ch’ing court. The Manchu rulers were anxious to harness the 
energies of the gentry to combat a rebellion which they were 
incapable of putting down by themselves; but they were not 
unconscious of the danger of allowing the existence of a substantial 
armed force which did not fit into the traditional military 
establishment. Thus, when Tseng Kuo-fan started to organize the 
Hunan Army, all he had was an imperial warrant; he had no say in
42
the civil administration of the province and no access to
provincial revenue. In spite of this he was able to form an
army which, in comparison with the regular banner forces, was
a model of organization, discipline and efficiency. He appealed
to strong local patriotism' rather than to national feeling,
to the idea of defending traditional Confucian values against
an odious barbarian heterodoxy rather than to loyalty to the
Manchu dynasty. All this \^ ould have been fruitless if he had not,
at the same time, been determined to provide his soldiers with
higher pay and better conditions than those of their unfortunate
comrades in the banner regiments.
Ho one could attempt the combination of several semi-private
militia units without incurring the unpopularity of many local
officials and gentry. In addition, in achieving his first notable
victory, he aroused the apprehensive suspicions of the court. On
14 October 1854 the city of Wu-ch'ang, which had been taken by the
Taipings during the summer, was recaptured by the Hunan Army as
4
the climax to its first major campaign. When this news was 
reported to the Emperor he is said to have remarked, 'Who would 
have thought that a scholar like Tseng Kuo-fan could have 
achieved such extraordinary merit!' To which the Grand Secretary
5
Ch'i Chtin-tsao replied, 'Tseng Kuo-fan, a shih-lang on leave,
is no more than a commoner. A commoner in his village makes a
ball to arms and musters more than ten thousand men: I fear that
this is not a happy event for our State.' After this the Emperor
6is said to have remained for a long time gloomy and troubled.
In spite of Tseng Kuo-fan's power and influence as the commander 
of a large army and a flotilla of several hundred war-boats, the 
mistrust of the court left him without a commensurate official 
position. As a result he had constant difficulty in finding 
money and supplies for his army, and this prevented its expansion. 
But the army was much too valuable to be dispensed with, so until
I860 the court continued to urge Tseng Kuo-fan on to greater 
efforts, hut kept the large and somewhat inert force of regulars 
(the Chiang-nan H.Q.) besieging Nanking, ready to reap the 
spoils and the glory if the Hunan Army should succeed in cutting 
the supply arteries of the rebel capital. But in I860 the Chiang- 
nan H.Q. was completely destroyed and the Taipings swept into
ty
southeast Kiangsu and Chekiang. Tso Tsung-t*ang openly expressed 
satisfaction at the removal from the scene of a force which was 
itself incapable of dealing with the rebellion and yet, by its
8mere existence, prevented its replacement by forces which could.
The way was left open for Tseng Kuo-fan. Only then was his
immense military power as commander of the most formidable
fighting force in the empire matched by equivalent administrative
power; he was appointed Governor-General of Liang-chiang and
Imperial Commissioner for the suppression of the rebellion in
south China. Already he had been permitted to recruit his army,
collect funds to support it and appoint his own staff; now,
breaking the long-standing rule that an official should not
serve in his own province, he was promoted to a position of
supreme^ regional power, and the court was obliged to turn a blind
eye to his fiscal vagaries. He immediately set about consolidating
his position by removing from office high officials who had
9already, or were likely in the future, to oppose him.
He had perhaps accepted his new powers with mixed feelings,
but the forboding he felt was probably outweighed by the prospect
of great successes.^ Although his military fortunes changed
for the better towards the end of 1861, particularly with the
11recovery of the key city of An-ch'ing, he ended the year in a
spirit of some anxiety and apprehension. He owed his position
as Governor-General of Liang-chiang to the intervention of Su-
shun, an imperial clansman who held several important posts and
12had the ear of the Hsien Feng Emperor in his declining years.
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In I860, when the Governor-General of Liang-chiang (Ho Kuei-
ch1 ing) was cashiered after he had abandoned the town of Chf ang-
13chou to the Taipings without a fight, Su-£hun had urged the
appointment of Tseng Kuo-fan to the vacant post in preference
to Hu Lin-i.^ But after the death of the Hsien Feng Emperor,
Su-shun, as principal regent to the new sovereign, fell victim
on 8 October 1861 to the coup-d'etat organized by the two
15Empresses Dowager and Prince Kung.  ^ Tseng Kuo-fan was
naturally worried at this rapid turn of events and feared that
deprived of his high backing, his enemies would be able to bring
about his downfall. On 25 December 1861 (HFll/ll/24) he wrote
to his brothers
Since the Tenth Month the new government in the
capital has brought about great changes. The Empresses
Dowager listen to reports on state affairs from behind
screens and everywhere people are apprehensive. I have
received in succession fourteen secret documents and
edicts. My responsibilities are too great, my power and
position too exhalted and my fame too lofty. It is
dreadful and alarming.
The following year on 25 August (TCl/7/28) Tseng Kuo-fan once
more expressed in a letter to his brothers the apprehension he
17felt felt even though victory seemed to be in sight:
To judge from the peoples' desire for order and the
disunity amongst the rebels, it would seem that there is
an opportunity for recovering Ghin-ling [Hanking]. But
from ancient times, those who have achieved great merit
18and honour, apart from Prince Kuo of Een-yang, have had 
as well, many ups and downs, many difficulties. One 
cannot say that it is easy. You and I should tread very 
carefully, as if we were on the edge of a precipice, and 
hope that we may avoid calamity.
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In October he attempted to resign on the grounds that his
19army was decimated by the plague. The following year on
15 June (TC2/4/27) he wrote to Tseng Kuo-ch'iian that he had
been most struck by the latter*s remark that Ho make a name
for oneself in troubled times is most difficult,* and informed
him that on the same day he had again asked the court to
relieve him either of his govemor-generalship or of his
20position as Imperial Commissioner. 'If you and I are careful,*
he continued, !and take the first opportunity to withdraw and
21retire from office, may we not avoid calamity?1
In 1864, about two months before the Taiping capital fell,
Tseng Kuo-fan wrote to Li Hung-chang complaining of the
difficulties of his command and the trouble he had in raising 
22funds:
For three thousand li along the Yangtse there is no boat 
which does not fly my flag, so that people elsewhere 
think that I have too much military power; they think 
that the likin of four provinces comes to me in an 
uninterrupted flow, that armies everywhere obey my command. 
Their suspicions are certainly not unfounded, but no one 
can be aware of the weakness of our army and the deficiency 
of our funds. As soon as I have completed my work I 
intend to petition at once to hand in my seals as Governor- 
General and Imperial Commissioner. I will not venture to 
stand aside from affairs, but will command some ten thousand 
troops and only take charge of one front, on the scale of 
eight or nine years ago. Perhaps in this way I may avoid 
disaster.
Chao Lieh-wen, who saw the draft of this letter to Li Hung-chang, 
commented upon it in his diary. Tseng Kuo-fan, he wrote, had had 
more than his share of bad luck, of slander and suspicion in the 
seven or eight years after organizing his army. Only after the 
setback at Chiang-nan [the destruction of the Chiang-nan H.Q. in
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I860], in a difficult and dangerous period, was he given proper
command, and only then because the court could find no one else.
After his successes in Anhwei there were people at court and
elsewhere who wanted to oppose him, but they dared not because
23of his achievements.
In viev/ of these anxieties, Tseng Kuo-fan1 s joy cannot have
been entirely free from apprehension when the Taiping capital
fell to Tseng Kuo-ch'iian's army in July 1864. His previous
fears that his power might shake the throne cannot have been laid
to rest by the prestigious success of recovering the rebel
stronghold. He realized that once the rebellion was suppressed
the court might consider him more of a liability than an asset
and dispose of him for being too successful, especially now that
he was not the only powerful regional commander. He was appreciative
24of his brother*s triumph which had brought fame to both of them,
but seems to have lacked confidence in Tseng Kuo-ch'iian's ability
to avoid*mistakes which might transform jealousy into accusation.
His hasty departure for Hanking as soon as he received news of
25its recapture was probably connected with this. If it was,
he must have quickly found his worst fears confirmed.
After sixteen consecutive days of bitter attacks on the city,
Tseng Kuo-ch'iian's army was in a sorry state; the haggard faces
26of the commanders were almost unrecognisable; disease was rife,
pay was in arrears and everyone was asking for leave. After the
city wall was breached at about noon on 19 July 1864, the whole of
the besieging force engaged in unrestrained looting, as the result
of which, and aided by the adoption of Ch*ing army uniform,^
several hundred Taipings, including the two most *wanted* rebels
in the country, broke out of the same breach in the city wall by
28which Tseng Kuo-ch'iian's soldiers had entered. Instead of 
remaining in the city where fighting was still going, Tseng Kuo- 
ch'iian had returned to his camp and gone to bed 'at the fourth
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watch1 [between 1 a.in, and 3 a.m.], in spite of being urged by
Chao Lieh-wen to go and restore order in the city. In the
meantime, the memorial announcing the victory had been despatched
to Peking reporting that the rebels had been entirely wiped out.
But during the night Tseng Kuo-ch'iian had to be woken up to be
told the news that about three hundred Taiping cavalry and some
thousand infantry had broken out of the city; later he was
reprimanded in a 'very severe' secret letter (t'ing-chi) for his
return to camp which had been incautiously mentioned in the 
29memorial.
In his memorial of TC3/6/23 (26 July 1863?Tseng Kuo-fan
reported that according to captured rebels:
...the rebel chief Iiung Hsiu-chfiian did in fact poison
himself in the Fifth Month of this year during the fierce
siege by the government troops, and was buried in the
courtyard of the rebel palace. The 'Young Sovereign' Hung 
31Fu-chen succeeded him, and he, after the city was
breached, filled his palace with firewood and burned
himself to death. As soon as the fire in the rebel
palace has died down the body of Hung Hsiu-ch'iian should
be dug up, and the suicide by burning [of the Young
Sovereign] verified.
Once Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been captured it was found that this
story was not true, since Li himself had escorted the Young
32Sovereign out of the city. Perhaps in order to protect him,
Li Hsiu-ch'eng emphasized to his captors that the boy did not
know how to ride, which was probably quite true, aiid that he must
33certainly have perished in the general confusion. Tseng Kuo- 
fan seems to have been inclined to believe this, perhaps because 
if it were true it would diminish the gravity of his offence in 
having passed on an unreliable report.
The matter was obviously a source of considerable embarrassment
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to Tseng Kuo-fan. The importance which the court attached to
the capture of the Young Sovereign is shown by the volley of
edicts full of threats and warnings which came from Peking as
34soon as news arrived that he had got away. On 10 August
(TC3/7/9) Tseng Kuo-fan heard reports that a group of several
hundred rebels, including the Young Sovereign, who had escaped
from Hanking, had arrived in Kuang-te in southern Anhwei. ^
By this time the editing of Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1 s deposition was
already completed, so the fate of the Young Sovereign had no
direct bearing on Tseng Kuo-fan!s treatment of the document; but
the fact that his first report about the young rebel king had
been proved wrong did Tseng Kuo-fan no good, and was subsequently
36used against him by his enemies.
Of more immediate concern to Tseng Kuo-fan on his arrival at
Hanking must have been the looting of the rebel capital by his
army. Prom the watch-tower at Yu-hua-t’ai Li Hsiu-ch1 eng*s
37magnificent palace had long been visible to the besiegers, ' 
who must often have looked down into the vast city in covetous 
anticipation of rich rewards after months of hardship, especially 
as their pay was often several months in arrears. When the time 
came everyone in the camp seized the opportunity. In the breakdown 
of discipline which followed the breaching of Hanking Li Hsiu- 
ch’eng and his companions were not the only Taipings to get away; 
others were able to make their escape with less risk as long as 
they were able-bodied; the rest were less fortunate.
After the city was breached, wrote Chao Lieh-wen, I 
estimate that apart from the vigorous rebels who were 
killed in the fighting, very few others were killed. Most 
of them carried stuff out of the city for the soldiers, or 
helped them find. . buried treasure, after which they were 
let go. I do not know how many old [Liang-] Kuang rebels 
got away over the wall on all sides; but local people who 
were weak or old and could not serve as porters, or who had
4 9
no treasure to dig up, were all killed. Nine out of ten
of the bodies of those killed in the streets were of old
people, but children of under two or three were also cut
down for fun. Amongst those crawling on all fours in the
streets there was not a single woman of under forty. None
of the old were without wounds, some with more than ten,
some with dozens of wounds; cries and wailing could be
heard on all sides. It was enough to make one’s hair stand
on end. The Governor [Tseng Kuo-ch’uan] made a proclamation
throughout the city that innocent people were not to be
killed or women carried off. But the various commanders...
[he lists them] were only interested in pillage themselves
58and completely disregarded the order...
T*ien Wang’s palace must have been regarded as the
richest plum for looters. It was virtually deserted when first
occupied by Hunan Army troops under Chu Hung-chang, who sealed
the treasury and posted two battalions to guard it until the
59arrival of Tseng Kuo-ch'uan. Later, by some means or other, 
the Fukien Infantry General Hsiao Fu-ssu managed to get control 
of the palace, and after removing a great quantity of gold and 
silver, set alight to the buildings ’in order to cover his 
traces.1^
Nothing demoralises an army like pillage. Though discipline
had been relaxed deliberately so that the troops could reward
themselves, it was far from easy to restore. In this wild frenzy
of looting it was inevitable that some got more than others. Tseng
Kuo-ch'uan himself, according to Kuo-fan, 'did not obtain very
much,'41 nevertheless, on his return to Hunan he was ahle to
42purchase 100 ch’ing, about 1,500 acres, of land. The jealousies
which resulted, exacerbated by charges of favouritism in
promotions, led to endless trouble and made it impossible to keep
45the looting a secret. The discontent of the soldiers against
50
their officers was expressed in posters which soon appeared
bearing the words * their hat-buttons are red but their hearts
are black; within a few months Ke Lao Hui broadsheets were
45seen in the city.
After being taken prisoner Li Hsiu-ch'eng had been first
brought to the camp of Hsiao Fu-ssu who, according to Chao
Lieh-\tfen, had been so anxious to get his hands on the Chung
Wang's regalia, that he persecuted the local people who had
brought him in. It has been suggested that Tseng Kuo-ch'tian
tortured Li Hsiu-ch'eng in order to get information from him
about secret caches of treasure in the city. This may be so,
though there seems to be no evidence to support the assertion.
But assuming that Chao Lieh-wen* s version of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's
capture is accurate, it would seem bery probable that if Hsiao
Fu-ssu \\ras ready to go to such lengths to get hold of Li Hsiu-
chfeng*s regalia, how much more would he have been eager to get
even richer information before handing the prisoner over to his
superiors? The interest of the latter in this question is bom
out by the record of Li Hsiu-ch1 eng * s interrogation at the hands
of Tseng Kuo-fanfs secretaries. One of the questions which he
was asked was, 'Can you indicate some places in the city where
47gold and silver is hidden?1 This question was crossed out in 
the manuscript of the record of the interrogation, either by 
P'ang Chi-yun himself or by his descendants, in preparation for 
its publication. Hor is Li Hsiu-ch * eng * s answer recorded in this 
document, though in his memorial of TC3/7/7 (8 August 1864)
Tseng Kuo-fan quotes Li Hsiu-ch'eng as authority for his claim
48that there was no treasure in the Taiping capital:
In the old days there was such a thing as the 'sacred 
store1 M  ], but in fact it was the private treasury of 
Hung Hsiu-ch'uan and not that of the rebel capital.
Officials and soldiers of the rebel state had no salaries
and the king's eldest brother and his second brother
used extortionate means to obtain money and grain from the
various departments. There was slightly more treasure
in Su-chou than in Chin-ling, but there was no public
treasury. The treasure and goods distributed by Li Hsiu-
ch' eng alone were divided amongst his subordinates, that
is why their relations were harmonious. Otherwise each
had his own private treasury and the state was poor.
In the preceeding section of the same memorial Tseng Kuo-fan
protests too much about the surprising absence of treasure
in the Taiping capital, which had long been reported to contain
'a sea of gold and silver.' What there was had all been
destroyed because 'after the city was taken on the 16th Lay
[TC3/6/16], killing went on for three days and there was no time
to pay attention to other things, so the rebel palaces and
49offices were reduced to ashes.'  ^ This is contradicted by the
account of Chu Hung-chang, cited above, and by the diary of
Chao Lieh-wen, which notes that the palaces of Hung Hsiu-ch*uan
and Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not begin to burn until twenty-four hours
50after the wall of the capital was breached.
Tseng Kuo-fan did not of course attempt to convince the
court that there was nothing at all in the city, but he gave a
warning against pursuing enquiries too far by emphasising the
51bad morale in the army and the serious shortage of funds. The
52court was obliged to let the matter rest.
Although the stories of looting may well have been exaggerated 
by jealous trouble-makers, there is ample evidence of a serious 
breakdown of discipline which deprived the court of the 
legitimate spoils of war, and further undermined the morale of 
the Hunan Army, reflecting discredit upon its commanders. So 
serious indeed was the situation that Tseng Kuo-fan took 
immediate steps to disband the army.
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I have decided to cut the army by half and leave only 
twenty thousand men or so, because there are no funds.
But for those disbanded there is nothing to pay their 
wages with and they cannot therefore be sent off at 
once; for those who remain there are no funds for
*
campaigning and therefore they cannot be sent immediately 
into action elsewhere... ?
On the credit side there was: first, the fact that the rebel
capital had after all been taken, though the merit of this
victory was somewhat diminished by the length of time it had
needed and the poor returns for the court in terms of material
benefit; secondly, the most famous of the Taiping generals, and
after the death of Hung Hsiu-ch1uan, the most dangerous of the
rebel leaders had been taken prisoner. This second achievement
took on a new importance for the Tseng brothers now that the
chaos following the breaching of the city had left them so
vulnerable to accusation and blame. Ghao Lieh-wen noted this
point in his diary. After expressing his disapproval of Tseng
Kuo-fan *s indulgence towards his officers which had led to the
general looting and *the escape of a great number of wild beasts
from the cage,1 Chao Lieh-wen went on,
Fortunately the Governor [Tseng Kuo-ch*uan] had heaven!s
own luck: only the fact that local people succeeded in
capturing the rebel chief Chung [W§n&] enabled him to get
away with it [literally, to hand in his answers and leave
the examination hall], otherwise the affair would not only
have ended without rewards, but blame would have been 
54inevitable.'
It was important for the Tseng brothers that this strong card 
be played properly. It was vital in the first place that there 
should be no doubt about the identity of the prisoner. For his 
captors to be sure that he was Li Hsiu-ch*eng was one thing, but
the court was evidently not prepared to take their word for it 
without making independent enquiries. Hot long after the some­
what sudden execution of Li Hsiu-ch'eng therefore, in the 
words of Chao Lieh-wen,
The Manchu General Fu-ming-ah arrived here [Nanking] a 
few days ago on the pretext of inspecting the banner 
garrison, but in fact he had received a letter from 
Seng Wang [Seng-ko-lin-ch'in] ordering him to make 
enquiries as to the authenticity of the rebel chief 
Chung [Wang], and about the state of affairs in the city... 
Whoever he encountered he would ask whether the so-called 
Chung Wang was genuine or not. Fortunately this man. had 
been kept alive for more than two weeks and the Grand 
Secretary had recorded his verbal testimony - not things 
which would have been easy to fabricate; moreover, he had 
been seen both by barbarians and by visitors from different 
parts, who all seemed agreed. If he had been killed on 
the same day [as he was taken], and his mutilated body 
displayed to public view, the matter would not have been
C r
cleared up.
Thus more was involved in deciding the fate of Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
and his deposition than mere considerations of the proper 
punishment for a rebel chief and the conventional presentation 
of his evidence.
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7. TSENG KUO-EAH AMD THE FATE OF LI HSIU-CH'ENG
Tseng Kuo-fan received the news of Li Hsiu-ch'eng* s 
capture at An-ch'ing on 26 July (TC3/6/23)^ and in the 
memorial which he wrote on the same dqy he asked whether 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Hung Jen-ta, who had also been taken 
prisoner, should be presented as captives or not. At the end 
of the memorial he stated that he was then about to leave for 
Nanking (he embarked the same evening and left in the morning) 
and on arriving there would make investigations and submit his
own proposal as to whether they should be sent to Peking or
2not.
He arrived at Nanking in the morning of 28 July and briefly
interrogated Li Hsiu-ch'eng in the afternoon. The following
day he wrote to his son Chi-tse in An-ch'ing saying that he
had questioned Li Hsiu-ch'eng and had decided that he should
4be executed at Nanking. This seems to imply that his 
interview with Li Hsiu-ch'eng was the most important factor 
in influencing his decision, though he must surely have 
discussed the matter with his brother. Unfortunately nothing 
at all is known of what passed between Li Hsiu-ch'eng and 
Tseng Kuo-fan on this occasion. But however the decision was 
arrived at Tseng Kuo-fan did not make any proposal to the 
court as he had promised; nor did he have Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
executed immediately. The reasons for the delay are not 
difficult to discern.
First, there was the necessity of forstalling a possible 
accusation that some captive Taiping had been persuaded to pose 
as Li Hsiu-ch'eng in order to bring glory to his captors. This 
was done by putting him on public exhibition where he could be 
seen by as many independent witnesses as possible. The 
subsequent visit of the Tartar General Fu-ming-ah showed how 
wise this precaution had been. Secondly, since they went to
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considerable trouble to edit and eventually publish the
deposition, one must assume that Li Hsiu-ch*eng1s captors
thought it worth waiting for, not least as additional proof
5of their prisoner’s identity. Thirdly, although Tseng Kuo-
fan told his son and possibly others of his intention to
execute Li Hsiu-ch*eng at Hanking, this cannot be taken to
mean that he intended to ignore entirely the orders of the
court. There is evidence that he hesitated and delayed before
taking the final step. In the evening of 3 August Tseng Kuo-
fan told Chao Lieh-wen that he proposed executing Li on the
spot and asked his opinion. Chao Lieh-wen* s reply was that
since the prisoner had already been in their hands for more
than ten days, during which time he had been seen by many
people, no one was likely to doubt his identity, in addition
*this rebel is exceedingly cunning and it is not convenient
that he should enter the capital. My opinion agreed with
that of the Grand Secretary. *
It is reasonable to assume that the matter was then
decided, since on 5 August the memorial announcing Li Hsiu-
ch* eng*s execution was already drafted, two days before the 
7event. But on the following day Tseng Kuo-fan had a final
interview with Li Hsiu-ch*eng. Again we know hardly anything
of what was said, but according to Chao Lieh-wen*s account,
Tseng Kuo-fan told Li Hsiu-ch*eng that his fate was not yet
decided and that he was awaiting the edict. Then, with some
ambiguity, he said that he had hesitated for days about this
and that he would inform him as soon as a decision had been 
0
reached. Perhaps this was intentionally ambiguous: if the
court’s decision did not arrive the decision was Tseng Kuo-
fan* s. The following day an official was sent to tell Li Hsiu-
ch* eng that there was no escaping his punishment, and in the
9
evening he was executed.
What happened in the final interview which Tseng Kuo-fan
had with Li Hsiu-ch'eng is one of the mysteries attached to the
affair, and is discussed further below, in a slightly different
context. If the ultimate decision had already been made, it is
difficult to see why Tseng Kuo-fan should have told Li Hsiu-
ch* eng that no decision had been reached. One might speculate
that Tseng had some last questions he wished to ask, or even
that he merely wanted to take leave of a person for whom he
seems to have had a certain sympathy. We know from Chao Lieh-
wen *s diary that 'the Grand Secretary was very sorry for him...'
and that Li Hsiu-ch*eng was spared, at his express order, the
ghastly punishment of being sliced to death (<t i4.). Although
his head was sent to various places for public display, his
10body was buried in a coffin. Privileged treatment indeed.
There is no question that Tseng Kuo-fan did not want Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng sent to the capital. Although he apparently did 
not express an opinion to the court until after the execution, 
it is clear from his letters to his son and to Li Hung-chang, 
from Chao Lieh-wen*s opinion, which agreed with his own, from 
his action in executing Li Hsiu-ch* eng before the arrival of 
the edict, from the reasons which he gave to the court after­
wards, that he was opposed to having him sent to Peking. We
cannot know however, whether or not he would have been
prepared to disobey the edict if it had arrived in time.
11Probably not. His hesitation, had it been confined to the 
question of the execution alone and had nothing to do vith the 
problem of the dispersal plan (see p.60, below), suggests that he 
would not have disobeyed, otherwise he might have had Li killed 
earlier. Even if the captive had set out for Peking this does not 
necessarily mean that he would have reached there. Ch*en Yii-
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oh1 eng had been captured and sent to Peking in 1862, tout he
only got as far as Yen-ching in Honan, where the Mongol
General Seng-ko-lin-ch' in apparently took the law into his
own hands and had hiiD executed on the protect that had this
rebel been allowed to enter the capital 'it would inevitably
12have resulted in injury to the honour of the State,' What 
Tseng Kuo-fan had to decide was: were his reasons for not
wanting Li Hsiu-ch'eng to reach Peking sufficiently strong to 
warrant the risk or rumours and accusation, if not reprimand 
or punishment, which might result if he disobeyed or forestalled 
an imperial order? The reasons he later gave to the court 
were:
Apart from the ? usurper Hung Hsiu-ch'Han, there is no 
need for the others to be presented as captives; the cases 
of Ch'en Yii-oh'eng and Shih Ta-k'ai may be taken as prec­
edents. Moreover, in the past, when leading criminals have 
been sent to the capital, they have invariably beguiled 
with sweet words to escape death. Li Hsiu-ch*eng knows 
that he can never be reprieved and may either starve 
himself to death on the way, or sneak off and escape.
If he thus avoids public execution, disastrous consequences 
might ensue.^
This does not sound very convincing, though it is a better
effort than that of Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, The danger of Li
Hsiu-ch*eng starving himself to. death on the way to Peking
cannot have been more serious than it was in Nanking, and adequate
precautions could surely have been taken against the escape
14of so important a prisoner. The openly stated reasons seem
the least credible. But Tseng Kuo-ch'uan, in a moment of
anger, let out a chance remark which may bring us nearer to the
truth: 'to present Li Hsiu-ch*eng as a captive would only
15increase the arrogance of the court.* ^ Other reasons were
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undoubtedly considered in cooler moments. It can hardly 
have heen a reassuring thought for the Tseng brothers or 
for many of their subordinates and colleagues, that a man 
so well-informed as Li Hsiu-ch*eng would in Peking be 
interrogated again by men who would have no scruples about 
using his testimony to find fault with their reports or 
their actions. The care with which Tseng Kuo-fan and his 
secretaries edited the deposition and expunged parts which 
were likely to conflict with official reports is evidence of 
their awareness o£ this danger. Nor, if it is true that 
there was much more treasure in the Taiping capital than 
Tseng Kuo-fan admitted, can it have been desirable that 
someone \\rho probably knew the truth be questioned by those 
who may have felt themselves cheated.
There were persistent rumours that Li Hsiu-ch*eng in
private interviews with Tseng Kuo-fan attempted to persuade
him to turn against the Manchus and even make himself Emperor.
The only grounds for these rumours are that Tseng killed
Li Hsiu-ch*eng rather than send him to Peking and that his
treatment of the deposition showed that he had something to
hide. No other evidence has been found. There is nothing in
the deposition itself to suggest that Li Hsiu-ch*eng was trying
to drive a wedge between Tseng Kuo-fan and his Manchu masters;
nor is there any evidence that Tseng Kuo-fan wished to make
16himself Emperor or turn against the Manchus. Nevertheless 
Tseng Kuo-fan*s position was a delicate one, and even if Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng had no such intention, Tseng Kuo-fan must have been 
very conscious of the danger that Li*s presence in Peking would 
greatly increase the court *s suspicion of his power and his 
designs.
If Tseng Kuo-fan hesitated until the 4th or 5th of August 
before deciding Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s fate, the failure of the
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imperial edict to arrive was both a reason for his indecision,
and something of which he could take advantage once his
hesitation came to an end. He had asked for a decision on
26 July (TG5/6/25) hut claimed that the answer did not reach
him at Hanking until 11 August (TC3/7/10) because the edict
had been mistakenly delivered to An-ch*ing and took four extra
17days to arrive at Hanking. He must have known more or less
when the edict should have reached him, since he knew the
length of time his memorial would have taken to reach Peking
from An-ch*ing and, since an edict dated TC3/6/26 (29 July)
had reached Hanking on TC3/7/2 (3 August), he knew how long the
18postal service was taking to deliver to Hanking. He probably
therefore expected the edict on the 6th or 7bh of August at 
19the latest, 7 But it did not arrive and in the evening of 
7 August he had Li Hsiu-ch1 eng executed. This was probably 
the earliest moment he could take the law into his own hands 
without blatant disobedience* He may have felt that if he 
had waited and still the expected edict did not arrive, there 
would be increasing pressure on him from other officials, 
and perhaps from foreigners, to have the prisoner sent to 
Peking. He noted this pressure in his memorial of TC3/7/7 
(prepared two days before the execution) probably in order to 
forestall criticism by mentioning it, and thereby implying that 
his decision had been taken after giving due consideration to 
opposing views,^
But if the decision to execute was taken in the first 
instance on these grounds alone, a new factor had presumably 
to be taken into consideration as soon as Li Hsiu-ch*eng' 
offered to collect together and disband his own and other 
Taiping troops.
The first expression of this apparent willingness to 
co-operate in extinguishing the rebellion was, as far as we
60
21know, in the conversation with Chao Lieh-wen on 23 July.
Chao asked him, 'Do you hope to get off safely?* and Li Hsiu-
ch* eng replied, *Only by death. But those on the right bank
[the north bank of the Yangtse] were all under my command; if
X could send letters to disband them they may avoid the fate
of plundering each other. Then I could die without regret.*
Chao Lieh-wen *s comment on this was, * These words were spoken
with the intention of begging for life. * He evidently did
not consider the matter of any importance and was unable to
imagine that anyone in Li Hsiu-ch * eng* s position could think
of anything other than saving his own life.
The next mention of the question may have been during Li
Hsiu-ch*eng*s interrogation by P'ang Chi-yun and his colleagues.
We know that he expressed his disapproval of the policy of
killing rebels from Kwangtung and Kwangsi, but the record is
very terse and does not tell us that he specifically referred
22to the idea of an organized dispersal. Then, as far as we
know, the next reference to this matter is on the 70th page
23of the deposition, ' although he had made passing references
to sparing Liang-kwang men, and ‘collecting together rebellious 
24persons.* The first clear offer to co-operate since the
conversation with Chao Lieh-wen is made in the following terms,
I am willing ... to do my utmost to obtain the
submission of all the people of the Heavenly Bynasty.
Tseng Kuo-fan did not read this until 5 August or after, since
he wrote at the end of the 62nd page *read on the Fourth Bay,* ^
though it is possible that the content of the *ten requests'
was reported to him before he actually read this section of the
26deposition. He probably read the 'ten requests', which 
contain Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s detailed plan for assembling and 
dispersing the Taiping remnants on the 5th or 6th of August.
If this is the case, it is likely that it was this part of the
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deposition which convinced Tseng Kuo-fan that Li Hsiu-ch1 eng
was serious in a matter to which he had previously referred
only in passing. It is possible that it was this which
provoked the evening meeting between Tseng Kuo-fan and his
prisoner. We know very little about this interview, but it is
clear from Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s reference to it that his reaction
was one of gratitude:
Last night I received the favour of the Grand
Secretary coming to question me, and received his
benevolent instructions, and I do not know how to
repay him ... now that I have seen the boundless
kindness of the Grand Secretary, this guilty general
is resolved to restore order in one part [of the
country] in repayment. After last night’s profound
kindness and friendliness I am very contented to
27die and happy to return to the shades. '
If Chao Lieh-wen*s account is true, and there is no reason 
to doubt it, Tseng Kuo-fan told Li Hsiu-ch*eng that his 
fate was still in the balance; Li’s own reference implies 
that Tseng Kuo-fan also told him that he would accept at least 
part of the disbanding scheme while he was awaiting the 
edict.
28It is difficult to believe with Lo Erh-kang that Tseng 
Kuo-fan lied to Li Hsiu-oh*eng on this occasion and told him 
that his life was to be spared. What had he to gain by such 
cruel deceit? Lid he promise Li his life in order to get him 
to write the letters with the secret sign to his old 
commanders which would persuade them to give up the fight, and 
then have him killed as soon as he got what he wanted? There 
is no evidence that this is what happened, no mention of such 
letters in any record and no unexplained surrenders which 
might point to such a trick. Hor, had this been the case, is
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it likely that Li Hsiu-ch1 eng, who would have realised 
that he had been duped as soon as the messenger arrived
to tell him that he was to be executed, would:baveepraised Tseng
29Kuo-fan so highly just before he died.
The likely explanation is that Tseng Kuo-fan, having read
the detailed offer of co-operation and realised that it was
feasible, id.shed to have a private meeting with Li Hsiu-
ch1 eng before coming to any decision. He apparently told
Li that his fate had not been decided, (though in fact he
had determined to execute if the edict did not arrive on
the following day) but that he would in any case allow the
dispersal of the Taiping remnants and would abandon the
policy of killing the men of Liang-kwang. Li Hsiu-ch1 eng
was grateful for this and promised to do all he could in the
time left to him, not imagining that having been kept alive
for so long he was to die on the following day. After
further consideration Tseng Kuo-fan probably came to the
conclusion that if he was to prevent Li Hsiu-ch’eng from
going to Peking he would have to execute him at once before
pressure for the adoption of the dispersal plan obliged him
to spare Li Hsiu-ch’eng in order to operate it. The
feasibility of the plan strengthened his determination to
have him killed if the edict did not arrive. When it failed
to arrive on 7 August, Li Mei-sheng was sent to inform Li
Hsiu-ch’eng that he was to die. Chao Lieh-wen *s words imply
an ambiguity which means perhaps that Li Hsiu-ch ’eng was
told that the edict had arrived and that Tseng Kuo-fan had no
choice but to obey it. He died convinced that Tseng Kuo-fan
was going to exercise clemency towards his former troops,
and grateful for being spared torture and for the promise
30of a decent burial.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s plan for bringing the rebellion to an end
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is contained in the 'ten requests.1 He proposed to achieve 
the submission of the remaining Taiping armies by aiming at
the hard core, the men of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Their
submission was to be obtained by a combination of Li Hsiu-
ch* eng's personal influence and a well-publicized policy of
clemency on the part of Tseng Kuo-fan and his colleagues.
Why did Tseng Kuo-fan not accept this apparently tempting 
offer of co-operation from the most influential surviving 
rebel, which would undoubtedly have shortened the final 
mopping-up operations? Unfortunately he did not commit to 
paper all the considerations which led to his refusal, and 
vie can only speculate as to what they were.
Tseng Kuo-fan seems at first to have been almost disposed
to accept. In his memorial of TC3/7/7 (8 August), written
two days earlier, he noted that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had 'forcefully
urged the unsuitability of government troops killing the men
of Liang-kwang because the more these rebels are singled
out the more determined would the rebel bands become, and
military operations would drag on. His advice might very
well be accepted. On 3 August (TC5/7/2)
he wrote to both Li Hung-chang and to Tso Tsung-t'ang
repeating Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s plea in terms which were not
unfavourable, although he did not directly express his own 
52opinion. But in his memorial of TC5/7/20 (21 August) no
mention is made of this matter,^ and in that of TC5/12/15
(10 January, I865) Tseng Kuo-fan stated that he had seen no
reason for sparing either Li Hsiu-ch'eng or the men of Liang-
54kwang in general. The reactions of Li Hung-chang and Tso 
Tsung-t'ang to his invitation to express their opinions, 
if that is what it was, did not influence Tseng Kuo-fan*s 
decision, because he could not have received their replies 
until after Li Hsiu-ch*eng's death.^ Li Hung-chang, who
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had already expressed his opinion more forcibly than in mere
3 6words in executing the surrendered wangs at Su-chou, thought
that since there were still large numbers of rebels at large,
the slightest relaxation of effort would lead to more trouble,
there was therefore no reason for not wiping out the men of 
37Liang-kwang.
Tseng Kuo-fan fs apparent change of opinion was probably 
connected with the death of Li Hsiu-ch*eng, after which he was 
less favourable to the idea of modifying his policy. The fact 
that the memorial of TO 3/7/7 In which he said that the idea 
was acceptable was written two days before the execution of 
Li Hsiu-ch*eng, supports this hypothesis. As long as Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng was alive, the surrender plan in which his role was 
vital, could still be considered; once he was dead it was 
impossible to operate it in the same form. Thus one of the 
reasons why Tseng Kuo-fan rejected the proposal was that it 
would have meant sparing Li Hsiu-ch'eng from death and making 
it possible that he would end up in Peking, Having decided 
that Li must die, Tseng Kuo-fan could not even champion a 
policy of clemency which did not depend on Li's co-operation 
without leaving himself vuliierable to the question, 'if you 
approved of a policy of clemency, and if Li Hsiu-ch'eng would 
have been of great assistance to it, why did you have him 
killed?*
But it would be ridiculous to claim that this was Tseng 
Kuo-fan's only, or even his most important reason for rejecting 
Li Hsiu-ch' eng * s co-operation; his decision was governed by 
political and practical considerations as well as by his own 
inclinations and beliefs.
Traditional policy for the pacification of rebellions was 
theoretically a judicious combination of ruthless severity and 
discriminating clemency; the former to be applied to the hard
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core of ringleaders and the latter to the rank and file rebels,
who could be judged, somewhat optimistically, to have been
58pressed into rebellion against their will. Theoretically
there were penalties for indiscriminate killing of these poor
rebels, but in fact, as the large-scale massacre of T'ien Ti
Bui rebels at Canton in the 1850*s shows, they were not
59always given the benefit of the doubt.
The decision to accept the surrender of rebels was usually
left to the commander on the spot, who accepted the possible
consequences at his own risk. This was often considerable,
since most rebel leaders who were willing to change their
allegiance were only willing to do so on condition that they
were allowed to retain their troops and their command, and
thus their power to cause embarrassment. For every Chang Kuo-
liang there was a Miao P ' ei-lin and a Li Chao-shou. When Wei
Chih-chun surrendered in 1859, government officials congratulated
themselves at having neutralized a large enemy force until some
of Wei's subordinates revolted against this treachery and
inflicted a defeat on the traitors. Hu Lin-i was moved to
comment, 'In the extirpation of rebels one cannot rely only
on getting them to surrender; if the government forces are
strong they will surrender, but if [more] rebels arrive they
40will go over to the rebels again.' The difficulty was that
it was a policy of pis aller which appealed to a commander most
when it was most dangerous, that is, when he was in a weak
41position. Sheng Pao employed this policy more than any other
general fighting the Taipings; but he was a bad general who
'lost every engagement he fought and reported each defeat as 
42a victory.' His practice of enticing rebels to change their 
allegiance achieved momentary success in winning over the two 
powerful rebels Miao P' ei-lin and Li Chao-shou. But Miao was 
an inveterate turncoat who eventually had to he extirpated,45
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and although Li Chao-shou survived longer, his arrogance
eventually brought about his downfall. The behaviour of his
proteges, especially Miao I?1ei-lin, cost Sheng Pao his life; he
was impeached in 186$ and permitted to commit suicide.
Tseng Kuo-fan was probably more inclined to severity than
to clemency. He warmly approved of Li Hung-changfs massacre
of the surrendered wangs at Su-chou,^ and believed that the
more rebels were killed the better.  ^ Early in his career
he had earned the nickname *head-shaver Tseng' for his
46propensity for having heads removed. In the four months
before the fall of An-ch'ing over 8,000 surrendered Taipings
47had been slaughtered in spite of government policy. The
following year, when over ten thousand Taipings surrendered to
Chu Hung-chang, the latter and Tseng Kuo-ch'uan decided that
it would be too dangerous to let them live and they were
admitted in unsuspecting groups of ten into the Hunan Army
48camp and massacred as they entered. Two years later however,
Tseng Kuo-fan seems to have been ambitious to emulate the
achievements of the Eastern Han, when innumerable 'Red-eyebrow
Rebels* surrendered and made a mountain with their arms.
This burst of optimism was occasioned by the mass surrender of
Taipings after the loss of An-ch'ing and at a time when there
was a serious shortage of grain. Pao Ch'ao had already
incorporated a thousand ex-Taipings into his army and there
49were two thousand more ready to come over. Tseng ICuo-ch'uan 
had also taken a first three thousand into his army; but, 
wrote Tseng Kuo-fan,
there is such a shortage of funds that I cannot even 
support my present forces, let alone all these surrendered 
rebels. When we accept several thousand more I shall be 
obliged to ask Your Excellency [Kuan Wen] for several 
thousand liang of gold, apart from the financial
a?
assistance which I must request for the four thousand
already absorbed, The cost of incorporating ten
thousand is not more than twenty thousand chin per
month, which cannot be compared with the difficulties
and risks involved in training soldiers to exterminate
50an equal number of rebels.
If there were difficulties about accepting the surrender of 
rebels in 1862, they were even greater and more complex in 
1864* To accept Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s plan would have involved 
withdrawing a part of the Hunan Army from Hanking back to 
Anhwei. This might be a hazardous undertaking in itself, 
given the unhealthy state of morale in the army; it would 
probably have meant that arrangements would have to be made so 
that the iroops could carry their loot with them. There would 
have been not only difficulty in supporting the Hunan Army in 
Anhwei, but even greater difficulty in finding the means to 
support tens of thousands of rebels until they could be 
disbanded and sent home* In addition, Tseng Kuo-fan must have 
considered that to have encouraged large numbers of Taipings 
to submit to him would have been easily misinterpreted by the 
court as an unmistakable sign that he was increasing his own
force in order to depose the dynasty.
He no doubt felt as well, and we can hardly disagree, that
the fall of Hanking marked the real end of the Taiping Rebellion,
especially for him, and that the risks involved in so hazardous
and costly operation outweighed the advantages. Some of his
reasons for rejecting Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s proposal were obvious
and shared by all, so that it was unnecessary for Tseng Kuo-fan
to go to any lengths to justify his decision. The court, on the
other hand, felt sufficiently relieved at the end of the rebellion
to be inclined to turn a blind eye to the peccadillos of so
51powerful a figure.
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VI TSENG KUO-FAN AND THE DEPOSITION.
After Li Hsiu-ch1 eng*s execution, his written deposition
remained to be dealt with. Its fate was bound up with that of
its author; if he could not be sent to Peking neither could it,
until rendered harmless. He knew too much, it told too much.
It could not be entirely suppressed, not only because it had to
serve a purpose in proving the prisoner’s identity, but also
because too many people knew of its existence; therefore it had
to be revised. Tseng Kuo-fan made no secret of the fact that
he tampered with the deposition and in the colophon to the
printed edition he stated the principles which governed his 
1editing of it:
The wrongly written characters have been corrected, his 
flattery of the Chfu [Hunan] Army has been expunged, idle 
words and repetitions have been cut, his specious pleading 
for life and requests to be allowed to expiate his guilt 
by obtaining the surrender of the various rebel [bands] 
in Kiangsi and Hupeh, together with the ’ten requests* 
concerning their surrender and the *ten failures* leading 
to the defeat of the rebel Hung, have all been deleted ... 
This statement must now be examined in the light of what we now 
know to have been suppressed.
Since the publication of the Taiwan facsimile and of Chao
Lieh-wen *s diary we now know that the manuscript of the
deposition passed through the hands of more than one editor
before it went to the printer. Tseng Kuo-fan*s editing can be
clearly seen since it was done in red ink on the manuscript.
Chao Lieh-wen read through the deposition twice at Tseng Kuo- 
2fan’s request, but he did not make any identifiable marks on 
the manuscript, so we have no means of knowing how much of the
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deletion he was responsible for. All we can he sure of is that 
Tseng Kuo-fan made some cuts himself, and that other cuts were 
made by someone else before the text was sent to the printer.
They did not differ as to the kind of cuts they made except that 
the second editor (or editors) appears even more cautious than 
Tseng Kuo-fan, deleting passages which he had left. The second 
editor evidently deleted all the passages which Li Hsiu-ch’eng 
had written in the top margins of the notebooks, although most 
of these passages were punctuated by Tseng Kuo-fan; they are 
all omitted from the printed edition. Whoever the various 
editors were, there was obviously an identity of interest 
amongst them and the principles which governed their treatment 
of the deposition can therefore be considered together.
An analysis of the changes they made show that they were 
done with five main considerations in mind: (l) to avoid arousing 
the suspicions of the court, (2) to avoid contradicting previous 
reports, (5) to emphasize the achievements of the Hunan Army,
(4) to eliminate praise for the rebels, including Li Hsiu-ch1 eng,
(5) to avoid giving grounds for concluding that the dispersal plan 
should have been accepted.
(l) In order to allay the suspicions of the court about his power 
and his intentions, Tseng Kuo-fan felt obliged to eliminate all 
eulogies of himself and his brother Kuo-ch’uan. He did not 
mention this in the colophon to the printed edition, but there he 
put ’flattery of the Hunan Army* high on the list for deletion.
In fact there is virtually no flattery of the Hunan Army in the 
deposition. In four places Li Hsiu-ch*eng made complimentary 
remarks about it: in one place (page 162) he remarks that Chang
ICuo-liang*s troops were not so good as those of General Tseng - 
this was allowed to stand, in another (page 180) he praised the 
Hunan Army, but more or less as an afterthought after praising 
at some length ’General Tseng’s determination and persistence’;
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this passage was not marked by Tseng Kuo-fan for deletion but 
was omitted in the printed edition. In another place (page 194)
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng mentioned the formidable threat that Tseng Kuo- 
fan fs army presented, and said that 'the army is always victorious 
and has never been defeated. ' This was flattery, but it was not 
deleted. Elsewhere (pages 215 and 218) similar flattery of the 
Hunan Array was also left untouched.
Flattery of the Tseng brothers on the other hand was 
assiduously expunged, (see pages 150, 160, 180, 187, 197, 217,
241, 242, 245, 246, 297, 251, 254)* It might have added to the 
rumours that they were not above coming to an arrangement with 
the Taipings against their Manchu masters. In addition, of 
course, they may well have felt that the flattery of a rebel was 
a doubtful compliment.
Connected with this modesty is Tseng Kuo-fan*s evident desire 
to conceal from the court his comparatively lenient treatment of 
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng, which seems to have provoked some of the eulogies. 
The opening remarks of the deposition (page 150) were presumably 
deleted for this reason. Li Hsiu-ch1 eng was allowed to say (on 
page 245) that after his capture he had been given food, but 
Tseng Kuo-fan apparently thought it unnecessary that the court 
should know that he had also been given 'tea in sufficiency.*
The mysterious passage (on page 251) which gives Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s 
reaction to the previous evening's interview with Tseng Kuo-fan, 
was also cut; it was too open to misunderstanding.
Some passages seem to have been deleted because they might 
appear applicable to the delicate position of Tseng Kuo-fan 
himself. Thus, the words 'The Sovereign saw the extent of my 
military power and wanted to divide my authority,' were deleted 
(page 211 ). There is also the highly significant deletion of 
the words ' sir. A*#* HH - this is also the way to win the
struggle for the state. This phrase appears on the second side
of the 55th double-page (yeh, page 19l)« The text on both
sides was punctuated by Tseng Kuo-fan; but each line is marked
with a kind of bracket at beginning and end implying that they
were to be deleted, then Tseng Kuo-fan appears to have cancelled
these marks. On the second side, in addition to these deletions
and cancellations, a number of other characters, including the
phrase in question, were separately deleted and the marks not 
4cancelled. In spite of the cancellation of the majority of the 
deletion marks on this double-page, the whole section was 
omitted from the printed edition, from Lu Chi-i's copy and 
consequently from all other editions before the appearance of the 
facsimile. This suggests that the whole yeh may have been 
physically removed from the manuscript for a time. If this is 
the case, the reason was probably because in this passage Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng emphasised the glory which would accrue to the name 
of the Tseng brothers if the remaining Taiping troops were to 
surrender to them, 'their virtue \*ould inspire ten thousand 
generations,' and because he suggested, although in a somewhat 
incoherent way, that leniency to these rebels 'is also the 
way to win the struggle for the state.' If this is what Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng meant, or'even if it was only what people might think he 
meant, it would be better that this should not be seen by a 
court which was already suspicious of Tseng Kuo-fan*s power.
It seems likely that it was for similar reasons that the 
phrase (on page 141), ' - there was no distinction
between ruler and minister - was deleted. But if some words 
were cut because they might apply to Tseng Kuo-fan himself, 
one sentence seems to have been allowed to stand for the same 
reason. One sentence in a long passage which was deleted by 
Tseng Kuo-fan (page I83) was deliberately punctuated and allowed 
to remain: 'I was his general and served long in the army 
without a moment of pleasure but with plenty of troubles.' It
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is perhaps not too fanciful to suppose that Tseng Kuo-fan was 
thinking of himself when he left this sentence in,
(2) It was necessary to exercise considerable care in eliminating 
anything which might contradict previous military reports and 
thereby stir up a hornets1 nest of reproach and investigation.
In his memorial of TC3/12/13 Tseng Kuo-fan wrote
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1s original deposition amounted altogether 
to several tens of thousand characters, and although it is 
in the main reliable, the exaggeration of his own military 
achievements is at variance with the military reports of 
the various commands.
With this no doubt in mind, Tseng Kuo-fan frequently deleted 
the details of military events in the deposition (pages 134> 1?6, 
136 , 146 148, 152, 154, 156, 157, 158, 165, 171, 195) and even 
mbsb references to hours or to the duration of battles, (see 
pages 155, 156, 168, 181, 184).
In three different places derogatory remarks about Li Hung-
6chang, of whom Li Hsiu-ch1 eng had a low opinion, or about other 
officials, were cut. Li Hsiu-ch1 eng wrote that the capture of 
Su-chou and other districts * cannot be said to be the result of 
Li Hung-chang's ability; in fact it was because of the efforts 
of the foreign devils.' This was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan, (page 
221 ). A little later he wrote of Li Hung-chang, fHe used the 
customs revenue from Shanghai to hire foreign devils ', (page 224) - 
this was not deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan but was omitted in the 
printed edition. And again (page 224), he wrote that the foreign 
devils had received 'more than 400,000 in silver. Hing-po had 
a heavy revenue from the customs and there was a lot of money 
there; the Ch'ing [officials] embezzled military funds, got 
the foreign devils to do the work, but took the credit themselves. 
It was the same for the attack on Shao-hsing.' These words were
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not marked by Tseng Kuo-fan for deletion but were omitted from
the printed edition, A few pages later (on page 228) the words
1 the foreign devils took Gh'ang-chou* were omitted, though not
marked for deletion, and there is a similar omission on page 226,
Li Hsiu-ch * eng *s remark that Li Shih-hsien's family, captured
at Li-yang, were 'leniently treated and well oared~forf, was
also expunged, probably in case Li Hung-chang should have
reported otherwise. As it happened Li Hung-chang had not
7reported capturing them at all, and when this section of the 
deposition reached Peking several months later (see p.23 above), the 
court made an enquiry, in reply to which Li Hung-chang gave a 
version of the affair which differs from that of Gordon, who was
p
responsible for the lenient treatment the prisoners enjoyed.
Perhaps the most important change, in the sense that it 
confused the historical record for about a century, is the 
falsification of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's
9
death. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote that Hung had died of illness
brought on by eating 'manna* and accentuated by his refusal of
medicine, (see page 240). But Tseng Kuo-fan had already reported
a different version to the throne. In his memorial of TO3/6/25
(26 July 1864) he wrote that according to captured rebels* Hung
Hsiu-ch'uan had taken poison 'during the 5th Month, at a time
when the government forces were fiercely attacking [the city].
Again, in his memorial of TO3/7/7 (8 August) Tseng Kuo-fan
reported the evidence given by a woman from the T'ien V/ang's
palace and repeated that he had poisoned himself 'on the 27th
Bay of the 4th Month because the government troops were
furiously attacking, * but that his death had been concealed from 
11the rebels. Ho alterations were apparently made to Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s
deposition by Tseng Kuo-fan himself, but the printed edition
was made to agree with Tseng Kuo-fan *s version by the deletion of
12some words and the addition of others. This was presumably done
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to avoid contradicting official reports, which may well have 
been made in good faith. The story of suicide was a perfectly 
plausible one, and is likely to have been one of the many 
rumours rife in the Taiping capital. But this can hardly have 
been the only reason for the falsification of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's 
version; perhaps it was considered that more pleasure would 
be given to the Emperor if he thought that his arch enemy had 
died by his own hand in a torment of fear and anxiety, than 
to know that he had merely died in his bed. There was also a 
pat on the back for the besiegers by emphasising in the two 
memorials and in the words added to the printed edition of 
the deposition, that the fierce attack on the city had brought 
about the suicide of the rebel king.
(3) Tseng Kuo-fan and his staff were, not unnaturally, anxious 
to get as much credit as possible for the success of their arms. 
With this in mind, they were not above deleting certain passages 
and even adding to the deposition. Li Hsiu-ch1 eng had written 
in most conciliatory and tactful terms of the occasion in 1861 
when Tseng Kuo-fan was isolated at Ch'i-men and came close to 
a crushing defeat which would undoubtedly have ended with his 
death or capture, (see page 197)* This was deleted, partly by 
Tseng Kuo-fan himself and partly by the subsequent editor, 
presumably because it was felt that the incident was best 
forgotten.
The deletion of remarks about the strength of the Taiping
capital at the time of its fall were all made in order to
exaggerate the achievement of its capture and confirm Tseng
Kuo-fanfs claim that in the three days which followed 'more
1%
than a hundred thousand rebels had been killed. * J Although 
he did not specify that this figure was made up entirely of 
fighting men, the implication was that they were so, or at least 
were die-hard rebels. He also reported the killing of three
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thousand rebel leaders, including those who let themselves be
burned to death or drowned t h e m s e l v e s F o r  this reason Li
Hsiu-ch’eng*s remark that there were only ’old people and
children but few fighting troops,’ (page 222) had to be deleted,
and also his comment (page 256) that there was ’panic inside and
outside the capital.’ In the record of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s
interrogation however, which the court did not apparently ask
for and which was not released until 1937* there was no need to
suppress this kind of evidence. When Li Hsiu-ch’eng was asked,
’How many people were there is the capital when it was taken?*
he replied, ’When the city was taken there were no more than
thirty thousand in it. Apart from the inhabitants there were no
more than ten thousand rebel troops, of these no more than three
or four thousand were capable of defending the wall. ’
In order to emphasize the Hunan Army’s achievement and explain
to an impatient court why it had taken so long, an addition was
made to the deposition (see page 252). Li Hsiu-ch’eng had listed
the disasters which, in his opinion, had led to the downfall of
16the T’ai-p’ing T’ien-kuo; the last of these read, ’There was 
no system of government. * This was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan in 
red ink, as usual; in its place, in black ink, was written,
1 - ’we should not have concentrated only 
on defending T ’ien-ching [Hanking] by withdrawing troops from 
elsewhere *. I do not know who wrote these characters; they do 
not seem to be in the handwriting either of Tseng Kuo-fan or Chao 
Lieh-wen; nor are they in Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s hand. This can be seen 
by comparing his writing of the various characters in the inter­
polated line elsewhere in the deposition - a comparison which is 
made on the following page. Li Hsiu-ch’eng only once used the
expression 1 ik.’pi ' in the deposition; it was on the other hand
17an expression commonly used by Tseng Kuo-fan, though this of 
course does not prove anything.
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Another interpolation in the text was made with the obvious 
purpose of adding to the prestige of Tseng Kuo-ch'tian, and in 
order to make it conform with information already given to the 
court. In relating the story of his capture (page 245), Li 
Hsiu-ch * eng had written that he was 'taken prisoner by two 
scoundrels,' This was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan and replaced 
by the words, written this time in red and clearly in his hand,
'then I was captured by government troops under General Tseng.1
(4) Connected with the desire to exaggerate the achievements 
of his army was Tseng Kuo-fan*s natural wish to prevent Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng from showing the rebels in too favourable a light.
Perhaps this side of the editing was done with an eye to the 
propaganda value of the deposition, but it was also to avoid 
offending the court by allowing Li Hsiu-ch'eng to claim any 
virtues for the rebels or for himself. The more obvious examples 
of this are where his words 'people everywhere respected him 
[Hung Hsiu-ch'tian] * were deleted (page 155) > axtd where his 
remarks about the strict discipline amongst the Taipings at 
Hanking in the early days of the rebellion were also expunged 
(page 140). Slightly less obvious are such deletions as that 
of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s words that the Kwangtung troops [secret 
society members] were 'bandits who harmed the people' (page200 ); 
this and other such references to 'bandits' (on pages 145, 166,
257 ) were presumably cut because they implied that the Taipings 
were not bandits who harmed the people. Or again, the words 
'our armies entered the town and immediately pacified the people1 
(page 200) were cut, probably because 'pacification' was something 
only the government could do. Elsewhere the word 'pacification' 
was allowed to stand, but not the fact that grain had been 
distributed to the peasants (page 211). A passage describing 
how the Taiping garrison of only three thousand troops at T'ung-
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oh'eng held out against a much larger government force (not 
•under Tseng Kuo-fan*s command) was also entirely deleted (page 146).
Most of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s analysis of the reasons for the
failure of the Taipings was also esqpunged (pages 183, 236, 241,
242 , 251, 252), including the whole section called 'The Ten
18Failures of the Heavenly dynasty.* This was partly, no douht, 
because Tseng Kuo-fan wanted, at least for publication, a fairly 
bald statement of facts and did not see the point in passing on 
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s personal opinion either to the court or to the 
public. But it may also have been connected with the fact that 
fundamental to Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s approach to this question was 
his belief that the T*ai-p*ing T*ien-kuo was a rival State, 
with an administrative apparatus, a real emperor and so on.
Such an assumption was obviously distasteful to Tseng Kuo-fan 
and even more so to the court.
Tseng Kuo-fan deleted several passages which might be 
doiisidered as showing Li Hsiu-ch*eng in a good light, such as 
references to his sincerity and diligence (pages 135, 144), to 
his loyalty (pages 192, 217, 218, 231, 242), his magnanimity towards 
his enemies (pages 169, 187, 203, 205), to his filial sentiments 
for his mother (pages 193, 223, 228) and his charity to the poor 
(pages 230, 236, 242).
(5) Once Tseng Kuo-fan had decided not to accept Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s 
plan for the disbanding of the remaining Taiping troops, it was 
necessary to delete those parts of the deposition which might 
make him vulnerable to criticism for not having done do. He did 
not entirely delete Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s appeals to spare the men of 
Kwangtung and Kwangsi, and even reported this appeal to the court, 
as we have seen. But he did not at first report the fact that 
Li Hsiu-ch*eng had offered to co-operate in obtaining the 
submission of the Taiping troops and had made specific proposals
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for doing so. In his memorial of Tc3/7/20 (21 August 1864) he 
merely reported that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had said that he could
19'obtain the submission of the rebel bands in Kiangsi and Hu-chou.' y 
The court did not know about the existence of the 'ten requests' 
containing the detailed plan until Tseng Kuo-fan sent up a copy 
of the printed edition. He was at once ordered to send up a 
copy of the 'ten requests' and 'ten failures' which the colophon 
to the printed edition stated had been suppressed. In response 
to this Tseng Kuo-fan sent up a copy of these two items 'and 
other remarks.'20
Had he intended to conceal the existence of the detailed 
plan altogether he would not have mentioned it in the colophon.
He presumably did this because too many people at his headquarters 
knew about its existence and had been discussing the pros and 
cons of accepting Li Hsiu-ch'eng's offer; he realised that 
the court was bound to .find out sooner or later. By that time 
however it would already be too late to have Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
sent to the capital, and his principal anxiety would already have 
been removed. But he had thought it necessary to make some 
changes in the deposition itself in order to forestall a possible 
reprimand for not having accepted the proposal. In order to do 
this it was necessary that anything be expunged which might 
encourage the court to think that a good opportunity had been 
missed. He therefore deleted all references to the proposal 
(on pages 159, 176, 191, 192, 251, 246, 247, 253, 254); although 
he punctuated it, he also deleted the section containing the 'ten 
requests (pages 248-251). IPor the same reason he removed from the 
deposition the many passages in which Li Hsiu-ch*eng protested 
his passivity, his having been carried along on a wave of 
rebellion without real enthusiasm for the Taiping cause (pages 144, 
159 , 160, 178, 191, 192, 246). If these passages had been 
allowed to stand, Tseng Kuo-fan could have been open to criticism
for having executed a rebel who was repentant and might seem 
to fall into the category of those who should be forgiven and 
spared; they would also make more credible the surprising 
transformation of a 'fierce and cunning rebel' into a willing 
collaborator.
This covers the main principles behind the editing of the 
deposition. Other cuts were made because of prolixity or 
irrelevance (pages 216 & 217 for instance), or because the 
words did not make sense (on pages 134, 144, 254, 255 
instance); other deletions were of passages which contained 
what Tseng Kuo-fan considered to be vulgarly superstitious or 
heterodox ideas (on pages 131, 132, 159, 160, 181, 196 for 
instance). In some cases passages were cut for a combination 
of reasons, in others (pages 136, 184, 250 for instance) it is 
difficult to see why they were made.
VII A HERO MADE AND OVERTHROWN.
Already in the two or three decades before Lu Chi-i's visit 
to the Tseng family home in 1944 Li Hsiu-ch*eng had enjoyed the 
reputation of a national hero. The early Chinese republicans, 
and especially Sun Yat Sen, tended to look upon the Taipings as 
their own revolutionary forbears, and attempted to popularise 
the story of their activities in order to arouse nationalist 
or anti-Manchu fervour amongst the people. At this time 
virtually no research had been done into the history of the 
rebellion, which had provided material for the romancer long 
before it became a respectable subject for the historian. But 
about Li Hsiu-ch'eng quite a lot was known, thanks to the 
existence of his deposition, and the popular stories based on it. 
It was known that he had joined the Taipings as a poor peasant 
and had risen from the ranks to achieve the highest command in 
their armies, with authority over several hundred thousand men.
He had won many victories, had fought against the foreigners and 
attacked their stronghold at Shanghai. He had gained for himself, 
in spite of the suspicions of a jealous monarch, the title of 
Faithful Prince, and had proved his right to it in the most 
emotive possible manner by giving up his horse, and by consequence 
his life, in order to save that of the young rebel king.
It was known that he had treated his defeated enemies with 
magnanimity and the people with solicitude and benevolence. 
Although he took arms against foreigners, he was scrupulous about 
protecting their lives and property,*1' and consequently enjoyed 
amongst them a reputation unequalled by any other Taiping 
commander. Missionaries who visited the areas under his control 
often came back with favourable reports of his just administration 
and personal integrity. Gordon, against whom he fought, regretted 
his death and had a very high opinion of his qualities. He had,
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in short, all the makings of a hero.
Most of this could be learned from Li Hsiu-ch*eng* s own 
deposition, in itself, considering the circumstances under which 
it was written, a remarkable achievement for a self-educated 
military man, I’rom the versions of it which were current before 
the Second World War the conclusion seemed justified that Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng was indeed *a brave man, brilliant general, 
considerate foe and loyal leader, who, if he had espoused a 
worthier movement and had served a better master, might, in 
another sphere, have done much to restore order and peace to 
a distracted country.'2
It is ironic to reflect that Li Hsiu-ch*eng owed his 
reputation to a great extent to Tseng Kuo-fan *s treatment of his 
deposition, Tseng Kuo-fan had suppressed most of the flattery 
of his captors and most important of all he had suppressed the 
*ten requests’ and all references to Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s proposal 
for helping to bring the rebellion to an end. Although Tseng 
Kuo-fan had made no secret of this, admirers of Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
did not believe that their hero had flattered his captors, 
begged for mercy or offered to collaborate. By tampering with 
the deposition and suppressing the manuscript Tseng Kuo-fan 
inevitably threw doubt on the authenticity of the version which 
he presented to the public. The historian Teng Yin-ch*eng, who 
saw, though probably did not examine, the manuscript, wrote,
'The refusal;, of the Tseng family to make public the original 
of Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s autobiography proves that there is something 
to hide, Tseng Kuo-fan*s refusal to send it to the Grand Council 
proves that there was something to hide, and his destruction of 
parts of it proves that there was something to hide. *3
By 1944, when Lu Chi-i examined the manuscript and made his 
copy, Li Hsiu-ch’eng's prestige as a hero and the assumption that 
Tseng Kuo-fan had a secret were so strong that the publication
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of revised versions of the deposition based on Lii Chi-i's 
copy, which should have been enough to encourage a more objective 
appraisal, in fact did little to undermine Li Hsiu-ch * eng1 s 
reputation. His fame as a pre-modern revolutionary hero was 
even enhanced after 1949 in an atmosphere which encouraged the 
search for heros in China's past and their canonization.
It was in this intellectual climate that Lo Erh-kang*s first 
version of Lii Chi-i's copy was published. Lo accepted the 
authenticity of the deposition;^ but he attempted to solve the 
apparent contradiction between the Li Hsiu-ch'eng of legend and 
the man who emerged from the deposition by denying that it 
represented Li Hsiu-ch'eng's real feelings. Li Hsiu-ch'eng had 
a secret political motive, according to Lo Erh-kang; he was 
only pretending to surrender. Two things led Lo to this 
conclusion. First, there was the fact of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's 
lifetime of devotion and loyalty to the Taiping cause, his 
courage in the face of death and so on. Secondly, Lo seems to 
have placed considerable credence in the rumours that Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng had urged Tseng Kuo-fan to oppose the Ch'ing dynasty and 
make himself emperor. Unofficial histories emphasise that 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng was well acquainted, as were many Taipings, with 
the San-kuo Yen-i (Romance of the Three Kingdoms), and Lo Erh- 
kang elaborated a theory that Li deliberately imitated Chiang 
Wei of the state of Shu, who pretended to surrender 16 Chung 
Hui of Wei. By flattering Tseng Kuo-fan and emphasising his own 
lack of committal to the Taiping cause, by offering to co-operate 
by assembling the remaining Taiping troops, Li Hsiu-ch'eng hoped 
to obtain his release, after which he would call his troops to 
his banner and carry on the fight. Lo Erh-kang did not however, 
claim this as a final answer; he put his theory forward as a 
tentative hypothesis and invited criticism, corrections and 
discussion.^
85
By the time that Lo Erh-kang published the fourth, revised 
edition of his study of the deposition in 1957 > he had also 
revised his opinion, though certainly not to the extent of 
judging Li Hsiu-ch*eng disloyal. He had abandoned the theory 
of false surrender on the San-kuo Ten-i model. The 1 ten requests' 
and Li Hsiu-ch1 eng * s flattery of his captors was designed to 
persuade them to stop the slaughter of the Taipings, hoping thus 
to 1preserve the revolutionary forces intact*, and to persuade 
Tseng Kuo-fan to turn his weapons against the foreigners (page 25$). 
Li Hsiu-ch’eng understood that he would not be allowed to live, 
and accepted this with fortitude. Lo Erh-kang was not entirely 
uncritical of his hero, but only on the grounds of shameful 
wishful thinking, in expecting anti-imperialism from a reactionary.
This new theory seems to have been x^ idely accepted by historians 
in China. Its only serious rival, the forgery theory, had been 
competently and convincingly demolished by Lo Erh-kang (see 
Chapter III). Many students of Taiping history were inclined to 
believe that this was the truth or something very near it, but 
that a mystery remained, of which the key was either in the 
Tseng family archives, or else had been destroyed; some historians 
therefore reserved their judgement. The publication of Lu Chi-i’s 
copy, with his preface describing the suspicious behaviour of 
Tseng Kuo-fan*s descendants, did little to dispel these doubts; 
but at the same time, with Kuo Mo-jo*s surmise that the manuscript 
had been destroyed in an aeroplane disaster, hope faded that the
7
key would ever be found. But was there a key?
The publication of the facsimile of the manuscript, though it 
did not really reveal any startling new facts, made it impossible 
to withhold judgement any longer, or to stick to the old 
explanations. What in fact did the facsimile tell us? Although 
it now became clear that Lii Chi-i had missed several passages 
in his copy, this did not radically alter it. But the facsimile
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did provide an opportunity to see the whole of what remained 
of the manuscript and to judge whether anything had been
8removed from it, either from the middle as some claimed, or
from the end. It also made possible a close examination of the
nature of Tseng Kuo-fan*s deletions. The publication of the
Taiwan facsimile made it possible, indeed essential, to look
again at the old prejudices about hi Hsiu-ch'eng. It was this
rather than the approach of Li Hsiu-chf eng's centenary, which
sparked off the great controversy about his place in the
9
pantheon of history.
The first blast against Li Hsiu-ch1 eng was given in an
10article by Chi Pen-yii, who charged the Faithful Prince with 
disloyalty. He did not deny the military and administrative 
achievements of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, but at the end, he said, Li had 
lost his revolutionary spirit and surrendered to the class 
enemy. He ended his life as a traitor and his deposition is 
a base confession of his 'crimes' against the Manchu rulers. It 
shows him to have been a man who lacked faith in the Taiping 
cause, who carried on only because it was 'difficult to dismount 
from the tiger's back,' who had wavered several times, but had 
not actually surrendered earlier because the government pursued 
a policy of dealing severely with men of Liang-kwang, His final 
shame was that he offered to collaborate with his captors and 
help to stamp out the revolution. He knew that if Tseng Kuo-fan 
announced clemency for the men of Liang-kwang, nothing would do 
more to undermine the revolution. Chi Pen-yii pointed out that 
there was no evidence, particularly in the deposition itself, of 
any attempt to drive a wedge between Tseng Kuo-fan and his Manchu 
masters. Even if Li Hsiu-ch'eng did encourage him to turn his 
weapons against the foreigners, there is no merit in this because 
it was unrealistic to expect a member of the landlord class to 
fight against imperialism. Chi Pen-yii denied that Li Hsiu-ch'eng
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could be excused for his behaviour because he was subject to the
limitations which history imposes upon the political understanding
11of the peasantry, without arguing the point at all closely*
Li Hsiu-ch*eng was not limited by history but acting against it,
since he wanted to suppress the revolution, the manifestation
of peasant class struggle against the landlord class, which is the
12only motive force of history in Chinese feudal society. Chi Pen-
yii pointed to the example of Ch*en Yli-ch*eng, who died heroically
13cursing the enemy, and of Hung Jen-kan and Lai Wen-kuang, and 
asked, Why were they not limited by history in the same way?
Li Hsiu-ch*eng was strongly influenced by feudal ideology, he was 
fatalistic and regretted not having been destined to encounter 
*an enlightened ruler* and so on. His surrender to the enemy was 
the natural outcome of this. Chi Pen-yii also accused him of 
abandoning peasant simplicity; his palace was very magnificent, 
and in the end he lost his life because he was unwilling to give 
up his riches. His unseemly wealth is shown by the payment he 
was forced to make to the Taiping state and by his ability to 
buy pardon for a traitor.
Lo Erh-kang1 s answer to this, published in 19^4> covers more 
15than sixty pages.  ^ This article by the leading Taiping 
specialist in China, is so detailed and so much more closely 
argued than those of the opposition, that it warrants a lengthy 
summary*
Ever since 1944 > when he saw Lu Chi-i*s copy of the deposition, 
Lo Erh-kang had been convinced that Li Hsiu-ch*eng had not given 
in to his captors; his study of the deposition for over twenty 
years had increased his conviction. But whereas previously he 
had elaborated the theory of * false surrender,* now, in re-editing 
the deposition, he had * unexpectedly* discovered that Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng had been employing a stratagem of * self-immolation in 
order to hold up the [enemy] troops' ).^
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Lo Erh-kang started by tackling the s elf-disparaging passages 
in the deposition. These, he said, are immediately suspect, and 
he lists eight reasons:-
(i) Li Hsiu-ch*eng protests too much, insisting on his 
sincerity as if with a guilty conscience. In fact he was being 
very cautious. Lo Erh-kang cites a correction Li made in the 
deposition which he considers highly significant. Li Hsiu-ch*eng 
had written (page 154) that news of the Taiping rising had been 
brought to his village but he * 7 &  15 * which, by the presence 
of the character 7k. implies that he did not manage to get there, 
or did not reach Chin-t*ien in time. Then, thinking that this 
was contrary to the image of himself he wished to create, as 
someone who had only joined because everyone else did, because 
there was not enough to eat at home and so on, he had erased
the character 1L . Unfortunately what he wrote in its place is 
not legible, but Lo Erh-kang believed that this shows that Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng was exercising extreme caution.
(ii) Li Hsiu-ch*eng emphasised his leniency towards traitors, 
to Li Chao-shou, for example, and says that he did not scold him 
(page 166). But we know that this is not true because a severe 
letter from Li Hsiu-ch*eng to Li Chao-shou is still extant,^
(iii) Li Hsiu-ch*eng also claimed that he was clement towards 
the enemy; but Lo Erh-kang detected a lie in his account of the 
second attack on Hang-chou (page 202), where he said that seven 
days before the attack he had petitioned the T*ien Wang to be 
allowed to spare the Manchus in the city; According to his own 
statement of the time needed to get an answer, he would have 
had the reply long before attacking the Manchu garrison, but he 
wrote in the deposition that he had been obliged to attack without 
waiting for it.
(iv) In the deposition Li Hsiu-ch*eng concealed the fact that 
he had been given overall command of the Taiping armies and that
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he had enjoyed the confidence of the T*ien Wang. He had been 
promoted to the position of chun-shih, equivalent to prime 
minister and commander-in-chief, but he had said nothing about 
this.^
(v) In general he had exaggerated or invented stories of
bad relations with Hung Hsiu-ch*uan; he had been critical of him
but loyal nevertheless. He had emphasised his disobedience in
refusing to * sweep the north1 (page 195); but Lo Erh-kang cited
Hung Jen-kan!s deposition to show that in campaigning south
of the Yangtse Li Hsiu-ch1 eng was in fact acting in accordance
with the plan which had been agreed to by Hung Jen-lean, who was
the prime minister. Lo claimed that this is confirmed by
19captured Taiping documents, y and by Li Hsiu-ch1 eng*s proclamation
saying that he had received orders to campaign in the upper
20reaches of the Yangtse. Again, elsewhere in the deposition
(page 218), Li Hsiu-ch*eng wrote that he was ordered to campaign
in the north and had no choice but to obey. Lo Erh-kang argued
however that this plan was worked out by Li Hsiu-ch*eng himself
21and cited evidence to support this.
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng*s account of the T*ien Wang * s order to start 
all documents with the words *The Heavenly Father, Heavenly 
Brother and Heavenly King...1 is suspect because it is not true
op
to say (page 2J2) that he and Li Shih-hsien did not obey.
Li Hsiu-ch * eng * s claim that the T*ien Wang refused to let 
the poor out of Hanking in 1865 and that he himself did this 
secretly (page 257)> is also false. Lo Erh-kang cites the 
record of one of those v/ho left the city at this time, and who 
said that it was done by order of Hung Hsiu-ch1 iian and in 
response to a petition from Li Hsiu-ch*eng.
(vi) In the deposition Li Hsiu-ch*eng concealed the fact that 
he had remained loyal to Hung Hsiu-ch *iian. He concealed his 
real motive for returning to Hanking after the loss of Su-chou
and Wu-hsi, and said that it was merely because his mother was 
in the capital (page 227). Earlier, he had given the same 
reason for remaining in Hanking (page 229)* But the fact that 
he could abandon his mother in order to ensure the escape of 
the Young Sovereign after the fall of the capital proves that 
he really put loyalty to his monarch before filial duty.
(vii) Li Hsiu-ch1 eng also concealed the fact that he was 
responsible for the defence of Hanking. He wrote (page 223) 
that he wanted to leave the city but was persuaded not to do 
so, and later declared that he was not in command at Hanking 
(page 228), Lo Erh-kang denies the truth of this and cites 
several government documents which, in the last days of the 
rebellion, spoke of 'the determined resistance of Hung and Li.1
(viii) Li Hsiu-ch*eng in his deposition pretended that he 
had for a long time been on the point of surrendering to the 
government, but that he had not done so because there was nowhere 
for him to go, he had no guarrantor. But, says Lo Erh-kang,
Li Chao-shou had gone over to the government and had been given 
a special post with responsibility for getting Taipings to 
surrender, why did Li Hsiu-ch*eng not take the opportunity to 
change sides when Li Chao-shou had urged him to do so?
The story about Sung Yung-ch*i negotiating Li Hsiu-ch * eng* s 
surrender just before the fall of Hanking (page 239) is also a 
fabrication in the opinion of Lo Erh-kang. An official with 
only a blue button was of very low rank and it is unthinkable 
that such an important rebel as Li Hsiu-ch*eng could have 
negotiated with someone so insignificant. This is why Tseng Kuo- 
fan changed 'blue button* to 'red button* and finally, in the 
printed edition to 'crystal button.' He felt that the original 
version of the story did not ring true. Moreover, if negotiations 
of this kind had been going on, why should Tseng Kuo-ch'uan have 
been so brutal in his treatment of Li Hsiu-ch'eng after his
capture? Had Li Hsiu-ch1 eng * s story been true Chao Lieh-wen 
would probably have mentioned it in his diary.
Having thus thrown doubt upon the veracity of these passages 
in the deposition Lo Erh-kang poses the question, What was Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng *s motive? It can only have been either the desire 
to persuade his captors of the sincerity of his offer to help, 
or some other hidden motive. Lo first examines the first of 
these alternatives.
(l) Lid Li Hsiu-ch'eng lack understanding of the revolutionary 
cause and determination to accomplish it. The answer, of course, 
is no. He rose in the ranks to high command, and stressed that 
he 'did not transgress in the slightest* (page 135)- His under­
standing, Lo Erh-kang admits, was limited by the age in which he 
lived and by his environment. In his youth he was much influenced 
by certain traditional fatalistic ideas; but in the practical 
life of struggle this fatalism gradually vanished and Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng developed an understanding of the necessity and ability 
of man to decide his own fate superior to that of Ch'en Yu-ch'eng, 
Hung Jen-kan and Lai Wen-kuang, as shown by their depositions.
If there are still traces of fatalism in Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s, this 
is deliberate, Lo Erh-kang tells us: he was trying to pull the 
wool over Tseng Kuo-fan*s eyes.
(ii) Lo Erh-kang deals with the accusation that Li Hsiu-ch*eng 
turned coat and surrendered because of his love of riches and 
comfort. The building of fine palaces was part of the Taiping 
system, and Li Hsiu-ch*eng was not the only wang to have one. It 
is true that he paid out large sums of money, but where did it 
come from? Mostly from captured goods and birthday tribute. In 
any case most of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s revenue was sent to the capital 
or spent on relief of the people, and even amongst his enemies 
he had the reputation of caring nothing for riches. As to his
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jewels, which caused his downfall, these were part of his 
regalia, the prerogative of high Taiping commanders.
(iii) hid Li Hsiu-ch'eng lose faith in the revolution in
the hour of defeat? This, says Lo Erh-kang, is impossible
because when he was being interrogated Li said, 'A commander
who, after winning victory after victory suffers a defeat and
23cannot recover, is not much good'. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not like 
this; he fought at T'ung-ch'eng, for instance, with determination 
and against considerable odds (page 146). Even after the loss 
of Su-chou and the rejection of his plan by the T'ien Wang he 
continued to obey orders although he disagreed with them and 
fought on; he broke out of the surrounded capital and even after 
being taken prisoner, sternly warned the enemy that u.. the 
Taipings could not all be killed - * jk 11 (page 251).
(iv) Was he an individualistic hero who had no confidence
in the masses? Lid he believe that the revolution was at an
end as soon as he himself had been taken prisoner? Ho, says
Lo Erh-kang, he was modest about his ability (page 192). His
confidence in the masses is shown by the phrase he had written
elsewhere to the effect that victory could only be won by everyone 
24uniting. After capture he asked Chao Lieh-wen, 'Do you think
25everything is finished now that you have captured me?' ^
(v) Was he afraid of death or torture? In 1859 > when he
fell under suspicion he was at P'u-k'ou surrounded by the enemy
and with little ammunition; if he had been afraid of death he
would have accepted Li Chao-shou*s offer and surrendered. If he
had been afraid of death he would not have given his good horse
to the Young Sovereign, an act which was typical of his generous 
26spirit. His unwillingness to shave his head also shows his 
fearlessness (page 245)* His behaviour at the first interrogation 
by Tseng Kuo-ch'uan shows him to have been a man of great courage. 
He spoke of death without fear of it: 'if you fear that I cannot
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be trusted, then execute me..,1 (page 247)* fI a® glad 
to return to the shades' (page 251). In the face of death he 
wrote his deposition at a considerable speed, with hardly any 
corrections, and even counted the number of words he wrote.
(vi) Was he taken in by Tseng Kuo-fan? . Is it true that he
was silent and uncooperative for the savage Tseng Kuo-ch'uan
but succumbed to the soft words of Tseng Kuo-fan? This rumour,
according to Lo Erh-kang, is based on an account written by
Li Hung-chang's grandson, Li Kuo-huai, which he got from his
father. The substance of the story is that for the first
interrogation of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, Tseng Kuo-ch'uan sat in state in
a great hall, surrounded by soldiers, and had the captive brought
before him in his prison cage. Li Hsiu-ch'eng answered the
questions put to him only by cursing his captors. But Tseng Kuo-
fan, on the other hand, interviewed Li Hsiu-ch'eng in a modest
back room, attended only by a servant, and said to him, 'You are
a good man.. .What a pity, what a pity!' At this Li Hsiu-ch 'eng
wept, asked for writing materials, begged for pardon and offered
27to assemble the remaining rebels. Lo Erh-kang denies the 
authenticity of this account. In Chao Lieh-wen*s interview with 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng the latter asked him whether he thought that there 
would be no more trouble, and mentioned the danger from foreign 
aggression. These questions were the prelude to the deposition; 
he was feeling his way to see whether it would be possible to 
trick the enemy. In any case neither Tseng Kuo-fan nor Li himself 
suggest that this*, kind of interview took place between them.
Thus Lo Erh-kang denied that Li Hsiu-ch'eng wanted to persuade 
the enemy of his genuine desire to co-operate. Therefore the 
second hypothesis must be the correct one, that he had a hidden 
motive in doing what he did. This, Lo Erh-kang claimed, was his 
plan to hold up the enemy troops by an act of deception and
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self-sacrifice* There were historical precedents. The traditional
method of suppressing peasnt rebellion was a combination of force
and enticement. The peasants on the other hand, would often
take advantage of the opportunities offered by enticement to gain
temporary respite, that is to say, they would pretend to surrender.
The situation at the fall of Nanking was favourable to such a
stratagem. After the Tfien Wang1s refusal of his plan for
giving up the capital, Li Hsiu-ch1 eng obeyed his decision and
immediately summoned Ch’en Te-ts'ai back to Nanking from the
Northwest; but Ch’en was held up in Ma-ch*eng for lack of grain.
The Taipings in the Su-chou and Chekiang region also suffered
from the shortage of supplies, so Li Hsiu-ch’eng changed the
plan; he ordered Li Shih-hsien to lead the Taiping troops from
the Su-chou and Chekiang region into Kiangsi, where there was
still grain. Here they were to wait until after the autumn
harvest, when they were to come back east. Ch’en Te-tsfai
was to descend on Yang-chou after the harvest, and the two armies
would meet and attack the enemy at Nanking. Crack troops x^ ould
be left in Kuang-te and Hu-chou to protect communications between
Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei and Kiangsi. When Nanking fell, Lo
Erh-kang points out, there were only about 10,000 Taiping troops 
28in the city; therefore their main armies were still intact, 
and this plan could still be operated. This is why Li Hsiu- 
ch’eng asked Chao Lieh-wen whether he imagined that it was all 
finished. He also knew that Nien strength was growing, and this 
is why he suggested to Tseng Kuo-fan that they could easily 
be suppressed (page 250) - in order to gain his confidence. Nor 
can he have been ignorant of the unhealthy condition of the 
armies of Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang, the growth of 
corruption and discontent and the spread of subversive secret 
society organizations within them. The overall situation therefore, 
was favourable to the Taipings at the fall of Nanking, in the
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the opinion of Lo Erh-kang, The main problem was to keep up 
Taiping morale and preserve unity. The Young Sovereign would have 
to be saved in order to act as a rallying point, and the tropps 
in Kuang-te and Hu-chou protected from attack, so that they 
could cross unhindered into Kiangsi and join up with the Taiping 
forces on the north bank of the Yangtse.
Next Lo Erh-kang discussed the method which Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
employed to achieve his ends.
(i) Li Hsiu-ch*eng first 1 inebriated Tseng Kuo-fan with 
flattery.* Although he must have known that when he had been 
defeated at Ching-kang Tseng Kuo-fan had tried to drown himself, 
that he had almost been taken prisoner at Chiu-chiang and had 
felt obliged to write a testament at Ch'i-men, Li Hsiu-ch*eng 
nevertheless repeatedly praised his determination, calm and so 
on,
(ii) He put on a mask of candour, falsely confessed to 
passivity in joining the revolution and said he was nothing but 
a time-server. He had rescued the Young Sovereign out of a 
sense of duty alone, and now wished to help to put an end to the 
rebellion in order to repay his captors for the good treatment 
which he had enjoyed at their hands. All this, according to Lo 
Erh-kang, was pretence.
(iii) He turned the weapon of superstition, 'which the landlord 
class uses to confuse the peasantry* against Tseng Kuo-fan 
himself; he spoke of fatalism, destiny and so on in order to 
confuse Tseng Kuo-fan.
(iv) Li Hsiu-ch'eng made use of cunning stratagems, and used 
his interrogations to further his plans. He was twice questioned 
by Tseng Kuo-fan. On the first, the main theme was the whereabouts 
of the Young Sovereign. Two days later, Tseng Kuo-fan listed the 
questions which his secretaries were to put to the prisoner, and 
although, when this interrogation took place, the fate of many
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individual Taiping leaders was brought up, the Young Sovereign 
was not one of them. This was sufficient proof for Lo Erh-kang 
that Tseng Kuo-fan was already satisfied with Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s 
version of what had happened to the boy. In the interviews Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng had probed Tseng Kuo-fan*s hopes and intentions, and 
had made his plans accordingly. He jumped at the opportunity of 
writing his deposition in order to further his schemes.
His first aim was to protect the Young Sovereign; this is why
he wrote that the boy must certainly have been killed, though he
knew that it was not true, according to Lo Erh-kang. When the
large group of Taipings, including Li Hsiu-ch*eng, broke out of
Nanking, the Hunan Army troops sent in pursuit took prisoner a
minor wang called Li Wan-ts*ai, who told his captors that the
group had divided into two parts, one to escort the Young
Sovereign and the other, under Li Hsiu-ch*eng to hold off the 
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enemy. Lo Erh-kang assumed that Li Hsiu-ch*eng was aware that
the first group had got away; but he did not know that they had
managed to reach Kuang-te on 24 July (TC3/6/2l),^ and wanted to
ensure that no further search was made for the Young Sovereign.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng also emphasised in the deposition (page 249) that
even if the boy had escaped, he was incapable of planning
anything. This was merely part of Li Hsiu-ch * eng * s cunning.
He knew that the Young Sovereign was accustomed to administration
and had told as much to Chao Lieh-wen, who had asked why
proclamations had been made in his name before the death of his 
31father. Lo Erh-kang cites, as additional proof of the boy’s 
ability, the fact that he called a military conference after 
arriving at Hu-chou, and the deposition which he wrote after 
capture. At the military meeting the plan which was decided on 
was the same as that which Li Hsiu-ch’eng had drawn up six months 
earlier. There was a good plan, that is why Li Hsiu-ch’eng told 
Tseng Kuo-fan that there was not. By telling him that the TaipingB
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at Kuang-te would scatter without a fight, he was trying to 
protect them from attack.
The second part of Li Hsiu-ch*eng1s plan was to give time for 
the concentration of the Taiping troops north of the Yangtse 
by tempting the enemy into inaction with offers to disperse them. 
The military situation at this time was as follows: south of the 
Yangtse there were Li Shih-hsien*s troops, already in Kiangsi, 
and the units at Kuang-te and Hu-chou, who were about to enter 
Kiangsi; north of the river there was Ch*en Te-ts*ai*s army 
at Ma-ch*eng in Hupeh. Only a short distance separated these three 
Taiping armies. Opposing them were: Tseng Kuo-fan*s Hunan Army, 
which was the largest force on the government side, but was 
exhausted after the long siege of Hanking; Tso Tsung-t *ang*s 
army, which was somewhat battered after several defeats, and Li 
Hung-chang1s, which was still dangerous. These three government 
armies were all south of the Yangtse; only Pao Ch*ao was on the 
north side, but morale was very low in his army owing to 
corruption. Li Hsiu-ch*eng was aware, according to Lo Erh-kang, 
that the enemy had insufficient resources to prevent the Taiping 
units from joining up, but those south of the Yangtse were not 
yet ready, and needed time; this Li Hsiu-ch*eng intended to 
provide them.
He used a very roundabout way, Lo Erh-kang tells us. He 
humbled himself, proclaimed his dying wish to save the people and 
so on, and Tseng Kuo-fan was taken in. His warning about the 
danger of foreign aggression was part of his plot; it was not 
that he wanted to place the responsibility for resisting 
imperialism upon the landlord class; he merely wanted to distract 
attention from the Taipings, who were, he continually told Tseng 
Kuo-fan, no longer a threat. To the very end Li Hsiu-ch*eng kept 
up the pretence and treated Tseng Kuo-fan with soft words, 
praising his kindness even when he was at the point of death.
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Lo Erh-kang traces to popular literature, such as the novels 
Tung Chou lieh-kuo chih, San Kuo yen-i, ffeng-shen yen-i and 
Shui-hu chuan the influences which led his hero to employ such 
a stratagem. A contemporary had commented that his gentle 
exterior concealed a determined man; Lo Erh-kang agrees with 
this and argues that his apparent lenience to certain doubtful 
characters, and organizations, in the Su-chou region, was a 
method of putting them off their guard so that he could, in 
his own time, more easily suppress them.
A proof of Li Hsiu-ch*engfs continuing loyalty and confidence 
in the revolution is the fact that he kept secret from Tseng 
Kuo-fan the details of the plan to *give up the capital and go 
elsewhere. * This plan was still, after the fall of Hanking, 
the only way to save the revolution, even though Hung Hsiu- 
ch !uan had not seen the wisdom of it. The enemy would not have 
known of the plan had not traitors and unstable Taiping leaders 
spoken about it. Another proof of his firm stand, according to 
Lo Erh-kang, and one which shows his methods, is his reaction 
to Tseng Kuo-fan*s * treasure hunting.' The victors at Nanking 
were very anxious to get their hands on the vast wealth which 
the city was reputed to contain; Li Hsiu-ch*eng was determined 
to foil them. Thus, in his deposition he frequently drew 
attention to his own generosity, to the large sums of money which 
he had been obliged to pay out. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not the man 
to say something without a purpose; he said all this to show 
that there was no money left and discourage them from searching.
If he had been disloyal he would have told them where the treasure 
was hidden.
His plan for the dispersal of the Taiping troops was entirely 
pretence. He suggested that Tseng Kuo-fan send men to accompany 
the messengers which he, Li Hsiu-ch'eng, would chose himself to 
go to the various commanders to persuade them to give up the
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fight; but Li Hsiu-ch*eng intended, Lo Erh-kang assures us, to 
select men who spoke with a Kwangsi dialect which would not be 
understood by Tseng Kuo-fan*s nominees, and who could therefore 
secretly tell the Taiping commanders what the real plan was.
The final proof that Li Hsiu-ch! eng was using a cunning 
stratagem was that Tseng Kuo-fan was taken in. Lo Erh-kang 
explained that Tseng was not very acute - he admitted as much 
himself - he liked flattery, and had been dreaming of millions 
of rebels surrendering to him. Having captured Li Hsiu-ch1 eng 
he was puffed up with pride, despised him, and consequently fell 
easily into the trap. He believed Li Hsiu-ch* eng's assurance 
that the Young Sovereign must have been killed and reported in 
these terms to the court. When news arrived that the boy was 
not dead he did not believe it. But Tso Tsung-tfang had already 
informed the court that the Young Sovereign had reached Kuang- 
te, and the court celebrations for the death of the rebel king, 
arranged on the basis of Tseng Kuo-fan*s information, had to be 
cancelled. Urgent commands were then sent to various commanders 
to get hold of the Young Sovereign as soon as possible. Tseng 
ICuo-fan received this order on 25 August (TC5/7/25), and was 
angry with the reproach and at Tso Tsung-tfang for going behind 
his back, so to speak, and telling the court that the boy was 
alive after all. Contemporary opinion blamed Tseng Kuo-fan for 
having sent in a false report; the truth was, says Lo Erh-kang, 
that he had fallen into Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s trap. But this was not 
all. Tseng Kuo-fan had previously been well-aware of the 
importance of Kuang-te and of the fact that the Taipings would 
certainly advance from there into Kiangsi. On 9 February 
(TC5/1/2) he had been ordered by the court to attack Kuang-te, 
but at the time he complained that he did not have sufficient 
troops. After the fall of Hanking this objection was no longer 
valid, but he fell into Li Hsiu-ch*eng!s trap and allowed himself
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to be convinced that the Taiping troops in Kuang-te and Hu-chou 
were of no importance. On 3 August (TC3/7/2) he repeated to 
Tso Tsung-t*ang that this was Li Hsiu-chf eng fs opinion and a few 
days later told the same to the court. Tso Tsung-t*ang had been 
encountering stiff opposition from the Taipings in this region 
and Li Hung-chang was moving to his relief. But on 3 August 
Tseng Kuo-fan ordered Li Hung-chang to halt this operation and 
move his army into the Huai River valley, since he was now sure that 
there would be no trouble from the Taipings at Kuang-te and Hu-chou. 
There were no Taiping troops in the Huai valley at the time, but 
it would be threatened when Ch'en Te-ts'ai tried to enter Anhwei 
from Ma-ch'eng. Li Hung-chang replied on 5 August giving news of 
the Kuang-te front and declining to go to Anhwei. This letter 
reached Tseng Kuo-fan on 10 August, the day on which news arrived 
of the Young Sovereigns appearance at Kuang-te. The following 
day Tseng received an order from the court to launch an attack 
on Kuang-te? so he countermanded his order to Li Hung-chang and 
began praparing for an expeditionary force to move on Kuang-te.
But although Tso Tsung-t'ang sent urgent appeals this force did 
not reach its destination until 30 August, three days after the 
Taipings had evacuated the place. Tseng Kuo-fan had seen no need 
for urgency, according to Lo Erh-kang, because he still doubted 
the truth of the story of the Young Sovereign's survival and 
because he still believed that the Taipings at Kuang-te would 
disperse without fighting. He had fallen into Li Hsiu-ch1 engfs 
trap. Had Huang Wen-chin not died of illness, and had the Taipings 
not been beaten at Shih-ch1 eng, Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1 s plan would have 
succeeded.
Tseng Kuo-fan also swallowed the bait which Li Hsiu-ch1 eng 
offered by pretending that he wished to co-operate. He wrote in 
a letter to Li Hung-chang on 21 August that Li Shih-hsien's 
movements were uncertain now that the capital had fallen and that 
Xi Hsiu-ch*eng had urged the sparing of Liang-lcwang men. He wrote
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in the same terms to Tso Tsung-t *ang. On August 6, Tseng Kuo-fan 
had his final interview with Li Hsiu-chfeng and, Lo Erh-kang 
believes, agreed to his request for a lenient policy towards the 
Taiping survivors; this is why Li Hsiu-ch1 eng expressed gratitude. 
Two days later, Tseng Kuo-fan despatched to the court his memorial 
of TC3/7/7> in which he noted Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s request and indicated 
his own approval. He was, according to Lo Erh-kang, merely feeling 
his way, testing the reaction of the court, and did not report 
Li Hsiu-ch * eng1 s detailed proposals; hut he had fallen into the 
trap. He was however, the only one to do so; Li Hung-chang was 
against a merciful policy and thought that Tseng Kuo-fan had been 
taken in. Tso Tsung-t*ang*s reaction to Tseng1s letter is not 
known, but he seems to have believed that Li Hsiu-ch*eng could not 
be trusted. The court did not comment.
* * *
Lo Erh-kang*s article was a virtuoso: demonstration of 
intellectual acrobatics; he could draw upon an encyclopaedic 
knowledge of Taiping sources for this last-ditch defence of his 
hero. He started from the assumption that Li Hsiu-ch*eng was an 
unwaveringly loyal and heroic revolutionary. Anything in the 
deposition which seemed to contradict this image had to be explained 
away; as a result, this respected Taiping specialist had to resort 
to tortuous and far-fetched arguments more suited to hagiography 
than to historical research. Eew could compete with Lo Erh-kang 
in wealth of detail and documentation, but commonsense and logic 
alone lead one to the conclusion that his case is not-proven.
Chi Pen-yu*s attack and Lo Erh-kang*s elaborate defence sparked
off a public discussion in China about Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s role in
history, in which dozens of articles appeared, not only in
52historical journals, but also in the daily press. Lo Erh-kang
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was soon pushed aside; his arguments apparently convinced no 
one, and there was no open support for his theory that Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng had mounted a gigantic deception. All the participants 
in the discussion were agreed that the Chung Wang had offered to 
collaborate, the differences between them were primarily concerned 
with the degree of his guilt, and what sentence should be passed.
In this sense it was hardly a controversy, certainly not one
33between Chi Pen-yii and Lo Erh-kang. ^
Opinions ranged from utter negation of Li Hsiu-chfeng's role 
in the rebellion, to a more balanced assessment of his contribution. 
Some authors questioned his motives for joining the Taipings and 
saw evidence of disloyalty all through his career, culminating
34m  a calculated attempi to undermine and destroy the revolution;^
they saw in his clemency towards the enemy and towards Taiping
traitors, a reprehensible lack of class-consciousness; his concern
for the people was a sham and his 1anti-imperialism * a treacherous 
35hoax. His final degradation, the offer to collaborate, was a base
3 6attempt to save himself because he feared pain and death. In the
opinion of these critics Li Hsiu-ch*eng1 s previous achievements
were to be written off, first because of his final capitulation,
and secondly because he himself had written them off by expressing
37regret for his past activities. Therefore he should be thrown
down from his hero's pedestal and his deposition removed from the
shelf of revolutionary documents.^
A more balanced view was taken by other authors, many of whom
39saw Li Hsiu-ch'eng as a waverer rather than a traitor. y He was
a man without deep revolutionary conviction, with elements of
defeatism and compromise in his character who, in the end, lost
faith in the Taiping cause. His life fell into two stages, one
40of heroxsm and one of 'confusion;' but the first period was the 
most important. He was not exceptional; surrender by peasant 
revolutionaries to the landlord class in periods of revolutionary
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ebb-tide is the norm, said one critic* exceptions are due to 
individual characteristics.41 Without having read all the 
articles which appeared, my impression is that such relatively 
moderate views were distinctly in the minority.
It would be tedious and unneccessary to summarize all the 
contributions to the discussion or to undertake a point by point 
examination of all the arguments raised, even those of Lo Erh- 
kang, In the chapter which follows I will therefore attempt a 
reappraisal of Li Hsiu-ch*eng and an evaluation of his depos­
ition. In doing so, the most important of these arguments will 
inevitably come under scrutiny.
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VIII LI HSIU-CH'EMfi AMD HIS DEPOSITION; AH ASSESSMEMI.
The main value of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s deposition as an historical 
document lies in what it tells us, from inside so to speak, about 
the failure of the T*ai-p*ing T’ien-kuo, and secondly in what it 
reveals about the character of Li Hsiu-ch*eng himself.
It is natural, considering the time and circumstances under 
which Li Hsiu-ch*eng wrote, that he should have been preoccupied 
with the shortcomings of the defeated rebellion rather than with 
those positive qualities which had brought whatever popular support 
it had enjoyed. In addition, the deposition deals mainly with the 
period after the outbreak of internecine strife, when Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng was in a position of authority, and this coincided with 
the years of Taiping decline. As a result, Li Hsiu-ch ’eng has been 
accused of giving an unduly pessimistic, even slanderous, account 
of the rebellion. The fact remains however, that the Taipings had 
failed, not suddenly but after a long period of increasing, though 
not unrelieved, weakness and degeneration. So Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s 
criticisms cannot be dismissed as the despairing moans of a 
disillusioned man who had no loyalty and no confidence in * revol­
ution* , especially since they confirm to a great extent what we 
already know from other sources.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng summed up his opinion about the weaknesses of 
the T*ai-p*ing T*ien-kuo in the section called *the ten disasters* 
(actually he lists eleven, see page 252). This is the only 
surviving record of the ideas of a Taiping leader about the reasons 
for the collapse of the rebellion. It is not a profound or closely 
reasoned analysis, nor should we expect such. Three of the 
disasters which he listed are concerned with the failure of the 
northern Expedition of 1855-1855 > confirming the view that this 
was a vital opportunity lost for overthrowing the Ch*ing Dynasty.
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One of the ’disasters1 was the defeat of the Western Expedition 
at Hsiang-t*an in the spring of 1854, in which another opportunity* 
was lost, this time for smashing the Hunan Army* when it was still 
in its infancy. Three of the remaining points are directly 
concerned with the outbreak of internecine strife in 1856, and 
another four can be said to deal with the indirect or direct 
consequences of it. But Li Hsiu-ch*eng does not give us any new 
information about the details of the event itself. He was not at 
the time sufficiently senior to be party to the inner intrigues 
amongst the leadership, and his ignorance or reticence - I am 
inclined to believe that it was the former - is an indication 
of the veil of silence which the Taipings, especially perhaps Hung 
Hsiu-ch*tian himself, drew over an event in which so few of the 
leaders, including those who survived, showed up at all well. 
Nevertheless his remarks underline the crucial importance of the 
Incident as a turning point in the fortunes of the Taipings. It 
is tempting, though idle since we know so little about the aims 
and ambitions of the man, to speculate about what might have 
happened if Yang Hsiu-ch* ing had succeeded in deposing Hung Hsiu- 
ch *iian. In the event the result of his unsuccessful attempt was 
catastrophic, not only because several thousand of the original 
Taipings were slaughtered, but also because the rebels lost, in 
Yang Hsiu-ch*ing a brilliant and resourceful leader. The after- 
math was even worse; *the greatest disaster* was the defection, 
with some two hundred thousand troops, of Shih Ta-k'ai, whom Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng probably believed was the only man who might have 
held the Taipings together by his popularity and ability. Instead 
Hung Hsiu-ch*ttan thought himself threatened and isolated, put his 
trust in incompetents merely because they were members of his own 
family and alienated some of his loyal followers. The deposition 
emphasizes the profoundly demoralizing effect which the inter­
necine strife and the consequent deterioration of administration
106
had upon the morale of the rebels. *A11 wanted to disperse*, and 
only the uncompromising policy of the government kept them together. 
Perhaps too subjective a judgement, but nevertheless one which 
deserves attention.
We see through Li Hsiu-ch*eng1 s eyes the damaging effect of 
the breakdown of strong central leadership, after which there was 
an increasing growth of semi-private spheres of influence, lack 
of cooperation between commanders, encouraged to a certain extent 
by the suspicions of the T*ien Wang, who wished to prevent anyone 
from becoming too powerful. Li Hsiu-ch*eng himself was far from 
blameless in this respect.
The deposition gives some insight, though again perhaps too 
negative and too coloured by personal feeling, into the nature of 
Hung Hsiu-eh*uan*s leadership, his obstinacy, his fanatical 
reliance upon heaven and distaste for practical affairs. Yet Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng also shows that the T*ien Wang was neither a puppet 
nor an utter recluse, as has often been implied. His authority was 
still a force to be reckoned with even in the last year of the 
rebellion, when he could still oblige an unwilling Li Hsiu-ch*eng 
to obey him. Nor did he cut himself off so entirely from the admin­
istration of his kingdom that Li Hsiu-ch*eng, and presumably others, 
could not obtain an audience with him. The publication of the 
facsimile of the deposition also dears up the mistaken account of 
Hung’s death, which had been generally accepted until then.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng stresses that good discipline was the rule amongst 
the Taipings, especially under Yang Hsiu-ch*ing, and that the 
growth of indiscipline, looting and so on, was due to certain 
individual commanders and groups of incompletely absorbed and 
insufficiently indoctrinated soldiery and rebels. He lists (on 
page 165), some of the commanders whom he considered responsible 
for this degeneration. Other evidence can be found which tends 
to confirm this and the damage the Taipings did to their own
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movement by the indiscriminate enlistment of allies and mutinous 
government soldiery.
The deposition also helps us to understand the Taiping conquest 
of the southeast and the nature of their control over this region. 
It shows that the Taipings in entering southeast Kiangsu and 
Chekiang, moved into a military, and to a certain extent, political 
vacuum. There was no serious military resistance to their advance 
after the defeat of the Chiahg-nan H.Q. And although there was, 
as we know from other sources, a loyalist underground opposition 
which played a part in the eventual reconquest of the territory, it 
is clear that Li Hsiu-ch1eng1s hope to be able to enlist Ch'ing 
offioials into his service was not entirey an idle dream.
With respect to the social and economic policies of the Taipings 
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng tells us almost nothing. But it informs us by 
default. By not mentioning the Taiping land programme, the T1 ien- 
ohtao t’ien-mu chih-tu, he confirms the inescapable conclusion to 
be drawn from other sources, that this document was long since 
forgotten as a practical guide to policy. The absence of comment 
on this and other aspects of economic and social life confirms 
the conviction tjfiat the fundamental Taiping concern, at least in 
the southeast, was the preservation of the rural status quo; but 
this was enforced with leniency and solicitude for the livelihood 
of the people.
A great proportion of the deposition is concerned with military
campaigns. But anyone hoping for detailed accounts of operations
suoh as Napier gave for the Peninsular War or Kinglake for the
Crimean, will be disappointed. Li Hsiu-ch* eng *s accounts of
battles are no more detailed than the official Ch*ing reports
which are embodied in memorials, though they are possibly more
reliable. This may have something to do with Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s
educational standard, which evidently made it difficult for him
2to express himself in very precise terms. It is significant of
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his preferences in literature that one of the best-written 
parts of the deposition is the account, semi-fictionalised since 
based on hearsay, of the conversation between Wang Yu-ling and 
his secretary, (see page 2C4), which might have come out of the 
pages of a Chinese novel.
Nevertheless the deposition does give some valuable military 
information, and supplementing this with reports of operations 
from the government side, fairly detailed accounts can be pieced 
together. In recounting the various Taiping campaigns to raise 
the sieges of Nanking, Li Hsiu-ch*eng underlines the enormous 
expenditure of effort the Taipings were obliged to make in order 
to defend their capital, an effort which reduced their ability 
to undertake offensive campaigns. The deposition also contains 
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s assessment of the value to the government 
campaign of suppression of foreign military intervention. Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng had a poor opinion of Li Hung-chang as a commander 
and implies that he could have achieved nothing without foreign 
aid. But he also had a poor opinion of the *Ever-Victorious 
Army* as a fighting force, though he did not underestimate the 
power of their artillery nor the value of their steamers.
The greatest value of the deposition is in what it tells us 
about Li Hsiu-ch*eng himself, which is of great importance in 
understanding the nature of the Taiping movement. It is obviously 
the main source of our knowledge about him, and particularly about 
what went on in his mind after he had been taken prisoner. It 
enables us to know more about him than about any other Taiping 
leader, with the possible exception of Hung Hsiu-ch*uan. This 
does not mean that one must begin by accepting the deposition 
without reservation as an authentic account of his career or as 
an accurate reflection of his character. Just as with any doc­
umentary material it is necessary to ask who wrote it and why, so
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in the case of the deposition we have to bear in mind the 
circumstances under which it was written, the fact that its 
author was a captive after the defeat of the rebellion and that 
it was written for the eyes of his captors, the fact that he had 
been ordered to write but could have refused♦ With these 
reservations in mind however, we should start by taking the 
deposition at its face value, and then judge to what extent it 
fits in with what we know already from other sources. Only if 
there are manifest contradictions is it necessary to search for 
hidden meanings and secret intentions.
Taking the deposition at its face value then, what picture 
can we reconstruct of Li Hsiu-ch* eng* s character, and especially 
of his state of mind when he was in enemy hands?
First, there is no doubt that he was considered by Hung Hsiu- 
ch'tian as fundamentally loyal, otherwise it is unlikely that he 
could have risen from the ranks to one of the highest positions 
and the most powerful military command in the Taiping kingdom.
But in the atmosphere which prevailed after the internal diss­
ension and massacres of I856 it was evidently not easy to wield 
great military power without arousing the suspicions of Hung Hsiu- 
ch* iian. In addition, he seems to have had several differences of 
opinion with the T*ien Wang which had nothing to do with his 
personal position. He was, according to his own account, cont­
inually warning and exhorting his sovereigns *1 did my duty as 
a minister and memorialized, urging my Sovereign to select and 
employ men of ability, to establish a system for relieving the 
people, to promulgate strict laws...* (page 149), ’^ or a long 
time I warned to the best of my ability and submitted innumerable 
documents, but my advice was not heeded* (page 159), 'I argued 
forcefully with him but was severely reprimanded* (page 177) > * The 
more I petitioned the more the T*ien Wang mistrusted me* (page 211), 
Sometimes Hung Hsiu-ch*uan was *full of righteous anger, and
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reprimanded me [in a manner] hard to bear1 (page 221). But 
even when Hung Hsiu-ch*uan's distrust led him to attempt to under­
mine Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s authority by weaning T*ung Jung-hai away 
from him (see page 212), or by promoting one of his subordinates, 
Ch*en K* un-shu, to the position of wang (page 211), Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng certainly felt injured, but he remained loyal.
Lo Erh-kang claimed that Li Hsiu-ch*eng deliberately exagg­
erated his differences with Hung Hsiu-ch*tian in order to hoodwink 
(Tseng Kuo-fan. He supported his contention by pointing out that 
although Li Hsiu-ch*eng wrote that he had refused to obey d new 
order about the formula with which all documents should begin 
(see page 252), we know from documents which have survived that 
this was not entirely true. Li also contradicted himself by 
stating at one point, in order to exaggerate the T*ien ¥ang*s 
distrust of him, that his mother was held as a hostage in Hanking 
(page 175)» but later he wrote that she was with him in P*u-k*ou 
at the time (page 254)* He also, according to Lo Erh-kang, 
fabricated the incident of Sung Yung-ch*i, with its implication 
that he was on the point of turning coat (page 259). Contradict­
ions and discrepancies there may be, but to build upon them the 
theory of an elaborate deception is very far-fetched. It may 
well be that Li Hsiu-ch*eng exaggerated the friction which had 
occurred between himself and Hung Hsiu-ch *uan. But the simplest 
and most plausible explanation would be that he wished, without 
any particular motive other than self-justification, to extol his 
own role as the man who tried to make Hung Hsiu-ch*iian see reason, 
to disassociate himself from the shortcomings and failure of the 
rebellion and emphasize the difficulty of his position. Had he 
wanted to convince his captors of a pretended disloyalty, this 
can hardly have been the method he would have chosen.
There is no reason to doubt that there were serious differences 
between Li Hsiu-ch*eng and Hung Hsiu-ch *uan, or that the latter
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was usually very unreceptive to suggestions; indeed, it would 
"be surprising if he had not been, since he was profoundly 
convinced that he had the authority of God* In face of this kind 
of obstinacy and suspicion Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s behaviour may be 
taken as a proof of his fundamental loyalty. He need not have 
stayed: *If I had not been loyal I would long ago have gone else­
where* (page 192), *1 had several myriad of troops outside [the 
capital] and could have gone free and unconstrained* (page 251),
He might have gone over to join his former officer Li Chao-shou, 
with whom he remained in contact, especially in 1859 when he was 
in a position of some danger in P*u-k*ou (see page 175). He 
might have gone off with Li Shih-hsien, who urged him to do so 
(page 2270, take independent action like Shih Ta-k*ai whom 
he much admired. When Chao Lieh-wen asked him why he had not 
surrendered long ago, he replied that since he had been granted 
honours by Hung Hsiu-ch*uan, he could not betray him (see Appendix 
II p. 266). In the deposition he wrote, *a man of feeling and 
principles, I wanted to show gratitude for past friendship without 
forgetting* (page 245)* Even after the T 1 ien Wang was dead, Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng felt that his duty extended to his son: *Although
the I*ien Wang*s term was up, although he had fallen on evil days 
and had lost the state and the country, nevertheless, I had 
received his favour and could not but remain loyal and do my 
utmost to save the offspring of the I*ien Wang* (page 245). In 
doing this he lost his own life, and yet he could probably have 
made arrangements for his own safety*
His loyalty was not unwavering. We know from his own account 
that he had wanted to give up. He wrote two or three times that 
his position was like that of a man riding a tiger; he was not 
happy with his mount, but the consequences of getting off were 
worse. As a Kwangsi man he was unlikely to escape execution. Only 
if he was prepared to make amends by fighting against the Taipings
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like Wei Chih-chun, might he have *won the pleasure of being 
allowed to return home1 (page 164), but there is no reason to 
suppose that he was, The incident of Sung Yung-ch*i (pp.239-40) 
is not in itself conclusive, since Li Hsiu-ch1 eng was not apparently 
the prime mover in this matter. Moreover, if there had been any 
real negotiations about his surrender it is likely that some mention 
could be found in Chfing records. However, we know from Chao 
Lieh-wen ’ s diary that negotiations were going on about this time 
with a trusted member of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s staff, though Chao does
X
not hint that they concerned Li himself. There had been rumours 
for a few years that he might be willing to turn coat. The Na 
Wang', Kao Yung-k*uan*s son, whose father had been executed after 
surrendering, told Gordon that *the Chung Wang was willing to come 
over1. ^ Earlier, in September 1862 Gordon had written to his 
mother that the Chung Wang was on the worst terms with the T'ien
c
Wang, *andis said to be negotiating surrender to the Imperialists*. 
His sense of loyalty was not strong enough to prevent him from 
keeping in contact with Li Ohao-shou, or strong enough to make him 
take action against Kao Yung-k'uan and the other Su-chou wangs, 
whose treachery lost him the city.
His loyalty, such as it was, was of a very personal kind, to 
Hung Hsiu-ch'uan and his son; it does not seem to have extended 
with the same degree of devotion to the Taiping cause. But what 
was the Taiping cause? This is obviously not the place to attempt 
to deal with so large and complex a question. But it is necessary 
to note at least two relatively uncontraversial components of the 
Taiping ideology to which Li Hsiu-ch*eng does not appear to have 
been deeply committeds Taiping Christianity, and what we may call 
for want of a better term, anti-Manchu nationalism.
Of these, Taiping religiopi had a special importance, because 
to a certain extent not only anti-Manchu sentiment, but other 
components, such as peasant animus against landlords and what one 
might tentatively call their social programme, were expressed
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in religious terms and justified "by religious authority. It was 
the Taiping religion above all which supplied that spark of 
fanaticism essential in rebellious or revolutionary movements of 
this kind. This heterodox, monotheistic and alien faith, diluted 
with traditional and popular beliefs, continually sustained the 
early Taipings in their conviction that they were carrying out 
a divinely appointed mission. It elevated the God-worshippers, 
the backbone of the rebellion, above the rest of society and 
turned them into a united, devoted band of elite. Their discipline 
and morality, which contributed significantly to their early 
successes, the strong bonds of brotherhood which attracted great 
numbers of poor people to their banner, stemmed from popular 
tradition, but were invigorated and justified by biblical authority. 
The charismatic appeal of the prophet Hung Hsiu-ch*ttan drew more 
support for the rebellion than the *Land System of the Heavenly 
Dynasty*. ^
In this religion Li Hsiu-ch*eng seems to have been no more
than a very lukewarm believer. There is little in the deposition
about his own understanding of Taiping religious doctrines. * After
I worshipped God,* he wrote, (and this could mean no more than
*after I joined*), *1 never dared to transgress in the slightest,
but was a sincere believer...* (page 135 )> and later, *When I
joined the Heavenly Dynasty I became acquainted with Heavenly
writings, thanks to my teacher. I will say no more about this*
(pag© 143)* ^ke next mention of anything even faintly resembling
religious sentiment is when Li Hsiu-ch*eng referred to his encounter
with a mysterious teacher near Hang-chou (page 143); but this
initiation has closer affinities with the Feng-shen yen-i than with
7
Giitzlaff*s Bible. The only other references to religion in the 
deposition are disparaging remarks about Hung Hsiu-ch *uan*s 
irrational dependence upon God. *The Soveriegn did not interest 
himself in affairs of state, but relied entirely upon Heaven,
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enquiring neither about military, nor about political matters1
(page 175); the T'ien Wang 1 relied entirely on Heaven and hardly
ever gave orders or instructions to his ministers' (page 177),
'his edicts spoke of Heaven, not of men1 (page I83) and so on,
When Li Hsiu-ch'eng was asked his opinion of the writings of Hung
Jen-kan, who had a more profound and enlightened knowledge of
Christianity than any other Taiping leader, he replied that he
had not bothered to read them (see Appendix II page 263), In
those of his proclamations and letters which survive, with the
8exception of his reply to the missionary Edkins, there is little
reference to religion. Another missionary, who had spoken with
Li Hsiu-ch'eng, confirmed his lack of interest in these matters.
On conversing with the Chung Wang, soon after his interview
with respect to the conflicting points between the Bible
and the T'ien Wang's doctrines, Mr. Holmes found it
impossible to gain his attention to these matters. He
confessed carelessly that the two did not agree, but as
the T'ien Wang's revelation was more recent than the
9Bible, it was more authoritative.
Since there is nothing to suggest that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had a 
superior understanding which led him to reject the 'gods of the 
crowd', his lack of enthusiasm for the religion of Hung Hsiu-ch'tian 
implies a weak commitment to Taiping ideology as a whole.
This is complemented by the very moderate nature of what we 
may call his political attitude, especially for a Kwangsi Taiping 
who must have been nourished on strong doses of anti-Manehu 
propaganda. He may well have had the sensibilities of his captors 
in mind when he was writing, but there is no reason to doubt, for 
instance, that he did offer free pardon to the Manchu garrison at 
Hang-chou, or that he was sincere when he wrote that the Manchus 
and their officials could not be blamed for serving a different 
master - 'Each serves his own Sovereign and you and I have no
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choice hut to ohey' (page 202). Similar sentiments axe express-
ed elsewhere in the deposition, and in Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s letter to
10Chao Ching-hsien. It is clear that he treated Han officials 
and commanders who served the dynasty with a clemency rare in 
rebellions of this kind. He sought out the body of Chang Kuo- 
liang, the renegade rebel who became a determined enemy of the 
Taipings, and gave him a decent burial (page 184); he spoke of 
Hsii Yu-jen, the Governor of Kiangsu who drowned himself rather 
than fall into the hands of the Taipings, as !a loyal minister*.11 
His courtesy to Lin Fu-hsiang and Mi Hsing-chao, Ch'ing officials 
taken prisoner in Hang-chou, made them respond in a way which 
cost them their lives (see note 1 to page 206).
I,i Hsiu-ch*eng has been criticized by contemporary Chinese
historians for attempting to take towns in the Southeast without
fighting for them, by bribing the garrisons and offering a free
pardon, thus allowing the enemy to preserve his military force
intact instead of destroying it. The point is arguable, After
all, he might have quoted the authority of Sun Tzu that *to
12subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill *. But 
it is probably true that Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s policy had a detrimental 
effect on the chances of Taiping survival in the area, not because 
towns surrendered without a fight, but because enemy troops were 
absorbed more or less indiscriminately into the Taiping armies, 
individuals and groups secretly hostile to the Taipings were 
employed in their administration, and militia bands, potential 
* fifth columns* were allowed to remain in existence. In the early 
days of the rebellion new troops seem to have been indoctrinated 
with Taiping ideas and forced to observe their discipline and 
moral code; but little of this seems to have been done after 
the Taiping conquest of the Southeast. This was mainly the result 
of the loss of vigour and morale in the rebellion after 1856, but 
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s lukewarm attitude to Taiping ideology must also
1.16
have had an influence in this respect.
Peasant animus against the landlord class, and that of the 
under-privileged in general against officialdom, were certainly 
other elements in the early Taiping movement. The desire for 
social justice, however vaguely formulated, by those who felt 
themselves to be victims of the social order, was expressed in 
some of the Taiping policies and satisfied to a certain extent 
by some of their reforms. An egalitarian ideal of mixed Chinese 
and Christian ancestry was the foundation of their land policy, 
the ! T * ien-ch1 ao tiien-mu chih-tu1, but even in the early period 
there is no evidence that it was ever put into practice. In the 
areas under Li Hsiu-ch*eng1s control after I860, about which a 
good deal of information exists, there is even less trace of any 
attempt at agrarian reform. On the contrary, at first sight it 
seems that the Taiping administration was primarily concerned 
with the immediate task of collecting revenue from the countryside, 
and consequently was at pains to disturb the rural status quo 
as little as possible. This meant confirming landlords in their 
tenure if they had not run away, and even encouraging them to
13
come back if they had. It seems probable, in the absence of 
any evidence to the contrary, that southeast Kiangsu and Chekiang 
were not exceptional in this respect.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s personal loyalty and his weak commitment 
to the Taiping * cause* were the main factors which governed his 
reactions to the collapse of the rebellion and his behaviour after 
he had been captured.
The tone of his remarks to Chao Lieh-wen (see Appendix II), of 
his replies in interrogation (Appendix I), and of the whole 
deposition, reflects his conviction that the T*ai-p'ing T*ien-kuo 
was at an end. How that the T*ien Vang was dead, and probably his 
son as well, now that the capital was lost, the Taiping armies in
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disarray and he himself in enemy hands, Li Hsiu-ch1 eng undoubtedly 
felt that his debt of loyalty to Hung Hsiu-ch*iian was paid to 
the full. Only by recognizing this is it possible to understand 
his subsequent behaviour.
When he was brutally interrogated by Tseng Kuo-ch*uan he acted
with dignity and resignation because he was expecting nothing
better; he had nothing to gain by answering questions. But when
he was informally examined by Chao Lieh-wen he was clearly more
co-operative. If Chao*s record is correct, and there is no reason
to doubt that it is reasonably accurate, it does a great deal to
confirm Li Kuo-huai*s version, in essence if not in detail. The
interviews with the Tseng brothers may not have taken place
exactly as Li Kuo-huai described them, (his story came from his
father and grandfather, neither of whem was present4), and Li
Hsiu-ch*eng*s reaction may not have been so simple or so sudden;
nevertheless, stripped of its fictional decoration, there is
something about the story which rings true. Li Hsiu-ch*eng did
respond to the comparative civility of his captors after the
initial savagery of Tseng Kuo-oh*uan and he became much less
reticent. We know nothing of him between the time of his interview
with Chao Lieh-wen on 2J July and his first meeting with Tseng Kuo-
14fan on the 28th. Hor do we know anything about what passed 
between them at this meeting. The next record we have is that 
of Li Hsiu-ch*eng»s interrogation by P*ang Chi-yun and Li Hung-i 
(Appendix I). This took place on $0 July. On the same day he 
began writing the deposition. It is clear from these accounts 
that after the first interview with Tseng Kuo-ch*uan, when he said 
nothing, Li Hsiu-ch*eng became increasingly co-operative and 
willing to talk, and this culminated in the writing of the depos­
ition. To this extent Li Kuo-huai*s story is hardly a slander.
Lo Erh-kang would have us believe that Li Hsiu-ch*eng never 
lost confidence in the revolution. Did he not say during the
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interrogation that *a commander who, after winning victory after 
victory, suffers a defeat and cannot recover, is not much good* 
(Appendix I page 262)? But these words cannot he pressed into 
Lo Erh-kang*s service to support this argument. A defeated 
commander ought to he ahle to recover, to he sure; but what if 
he has no army, no master and no state, and is firmly locked up in 
an enemy prison? Li Hsiu-ch*eng may have said to Chao Lieh-wen, 
'Now that the capital has fallen and I have been made prisoner, 
do you think that there will he no more trouble in the country?' 
(Appendix Upage 268). But does this really amount to a stem 
warning that the Taipings were not finished? He may have written 
in the deposition, 'You cannot kill them all!' * E^.); hut
was this really a brave cry of defiance? Lo Erh-kang conveniently 
separated the phrase from its context. What Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote 
was, 'It is no use to inspire awe by killing - they cannot all 
he killed; hut kindness can win the submission of the people*
(page 251).
Lo Erh-kang believes that the overall situation in the summer 
of 1864 was favourable to the Taipings, in spite of the fall of 
their capital, and that this was what determined Li Hsiu-ch*eng 
to attempt a cunning plan. There had been about ten thousand 
Taiping troops in Hanking at the time, therefore the bulk of the 
rebel forces were still intact. The Hunan Army was in disarray, 
Tso Tsung-t * ang had been badly mauled and only Li Hung-chang 
represented a serious threat. . Thus the stage was set for the 
sort of stratagem which a hero of the San Kuo yen-i might use.
But was this really the situation after the fall of Hanking?
Even if the government armies were somewhat battered, the Taipings 
had been in a much worse state for some time. Nothing indicates 
this more clearly than the epidemic of treachery in which many 
Taiping commanders went over to the government side with their 
troops: T'ung Jung-hai in the summer of 1862 (see page 212), Lo
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Kuo-chung early in 1863, Ku Lung-hsien in the winter of the same 
year, the Su-chou wangs in January 1864 (page 227) and Teng Kuang- 
ming in April. In the winter of 1862, even with the immense 
force at his command, Li Hsiu-ch*eng had been unable to break 
the siege of Hanking by a small army of plague-ridden Hsiang-chiin 
(see page 218); his Western Expedition in the summer of 1865 had 
failed to achieve its object and had ended in the catastrophic 
debacle at Chiu-fu-chou (page 220). These were already grave 
symptoms of decline. By the time Li Hsiu-ch*eng began to write 
Hung Hsiu-ch *iian was dead, the capital had fallen, he was a 
prisoner and the Young Sovereign and Hung Jen-kan were dead as 
far as he was to know. Li Hsiu-ch*eng was well aware, Lo Erh- 
kang stresses, of the importance of maintaining unity and morale: 
could he have imagined that there was still hope in this respect 
in August 1864?
Lo Erh-kang claims that Li Hsiu-ch*eng knew that the Young 
Sovereign would get away, and acting as a rallying point and 
leader of the movement, would carry out a plan which had already 
been adopted. So he had at all costs to conceal from Tseng Kuo- 
fan the fact that the Young Sovereign had made good his escape, 
and prevent the enemy from sending troops in pursuit. But did 
Li Hsiu-ch’eng try to deceive Tseng Kuo-fan on this point? It 
is possible that Tseng asked him about the fate of the Young
Sovereign during their first interview on 28 July; but this is
by no means certain, since Tseng may have believed the reports 
which said that all the Taipings who had escaped from the city 
had subsequently been killed.^ If LI Hsiu-ch*eng was questioned 
about the Young Sovereign, there is no reason to suppose that 
his answer would have been different from what he later wrote in 
the deposition (page 245 ).
Although he got out [of the city] I do not know whether
he is still alive today. He was a young boy of sixteen
120
and had grown up from childhood without ever having 
ridden a horse, and moreover, had never had to suffer 
[such] fright. General Tseng’s soldiers pursued from 
all sides and he must certainly have been killed. If 
General Tseng's cavalry or infantry killed him on the 
road they would not have known that he was the Young 
Sovereign.
Later Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote (page 249):
The question is being discussed, supposing he did get 
away, what kind of clever plan the Young Soverign may 
have? This man certainly cannot have any [such plan].
Is this evidence that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was trying to pull the 
wool over Tseng Kuo-fan *s eyes in order to save the Young 
Sovereign? There are no grounds for assuming that he was not 
expressing more or less what he believed to have happened. If 
he had wished to persuade Tseng Kuo-fan that the boy was dead, 
he could easily have invented a plausible story, and would have 
said nothing about exchanging horses with him (page 244). In 
the circumstances it is not surprising that he should have 
believed the boy to have perished. The fact that Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
himself had been obliged to give up his horse implies that very 
few of the several hundred Taipings who broke out of the city 
could have stayed with their leaders. Even Li Hsiu-ch*eng was 
soon separated from the Young Sovereign. The fact that Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng himself, a popular and distinguished commander, could 
have apparently been abandoned with his useless horse, shows the 
extent of the danger, or the degree to which discipline had 
broken down. No news of the Young Sovereign arrived at Nanking 
until after Li Hsiu-ch*eng's execution; what could be more 
natural than his assumption that the boy was dead? It is probable 
too that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was sincere in saying that the Young 
Sovereign could not have any clever plans, Lo Erh-kang points
1-21
out that when Chao Lieh-wen asked him why for several years
there had been edicts signed by the Young Sovereign, Li Hsiu-
ohfeng replied that it was in order to accustom him to the
management of affairs (see Appendix II page 267). Yet the boy
himself, in his deposition, said that even after he had succeeded
his father he had only been given drafts to sign, drawn up for
16him by Li Hsiu-ch'eng or Hung Jen-kan. Moreover, what opinion 
must we form of the son and heir of the rebel king Hung Hsiu-ch*ban 
who, after being taken prisoner, had the the astounding naivete, 
even for a boy of fifteen or sixteen, to tell his captors that now 
his ambition was to be allowed to study?
Kwangtung is not a good place; I do not want to go back 
there. I would just like to go with Mr. T'ang to study
17in Hunan, and I would like to pass the hsiu-ts1 ai degree. ‘
Lo Erh-kang argues that a plan, essentially the previous plan
for giving up the capital and going elsewhere (page 221), was to
come automatically into operation as soon as the capital fell,
and that the first step in this plan was that the Young Sovereign
and Hung Jen-kan were to join up with the Taiping forces at Kuang-
te and Hu-chou. But if this were so, Hung Jen-kan would not have
written in his deposition that they were considering meeting up
with Li Shih-hsien, and that this was because there was a shortage
18of grain in Hu-chou. In fact, when they did try to make contact
with Li Shih-hsien, they found that he had already left Kiangsi
19and had moved into Fukien. '
In arguing that Tseng Kuo-fan had fallen into Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s 
trap, Lo Erh-kang placed great emphasis on what he considered 
Tseng's otherwise inexplicable behaviour in not immediately send­
ing troops to Kuang-te and Hu-chou to mop up the Taipings there,
20in spite of an imperial order to do so. Tseng Kuo-fan may 
have been influenced by Li's opinion that the Kuang-te Taipings
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21could be dispersed without a fight, but this was not the only 
reason for his delay. First, as we have pointed out, the state 
of the Hunan Army units at Nanking was far from satisfactory and 
Tseng Kuo-fan was unwilling to commit them to further action. 
Secondly, Kuang-te fell between the spheres of influence of Li 
Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-t'ang, and he did not want to arouse
22further jealousy on their part by interfering with their campaigns. 
Finally, and this was perhaps the most important reason, Tseng Kuo- 
fan probably believed, either on the grounds of what Li Hsiu-ch1 eng 
had told him, or on the basis of military intelligence, that the 
Taipings at Kuang-te did not in fact represent any serious threat.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng was perhaps understandably pessimistic when he 
told Tseng Kuo-fan this; but no one knew better than he that 
the Taipings had been dealt a blow from which they could not 
recover. He may have been a little premature in assuming that 
the Young Sovereign had perished, but in the absence of information 
to the contrary this too was very natural.
Thus, when Li Hsiu-ch*eng began writing on 30 July it was in a 
spirit of resignation and retrospection which gives to the depos­
ition a certain flavour of detachment. There is a tradition, as
noted earlier, that he set out to leave behind a true history of
23the T*ai-p*ing T*ien-kuo. ' This may be based on something he said 
in interrogation, but no record of such a statement exists. In 
the deposition itself he wrote, *it is my sincere desire [to relate] 
the history of the Kingdom, oarefully and in detail from beginning 
to end, to arrive at the reasons for its failure* (page 184), and 
again, *My Sovereign’s affairs having already come to such a pass, 
all I can do is to write for the inspection of the Grand Secretary 
and the Governor, so that they may know the history of my 
Sovereign’s attempt to establish a dynasty. I relate the sources 
of its destruction, concealing nothing, but recording everything 
in detail* (page 160).^
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There is a strong element of self-justification in the 
deposition. It is understandable that a man of Li Hsiu-ch* eng* s 
power and ability should not want to go down in history as a vile 
bandit who ended his life on the execution ground. He did not 
hint at his own contribution to the breakdown of central control 
and discipline. He was anxious to present himself as a man of 
honour and feeling who had, mainly because of destiny, served the 
wrong cause or the wrong master. Nevertheless, he never, even 
at his most abject, abandoned the idea that the T*ai-p*ing T'ien- 
kuo was a rival state, not just a mob of bandits. Failure came 
from military errors, from the betrayal of good principles, from 
the lack of unity and discipline, not from anything fundamentally 
wrong in having challenged the ruling dynasty. That this theme 
was one of his main motives for writing the deposition is bom 
out by the fact that he devoted a special section to his conclus­
ions (see pp.251-2).
The most controversial part of the deposition is Li Hsiu- 
ch1 eng* s offer to collect together his former troops so that they 
could be disbanded. According to Lo Erh-kang*s theory, this 
was part of Li Hsiu-ch*eng1 s cunning plot; he proposed it in 
order to play for time and allow the Taiping troops north and south 
of the Yangtze to assemble for a counter-attack. If Tseng Kuo-fan 
agreed, Li Hsiu-ch*eng would chose messengers whose Kwangsi 
dialect would not be understood by Tseng Kuo-fan*s men, and who 
would be able to convey his secret instructions! Opponents of 
Lo Erh-kang have roundly condemned Li Hsiu-ch * eng- for treachery 
in seeking to undermine the revolution and buy his own life. One 
interpretation follows the assumption that Li Hsiu-ch*eng was an 
heroic and invincible revolutionary, the other that he was a traitor 
to an heroic and invincible revolution. Neither considered the 
possibility of judging Li Hsiu-ch*eng in other than purely black 
and white terms.
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Although Li Hsiu-ch1 eng had mentioned in conversation with
Chao Lieh-wen that he would like to he allowed to disband the
remainder of his troops (see Appendix II page 268), the matter
was apparently not mentioned again until half way through the
deposition (see page 192). This suggests that unless Li Hsiu-
ch* eng was exercising great subtlety in gradually working up
to the point, the desire to gain ;acceptance for the dispersal
plan was not the first consideration he had in mind when he began
writing. It is not an injustice to his undoubted ability to
deduce from a close study of the deposition that Li Hsiu-ch*eng
25was not capable of such literary subtlety. It is more likely 
that the idea of persuading Tseng Kuo-fan to accept some sort of 
plan for the disbanding of the Taiping troops took on an increas­
ing importance for him, perhaps because of a growing conviction, 
as no news came of the Young Sovereign and Hung Jen-kan, that the 
rebellion was really finished.
When he first mentioned the matter to Chao Lieh-wen, the latter 
believed that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was in some way begging for his life 
(see Appendix II page 268). Tseng Kuo-fan too, in memorials and 
in the colophon to the printed edition, stated that Li had begged 
for pardon. The only evidence we have to go on however, is the 
deposition itself and the records of interrogation. If Chao Lieh- 
wen recorded Li's remarks accurately we may judge almost as well 
as he, whether or not the prisoner was begging for his life, and 
are likely to conclude that the assumption seems unjustified.
Tseng Kuo-fan did not produce any evidence, and it is perhaps 
worth noting that his statements were official, and possibly inf­
luenced by considerations of what might give pleasure to the 
court.
The evidence from the deposition is also inconclusive on this 
point. Certainly Li Hsiu-ch'eng never directly pleaded for his 
life. He begged for clemency for Kwangsi men; but he did not
125
necessarily imagine that this would include himself or other 
1ringleaders1; he expressed envy for Wei Chih-chun, who had 
gone over to the government and had Von the pleasure of being 
allowed to return home* (page 164). The strongest arguments to 
support the contention that he wished to bargain for his life are: 
first, that he wrote at one point (page 191), 'To be first loyal 
to Ch'in is the loyalty of an honest man; but if Ch'u can forgive, 
he will repay even unto death*, and secondly, that the plan for 
the dispersal of the Taiping remnants depended on his being 
allowed to live, at least until its completion. If successfully 
accomplished, there would be a good case for sparing him. But 
this does not mean that the only, or even the main motive for 
proposing the plan was to save his own life.
Death was never very far away in such days of turmoil, and 
everyone knew the penalties of rebellion. Nearly everyone fears 
death, but Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s behaviour when stabbed by Tseng Kuo- 
ch'dan, his remark to Chao Lieh-wen that he expected only death 
(Appendix II page 268), the resignation he expressed to Alabaster 
(see page 21) and the fact that according to Chao Lieh-wen he 
died with dignity and calm, do not suggest that he would have 
descended to bargaining for his life. One wonders whether Tseng 
Kuo-fan would have felt sorry for him if he had.
If Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not propose the dispersal plan to obtain
mercy for himself or in order to^  hoodwink Tseng Kuo-fan, then
he did so in order to save bloodshed, especially of his relatives,
friends and former troops. Such motivation is neither out of
character nor incompatible with his state of mind at the time.
His lenient treatment of captives, his solicitude for the welfare
of the poor, are related in the deposition but also confirmed by
other sources. This shows him to have been a comparatively humane
man. Amongst foreigners in China he was generally recognized as
2 6
a moderate and popular rebel leader, Gordon regretted his
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death (see note 32 to Chapter I). Even contemporary Chinese
writers hostile to the Taipings, though usually unwilling to
admit that he was genuinely of a kindly disposition, conceded
that at least he gave the appearance of "being so, and that he was
27popular with the people. If, as we have shown, his loyalty 
was of a personal nature, to the T*ien Wang and to his friends, 
and not to an abstract ideal of revolution, then there is nothing 
improbable in the suggestion that once he believed the rebellion 
to be irrevocably lost, he hoped to prevent further bloodshed by 
arranging for the dispersal of his armies. He was not exceptional 
in feeling concern for his troops. Shih Ta-k*ai, whom Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng admired, had given himself up in June I863, together with 
his son, in the hope of persuading the government commander to
28spare his defeated and surrounded army and allow them to disperse.
In order to achieve his aim Li Hsiu-ch* eng was ready to flatter
Tseng Kuo-fan in a fulsome manner which many modem Chinese find
highly unpalatable. But Li Hsiu-ch*eng was probably not entirely
insincere in his praise of Tseng, who was after all, an exceptional
and outstanding official for his time, whatever later generations
may have said of him. In comparison with the generality of his
colleagues he was a man of principle, integrity and resolution, and
his reputation remained virtually unchallenged by anyone except
29jealous impeachers before Chang Ping-lin.  ^ It is difficult to 
think of any Ch*ing official more likely to win Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s 
admiration.
Finally, it is clear that Li Hsiu-ch*eng considered that the 
threat from foreign aggression was an additional reason for 
bringing the defeated rebellion to an end as soon as possible.
’The thing to be feared now is that the foreign devils will 
certainly take action... Now it will not be very difficult to 
settle the T’ien Ch*ao affair, and the first thing is to guard 
against the aggression of the foreigners... [the opportunity should
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be taken] now, before they make a move.,,1 (page 255)* But this 
theme was not developed; either Li Hsiu-ch*eng did not consider 
it important enough, or else he did not have the time or the 
literary ability to emphasize it. His specific proposals for 
how China should resist were limited to the idea of purchasing 
and adopting certain foreign weapons, the value of which Tseng 
Kuo-fan was not entirely unaware. Had Li Hsiu-ch*eng stated in 
so many words that everyone should unite to resist imperialism, 
he would still have been criticized in our own day for wishful 
thinking, but much would have been forgiven him.
If this picture of Li Hsiu-ch*eng is a true one, it would be 
valuable to determine to what extent he was typical of Taiping 
leaders in the latter half of the rebellion. How far was he 
exceptional in the nature of his loyalty, in his weak commit­
ment to the Taiping * cause*, in his moderation, in his tendency 
to compromise? These questions must be left unanswered for the 
time being. But if he was not Just an exception, it will mean 
that some common assumptions about the nature of the T*ai-p*ing 
T*ien-kuo will have to be re-examined. So much the better.
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THE DEPOSITION OP LI HSIU-CH'ENG
Hotes on the Translation
1. This translation is from the Taiwan facsimile edition of the
deposition, Li Hsiu-ch’eng ch1 in-kung shou-ohi $*>)
Taipei, 1961.
2. Passages deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan are typed in capitals.
3* Passages not deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan but omitted in the Chiu 
Ju T*ang Edition, are in capitals, between curved brackets.
4. Passages protruding into the left Margin are those which Li
Hsiu-ch*eng wrote in the top margins of the original. All these 
additions were omitted in the Chiu Ju T*ang Edition, though 
most were not deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan.
5* Figures in the left margin refer to the pages of the facsimile,
which however are not marked.
6. Reference is made in the notes to omissions by Lu Chi-i in his 
copy only where such omissions are substantial.
7. As far as possible all omissions and deletions have been 
restored to the text, whether they were made for grammatical 
or other reasons, except, in the former case, where they would 
unduly burden the text with nonsense. Tseng Kuo-fan*s outs 
were made in such a way as to leave intact or to improve the 
sense of the passage in question* In the translation it has not 
always been possible to indicate this.
8. When Tseng Kuo-fan oame to a passage which he did not understand, 
or in which the grammar was hopelessly confused, he usually 
deleted it. I have had to guess at the meaning and attempt a 
translation. The results are not always very intelligible.
9. The style of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s writing reveals the low standard
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of his formal education and his taste for popular literature. 
It is neither literary nor colloquial his use
of particles is especially shaky. In order to preserve 
something of its original savour and ambiguities, I have not 
attempted to translate it into polished English prose.
THE DEPOSITION
IT WAS IN THE SIXTH MONTH OP THE YEAR CHIA-TZTJ [1864] THAT 
THE STATE WAS DESTROYED AND I WAS TAKEN PRISONER AND BROUGHT1 
TO THE CH'ING CAMP, WHERE I WAS TREATED KINDLY AND LENIENTLY 
AND MY DAILY NEEDS WERE PROVIDED FOR, OWING TO THE LIBERALITY 
OP THE GOVERNOR,2 I WAS ALSO HONOURED BY THE SPEEDY ARRIVAL OP 
THE GRAND SECRETARY,5 WHO INTERROGATED ME ABOUT WHAT HAD OCCURRED.^ 
ON THAT DAY I REPORTED THE SUCCESSION OP EVENTS IN GENERAL, BUT 
NOT VERY CLEARLY; THEREFORE I WILL AGAIN SORROWFULLY SEARCH 
MY MEMORY AND STATE EVERYTHING CLEARLY.
HOW MY SOVEREIGN WAS DESTINED TO FOUND THE STATE5 HAS BEEN 
RECORDED IN THE 1T1IEN-WANG1S DECREE,*6 WHICH ALSO RELATES HIS 
ORIGINS AND THE HISTORY OP THE RISING. BECAUSE OP THE PALL OP 
THE CAPITAL I DID NOT BRING WITH ME A COPY OP THE DECREE, BUT 
WHAT I CAN REMEMBER IN GENERAL TERMS I WILL WRITE DOWN FOR THE 
SCRUTINY OP HIS EXCELLENCY THE GRAND SECRETARY. I START WRITING 
WITH ALL SINCERITY, WITHOUT CONCEALING THE LEAST THING.
First, as to the T*ien Wang*s origins, this is recorded 
clearly in the hook. There were three brothers in his family,
7
the eldest Hung Jen-fa, the second Hung Jen-ta.' The T'ien
Wang1 s name was Hung Hsiu-ch *uan.^ [They were children of] the
same father hut different mothers.^ HIS FATHERfS NAME I DO NOT 
10KNOW. The eldest and second sons were horn of the former 
mother. (HUNG HSIU-CH'TON WAS BOHN OF THE LATER MOTHER).11 
THESE FACTS WERE RECORDED BY THE T'lEN WANG IN THE DECREE AND 
WERE CONTINUALLY TAUGHT AT THE PREACHINGS,12 SO THAT EVERYONE 
KNEW. The eldest brother and the second brother worked on the 
land before they left home, while Hung Hsiu-ch*uan studied."^
He and Peng Yun-shan were friends and school-fellows.1^
One day the T'ien Wang suddenly fell ill. This was the illness 
of the year Ting Yu [1837]* He died and came to life again
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1after seven days. After he came to life again he spoke mostly
in heavenly words and used little of common speech. He exhorted
2
the people to worship God and cultivate virtue SAYING THAT
2 people willing to worship God would avoid disasters and suffer- 
ing, Those who worshipped God must not worship other deities, 
for this would he a crime. Therefore, after people "began 
worshipping God none dared worship other deities. People are all 
afraid of death; being told that snakes and tigers would devour 
them, who would not be afraid? Therefore they obeyed.
The T1 ien Vang was from Hua-hsien in Kwangtung.^ Prom Hua- 
hsien he went to Hsun-chou, Kuei-p*ing, Wu-hsiian, Hsiang-chou,
5
T*eng-hsien, Lu-ch'uan and Po-pai in Kwangsi - scattered over
£
several thousand li. He often hid in the depths of the mount­
ains, where he secretly taught people to worship God. HE 
TAUGHT PEOPLE ABOUT BEING EATEN BY SNAKES AND TIGERS AND ABOUT 
AVOIDING DISASTERS, SICKNESS AND SORROW. EACH PERSON PASSED 
ON THE WORD TO TEN OTHERS, TEN TO A HUNDRED OTHERS, A HUNDRED 
TO A THOUSAND, A THOUSAND TO TEN THOUSAND. (IN SEVERAL HSIEN 
SOME EOLLOWED AND THERE WERE SOME WHO DID NOT. IN EACH 
VILLAGE OP A HUNDRED OR SEVERAL) tens of families, three or 
five families might join, or eight or ten families. But there 
were educated and intelligent people - scholars - who did not 
join. Those who did were all peasants and poor people, and 
they assembled together and made a host.
Those who were in the know, who wanted to establish a state, 
who planned deeply and far ahead, were the Tung Wang Yang Hsiu- 
ch* ing, the Hsi Wang Hsiao Ch*ao-kuei, the Nan Wang Peng Yun- 
shan, the Pei Wang Wei Ch*ang-hui, the I Wang Shih Ta-k*ai, and
7
the T1 ien-kuan-ch* eng-hsiang Ch*in Jih-ch*ang. These six men
8 9were deeply in the know. The others' really followed for the
3 sake of food. THIS IS THE TRUTH.
IP YOU WISH TO KNOW ABOUT THE ORIGINS OP THE FORMER WANGS
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I WILL ESPECIALLY GIVE A CLEAE ACCOUNT OP THEM ONE BY ONE.
The Tung Wang Yang Hsiu-ch*ing lived in Kuei-p’ing-hsien, THE 
HB3E OP THE MOUNTAIN WHERE HE LIVED IS P'ing-ai-shan; he
cultivated hill land and humed charcoal for a living when he
1 2 was at home. He was not clever, but after he became a God-
worshipper he understood everything; I do not know how
providence could so transform this man. I REALLY DO HOT
UNDERSTAND. The T*ien Wang placed great confidence in him and
handed all the affairs of state over to him. His military
discipline was strict, his rewards and punishments just.
The Hsi Wang Hsiao Gh ’ ao-kuei came from Lu-lu-t*ung in Wu-i- 
4hsien. At home he made a living by cultivating land and hill
land. The younger sister of the T*ien Wang was his wife; he was
therefore given much responsibility. He was courageous and
resolute and was in front when there was a charge.
The Nan Wang Feng Yun-shan studied when he was at home. He
was able and educated. Amongst the original six it was the Nan
Wang who planned the setting up of the Kingdom; at first it was
he who did everything.
The Pei Wang Wei Gh * ang-hui came from Chin-t*ien in Kuei-
p*ing-hsien. At home he was in and out of the yamen on business,
and was a chien-sheng. He had a lot of ability to take quick
advantage of opportunities.
The I Wang Shih Ta-lc’ai also came from Kuei-p*ing, from Pai-
sha. His family was wealthy; he had studied and was well versed
7in literature and military technique.
The T *ien-kuan-ch1 eng-hsiang Ch*in Jih-ch*ang also came from 
Pai-sha in Kuei-p*ing. At home he worked as a hired labourer.
He was without any talent, but was loyal, brave, sincere and
righteous, consequently the T'ien Wang placed great trust in
,  ,  8 him.
At the beginning it was these six men who taught people to
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worship God.
4 When I was at home I knew nothing about any ’T’ien Wang,1
but in every village and. every place people had heard merely of 
’Hung hsien-sheng. * PEOPLE EVERYWHERE RESPECTED HIM, SO IN 
SEVERAL HSIEN THERE WERE MARY PEOPLE WHO WORSHIPPED GOD.
Por many years after people were taught to worship God, 
nothing happened; but about the 27th or 28th year of Tao Huang 
[1847» 1848] there were rebel and bandit risings all over 
Kwangsi, which disturbed the towns. Most, communities had 
militia bands. There were differences between the militia and 
the God-worshippers; the God-worshippers stuck together as 
one group and the militia as another group. They vied with
each other and threatened each other, and thus forced a
. . 1rising.
At the time of the rising, [in the struggle between] the
militia and the God-worshippers, one village was pitted against
2another - sometimes they were in the same village - therefore 
they banded together.
In the 30th year of Tao Kuang, in the 10th Month, [5 October 
to 3 December 1850] the villages of Chin-t’ien, Hua-chou, Lu- 
ch’uan, Po-pai and Pai-sha rose (SPONTANEOUSLY) on the same 
day.5 THIS WAS ORDAINED BY HEAVEN. IT WAS NOT PLANNED IN DETAIL, 
AND THIS FURTHER INCREASED THE FAITH OF THE GOD-WORSHIPPERS.
hsiang were all in Chin-t’ien. Shan-jen-ts’un comes under the 
administration of P’ing-nan-hsien, which is next to T'eng-hsien. 
The place of the rising was 70 or 80 li from my home, by
(IT IS MORE THAN 300 LI FROM
At the time of the rising the
CHIN-T’IEN TO TA-LI. SHAN- 
JEN-TS’UN AND THE PLACE OP 
THE RISING ARE 70 OR 80 LI 
FROM MY HOME AT TA-LI).
T’ien Wang was hiding in the home 
of Hu I-huang in Shan-jen-ts'un,4
and not a single person knew of it.
The Tung Wang, the Pei Wang, the 1^ 
Wang and the T ’ ien-kuan-oh * eng-
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mountain paths difficult to follow. At this time I was at home
and heard the news of the rising at Chin-t’ien WHICH GOD-
WORSHIPPERS BROUGHT TO MX HOME; BUT I BIB HOT GO, I REMAIHEB
AT HOME.1 HOT LONG AFTERWARDS I HEARD THAT from Chin-t’ien
the Tung Wang sent troops to Hua-chou to take the T’ien Wang to
2the assembled group at Chin-t'ien.
3 4 3To Chin-t’ien came Ta-t’ou-yang, Ta-li-yii, and Lo Ta-kang.
AT THIS TIME I WAS STILL AT HOME, BUT WHEN I JOIHEB THE ARMY
IT WAS UHDER LO TA-KAHG, SO I KNOW ABOUT THIS, ANB THAT IS WHY
I ABB IT.^ These men had been active as bandits at Ta-huang-
chiang-k’ou.^ They went to Chin-t'ien to join the army. This
Ta-t’ou-yang, when he came to Chin-t’ien, saw that the God-
worshippers were not very strong and were unlikely to come to
anything, and therefore did not join. Later he went over to
the Ch’ing Provincial Commander-in-Chief Hsiang [ Jung] Lo
Ta-kang was not on good terms with Ta-t’ou-yang. Later Lo Ta-
kang joined.
AFTER THE CAMP WAS MOVED FROM WU- 
HSttAN TO HSIANG-CHOU THERE WAS A 
BATTLE IN WHICH THE CH’ING TROOPS 
AT MIAO-WANG WERE WIPEB OUT, ANB AT 
CHUNG-P * ING IN HSIANG-CHOU THERE 
WAS A BATTLE, AT MA-AN-SHAN. IN THE. 
BATTLE OF MA-AN-SHAN THE CH’ING 
TROOPS SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE LOSSES; 
MANY OF THE T’IEN CH’AO WERE KILLED 
TOO. AFTER THE TROOPS MOVEB FROM 
CHIN-T’IEN TO WU-HSttAN THERE WAS A ' 
BATTLE AT SHUANG-CHIEH-TING,9 WITH 
MANY KILLED ON BOTH SIDES. (AT THE 
BATTLE OF HSIN-HStt THE CH'ING 
[TROOPS UNDER] PROVINCIAL COMMANDER-
After the T’ien Wang’s
arrival at Chin-t’ien the troops
were moved to Tung-hsiang and
San-li in ¥u-hsuan, where the
God-worshippers were assembled
together. After the people of
Wu-hsuan were assembled, they
went to*' Hsiang—chou and
mobilized troops of the God-
worshippers, and turned back
to Chin-t’ien and Hsin-hsu,
where they camped for several 
10months. They were surrounded 
on four sides by Ch’ing troops, 
but escaped out of the difficult
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IN-CHIEH HSIANG [ Jung] AND CHANG situation by narrow mountain
CHING-HSIU SURROUNDED US).1 paths.2 They came out to Ssu-
3
wang and Ssu-hui, and engaged more than ten ying of the Ch'ing
Commander-in-Chieh Hsiang [Jung]'s troops, which were destroyed
by the Hsi Wang and the Nan Wang, ^ They came out of the
5encirclement by way of Pa-t'ung-shui^ to Ta-wang-hsu. Then they
c
divided forces and went on land and by water to Yung-an-chou.
7
At this time I was still at home, and I heard that the troops 
6 who were coming by the land route were all to pass through my 
village from Tfeng-hsien in Wu-chou [Prefecture] and Ta-li-li 
in the 57th Sub-district, up to Yung-an.
My family was poor. My parents had two sons - my younger 
brother is Li Ming-ch'eng. THERE WERE MANY COUSINS AND UNCLES 
IN THE PAMILY, BUT IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO LIST THEM ALL. I WILL 
ONLY GIVE A GENERAL ACCOUNT. My family was poor and it was 
difficult to make ends meet each day; TO GET THROUGH A MONTH 
WAS EVEN MORE DIFFICULT. We made a living by cultivating some 
mountain land and working as labourers.
When I was eight, nine and ten, I studied with my uncle, but 
after the age of ten I was with my parents trying to make a 
living. At the age of twentysix or twentyseven I heard that 
there was a !Hung hsien-sheng1 who was teaching people to 
worship God. AFTER I WORSHIPPED GOD ^ I NEVER DARED TO TRANSGRESS 
IN THE SLIGHTEST, BUT WAS A SINCERE BELIEVER, ALWAYS FEARING THE 
SNAKES AND TIGERS.
10The T'ien Wang passed through Ssu-wang to Ta-huang-hsii,
where he divided up his forces, some to go by water and some by
land, up to Yung-an. The road passes through Ta-li, where there
are high mountains on all sides, surrounding the plan for
several hundred li. THE HSI WANG LEADING the troops going by
land, passed through Ta-li, were led by the Hsi Wang [sic], the
11T1 ien-kuan-oh' eng-hsiang and Lo Ta-kang. The troops led by the
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1Hsi Wang and the Pei Wang stayed for five days in Ta-li,
SEARCHING POR grain, foodstuffs and clothing in the villages,
7 taking from whatever village they c ame to, AND THE GRAIN WHICH 
THE PEOPLE HAD MOVED INTO THE DEPTHS OP THE MOUNTAINS WAS 
ALSO TAKEN.
The Hsi Wang stayed in a village near my home and he gave
out that the God-worshippers must not he afraid and flee. They
could eat together as one family, so why should they flee? My
family was very poor, so having no food to eat did not flee.
When the army marched, the houses of all those who had joined
2the God-worshippers were set alight and burned. People 
followed because they were poor and had nothing to eat. Village 
people had no sense of distance and would hundreds of li and 
not know how to get back. When there were soldiers in pursuit, 
how could they avoid being afraid?
We went from Ta-li straight up to Yung-an. After taking
3 4Yung-an, we remained in the town for several months. Then
Grand Secretary Tai ^  with Wu-[lan-t *ai]^ and Hsiang [jung]'s
armies surrounded us on all sides so that we were cut off.
7
Then we went by a small road through Ku-su-ch,*ung to Chao-pfing.f
0
Ku-su-ch’ung was garrisoned by ChTing Shou-ch'un troops.
These were smashed by Lo Ta-kang, and this enabled us to get out
9of the encirclement by a narrow path.
We captured more than ten loads of powder and thus obtained 
ammunition, without which we would not have been able to get out 
of this encirclement, because we were besieged in Yung-an without 
a scrap of powder. IN FACT IT WAS ONLY WITH THE HELP OF THE 
TEN OR MORE LOADS OF POWDER WHICH WE OBTAINED FROM THE SHOU- 
CH'UN TROOPS AT KU-SU-CH'UNG THAT WE WERE ABLE TO GET OUE OF THE 
ENCIRCLEMENT.
The Shui-tou stockade at Yung-an was held by the T1 ien-kuan- 
ch*eng-hsiang Ch'in Jih-ch!ang; the Ch'ing troops were commanded
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8 by Chang Ching-hsiu.
After breaking through the encirclement we moved to Hsien-
hui and were pursued by the main force of General Wu-[lan-t !ai],
and more than two thousand of the T’ien Ch’ao soldiers, men and
2
women, were killed. So when we saw what a desperate position 
we were in, on the following day we made an united effort and 
fought to the death with Wu-[lan-tfai]'s troops and killed four 
or five thousand of them.^ General Vu-[lan-t fai] was wounded 
and died at Lu-t'ang-hsu.^
After the victory the Tung Wang gave the order not to go to 
Chao-p’ ing and P’ ing-lo, but to go by paths across Niu-chiao
5
and Yao-shan to come out at Ma-ling, then go up to Lu-t’ang 
and Kao-t'ien and lay siege to Kuei-lin. After hesieging it
for more than a month, the city was not yet taken and the troops
were withdrawn to Hsiang-pi-shan and across the river, then on
7 8to Ch1 uan-chou by way of Hsing-an-hsien.
After the capture of Ch'uan-chou - the Han Vang was killed in 
9battle here - it was decided to go up to Tao-chou, attack Yung-
10ming and take Chiang-hua-hsien.
In Tao-chou, Chiang-hua and Yung-ming in Hunan we enlisted
11some twenty thousand people. At this time the troops in
12pursuit of us were those of Hsiang [Jung] and Chang [Kuo-liang].
Later, the troops moved to Chfen-chou, and here also enlisted
15twenty or thirty thousand people, and at Ch1 a-ling-chou J several 
thousand."^
Then the troops moved again and the Hsi Vang Hsiao Ch’ao-kuei
took Li K ’ai-fang, Lin Feng-hsiang and others to attack Ch’ang- 
15sha. At this time I was an ordinary soldier and held no office.
9 Vhen the Hsi Vang went to attack Chlang-sha the T’ien Wang
'fclle ^ung Vang were still in Ch*en-chou. The Hsi Vang was 
killed by a cannon shot outside the south gate of Chfang-sha.
Li Kfai-fang sent a report back to Ch*en-[chou] and the T’ien
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Wang1 and the Tang Wang moved with the troops to Ch'ang-sha,
which was then fiercely attacked for several days without
success. The great wall of Ch’ang-sha was mined and knocked
1
down in several places, but the troops could not break in. 
Outside, the Ch’ing armies of Hsiang [Jung] and Chang [Kuo-liang] 
were surrounding and attacking us, but at a victorious battle
opposite Ch’ang-sha at Sha-chou we killed many of the Ch’ing
2government troops. Afterwards we attacked the city but still
could not take it. The T’ien Ch’ao troops had grain but no oil 
or salt.5 THE TEOOPS W E E  STOUT OP HEABT BUT THEIE STRENGTH WAS 
IHSUPPICIENT. Because of this, the attack on the city was not 
successful.
At the south gate of Ch’ang-sha the T1 ien Wang had the
Imperial Seal made and was acclaimed Emperor; his wife was
acclaimed Empress and the Tung, Hsi, Han, Pei and I_ Wangs were
given their titles. The wangs were appointed first and the
Tfien Wang was proclaimed Emperor afterwards.
After the making of the seal the city was not yet taken, and
it was decided to move the army, intending to go by Ch'ang-te,
by I-yang-hsien, along the side of Tung-t’ing Lake, with the
7
purpose of making Honan our base. At I-yang we unexpectedly
seized several thousand private boats and it was decided to go
8 9down stream. We passed through Lin-tzu-k' ou, and leaving Tung™
t’ing Lake, came to Yueh-chou and continued into Hupeh by land
10 and water. At the capture of Yueh-chou we obtained Wu San-kuei’s
arms, which were loaded into boats; then we went straight to
Hupeh.
11We took Han-yang and Hankow and besieged Wu-ch’ang. We
12then took the city by mining [the wall]. At this time the 
Tung Wang gave the orders, while Li K ’ai-fang, Lin Feng-hsiang 
and Lo Ta-kang commanded the troops. After a siege of more than 
twenty days Wu-ch’ang was taken, but it was not held.^ [The
army went] straight to Yang-lo, took Huang-chou, Ch’i-shui,
Ch’i-chou, Chiu-chiang and An-ch’ing. This was all done by
2
a simultaneous advance by water and on land.
At this time Hu I-huang, Li K’ai-fang and Lin Feng-hsiang 
commanded the troops of the land route. The Tung, Pei and I 
Wangs, with the T’ ien-lcuan-ch1 eng-hsiang, Lo Ta-kang, Lai Han-
3
ymg^ and others, were in command of the armies on the water.
We took An-ch'ing but did not hold it. We hastened down 
river and surrounded Ghiang-nan [Hanking], attacked the city 
for seven days and took it by mining [the wall] and breaking in 
at the I-feng Gate.^ " In the river there were more than ten 
thousand boats loaded with grain and other things.
At this time the T'ien Wang and the Tung Wang still intended 
to detail troops to hold Chiang-nan, THE T’IEN WANG wanting to 
go on to Honan, to take Honan as our territory. But an old 
Hunan boatman loudly raised his voice and personally petitioned 
the Tung Wang not to go to Honan, saying, "In Honan the rivers 
are small And there is little grain; if the enemy surround us 
we will not be able to survive. Having taken Ghiang-nan we have 
the strategic advantage of the Yangtse, and we have myriads of 
boats; why go to Honan? Hanking is the home of emperors, the 
wall is high and the moat deep, the people are rich and there 
is a superabundance of everything. You have not yet established 
your capital, then why go to Honan? Although Honan is the centre 
of the country, there are many strategic advantages too, it is not 
to be compared with Chiang-nan. I beg the Tung Wang to consider 
this." The Tung Wang reconsidered the matter in the light of 
this old boatman’s words, and we did not go [to Honan]. This 
boatman was the man who piloted the Tung Wang’s boat. He was 
convinced by this boatman and changed [his plans] accordingly; 
so in the end we did not go [to Honan].^ Instead the T’ien Wang 
was carried into Nanking,^ and its name was changed to T’ien-ching,
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Armies were set up and the military regulations put in
order. The Tung Wang was in charge of the government and
everything was strictly regulated. Laws were promulgated and
the people pacified. In the city of Chiang-nan [Nanking]
men and women were separated, the men into the menfs section
2and the women into the women*s section. The various trades
3
were also formed into sections. Those who wished to join the 
army could do so, those who did not could [return] home.^
People leaving the city were allowed to carry [things] in their 
hands, but were not permitted to use carrying poles,^ WOMEN 
ALSO.^ Men and women were not allowed to speak to each other; 
mothers and children were not allowed to talk together. It was 
very strict and won the people*s respect.
A strict command was issued for the pacification of the 
people, in EVERY FAMILY BEING PACIFIED, every area being 
pacified, [that if anyone] whether officer or soldier, dared to 
enter people *s homes WITHOUT ORDER he would be punished without 
12 mercy. THOSE WHO STEPPED WITH THE LEFT FOOT OVER THE THRESHOLD 
OF A PRIVATE HOUSE WOULD HAVE THE LEFT FOOT CUT OFF, THOSE WHO 
STEPPED OVER THE THRESHOLD OF A PRIVATE HOUSE WITH THE RIGHT FOOT 
WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT FOOT CUT OFF. The laws were strict, there­
fore in the year Kuei Ch*ou [1853] we were everywhere victorious 
and the people were well-disposed to us.
Tung Wang* s discipline was strict and respected by 
soldiers and people. The Tung Wang himself was overbearing and 
ruthless. He was the first man in the whole state. Wei Ch*ang- 
hui, Shih Ta-k*ai and Ch*in Jih-ch*ang had been very intimate 
at home, planning the rising, and when the Tung Wang became too 
domineering these men nurtured a grudge against him; they 
obeyed with their tongues but their hearts were [enraged]^ NOT 
APPEASED. SMALL GRUDGES MULTIPLIED AND GREW INTO A DISASTER; 
THEIR GRUDGES ACCUMULATED AND THE ENMITY BECAME DEEP. THE TUNG,
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PEI AND I WANGS WERE NOT ON GOON TEEMS. The Pei Wang and the 
I Wang were united by their hatred of the Tung Wang.
Then the Tung Wang was killed by the Pei Wang, Originally
'fc*ie Wang and the I Wang had secretly decided to kill only
Tung Wang, because the T’ien Wang had great faith in him and 
had delegated too much power to him, and he demanded that the 
T’ien Wang accord him the title of ’wan sui. At that time 
all the power was in the hands of the Tung Vang and he [the T’ien 
Wang] had no choice but to acclaim him [ ’wan sui’ ] . He forced 
’k*10 T’ien Wang to come in person to his palace to acclaim him 
* wan sui *. The Pei Wang and the 1 Wang v/ould not accept this. 
THERE WAS TO BE HO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PRINCE AND MINISTER; THE 
TUNG WANG WANTED TO BE SUPREME. THEN THE PEI AND I WANGS PLOTTED
TO KILL THE TUNG- WANG. THE PEI WANG AND THE I WANG secretly
planned to kill the Tung Wang, and to kill his three' brothers,
13 THAT IS, YUAN-CH'ING AND FU-CH'ING;2 but apart from them, few 
others were to be killed. Then, after the Pei Wang killed the 
Tung Wang, he killed all the Tung Wang’s relatives and all his 
staff, civil and military, young and old, men and women - all 
were wiped out. Because of this the I Wang was angry with him. 
The I Wang was at Hung-shan in Hupeh when he heard that many 
people had been killed in the capital. From his camp at Hung- 
shan in Hupeh he hastened back to the capital with Tseng Chin- 
lien and Chang Sui-mo, intending to stop the killing. To his 
surprise the Pei Wang had evil intentions and wanted to kill the 
I Wang as well. When the I Wang heard about this he escaped 
(THE NAME OF THE CH'ING OFFICER over the city wall by the small
WHO BESIEGED NING-KUO WAS CHOU? south gate and went off. He
I DO NOT KNOW HIS GIVEN NAME. went to An-ch'ing to plan his
THIS MAN WAS LATER KILLED WITH revenge. At this time the Pei
(sic) LI SHIH-HSIEN IN BATTLE Wang killed the whole of the
AT WAN-CH'IH, WU-HU).5 Wang's family.4 The army at
Hung-shan was brought to the relief of Ning-kuo.
In the capital the Pei Wang was killing civilians and
military, old and young, men and women, without distinction.
This became unbearable; everyone inside [the capital] and out,
and the whole court, were agreed, so the Pei Wang was killed
1
and the people's minds were set at ease.
Later the Pei Wang's head was sent to Ning-kuo so that the I
Wang could see for himself that there was no mistake. Then the
I Wang returned to the capital. The whole court wanted him to
2
take over the government and the people welcomed this; but the 
Sovereign was not pleased and would only employ the An Wang and 
‘the Pu Wang. The An Wang was the Sovereign's eldest brother 
Hung Jen-fa and the Pu Wang was his second brother Hung Jen-ta.
The people at court were very displeased at the Sovereign for 
using these two men. They had neither ability nor foresight; 
but they were versed in the Heavenly Doctrines and in no way 
disagreed with the T'ien Wang's ideas. The I Wang was obstructed 
by them, and because of this there was ill-feeling between the 
I Wang and the An and Fu Wangs. Their suspicions and obstruction 
forced him to leave the capital. It was because of this that he 
then went on a long expedition and did not return to the capital.
I have already recorded how the T'ien Wang started the rising, 
and the former position of the Tung Wang Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, the 
Hsi Wang Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, the Han Wang Peng Yun-shan, the Pei 
Wang Wei Ch'ang-hui, the I Wang Shih Ta-k'ai, the T'ien-kuan- 
ch'eng-hsiang Ch'in Jih-ch'ang, the Ti-kuan-ch'eng-hsiang Li K'ai- 
fang, the T' ien-kuan-fu-ch' eng-hsiang Lin Peng-hsiang, the Tung- 
kuan-ch' eng-hsiang Lo Ta-kang and the Hsia-kuan-ch' eng-hsiang 
Lai Han-ying. [i have spoken about] the T'ien Wang's origins,^ 
of the way in which the Tung, Hsi, Han, Pei and I Wangs planned 
together and started the rising and how these people later killed
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each other, which was the source of disorder. This has "been
clearly recorded.
I have already [sic] clearly related all the facts about how
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng became an officer of the T'ien Ch'ao and the
campaigns which he undertook every year under orders, without
concealing anything. I RESPECTFULLY PRESENT EVERYTHING IN
15 DETAIL FOR THE INSPECTION OF THE GRAND SECRETARY, SO THAT HE MAY
IMMEDIATELY UNDERSTAND AND THERE EE NO QUESTION OF ERROR.1
I was bom at Hsin-wang-1s * un in Ch1 ang-kung-li in the 57th
sub-district of Ning-feng-hsiang, in T'eng-hsien, Wu-chou
2
Prefecture, Hwangsi. My father, Li Shih-kao, HAD ONLY W O
OFFSPRING, LI HSIU-CH'ENG AND MY YOUNGER BROTHER LI MING-CH'ENG.5 
My mother's name was Lu. MY FAMILY WAS POOR AND HAD NOT ENOUGH
TO EAT. WE MADE A LIVING TILLING THE LAND AND CULTIVATING
MOUNTAIN [slopes]^AND HIRING OUT AS LABOURERS,5 KEEPING TO 
OUR STATION AND ACCEPTING OUR POVERTY. AT THE AGE OF EIGHT, NINE
AND TEN I STUDIED WITH MY
UNCLE, BUT MY FAMILY WAS POOR 
AND I COULD NOT STUDY LONGER.
BUT I USED TO WORK AS A 
LABOURER IN THE SCHOOLS AND 
KNEW THEM ALL WELL. WHEN I 
JOINED THE T’IEN CH'AO I BECAME 
ACQUAINTED WITH HEAVENLY 
WRITINGS, THANKS TO MT TEACHER.
I WILL SAY NO MORE ABOUT THIS.
WHEN I WAS YOUNG AT HOME, IN 
THE 26TH, 27TII AND 28TH YEARS 
OF TAO ICUANG [1846-8], THE T'IEN 
WANG CAME FROM HUA-HSIEN IN KWANGTUNG PROVINCE TO P'ING-NAN, WU- 
CHOU, WU-HStfAN AND OTHER HSIEB IN KWANGSI, AND WAS EXHORTING
(I BECAME ACQUAINTED WITH HEAVENLY 
WRITINGS AT HANG-CHOU, BEHIND THE 
HILLS AT WEST LAKE, WHERE THERE WAS 
A TEACHER MORE THAN NINETY YEARS 
OLD, WHO TAUGHT ME FOR SEVEN DAYS 
AND SEVEN NIGHTS. AFTERWARDS THIS 
MAN WENT AWAY WITHOUT SAYING ANY­
THING AND I COULD FIND NO TRACE OF 
HIM. NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN CAPTURED 
AND CANNOT AVOID MY DESTINY I SPEAK 
OF THIS).7
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PEOPLE TO WORSHIP GOB. I HAVE ALREADY GIVEN AN ACCOUNT OP THIS.
AFTER PEOPLE JOINED THE GOD-WORSHIPPERS, REBEL RISINGS
FLARED UP EVERYWHERE IN KWANGSI.1 EVERY YEAR BANDITRY SPREAD;2
BANDIT CHIEFS APPEARED: CH'EN YA-KUEI, CHANG CHIA-HSIAHG,3 TA-
T'OU-YANG,4 SHAN-CHU-CHIEN,5 LO-MI-SSU AND LIU SSU.6 THESE
BANDIT CHIEFS CARRIED ON THEIR EVIL DEPREDATIONS YEAR AFTER YEAR,
ROBBING PAWNSHOPS AND INCESSANTLY RAIDING TOWNS.7 THE VILLAGERS
WERE USED TO SEEING BANDS AND HAD CEASED TO EE AFRAID, SO WHEN
THEY SAW THE TROOPS OF THE GOD-WORSHIPPERS ARRIVE THE MEMBERS OF
THE SOCIETY DID NOT FLEE ELSEWHERE. BECAUSE OF THIS THEY WERE
16 OPPRESSED BY THE MILITIA AND THEREFORE JOINED US IN BEWILDERMENT.
All the way from Kwangsi I was an ordinary soldier; I had
no hand in internal administration at this time. After the
taking of Nanking I had an administrative position under the
8Ch fun-kuan~ch1 eng-hsiang Hu I-huang. Then the Tung Wang gave
9
an order that from each ya an officer be appointed to take
charge of new recruits. The Tung Vang appointed me to the post
of Commandant of the 4th REAR Army of the Right, commanding a
10new ying to hold the T'ai-pfing Gate. This was in the year 
Kuei Chfou [1855]*
11In the 8th Month of the same year I was appointed Chien-chun
of the 4th Army of the Rear to garrison Kao-ch!iao, outside the 
12
I-feng Gate. In the 10th Month I went with the I Wang to
13An-ch*ing to pacify the people.  ^ At this time my position was 
low and I merely did what I was told,
IN THE ARMY I WAS DILIGENT AT STUDY AND PRACTICE, CORRECT 
IN MY BEHAVIOUR AND DID NOT SHIRK HARD WORK, SO ALL MY SUPERIORS 
LIKED ME. I NEVER REFUSED WORK, EITHER LIGHT OR HARD. IN ANHWEI 
I WAS SUPERVISING CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AND WAS ALSO IN COMMAND 
OF TROOPS CONSTRUCTING DEFENCES. I PUT MY HEART INTO EVERYTHING. 
Then Ch1 un-kuan-chT eng-hsiang Hu I-huang led troops to take
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Lu-chou-fu."1' After the prefecture had been taken, a despatch 
arrived [transfering me] to garrison Lu-chou-fu and pacify the 
people.^ This was in the 4th Year f1854]• At this time I was
appointed to a position of
command. AT THIS TIME MY RANK 
WAS LOW A M  I HAH LITTLE RESPON­
SIBILITY.
The I Wang had quarrelled with 
the An and Pu Wangs and had gone 
elsewhere.^* The Tung and Pei 
Wangs were dead and Ch'in Jih-
ch'ang, because of the mutual slaughter of Wei Gh,ang-hui and
the Tung Wang, was also killed. CHfIN JIH-CH'ANG IS THE SAME AS
5
CH'IN JIH-KANG. Because there was a shortage of men in the 
state [administration], the court ministers selected 18th Chih-
hui Ch'en Yli-ch*eng, 20th Ghih-hui Li Hsiu-ch*eng, the Ts'an-
7 8t * ien-an Meng Te-en, and the Shih-t1 ien-fu Li Shih-hsien to
help [in the administration of] the Kingdom.^
10At this time the I Wang left An-ch'ing to go far away.
Fortunately I enlisted the troops of Chang Lo-hsing and Kung
11Te-shu, who claimed to have an army of a million. Consequently
the T'ien Wang issued a decree and promoted me to Ti-kuan-fu-
ch*eng-hsiang, to garrison T'ung-ch'eng and protect An-ch'ing.
Because of the ill-feeling between him and the An and Pu Viangs,
I Viang left the capital and went away and the morale of the
12soldiers and people was damaged.
Lu-chou was taken by General Ho [Ch'un] of the Ch'ing and
13the whole garrison was wiped out. Then General Ho himself came
down to Chen-chiang and with Chang Kuo-liang attacked Chen-chiang ^
sending part of his array to attack T'ung-ch'eng-hsien, led by
the Ch'ing Provincial Commander Ch'in Chiu-t'ai, to mount the 
15siege.There were more than a hundred stockades of various
(WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THIS I 
WILL LEAVE FOR THE MOMENT AND 
RELATE THE AFFAIR OF THE 
I WANG AND THE AN AND FU WANGS;
I WILL CONTINUE SPEAKING 17
ABOUT THIS LATER).
146
sizes under the Ch'ing commander, at San-ho, Shu-ch*eng, Liu-an,
Lu-chiang, Ch'ao-hsien, Wu-wei and other hsien in the Lu-[chou]
1
prefecture, all joined up in a tight ring. At the time of the
18 siege of T’ung-ch'eng I was a ch1 eng-hsiang, X HAD ONLY SIX
OR SEVEN THOUSAND TROOPS WHO, WEAK AND USELESS, HAD BEEN LEFT
BEHIND FOR ME WHEN THE I WANG RAN OFF AND ENTICED THE TROOPS TO 
2
GO WITH HIM. We fought hard at T’ung-ch'eng in order to protect
An-ch'ing. At this time Chang Lo-
hsieng and Kung Te-shu had already
x
rebelled at San-ho-chien. Li Chao- 
shou was then serving in my force; 
he was in contact with Chang Lo- 
hsing and Kung Te-shu and sent a 
special letter asking Chang Lo-hsing 
to come over, Chang Lo-hsing on receiving the letter immediately 
replied that he was willing to come over.^ Then we fought with 
even greater determination at T'ung-ch'eng. EVERY DAY THERE WAS 
AN ENGAGEMENT AND THERE WAS CEASELESS FIRING. MORE THAN TEN 
THOUSAND CH'ING TROOPS DID BATTLE WITH US EVERY DAY. THE T'IEN 
CH'AO HAD LESS THAN THREE THOUSAND TROOPS. THE ENEMY HAD MORE 
THAN A HUNDRED ‘ STOCKADES; WE HAD ONLY THE ISOLATED CITY WITH 
THREE STOCKADES OUTSIDE IT. WE FOUGHT AND RESISTED WITH DETER­
MINATION IN ORDER TO DEFEND T'UNG-CH'ENG. That An-ch'ing was 
secured was due to my fighting.
Then, seeing that the situation was not good after the I Wang
had left the capital, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was given command of the
5troops which were attacking Ning-kuo.
At home Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was a good friend of mine; our homes
19 were not far apart and we had long been intimate. On joining the 
T'ien Ch'ao we became even closer friends. At that time I sent
a special messenger to Ning-kuo to 
(I HAVE MENTIONED ABOVE THAT ask help of Ch'en Yii-ch'eng. He
(AS REGARDS CHANG LO-HSING, I 
HAVE SAID SOMETHING EARLIER, 
AND NOW ADD A LITTLE SO AS TO 
MAKE HIS HISTORY CLEAR. THAT 
IS WHY I REVERT TO HIM).
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THE SIEGE OF NING-KUO HAD immediately agreed to my request,
NOT BEEN LIFTED). although the siege of Ning-kuo had
not been lifted, and detailed forces 
1
to come to the relief o£ T’ung-ch’eng. The troops crossed the
2 <5
[Yangtse] river at Ts'ung-yang and assembled, I myself went
with a cavalry escort to Ts'ung-yang, drew a plan for the attack
and discussed all the details with the Ch1 eng-t1 ien-yu [Ch’en
Yii-ch’eng].^ The enemy troops at T’ung-ch’eng had calculated
that we were sure to make a direct attack, so the Ch’ing
5commanders prepared a frontal defence. I and the Ch’eng-t’ien- 
yu planned to send out special troops. I went back to T’ung- 
ch’eng and carefully prepared a force to fight the enemy. In 
the meantime the Ch ’ eng-t1 ien-yu’ s picked troops advanced
0
victoriously from Ts’ung-yang, took Wu-wei-chou, and went 
on to T'ang-t1 ou-ohen,® (THIS IS THE T'ANG-T'OU OF WU-WEI, NOT 
THE T'ANG-T'OU OF CHEN-CHIANG).9 and Yun-ts'ao and joined up 
with the troops of the Ya-t'ien-hou Ch'en Shih-chang, and
fiercely attacked the Ch’ing stockades at T*ang-t*ou. AFTER
TAKING THEM they went by the Huang-lo River to take Ta-kuan
11and Ch’ao-hsien. Troops were detailed to hold it AND THE ARMY
WAS MOVED, The Ch’eng-t’ien-yii 
I DO NOT KNOW THE NAME OF THE took iihfantry and cavalry up to
CH’ING COMMANDER OF THE REGION attack Lu-chiang and again took
FROM WU-WEI, T’ANG-T’OU TO ■ Lu-chou. Troops were sent to
CH’AO-HSIEN.12 THIS WAS CH'EN hold Lu-chiang and the army was
Ytt-CH’ENG'S AFFAIR - I WAS IN brought on to Chieh-ho and
T'UNG-CH'ENG. attacked Ta-kuan.1"* After
surrounding T ’ung-ch’eng we cut 
the supply lines of the Ch’ing army.*^ The countryside around 
20 T’ung-ch’eng consists of high mountains on one side and a plain 
on the other. After the Ch’ing army’s communications were cut 
the Ch * eng-t ’ ien-yu surrounded them from outside, while I led
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troops to break out from the town. The two forces meeting, the
Ch*ing army was severely defeated."** We divided into three
2
columns to give chase and took Shu-chfeng and Liu-an. In these
two places several tens of thousands of people gave us their 
3allegiance.
After passing Liu-an we went towards San-ho-chien to enlist
Chang Lo-hsing, who unexpectedly sent Kung Te-shu and Su Lao-
4
tfien to meet us half way. We immediately decided to take 
Ho-ch1 iu-hsien, and after taking the town, handed it over to
5
Chang Lo-hsing as his domain. In the meantime the Ch1 eng-t1 ien- 
yu took troops and seized Cheng-yang-kuan, attacked Shou-chou, 
but failed to take it.^ So he withdrew and went straight to 
Huang[-mei] and Su[-sung],‘ where he came up against General 
Tseng [Kuo-fan] and did battle with the Ch'ing commander Li Hsii-
Q
pin. After suffering a setback at Sung-tzu-p1ai, [his] battles
with the Ch'ing troops were 
9indecisive.
At this time there was no one 
in charge at court; in the 
field there were no capable 
commanders. Both the Ch'eng- 
t1 ien-yu and I had troops, so we 
were appointed by the court to 
command the troops in the field. 
Later, when they saw that my cousin Li Shih-hsien was young, bold 
and determined, he also was appointed. The Kingdom thus obtained 
a commander. Shih-hsien was [appointed] later. Meng Te-en had 
21 long been at court; he was a favourite minister of the T'ien
Wang and never left the capital. He was later made Cheng-chang- 
shuai-ta-ch1en,^in control of all matters inside and outside 
of the capital* Even Chfen Yii-ch'eng and I were under his 
command.
(AT THIS TIME THE GH’ENG-T’IEN-Yt) 
WAS TUHG-KUAN-CH1ENG-HSIANG. AND 
I WAS APPOINTED TI-KUAN-CH1ENG- 
HSIANG WITH THE RANK OP HO-T'IEN-
I f)
HOB). IN ORDER THAT THERE BE NO 
CONFUSION I RECORD THIS HERE, SO 
THAT IT MAY BE MADE CLEAR.
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After the I Wang left the capital, after the killing of the 
Tung Wang and the Pei Wang, the administration was in the hands 
of Meng Te-en; morale fell and there was no unified policy, 
each went his own way. The Sovereign did not place complete 
confidence in anyone. He had been frightened by [the affair of] 
the Tung, Pei and 1^ Wangs. He dared not trust other ministers,
but placed all his trust in memberp of his own clan.
At this time all wanted to disperse, but no one dared to do 
so because they had heard that all Kwangsi men captured by the 
Ch'ing armies were killed without mercy. For this reason we 
remained united and did not disperse. If the Ch'ing government 
had been willing to spare Kwangsi men in the early days, there 
would long since have been a break-up. Someone reported to the 
T'ien Wang AND HE KNEW ABOUT THIS MATTER 1 that everyone wanted
to disperse, and he increasingly 
(THE T'IEN WANG'S APPOINTMENT OP bestowed favours so that all
MANY WANGS STARTED PROM THIS TIME. were encouraged and united.
IT WAS TO REWARD PEOPLE FOR This one encouragement was
PLUCKING UP THEIR COURAGE).2 enough to keep people steady
for several years.
At this time Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was encamped at T'ai-hu and 
Ch'ien-shan and I was at Liu-an and Ho-shan. I went with a 
cavalry escort to An-ch'ing for a meeting with Ch'en Yii-ch'eng
to discuss how to put an end to the disorders in the government.
Just at this time, AT THE TIME OF THE MEETING, the T'ien Wang
promoted me and Ch'en Yii-ch'eng. He was appointed Yu-oheng~chang-
22 shuai, still having the real rank of Ch' eng-1' ien-yii; at that 
time I was Iio-t * ien-hou and was made Fu-chang-shuai, with a 
military command. I started off as a soldier and [now] had 
heavy responsibilities. Seeing that the Kingdom was in 
disorder and the Sovereign was discredited, I did my duty as a 
minister and memorialised, urging my Sovereign to select and
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employ men of ability, to establish a system for relieving 
the people, to promulgate strict laws, to respect the principles 
of the Kingdom, to [give] just rewards and punishments, to 
adhere to the ancient system and [govern] everywhere with 
benevolence. I begged the Sovereign to observe the proper 
principles and assist the people; to be lenient in punishments 
and liberal in all things; to reduce the grain tax on the 
people, to employ the I .Wang again and not the An and Fu Wangs.
Because of this admonitary memorial the Sovereign issued a 
decree depriving me of my title. Again I submitted a document 
exposing the state of the empire and relating the facts about 
the admonitary memorial. This document passed through the 
hands of a court official who saw that what I said was reasonable 
and therefore himself presented an admonitary memorial at the 
palace, and my rank was restored to me.
At that time General Ho [Gh*un] was besieging Chen-chiang,
1and its communications were cut. There was no grain in the 
town and no relief came from outside. The I Wang had gone off and 
at that time there were no outstanding men in the government.
Only Ch'en Yii-ch' eng and I had great forces. Therefore P WAS 
PUT FORWARD and sent to the relief of Chen-chiang. I hurried 
up to Liu-an from An-ch'ing and the whole army was brought down 
to rescue the troops from Chen-chiang. The town of Chen-chiang 
was then lost.
23 At this time the two Ch'ing generals, Ho [Ch'un] and Chang
[Kuo-liang], led their troops to attack Chu-jung. The T'ien 
Ch'ao garrison commander at Chli-jung was Chou Sheng-fu, who had
the hereditary rank of Hslarkuan- 
CHOTJ SHENG-FU, GARRISON COMMANDER ch * eng—hsiang. After several
of CHtf-JUNG, WAS THE ELDER BROTHER months of fighting, the town of
OF CHOU SHENG-K1 UN, WHO WAS KILLED Chu-jung was taken by Ho [Ch'un]
WHEN HIS STOCKADE AT T'ANG-T'OU and Chang [Kuo-liang]'s troops,
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WAS TAKEN BY CHANS KUO-LIANG. after which they came to Besiege
CHOU SHENG-FU INHERITED HIS BANK T'ien-ching. This was the
AND TOOK OVER THE GARRISON AT second siege of T'ien-ching. I
CHO-JUNG. THESE ARE THE FACTS leave this natter now and
ABOUT HIM. . relate General Hsiang [Jung]'s
first siege of T'ien-ching.
At the first siege of T'ien-ching,^ Generals Hsiang [Jung] 
and Chang Kuo-liang commanded several thousand Manchu soldiers 
and twenty or thirty thousand Han troops. They fortified
positions from Hsiao-ling-wei to this side of the tomb of Chu
4 5Hung-wu, and to the southeast as far as Ch'i-weng-ch'iao.
When General Hsiang [Jung] was laying siege to T'ien-ching,
6Chen-chiang was being besieged at the same time. The Ch'ing 
general attacking Chen-chiang was called Chi[-erh-hang-ah],
7
a Manchu. His stockades were in the Chiu-hua-shan, ;Tang-t'u,
0
Chin-shan region. I do not know the name of the Ch'ing
commander at I-cheng. The 
(ON SECOND THOUGHTS, THE COMMANDER T'ien Ch'ao commander at Chen- 
HOLDING T'U-CH'IAO AND SAN-CHA-HO^ chiang was Wu Ju-hsiao. THE
WAS A CH'ING COMMANDER CALLED TE)?-0 COMMAND OF ALL THE TROOPS IN
THE I-CHENG AND CHEN-CHIANG
REGION ALL CAME UNDER THE COMMAND OF WU JU-HSIAO.
11At that time I was still Ti-kuan-fu-ch1 eng-hsiang, and I
went to the relief of Chen-chiang together with Tung-kuan-
ch' eng-hsiang Ch'en Yii-ch'eng, Ch * un-kuan-ch * eng-hsiang T'u
Chen-hsing, Hsia-kuan-fu-oh * eng-hsiang Ch'en Shih-chang, (THE
CH'EN SHIH-CHANG M O  WAS LATER PIEN-T'IEN-HOU')12 and Hsia-yu-
oheng-ch' eng-hsiang Chou Sheng-k'un. This was the relief army
15for the first siege. ^
24 We entered T'ang-t'ou*^ in Chen-chiang [Prefecture] and
fought for several days indecisively against Chang Kuo-liang.1  ^
Then from Chiu-hua-shan the Ch'ing commander Chi-[erh-hang-ah]
sent troops to help Chang Kuo-liang. We also selected our
best troops and the two sides met in a great battle at T'ang- 
1
t'ou. But neither side could make any progress. We wanted to 
relieve Chen-chiang, but could not do so, nor could Chi-[erh-hang- 
ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang] defeat us; the two sides were 
encamped in stockades facing each other, not giving battle but 
talking.2 WE WANTED TO BELIEVE CHEN-CHIANG EOT COULD NOT.
I discussed with the other Ch' eng-hsiang and the Ch1 eng-hsiang 
Ch'en Yu-ch*eng was sent in a small boat to dash down river to
3
Chen-chiang. The river was entirely under the control of the 
Chfing gunboats, and though^ [the control] was tight, Ch'en Yii- 
ch'eng braved death and made a dash to Chen-chiang. There he 
and Wu Ju-hsiao made their plans and selected troops to make a 
break out, while I commanded a force to fight its way in from the 
outside.
Meanwhile we had discovered that at T'ang-t'ou there was a
small river which branched off the great [Yangtse] river and
5led to the hills. The Ch'ing troops had stockades along this 
river, [protected] on one side by the hills and on the other side 
by the river, so that approach from either side was difficult.
Our troops went down to T'ang-t'ou by way of the T'ang-shui-shan- 
pien, keeping close to the river, to a place where it was 
difficult for either side to advance. The Ch'ing detachments 
were then all moved to T' ang-shui-shan-pien to block our 
advance.^ Chen-chiang was not destined to be lost this time.
Wu Ju-hsiao and Ch'en Yii-ch'eng had already broken out. I was 
on a hill watching, and saw infantry and cavalry come out of 
Chen~[chiang]. I COULD SEE THE FLAGS CLEARLY AND KNEW THEY WEHE 
OUB TROOPS. That evening I personally selected three thousand 
of the best soldiers and led them myself by way of THE PLACE 
WHERE BOTH SIDES HAD BEEN BALKED, WHERE THE CH'ING TROOPS HAD 
BLOCKED OUR ADVANCE ALONG THE T'ANG RIVER. THEBE WERE NO TROOPS
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DEMDING THIS PLACE, WHICH IS CALLED T'ang-t'ou-ch'a-ho.
WE CAME BY THIS WAY AM) repaired and occupied the former Ch'ing 
1stockades. When it was light, Ch'eng-hsiangs Ch'en Shih-chang, 
Tfu Chen-hsing and Chou Sheng-k'un, who had been camped at 
T 'ang-shui-shan-pien, came out and fought with Chi-[erh-hang-ah] 
and Chang [Kuo-liang], who did not know that I had made a 
surprise raid with special troops across by way of T'ang-t*ou­
chf a-ho. Only at noon did they receive news that I had surprised
them in the rear. T1 ang-t'ou-ch'a-ho is about twenty li from
2
T*ang-shui-shan-pien. By that time Wu Ju-hsiao and Ch*en Yii- 
ch’eng *s troops had also arrived from Chen-chiang, and we met.
We were wild with joy, and the troops from inside and outside 
[the city] joined up as one and with renewed valour engaged 
Generals Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang]. The following
•z
day, when the armies met, Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang] 
were defeated and lost sixteen stockades. The same day we with­
drew and went down to Chen-chiang and camped at the foot of Chin- 
shan, Chin-chi-ling and at the foot of Chiu-hua-shan, opposite 
the Headquarters of General Chi-[ erh-hang-ah ]. He was prepared 
26 for our attack and his Headquarters was closely defended at all 
points. Then during the night we assembled all the boats of
Chen-chiang and throughout the night crossed from Chin-shan to 
4Kua-chou.
At dawn the following day I led troops, and with Ch’en Yii- 
ch’eng, T*u Chen-hsing, Ch'en Shih-chang and Wu Ju-hsiao, fiercely 
attacked T'u-ch'iao and broke into the Ch'ing cavalry camp there. 
The Ch'ing army was badly defeated and their emplacements at
5
Hung-ch'iao, Pu-shu-wan, and San-ch' a-ho were all destroyed - 
a hundred and twenty<Gh*ing stockades of all sizes. IN THE CH'ING 
CAMPS AT THAT TIME ^  they heard the news and fled. ^ Then we 
took Yang-chou, and afterwards transported grain and fodder from 
the Yang-chou region to Chen-chiang.^ I 10 NOT KNOW THE NAME OF
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THE CH'ING COMMANDER AT T'U-CH'IAO - IT IS A LONG TIME AGO.
[Our] commanders at T * ang-t1 ou-ch1 a-ho and T 1 ang-shui-shan-
pien then came down together to Chen-chiang and crossed oyer
to Yang-chou, leaving only Hsia-yu-oheng-ch1 eng-hsiang Chou
Sheng-k'un and his troops to hold the former stockades of
Chang [Kuo-liang] and Chi-[erh-hangah], with the purpose of
protecting our rear.
After taking T'u-ch'iao and capturing Yang-chou, we took
supplies back to Chen-chiang. When this was finished we wanted
to take our armies back to the capital. Hsia-kuan-yu-cheng-
chf eng-hsiang Chou Sheng-k'un was holding T * ang-t1 ou with
six of the former stockades of Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang
[Kuo-liang]. After I and Ch!en Yii-ch'eng, T'u Chen-hsing and
Ch'en Shih-chang had taken T'u-ch'iao, these six stockades held
by Chou Sheng-kfun, were again taken by Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and
Chang [Kuo-liang], after the defeat of Chou Sheng-k'un*s 
1troops. Chi-[erh-hang-ah] and Chang [Kuo-liang] strongly
27 fortified, strengthened and repaired them, and cut off our
2
return to the capital.
At this time there was no alternative but for the whole
army to leave Yang-chou and X-cheng and make for Liu-ho-hsien,
*
hoping to reach T'ien-ching by way of P'u-k'ou, When Chang
Kuo-liang got news of this he took troops to Liu-ho to defend
4 rit, and again we were prevented from getting back [to the
capital]. There was no choice but for all of us to fight our
way resolutely, cross the river at Chin-shan and return [that
way].^
On arriving at Chin-shan WE COMPLETED THE EE-GROUPIWG. ^ At
7that time Chang Kuo-liang had not returned from Liu-ho. We
Simmediately launched an attack on Kao-tzu. ON THIS DAY WE 
TOOK SEVEN CH’ING STOCKADES; THE REMAINING FOUR BIG STOCKADES 
WE DID NOT HAVE TIME TO TAKE. General Chi-[erh-hang-ah] came
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came from Chiu-hua-shan with relief FOR THESE STOCKADES, hut
he was immediately driven by our troops into the Kao-tzu hills.
GENERAL CHI RAH OFF THAT RIGHT M D  ENTERED HIS STOCKADE AT KAO-
TZU, WHICH WAS THEN SURROUNDED ON ALL SIDES BY OUR TROOPS, SO
THAT IT WAS CUT OFF. General Chi-[erh-hang-ah] pointed a foreign
1
pistol at his heart and killed himself.
When the Ch*ing soldiers saw that the commander had killed
himself, there was chaos, AND THESE UNITS LOST THE INITIATIVE TO
THE T'lEN-C^AO COMMANDER. As soon as it became known that the
Chfing general Chi-[erh-hang-ah] was dead and his troops without
28 a commander, the garrison was at once moved down from Chiu-hua-
shan. The following morning the whole army collected at the foot
of Chiu-hua-shan. Seventy or eighty stockades of General Chi-
[erh-hang&ah]*s troops were without a commander and his army
2
fell into disorder and fled without fighting.
After the collapse of Chi-[erh-hang-ah]*s army, Chang Kuo-
liang hastened from Liu-ho, but it was too late to save them.
His troops took up positions at Tan-t *u-chen, and our victorious
army was then moved to Tan-t *u to do battle with Chang Kuo-
liang.4 WE FOUGHT FROM MORNING TO MID-DAT WITHOUT A DECISION.
AT THE CHIA HOUR [3-5 p.m. ] the garrison commander of Chen-chiang,
Wu Ju-hsiao, led about a thousand men to our assistance. After
defeating Chang Kuo-liang*s cavalry, the infantry advanced and
Chang*s troops were badly beaten.
Early the following morning we set out for the capital. The
old Ch*ing garrison at T*ang-t,ou fled when they saw that the
camp at Chiu-hua-shan was lost. Then our T*ien Ch*ao troops
6went straight back to the capital.
The Tung Wang gave an order that we were to smash General
Hsiang [Jung]*s army at Hsiao-ling-wei, before we would be allowed
7to enter the city. Our army, which had been victorious at 
Chen-chiang was obliged to halt at Yen-tzu-chi, and on the
following day we took up positions there; we were forced to 
and there was nothing we could do; but the officers and men 
were cursing angrily.
Then I went myself with Ch'en Yu-ch’eng, T'u Chen-hsing and 
Ch'en Shih-chang into the capital to discuss with the Tung Wang, 
explaining that we were unwilling to attack General Hsiang 
[Jung]’s Headquarters. WE REPORTED THAT Hsiang’s Headquarters 
had long been strongly intrenched there and could not be taken 
in a quick battle. The Tung Wang was full of righteous anger 
[and said] that those who did not obey orders would be executed;
therefore we did not press our case and went into action.'1'
2The following day we began the attack, and from Yen-tzu-chi
*
took up positions in four stockades at Yao-hua-men. The Ch’ing
commander of Yao-hua-men had been sent by General Hsiang [Jung]
to hold it. I began my [line of] emplacements from here. The
following day Chang Kuo-liang, who had already returned to Hsiao-
4ling-wei from Tan-tfu, led his troops into battle against us in 
the early morning. FROM THE CH’EN HOUR [7-9 am.] TO THE SSU 
HOUR [9-11 am.] THE TWO SIDES WERE FIGHTING AND Chang’s troops 
were defeated. THE T’IEN CH’AO TROOPS FOLLOWED UP AND GAVE 
CHASE. THE SAME DAY, CHANG’S TROOPS returned again to Hsiao- 
ling-wei. We launched an attack and besieged the Ch’ing stockades 
at Yao-hua-men.
The following day Chang Kuo-liang came on again with cavalry
and. infantry. THE TWO SIDES TOOK UP POSITIONS AND ENGAGED,5
DISPLAYED THEIR FLAGS AND GAVE BATTLE. OUR INFANTRY WAS FIGHTING
HAN TROOPS AND OUR CAVALRY FIGHTING MANGHUS. WE FOUGHT FROM THE
CH'EN HOUR UNTIL THE WU HOUR [11 am. - 1 pm.] WHEN the I Wang
arrived with Tseng Chin-lien, Chang Shui^mo, and their troops to 
7reinforce us. On the Ch'ing side, the Manchu cavalry were first 
defeated, and after this the Han troops commanded by Hsiang and 
Chang were also defeated. On this day Hsiang and Chang were unable
to relieve Yao-hua-men, and their troops were defeated, after
50 which we gave chase from all sides. We defeated more than twenty 
Manchu and Han stockades at Hsiao-ling-wei, LEAVING ^ ONLY SOME
OF GENERAL HSIANG [jung]'S STOCKADES ON THE LEFT AND RIGHT. CHANG 
KUO-LIANG WAS INTRENCHED AT CH11-WENG-CH' IAO; HERE ALSO THERE 
REMAINED ONLY A PEW2 STOCKADES ON THE PLANKS. That night Hsiang
*
and Chang withdrew and our T*ien Ch!ao troops did not give chase.
Then came an order from the 
(THIS WAS IN THE 5TH YEAR4 AND THE Tung Wang that all weapons and
TUNG WANG HAD NOT YET BEEN KILLED). supplies should he brought into
the city.5 THE TROOPS ENCAMPED 
TO REST POR A PEW DAYS AND THE SOLDIERS WERE WELL REWARDED, THEN 
I was ordered with Ch*en Yu-ch*eng, Tfu Chen-hsing and Ci^en Shih- 
chang, to take troops and give chase by way of Chu-jung.
6We took Chii-jung in passing, and went down to Tan-yang, where
Hsiang [Jung] and Chang [Kuo-liang] had already been been for
six or seven days AND HAD FORTIFIED IT STRONGLY ON ALL SIDES.
WHEN I ARRIVED WITH THE FOUR [sic] CH'ENG-HSIANG AT TAN-YANG, V®
PLACED OUR STOCKADES 25 LI FROM THE WEST GATE, INTENDING TO
ATTACK THE TOWN ON THE FOLLOWING DAY. BUT UNEXPECTEDLY CHANG AND
HSIANG'S TROOPS TOOK THE INITIATIVE THE FOLLOWING MORNING and a
fierce battle was joined. On that day Chang and Hsiang1s troops
were defeated, returned to the town and refused to come out again
7
and fight, but defended it with determination. We attacked 
hard but failed to take it. The Ch*ing troops were rested and 
vigorous, but the Tfien Ch'ao troops had been fighting for a long 
time without a rest, so officers and men had little fighting 
spirit.
51 Then Chang Kuo-liang deployed his forces to give battle.
Outside the south gate of Tan-yang there was a great battle, but
9
neither side could gain the advantage.
General Hsiang [Jung] was now besieged in Tan-yang, having
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lost his headquarters at Hsiao-ling-wei; the officers and men
were dispirited and were now shut up in Tan-yang; so General
Hsiang [Jung] killed himself. Chang ICuo-liang was General
2
Hsiang* s adopted son; when he saw that General Hsiang had killed
himself, he roused himself to give battle again, and destroyed
seven of our stockades outside the south gate, killing six or
seven hundred [of our men]. The commander at the south gate,
3the 13th chien-tien, Chou Te-hsien, was killed by a shot, and
j
the rest fled. This oommander was very courageous; when the 
troops saw that he had been killed and that Tan-yang could not 
be taken, they began to waver and lost heart, There was nothing 
to be done, so the whole army withdrew and attacked Chin-t*an, 
but we were unable to take it though we attacked continually for
5
more than twenty days. Here also we were fighting against Chang
Kuo-liang. OH EACH M Y  OF BATTLE NEITHER SIDE HAD THE ADVANTAGE,
BOTH STOOD FIRM, AND WE ATTACKED THE TOWN WITHOUT EFFECT. Li
Chao-shou was also present.
After failing to take the town, we withdrew the army and
returned to Ting-chueh-ts*un, 25 li from Chii-jung. It was at this
732 time that the Tung Wang was killed. This was pre-ordained. If 
General Hsiang had not been defeated and was still encamped at 
Hsiao-ling-wei, he could have taken advantage of the disorders 
when they occurred, and the capital would not have been able to 
hold out for so long. It was heaven-ordained that the disorders 
should have occurred after General Hsiang*s defeat, and not 
decided by roan.
THE DISORDERS IN THE KINGDOM, OUR DOMESTIC TROUBLES,8 ORIG­
INATED FROM THIS. DISUNITY AND IRREGULARITIES IN INTERNAL 
ADMINISTRATION ALSO ORIGINATED FROM THIS. From the disorders of 
the 6th Year [1856] onwards THE SOVEREIGN USED PEOPLE WHO WERE 
IRRESPONSIBLE, TRUSTED THOSE WHO WERE UNTRUSTWORTHY; SLANDER AND 
JEALOUSY FLOURISHED, ABLE AND VIRTUOUS MEN WERE DISAPPOINTED AND
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SHUNNED US; THE BEAT/E AMD OUTSTANDING WERE NOT PROMOTED. THE 
PEESENT DETEAT IS THE BESULT. FOE A LONG TIME I WAENED TO THE 
BEST OF MY ABILITY AND SUBMITTED INNUMERABLE DOCUMENTS, BUT MY 
ADVICE WAS NOT HEEDED. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO ABILITY, IN MY YOUTH2 
AT HOME, I DID NOT KNOW THAT THE T’IEN WANG HAD DESIGNS ON THE 
EMPIRE; BUT HAVING MOUNTED5 THE TIGER I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO 
FOLLOW. OF THOSE WHO JOINED FREELY, THERE WERE TENS OF THOUSANDS 
FROM LIANG-KWANG AND I WAS NOT THE ONLY ONE LIKE THIS. EVEN IN A 
VILLAGE OF TEN FAMILIES THERE ARE CERTAINLY SOME TOO ARE LOYAL;4 
AMONGST TENS OF THOUSANDS, HOW COULD THEBE BE NO ONE WITH 
ABILITY? THEY WERE NOT ALL JUST COUNTRY BUMPKINS.
IN THIS WORLD WE DO NOT KNOW THE ARRANGEMENTS OF HEAVEN. IF 
ONE COULD HAVE FORE-KNOWLEDGE WHO WOULD WANT TO DISOBEY THE WILL 
OF HEAVEN AND REBEL AGAINST IT? WHO WOULD WILLINGLY BE EVIL, 
[im]RIGHTEOUS5 AND UNFILIAL? TOO IS WILLING TO TURN HIS BACK6 
ON HIS NATIVE PLACE AND LEAVE HIS ANCESTORS, TO DEPART FROM 
RELATIVES AND FRIENDS, GO AWAY FROM HIS FAMILY AND LEAVE HIS 
HOME? THESE ARE CHANGES OF PROVIDENCE WHICH WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND. 
THIS IS THE FATE OF MAN. IT IS THE JUST RETRIBUTION OF HEROES 
35 THAT THEY SHOULD SUFFER TRIALS AND AFFLICTIONS. IT IS HARD TO 
ESCAPE THE PREDESTINED FATE OF FIVE HUNDRED YEARS. THE GREAT 
CHANGES OF SEVERAL THOUSAND YEARS FROM CHOU TIMES TO THE PRESENT, 
THE CHANGES AMONGST MEN, ARE NOT UNDER OUR CONTROL.
PEOPLE FOLLOWED THE MAN CALLED HUNG AND TOOK THE SAME ROAD 
BECAUSE OF IGNORANCE. THEY FOLLOWED HIM BECAUSE THEY WERE 
CONFUSED. THE DESTRUCTION OF IMAGES WAS THE T'IEN WANG'S IDEA, 
AND IT WAS THEIR RETRIBUTION FOR BEING SO LONG WORSHIPPED BY MEN 
WITH INCENSE. IN THE CHOU DYNASTY THE EXECUTED GENERALS WERE 
DEIFIED: THIS WAS PRE-ORDAINED. TO-DAY THE DESTRUCTION OF MANY 
IMAGES, REALLY EXECUTED GENERALS TOO TORE DEIFIED, IS THEIR 
TRANSFORMATION.
I DO NOT KNOW THE COURSE OF FATE. JUDGING8 FROM THE FACTS,
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THAT OUR TfIEN OH1 AO HAS CREATED INNUMERABLE GENERALS AND THE 
T! IEN WANG BAS DESTROYED INNUMERABLE TEMPLES, IT IS OBVIOUS 
THAT THE PRE-DESTINED TERM HAS RUN OUT AND THE KINGDOM HAS 
PERISHED.
PROM CHILDHOOD I UNDERSTOOD NOTHING AND JOINED BLINDLY, 
CAUSING THE PRESENT MISFORTUNE. I LEFT1 MY PARENTS; MY WIFE AND 
CHILDREN ARE SCATTERED; YET IT IS NOT IN MY NATURE TO BE 
UNVIRTUOUS, UNFILIAL AND UNRIGHTEOUS.
NOW THAT THE STATE HAS FALLEN AND I AM TAKEN PRISONER, IT IS 
MY SINCERE DESIRE [to relate] THE HISTORY OF THE KINGDOM, CARE­
FULLY AND IN DETAIL FROM BEGINNING TO END, TO ARRIVE AT THE 
REASONS FOR ITS FAILURE. BECAUSE I SEE THAT THE GOVERNOR IS A 
MAN OF VIRTUE, MUCH TO BE RESPECTED, A SAVIOUR OF THE PEOPLE.
I HAVE LONG KNOWN OF THE GRAND SECRETARY'S PROFOUND BENEVOLENCE 
AND LIBERALITY, HIS TRUE HEART OF A SAVIOUR OF THE PEOPLE. WHEN 
HE HASTENED FROM HIS HONOURED RESIDENCE TO INTERROGATE ME, I 
34 DID NOT HAVE TIME TO MAKE EVERYTHING CLEAR; SO I AM ANXIOUS TO 
WRITE EVERYTHING CLEARLY AND IN DETAIL FOR THE WORTHY PERUSAL 
OF THE GRAND SECRETARY.
FROM THE TIME WHEN OUR T'lEN WANG RAISED THE REVOLT UNTIL THE 
PRESENT, WHEN THE TWO SIDES ARE IN CONFLICT, EACH BELONGED TO 
A DIFFERENT DYNASTY. ALTHOUGH I HAD HEARD [of Tseng Kuo-fan's 
qualities?], THIS IS NOT THE SAME AS SEEING FOR ONESELF. NOW 
OUR SOVEREIGN IS DEAD AND OUR KINGDOM HAS COLLAPSED AND I HAVE 
BEEN TAKEN PRISONER. I HAVE LONG KNOW OF THE BENEVOLENCE OF 
THE GRAND SECRETARY, WHICH EXTENDS IN EVERY DIRECTION, HIS 
VIRTUOUS MIND, MUCH TO BE ADMIRED.
I WILL WRITE DOWN EVERYTHING CLEARLY BECAUSE I HAVE A ROUGH 
AND STRAIGHTFORWARD NATURE; THAT IS WHY I WRITE EVERYTHING DOWN 
CLEARLY. I DO NOT SEEK TO PLEASE MYSELF, BUT WRITE STRAIGHT 
FROM THE HEART. I DID NOT KNOW THAT I WOULD SPEND MY LIFE 
SERVING HUNG [Hsiu-ch'uan] AS MY RULER, AND I DID NOT FORESEE
.1.61
J
THE TROUBLES OF TO-DAY. HAVING SAID THIS, I WILL SPEAK OF THE 
DISORDERS IN THE STATE, AND OF HOW THE PEOPLE AND THE COUNTRY 
WERE LOST.
After the killing of the Tung Wang, the Pei Wang was also
killed, after which the An Wang and the Fu Wang compelled the
I Wang to flee. At this time there were troops holding San-ho,
1and the commander was Lan Ch1 eng-ch'un. Urgent appeals arrived
in the capital because San-ho was under siege by Ch’ing troops
from the Prefecture of Lu-[chou]. So I was sent with my own
troops to relieve San-ho; but when we reached Wu-wei-chou, the
garrison at San-ho had already been defeated and had withdrawn,
2
then Lu-chiang-hsien was lost.
Chang Kuo-liangfs troops, who had recovered from their 
defeat, then attacked Chti-jung. The garrison there, under
Chou Sheng-fu, was defeated, 
NOTE THAT ABOVE [I related] THE and withdrew.4 Having taken
FIRST SIEGE OF CHEN-CHIANG, THIS Chii-jung, the Ch’ing general
WAS THE SECOND SIEGE. continued his advance and again
laid siege to Chen-chiang.
35 After he had besieged and taken Chen-chiang, Chang Kuo-liang 
with General Ho [Ch’un] again laid siege to T’ien-ching.^ 
this was in the 8th Year [1858].
At that time the kingdom had no generals and the government 
no leaders. The I Wang had taken away all the troops of the 
T’ien Ch’ao. Yang Fu-ch’ing was already in Fukien,^ Wei Chih-
Q
chun was in forced retirement, Lin Shao-chang had been deprived
9
of his rank and was doing nothing. Lin Ch’i-jung was besieged
in Chiu-chiang,1^ Huang Wen-chin was immobilized by Ch'ing
11troops at Hu-k'ou, Chang Ch'ao-chueh and Ch’en Te-ts’ai were
12holding An-ch’ing, isolated and with few troops. Ch'en Yu- 
ch'eng was doing well, though his rank was low; he was in the
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1region of Hsiao-ku-shan and Iiuang-yang-chen.
At that time the government was in confusion. Meng Te-en
2and Li Ch1 un-fa alone could do nothing. They were kept under 
the thumbs of the An Wang and the Fu Wang AND COULD DO NOTHING. 
This was in the 8th Year [1858]. Fortunately when Generals Ho 
[Ch*un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] besieged Tfien-ching, there was 
sufficient grain and enough of everything, to that although 
there were few troops in the capital, there was more than enough 
to eat and they were willing to fight, and therefore it stood 
■firm.
Chang Kuo-liang*s troops were from Kwang-[tung], and although 
they were good, they were not so strong or so willing and consc­
ientious as those of General Tseng [Kuo-fan]. Kwang-[tung] 
soldiers are brave, but they are disunited. Though they had 
several thousand Manchu troops [with them], they were not so 
tough.as General Tseng [Kuo-fan]*s [Hu]-nan troops. For this 
reason, the siege of the 8th and 9th Years [1858 & 1859] did not 
trouble us.
The supplies for General Ho and General Chang*s armies came 
from Fukien, Kwangtung, Kiangsu, Hang-chou and Kiangsi. At that 
56 time we still had, up-river? An-ch*ing, Wu-wei, Ch*ao-hsien, Wu-
hu and the strong points at Tung-[ 1 iang-shan] and Hsi-liang- 
[shan] We had the grain supply from Ho-chou and the crossing 
at Liang-p'u,^ and though [later] Liang-p*u was taken by General
r r
Te-[hsing-ah], [the region] above Ho-chou was still undisturbed. 
The capital had enough grain and to spare, and therefore stood 
firm, although it was closely besieged by the three generals, Ho 
[Ch*un], Chang [Kuo-liang] and Te-[hsing-ah] J
At this time I was employed on the recommendation of a court 
official. THE SOVEREIGN PLACED HIS TRUST IN ME AND EMPLOYED ME, 
AND I RESPONDED WHOLE-HEARTEDLY. IP A SOVEREIGN EMPLOYS MEN 
WITH CONFIDENCE, THEY STRIVE TO REPAY HIS TRUST EVEN UNTO DEATH.
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AT THAT TIME my young cousin Li Shih-hsien was in command of my 
former troops and was fortified in strong positions at Huang- 
chfih and Wan-chih.***
At this time all the affairs of state were handled "by me alone,
2The Sovereign put all his trust in me. The laws were strictly 
enforced and therefore [the state] stood firm. When orders were 
given no one dared to dispbey; everyone was obedient and followed 
my instructions.
The northeast of the city was now under siege; there only
x
remained the south gate, which was soon to be invested too. I 
recalled Lin Shao-chang, who had been relieved of his command,^ 
to the capital, and went bond for him, after which he was made 
Ti-kuan-yu-fu-ch * eng-hsiang, responsible for the affairs of the 
capital.
It was clear that the situation was not good. In the field 
there were no commanders I could call upon. I had no choice but 
to discuss with the court ministers and suggest that I should 
leave, and organize relief from outside [the capital]; but the 
ministers all insisted that I should remain. THEN I FLAMED 
EVERYTHING FROM BEGINNING TO END, AND EVERYONE WAS REASSURED AND 
WILLING THAT I SHOULD LEAVE THE CAPITAL. SO AGAIN I PETITIONED, 
BUT AGAIN THE SOVEREIGN WOULD NOT CONSENT. ONCE MORE I MADE A 
37 COMPLETE STATEMENT OF THE CASE BUT the Sovereign still refused,
AMD I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO HEAVE COURT? A few days latex I again 
sounded the bell and beat the drum to announce that I had a 
petition to present at court. I saw that I could not succeed 
unless I made a forceful petition. After I had beaten the drum, 
the Sovereign held court and I made my request as strongly as I 
could. The Kingdom \*as not destined to perish at that time; its 
span was not yet accomplished. The Sovereign MOREOVER CAME TO HIS 
SENSES and understood and granted my request.
The following day I left court, after handing over all the
affairs of the capital to Meng Te-en, Lin Shao-chang and Li Ch*un­
fa. I requested that the rT1 ien Wang* s] eldest brother and the
second brother should not be permitted to have control. At this
time it was satisfactory because [the Sovereign] was willing to 
trust my advice.
When I had handed over the affairs of government, I took leave 
of the Sovereign and left the capital by the south gate, reaching 
Wu-hu in a day and a night. ^ I discussed with my cousin Li Shih- 
hsien and decided that one of us should fight on the south bank 
and the other on the north bank [of the Yangtse]. The Ch’ing 
forces were strong at this time and there were troops everywhere;
[our] morale was bad, and there was nowhere to flee to.
During this period, when I first had heavy responsibility, I 
did not make my plans well but acted in a confused manner. But 
the Kingdom was not then destined to perish, and though I acted in 
a confused manner, it worked; though we were disorganized, the 
result was not bad. That is \rhy the Kingdom survived until now.
Wei Chih-chun and Ch’en Yii-ch*eng together advanced upon 
Ku-chih [sic], Shuang-ch*eng [sic] and other places. The T’ien 
Wang wanted to punish Wei Chih-chun but I went bond for him, so 
he was appointed Ting-t*ien-fu, [and his troops] combined with 
those of Ch'en Yii-ch'eng.3 NOW WEI CHIH-CHUn , BY SURRENDERING 
HIS LIFE TO THE CH'ING DYNASTY, HAS WON THE PLEASURE OE BEING 
ALLOWED TO RETURN HOME.4 IN PACT IT WAS I WHO SAVED HIS ITER,
AND HIS JOY IN RETURNING HOME IS MI SORROW, FOR I CANNOT FIND 
A WAT OUT AND MUST DIE. WHAT MUST BE MUST BE!3
Ch’en Yii-ch’eng wished to go to Te-an, to assemble enough
troops to relieve T’ien-ching;^ but Heaven did not permit this,
for at Lo-t*ien and Ma-ch’eng he was defeated and had to withdraw
to T’ai-hu, where he encamped. This was between the 5th and 6th
7
Months of the 9th Year.
After Chfen Yu-oh * eng* had gone far away, Li Shih-hsien 
actively held down the enemy on the south bank while I remained 
without a plan at Wu-hu. Then I selected five thousand picked 
troops from my army, some of whom crossed the river at ¥u-hu and 
others from Hsi-liang-shan to Tung-1iang-shan. After crossing 
the [Yangtse] River at these two points, they all assembled at 
Han-shan.^
At that time I had as commanders only Ch'en K'un-shu, Hsiao
2Chao-sheng, Wu Ting-ts'ai and Ch'en Ping-wen. By the time we 
had assembled at Han-shan, Ho-chou had already fallen and more 
than twenty ying of Ch'ing troops were stationed there. So we 
had to take Chao-kuan and go down river to Ho-chou. First we 
smashed the Ch'ing force at Ho-ts'un-p'u and then the twenty-odd 
ying at Ho-chou. By the time relief came from General Te-[hsing- 
ah] at Liang-p'u I had already defeated the garrison at Ho-chou 
and it was too late to save them. THERE WERE STILL ^ TWO STORE 
FORTS WHICH WE HAD NOT YET TAKEN, WHICH WERE RELIEVED BY GENERAL 
39 TE-[hsing-ah] *S CAVALRY AND INFANTRY, AND SEVERAL HUNDRED OF M  
INFANTRY WERE KILLED. CH'EN K'UN-SHU WAS THERE.4
Then I took my army and occupied Ch'uan-ehiao, Ch'u-chou and
c
Lai-an, in order to draw off part of General Te-[hsing-ah]'s
force at P'u-k'ou. But though the towns were taken and General
Te-[hsing-ah]'s force divided, I had not enough troops and could
not get beyond Lai-an. Then Sheng- kung-pao1 s cavalry attacked us
and after several engagements we lost the initiative and withdrew
6from Lai-an to Ch'u-chou.
7
I then left Li Chao-shou to hold Ch'u-chou. When Li Chao-shou 
was my subordinate I treated him exceptionally well, so that when
my old officers saw how well 
(THE RUINATION OP OUR T'IEN CH'AO CAME I treated him they were
PROM, PIRST LI CHAO-SHOU, SECONDLY THE resentful. His troops were
DAMAGE PROM THE ENLISTMENT OP [CHANG] always giving trouble, and
1 6 6
LO-HSING,1 THIRDLY, THE DAMAGE 
CAUSED BY THE ENLISTMENT OP THAT 
GANG OF KWANGTUNG SOLDIERS,2 WHICH 
CAUSED THE DEMORALIZATION OP OUR 
T’IEN CH'AO, AND THE DAMAGE DONE 
BY THE THREE COMMANDERS LIU, KU 
AND LAI, AND BY YANG FU~CH'ING.4 
WHEN ORDINARY PEOPLE WERE KILLED 
IT WAS BECAUSE OP THESE MEN. THE 
SOVEREIGN DID NOT CONCERN HIMSELP 
WITH STATE APPAIRS, DID NOT ENACT 
STRICT LAWS, DID NOT EMPLOY INTELL­
IGENT AND ABLE MEN TO CARRY ON THE 
ADMINISTRATION, SO THAT RUIN WAS 
BROUGHT ABOUT BY THESE MEN. THOSE 
WHO MOLESTED THE PEOPLE WERE CH'EN 
K'UN-SHU AND HUNG CH'UN-YUAN.6 
CH'EN K'UN-SHU WAS ONE OP MY OFF­
ICERS AND I GAVE HIM 100,000 TROOPS. 
HE WAS A BRAVE MAN, THAT IS WHY I 
GAVE HIM A LARGE FORCE. LATER AN 
EVIL MINISTER SAW THAT I HAD A 
GREAT MILITARY FORCE AND SECRETLY 
ASKED THE T'IEN WANG TO PROMOTE HIM 
TO HIGH RANK IN ORDER TO DIVIDE MY 
POWER. CONSEQUENTLY HE BECAME VERY 
PROUD OP HIMSELP AND WOULD NOT ACCEPT 
MY ORDERS. I COULD NOT CONTROL HIM 
AND HE MOLESTED THE PEOPLE. THAT IS 
THE SORT OP MAN PIE WAS.9 TO EACH 
PLACE ON THE SOUTH AND NORTH BANKS 
RUINED BY THEM, I SENT OFFICIALS TO
molesting the people. When they
came to towns they would extort
money, and if it was refused,
they would maltreat the people.
Officers in every hsien  ^were
beaten and insulted. After such
incidents he dared not face me,
so he turned traitor, and went
over to the Great Ch'ing. When
Li Chao-shou was my subordinate
and maltreated the people, or
when he interfered with garrison
commanders, I did not so much as
remonstrate with him, even when
he gave over Ch'u-chou to the
Great Ch'ing, I did not censure
him, but even went behind the
T'ien Wang's back and got his
wife out of T'ien-ching and sent 
7her to him.*
Plaving said this, I will 
continue from the point where I 
was alone without a plan to 
relieve the capital. This was 
in the 9’tH Year.^
[Ms.p.40]
Having handed over the district 
of Ch'u-[chou] to Li Chao-shou,
I went b&ck to Ch'iian-chiao. I 
had no. troops to use. The 
Sovereign and my mother were shut 
up in the capital, and I wept
PACIFY THE PEOPLE, TO GIVE THEM day and night at Ch1 uan-chiao.
GRAIN AND SEEDS; I ASSEMBLED THE Though I had enlisted Chang Lo~
PEOPLE AND GAVE THEM CAPITAL IN hsing and his array, this type of
ORDER TO SAVE THEM. THE OPPRESS- man accepts honours hut not
ION OF THE PEOPLE, THE BURNING AND orders. At that time I had only
KILLING, WAS DONE BY THESE MEN. my officers Ch’en K ’un-shu, Wu
FROM THE TIME OF THE RISING UNTIL Ting-ts’ai, Hsiao Chao-sheng,
THEN, THERE WAS NO MALTREATMENT OP T'an Shao-kuang and Lu Shun-te,1
THE PEOPLE - EVERYONE KNOWS THIS. who were willing to fight to the
THE OPPRESSION OP THE PEOPLE WAS death and relieve the capital.
LONE BY THESE MEN).2 But I had leas than 5,000 picked
troops at my command. I wanted
first to clear Liang-p’u and restore communications across the
river in order to caAm the people of the capital.
Every day we trained at Ch’iian-ch&ao, and when thoroughly
prepared, we went WITH A STRONG PORCE OP CAVALRY [?]3 down to Ta- 
4
liu-ts’un, where we fortified a camp, and from Chiiao-lin advanced 
5on Liang-p’u. But we did not expect that General Te-[hsing-ah]
would send more than ten thousand cavalry and infantry to fight us
at Ta-liu-ts'un. He was supported by three or four thousand
6cavalry under General Sheng, At the first engagement we were 
victorious, but on the following day we lost the advantage and the 
old and new stockades were all lost, together with more than a
7
thousand officers and men. The defeated army went to the region 
of T’ang-ch’iian, while I myself returned to Ch1uan-chiao with a
Q
few cavalry. It was truly hard to bear ^nd I did not cease to
weep. Once more I was in Ch1 uan-chiao without a plan.
41 Then I wrote to each garrison commander summoning all T’ien
Ch’ao officers and officials to come on a certain day to Ts'ung-
yang in Anhwei for a meeting. The commanders from all parts came
as arranged. This was in the middle of the 6th Month of the 9^h 
g
Year. Ch’en Yii-ch’eng, who had withdrawn after his defeat at
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Lo-t'ien and Ma-ch*eng also came, although .he had not been
notified, to the Ts*ung-yang meeting. All swore to stand
together and a plan for joint action was decided upon.
Chfen Yii-ch’eng's troops crossed from Ch’ien-shan to Shu-
ch’eng, took Lu-chou and then from Tien-fu attacked Liang-yuan
and Ting-yuan.^* This siege of Ting-yuan was made on Chfen Yu-
ch ' eng' s orders hy ¥u Ju-hsiao in command of Kung Te-shufs 
2
troops. Ch'en Yii-ch’eng came down to Ghfu-chou by way of Chieh-
3
p’ai. By this time I had already returned from Ts'ung-yang to
Ch1 uan-chiao to regroup; then I marched to Ch'u-chou and Wu-i to
join up with Ch’en Yii-ch'eng.^ Then General Te-[hsing-ah] moved
troops from P'u-k’ou by way of Hsiao-tien to Wu-i, and Sheng
5kung-pao1 s cavalry also came from Shui-k'ou. There was a great
cavalry and infantry battle at Wu-i, with the two armies of Te-
[hsing-ah] and Sheng-[pao], and on the other, the two commanders
Ch’en [Yii-ch’eng] and Li [Hsiu-ch'en&]. We fought PROM THE CH'EN
HOUR [7-9 am.] UNTIL THE WU HOUR [ll am - 1 pm.], when the armies
of Sheng-[pao] and Te-[hsing-ah] were defeated and our army took
advantage of our victory to give chase. Te-[hsing-ah]'s army
lost three or four thousand men.
The following day we went to Hsiao-tien and engaged Ghang Kuo-
liang, who had come from Chiang-nan with picked troops to relieve 
742 Hsiao-tien. Chang's troops were severaly defeated, and we followed
up our advantage and chased them to P’u-k’ou. Then Ch'en Yii-
ch’eng attacked Te-[hsing-ah]1s army in front while I attacked in
the rear, throwing it into disorder. He lost more than ten
8thousand killed at P'u-k'ou. Communications across the river 
with T’ien-ching were now restored. This was the first step 
towards saving the T’ien Wang.
Then Ch’en Yii-ch'eng went to attack Liu-ho and I went up to 
T'ien-ch'ang and Yang-chou. These places had no Ch'ing garrisons
9
and we took whatever place we came to. Only Yang-chou was
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garrisoned, but the troops fled without fighting and the Prefect 
of Yang-chou was taken prisoner.1 HE! WAS TREATED WITH POLITENESS 
AND RESPECT; HIS WHOLE FAMILY WAS SOUGHT OUT AND ASSEMBLED 
TOGETHER. WE ASKED THIS PREFECT WHETHER HE WAS WILLING OR not 
willing to join us. HE COULD DO SO IF HE WISHED, BUT THOSE WHO 
WERE NOT WILLING WERE FREE TO DO AS THEY LIKED. HE WAS UNWILLING 
TO FOLLOW US, SAYING THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE FAVOURS OF THE CHIING 
DYNASTY AND DARED NOT REBEL AGAINST IT. So the Prefect was sent 
away through Hsien-nii-miao and given 550 liang for travelling 
expenses.
At this time I had only a few troops and did not hold Yang- 
2
chou. After Ch’en Yii-ch’eng had taken Liu-ho there was suddenly
an emergency in An-[hwei] Province, because the region of Huang-
mei, Su-sung, T*ai-hu, Ch’ien-shan, Shih-p’ai, T’ung-ch’eng and
Shu-ch’eng was taken by the Grand Secretary’s officer Li Hsii-pin.^
On a single day five despatches arrived announcing this emergency.
Therefore Ch’en Yii-ch’eng had no desire to continue his advance,
45 but withdrew his troops and went to the rescue. He requested the
T’ien Wang that I be instructed to go with him. Ch’en Yii-ch'eng
withdrew his troops first and I followed, advancing straight on
through Ch'ao-hsien. The officer who had been sent to hold San-
ho was Wu Ting-kuei, and he was
(SAN-HO WAS LOST AND AGAIN TAKE® being hard pressed by Li Hsu-pin.4
BY THE T'lEN-CH'AO. AFTER LAW The Ch'eng-t'ien-yu Ch'en YU-
CH'ENG-CH'UN LOST SA1-T-H0, THE oh'eng - he had already been made
CH'ING TROOPS DID NOT HOLD IT, AND Commander of the Eront Division -
WU TING-KUEI WAS SENT THERE AS led troops from Ch'ao-hsien to Pai-
COMMANDER). ^ shih-shan and Chin-niu, and advanced.
After surrounding San-ho, he cut
across the rear of Li Hsii-pin and prevented relief from Shu-ch’eng
6from reaching Li Hsii-pin’s army at San-ho.
Li Hsii-pin saw that the forces of the Commander of the Front
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Division Ch'en Yii-ch' eng were intrenched at Chin-niu, took 
picked troops and at the Fourth Watch the following morning 
[1-3 made a surprise attack on the edge of the Commanderfs
camp. It is said that [Li] Hsii-pin wanted to go into battle 
a dawn, but his subordinates wanted to start at the Fifth Watch 
[3-5 am*]. Hsii-pin said, "Ch'en Yii-ch* eng *s troops are good and 
I fear that the battle will not go in our favour, My officers 
will wreck everything for me." For this reason the battle was not 
started at the Fifth Watch. If the officers' advice had been 
followed and the battle started at the Fifth Watch, Ch'en Yii- 
ch'eng's army would certainly have been defeated.
At dawn Commander Ch'en's stockades WERE ATTACKED BY GENERAL 
LI [Hsii-pin] and were smashed by General Li, who pursued Commander 
Ch' en [Yii-ch' eng] * s troops over Chin-niu-shan. It was only just 
light, and there was a thick mist, so that one could hear voices 
44 but could not see where one was going. Who could have imagined 
that Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was still to the rear of Li Hsii-pin? As Li 
chased Ch'en in front, Ch'en fell upon Li from behind* When Li 
[Hsii-pin] realized that Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was attacking his rear, 
he turned his army about to resist, but his own army fell into 
disorder and more than a thousand Ch'ing soldiers were killed.
Fai-shih-shan is 25 li from Chin-niu. I went there after 
Ch'en Yii-ch'eng had asked for me to be sent, after I had been 
appointed Commander of the Rear Division by the T'ien Wang* That 
morning, encamped ,^bout 10 li from Pai-shih-shan, I heard 
continuous gunfire from Chin-niu and realized that the battle had 
started; so I personally led my troops close to San-ho. It was 
just at this time that the armies of Ch'en [Yii-ch'eng] and Li [Hsii- 
pin] joined battle, and engaged seven or eight li in front of 
General Li's camp. When my troops arrived, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng saw 
that the soldiers were fresh and vigorous; he then smashed Li 
Hsii-pin* s van; those at the base wavered, were defeated and fled.
1Li Hsii-pin was besieged in his stockade. The Ch'ing force had 
no relief from outside. San-ho is 50 or 60 li from Lu-[chou] 
Prefecture, which Ch'en Yii-ch*eng had detailed Wu Ju-hsiao to 
hold. Li Hsii-pin*s troops at Shu-ch1 eng were also cut off by
2
Ch'en Yii-ch*eng's army, so that they could not come to the rescue.
When General Li [Hsii-pin] found that no relief was possible and
45 that his stockade was closely besieged, he killed himself. Then
all Li [Hsii-pin]'s troops were assembled and many of them joined
Ch'en [Yii-ch'eng]*s army, and a few came to mine. But they were
Hunan men, and having gone with the army some distance, these
Hunan men killed ten or so of Ch'en [Yii-ch'eng]'s soldiers when
they were off their guard; so Ch'en had them all killed. THERE
REMAINED ONLY THOSE WHO HAD JOINED MY FORCE,^ but after this they
all ran away one after the other.
After we had beaten Commander Li [Hsii-pin] *s army at San-ho
I parted from Ch'en Yii-ch'eng and we continued by different routes.
He passed close to Shu-ch'eng and through Ta-kuan, while I went
by San-ho to Lu-chiang and Chieh-ho. T'ung-ch'eng had been taken
by Commander Li [Hsii-pin]'s troops and an officer had been detailed 
£
to hold it. Ch'en Yii-ch'eng and I met at Lii-t'ing-shih in T'ung- 
[ch'eng-hsien] and decided on the disposition of our forces. Ch'en 
Yii-ch'eng had fought against troops under General Tseng [Kuo-fan]*s 
commander Li [Hsii-pin], and knew what to expect. I had not fought
7
with them, and the territory was hew to me. I was sent to advance
on T'ung-ch'eng and Tou-p'u, while 
(i DO NOT KNOW THE NAME OF Ch'en Yii-ch'eng would advance on T'ung-
THE CH'ING COMMANDER AT ch'eng from the mountains.® AT THE
T'UNG-CH’ENG). WEST GATE THE CH'ING COMMANDER SENT
TROOPS TO ENGAGE CH'EN Ytf-CH'ENG. I 
ALSO ARRIVED. THE CH'ING COMMANDER GAVE BATTLE ON BOTH SIDES WITH 
CAVALRY AND INFANTRY. The Ch'ing troops knew that at San—ho they 
had lost a good commander in Li Hsii-pin, and were afraid and had
little fighting spirit; so they were defeated. On the same day
46 our troops entered the town over the wall at the west gate. I
attacked from Tou-p'u, by which time it was already night. The
Ch'ing garrison withdrew and fled during the night, but many were
killed. After recovering T'ung-ch'eng that night, we rested the
1troops for three days.
An-ch'ing was already under siege and its communications were
cut; but after the battles of San-ho and T'ung-ch'eng, the siege
2
of An-ch*ing was lifted. This was in the first place, the relief
of T'ien-ching, OF THE SECOED 
(COUNTING THAT OF GENERAL HSIANG SIEGE, when communications were
[Jung] IT WAS THE SECOND BELIEF)5 restored through P'u-k’ou; the
battles of San-ho and T'ung- 
ch'eng [also] raised the siege of An-ch'ing.
Then Ch'en Yii-ch'eng *s army went by way of Shih-p'ai into Su- 
sung. But his army was over confident after its victories, and at 
Su-sung was defeated by cavalry and infantry under General Tseng 
[Kuo-fan]'s officers, and had to withdraw and return.^ Commander 
Ch'en [Yii-ch'eng] had ordered his subordinate Li Ssu-fu to bring 
an army from Ch'ing-tsfao-ke, to advance by Huang-ni-kang and 
north of Shih-p'ai, to help him to achieve success at Su-sung.
But at Huang-nin-kang they lost a column in a Ch'ing cavalry 
charge, and were not able to help at Su-sung. They did not know 
of the defeat at Su-sung, so both failed,
Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was determined to get Su-sung at all costs, in 
order to protect An-chfing. At that time I advanced on T'ai-hu 
from Ch'ien-shan. In each place the Ch'ing troops withdrew of 
their own accord and 1 took the two towns. It was Ch'en Yii-
47 ch'eng who appointed commanders to garrison them.
After his defeat at Su-sung, Ch'en Yii-ch'eng returned to T'ai-
hu and had a discussion with me. He wanted the whole army to
6advance steadily on Erh-lang-ho. We discussed it again and again,
■but I was -unwilling. He was so insistent however, that I had no 
choice but to agree to go with him. We then divided into columns
and advanced on Erh-lang-ho. We came up against Pao [Chfao]s
1 2 army, and also General Tso's army, which had come, the one from
Erh-lang-ho and the other from Su-sung; infantry and cavalry
advancing together. Ch'en Yii-ch'eng *s force was first defeated;
his stockades were all taken by Pao [Ch'ao]*s army, and he was
forced to take to the hills. Several thousand of the T'ien Ch'ao
troops were killed. There only remained six large stockades
occupied by my troops, which x^ ere besieged until nightfall, when
To-[lung-ah] and Pao [Ch'ao] recalled their troops. We then
■z
broke out and got away. The same night we withdrew to T'ai-hu. 
Ch'en Yii-ch'eng also arrived, and stationed his troops in T'ai-hu 
while he himself returned to An-ch'ing. I returned with my troops 
and camped at Huang-shan in Ch'ao-hsien, where we rested over the 
Hew Year.^ The two armies of To-[lung-ah] and Pao [Ch'ao] also 
rested.
At this time Chiang-p'u was commanded by Hsueh Chih-yuan, but 
in the 1st Month of the 9th Year [1859] > he surrendered to the 
Ch'ing and gave over the town to them. At this time Li Chao- 
shou was at Ch'u-chou, Wu-i and Hsiao-tien, and his linked fort­
ifications joined up with Chiang-p'u. P'u-k'ou was also occupied 
by Li Chao-shou's troops. This was because of the third siege of 
T'ien-ching. I was still at Huang-shan and was too late to save
it. When I heard of the betrayal of Chiang-p'u I hurried down to 
7FU~k'ou. The town was deserted, but outside were Li Chao-shou's 
troops. I had to leave an officer to garrison P'u-k'ou in order 
to keep open the route to T'ien-ching for the time being. Fortun­
ately we still had control of Liu-ho, T'ien-ch'ang, Ho-chou, Ch'ao- 
hsien and Wu-wei,
Then General Chang [Kuo-liang] on the south bank sent reinforc-
8ements and Liang-p'u was again closely besieged. At that time
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though we had a few minor crossings to the capital, in fact
we did not use them. After this we had no choice but to call
upon the Commander of the Front Division Ch'en Yu-chfeng to
hasten to the rescue with his troops, and he came by way of Lu-
[chou] and Liang-yuan.^
At this time there were several myriad Ch’ing troops besieging 
2
Liu-ho. The Ch’ing commander at the siege of Liu-ho was a man
called Chu, from Kwangsi, a subordinate of General Chang [Kuo-
Xiang].5 AFTER SETTING OUT FOR LIU-HO, the Commander of the Front
Division first attacked [at] Liu-ho, but was :qot successful in
the first engagement.^ Then he moved on to Yang-chou to make a
5
show of laying siege to it, Chu’s army was stationed near the 
east gate of Liu-ho in more than 40 stockades. The attack on 
49 Yang-ohou, AFTER PASSING BY THE EAST GATE, was with the intention 
of diverting part of Chu’s force, so that our troops could wheel 
round and make a surprise attack. Chu*s troops, which had been 
sent to the relief of Yang-chou, were cut off by our wheeling
7
round. There were no fighting troops there and relief could not
quickly arrive. The General Chang [Kuo-liang] in Chiang-nan
despatched troops to the rescue; there was a battle at Ling-tzu-
8k*ou and Chang*s troops were defeated. The same night Chu*s
force entirely withdrew and the siege of Liu-ho was lifted. The
9losses amongst Chu*s troops were considerable.
Then Ch*en Yu-ch*eng and I led our forces back to P'u-k*ou and
destroyed fifty or sixty stockades of the Ch’ing commander Chou
10[T'ien-p*ei]*s force, which was besieging P'u-kfou. We moved
our troops to P’u-[k*ou] from Liu-ho and fought a great battle
for five or six days with the Ch*ing general Chang Kuo-liang and
11his commanders Chang Yu-liang and Chou [Tfien-p’ei]> Chang Kuo- 
liang^ troops were defeated, and when Chou saw that his chief’s 
troops had been defeated, his officers and men were discouraged 
and lost their fighting spirit; there was also the fear of having
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the river behind them.1 (SO THE TROOPS WERE AFRAID AMD HAD NO
DESIRE TO EIGHT), The Ch^ing garrison at P ’u-k'ou could not
hold out and fifty or sixty Chfing stockades were lost. They
withdrew to the hank of the river hut could retreat no further.
But they had not withdrawn from Chiang-p'u, so communications
*
with the capital were only half restored at this time. This 
was the partial relief of the fourth siege of the capital.
After the capture of Pfu-kfou and Liu-ho, General Tseng [Kuo- 
fan]*s great army came from Huang-[mei] and Su-sung, and once 
more urgent reports came from the front up-river.^ The Commander 
50 of the Front Division withdrew his troops and went to the rescue.^
I was unahle to go because I had to protect P^-k’ou, We had 
smashed the Chf ing stockades at Llang-p*u, hut not thoroughly, and 
later they made a come-back. ^ I had long been holding P'u-k’ou 
and lacked supplies and provisions for the troops. From outside 
no relief came. On the south bank General Ho [Chfun] and General 
Chang [Kuo-liang]1 s force was strong, but I had no troops to 
fight them with, no powder and no cannon.
In the government there was no leader to take charge. The 
Sovereign did not interest himself in affairs of state, but 
relied entirely upon Heaven, enquiring neither about military 
nor about political matters. There was really nothing I could no 
in the T*ien Chfao. I was vigorously defending P'u-k'ou, yet I 
fell under suspicion and it was said that I was intending to contact 
the Ch*ing government and surrender. In T'ien-ching my mother and 
wife were held as hostages, and the river was sealed off and my 
troops prevented from returning to the capital.' There were 
letters between me and Li Chao-shou and when the T*ien Wang found 
out about this he feared that I would turn traitor, so he appointed 
me Chung Wang in order to make me happy and prevent me from 
defaulting.^ I really do not know why the court should have taken 
such precautions against me.
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Though I was oppressed at this time, as a man from Kwangsi, 
far from home, there was nowhere for me to go. We men of Yueh 
have not dispersed it is really because there was nowhere for us 
to go, so we were compelled to carry on. IF GOVERNOR TSENG [Kuo- 
ch’ttan] AND THE GRAND SECRETARY COULD PETITION THE EMPEROR TO
51 SPARE THESE MEN OF YffciH, THAT WOULD BE EXCELLENT. OUR TfIEN WANG 
ESTABLISHED HIS KINGDOM, BUT I DID NOT KNOW THAT HE INTENDED TO 
FOUND A STATE. (THE GREAT CH'ING WANTS ABOVE ALL TO EXTINGUISH 
THE FLAMES OF WAR AND BRING PEACE TO THE EMPIRE AND WIN THE HEARTS 
OF THE PEOPLE). OUR SOVEREIGN WAS IN FACT DEFEATED AND PERISHED 
BECAUSE HE DID NOT CULTIVATE GOOD GOVERNMENT. I HAVE LONG KNOWN 
OF THE BENEVOLENCE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY IN COLLECTING TOGETHER 
REBELLIOUS PERSONS AND PREVENTING DISORDERS AMONGST THE PEOPLE.
THE SOONER THE COMMON PEOPLE CAN BE AT PEACE, THE SOONER THE
CHr ING OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS CAN PUT DOWN THEIR ARMS AND CEASE 
FIGHTING. THEN EVERYONE WILL PRAISE THE ENORMOUS BENEVOLENCE 
AND VIRTUE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND OF THE GOVERNOR, AND THE 
WHOLE PEOPLE WILL BENEFIT. I SPEAK OUT IN THIS DIRECT AND CLUMSY 
WAY BECAUSE IT COMES STRAIGHT FROM THE HEART. WHO AM I TO SAY MORE 
OR TO ARGUE? THIS IS NOT FLATTERY ON THE PART OF THIS MILITARY 
CRIMINAL. I HAVE LONG KNOW OF THE GOVERNOR AND THE GRAND 
SECRETARY1S BENEVOLENCE AND LIBERALITY - THAT IS WHY I HAVE SPOKEN 
IN THIS WAY. Now that I am on the point of death, I hope that the 
people may soon be at peace. My idle words have been crudely 
expressed and I beg that this may be excused.
Now I will continue to give a clear account of what happened
after I was under constraint in P'u-k'ou. At that time Chiang-
p!u was still**' being besieged by General Chang fKuo-liang]1 s
troops. I saw that the situation was not AT ALL good, and went
2back to the capital with a small cavalry escort and petitioned
52 the Sovereign, but he would not agree. Then in the palace I
17?
I argued with the Sovereign and asked him, "If you leave me
holding P'u-k’ou, whom do you hope will come to your relief from
outside?" I carefully planned the details with the Sovereign's
1
state minister and with the Sovereign. The Commander of the
Pront Division Ch'en Yu-ch'eng was at Ch'ien-[shan], T'ai-[hu],
Huang-[mei] and Su-[sung], fighting against General Tseng [Kuo-
fan]'s troops and could not he moved.^ Wei Chih-chun had already
gone over to the Ch'ing Dynasty; Liu Kuan-fang and Lai Wen-hung
and ICu Lung-hsien had made their names but were not yet of [much]
use. The Commander of the Centre Division, Yang Pu-ch'ing, was
at Tung-liu and Ying-chia-hui in Ch'ih-[chou] Prefecture, also
fighting against General Tseng [Kuo-fan]'s troops.^ Li Shih-hsien,
Commander of the Left Division, was in the region of Nan-ning and 
A
Wan-chih.
The four gates of the capital were closely besieged by the
two armies of Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang], and [surrounded
5by a] deep moat. The Kingdom had little grain left. The
Sovereign would not allow me to leave and bring relief from
outside. WHAT DID THE SOVEREIGN THINK TO DO?6 I argued force-
fully with him and was severely reprimanded. He would make no
clear decision because he was not interested in military matters,
but relied entirely upon Heaven, and hardly ever gave orders or
instructions to his ministers. I had no choice but to make another
strong petition stating my determination to leave the capital. The
Sovereign realized that I could not be held, and gave his consent
to my leaving the capital.
The military affairs of P'u-k'ou were all handed over to Huang
7Tzu-lung and Ch'en Ts'an-ming; then I immediately set out from 
P'u-k'ou and marched to Wu-hu. Within- three or four days the 
forts along the river outside P'u-k'ou were smashed by General 
53 Chang [Kuo-liang]1 s troops and Chiu-fu-chou was lost.8 Again the 
capital was surrounded. This was for the fifth time. Generals
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Ho [Ch*un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] surrounded it with even more
stoolcades and deeper moats. The court was without a plan and the
capital was gripped as if in an iron cask. But the fortune of
the T*ien Ch*ao was not yet exhausted and it was not yet destined
to perish. Again peoples* spirits were roused. From outside I
sent despatches to all parts and everywhere people were ready to
follow my suggestions and submit to my direction. The whole
burden of planning the relief of the fifth siege of T*ien-ching
fell upon me. By good will and devotion I obtained the co-operation
of the field commanders. To-day, if everyone knows the name of
the Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch*eng, it is really because I was ready
to distribute money; countless enemy officers and officials with
whom I came in contact I treated well;^ and because I was willing
to give material help to the suffering people. It was because of
this, that in and out of the capital, old and young, all knew
Li Hsiu-ch*eng. It is not because I was talented, and I was not
the head of the government. The senior and most trusted by the
2T*ien Wang were: the Young Hsi Wang Hsiao Yu-ho, then the T*ien 
Wang*s elder brother Hung Jen-fa and his second brother Hung Jen- 
ta; the [third] most trusted was the Kan Vang Hung Jen-kan; then 
came the Imperial Sons-in-law Chung and Huang;v the fifth was the 
54 Ying Wang Ch*en Yu-ch*eng and sixth came Hsiu-ch*eng. After the 
death of Chfen Yu-ch*eng, his duties as principal commander were 
given to me. I WAS MERELY^ SERVING CH'IN WHILE IN CH'IN AND CH'TJ 
WHILE IN CH'U, AND I DID MY BEST.
At that time T*ien-ching was closely besieged and we were 
without a plan. Then on the 2nd Bay of the First Month of the 
Tenth Year [10 February I860], I took my troops from Wu-hu to 
Nan-ling by way of Ch * ing-ke-^chiang and Ma-t*ou, and from Kao-
5
ch*iao in Hing-kuo crossed to Shui-tung. At that time the 
Ch*ing troops at Ning-kuo were prepared for an attack on the 
town, THEY WERE WELL-PREPAREB FOR MY ARRIVAL. To their surprise
I went past Ning-kuo by m y  of Shui-tung and in two days and two
1
nights reached Huang-te-chou.
We immediately took Kuang-te and left Chfen K’ un-shu and Ch’en
Ping-wen to hold it, I myself took my subordinates T’an Shao-
lcuang, Lu Shun-te and Wu Ting-ts’ai and left Kuang-te for Ssu~an.
At Ssu-an there were some of Chang Kuo-liang’s troops holding the 
2place. On this day, when we joined battle and the two sides met
Chang was defeated, his stockades were taken and Ssu-an m s
3 4captured. We went then to Hung-hsin, where we joined up with
5my cousin Li Shih-hsien’s troops. We intended to attack Hu-chou
with our combined forces.^ [But the capture of] Hu-chou did not
require many troops, so I left Li Shihrhsien to take it and
7withdrew my own troops by m y  of Miao-hsi to Wu-k’ang,' and in a
day and a night, marched on Hang-chou with only six or seven 
8thousand men. We besieged the five gates of Hang-chou, and after
9three days and nights, broke in through the Ch’ing-p’o Gate.
The capture of Hang-chou was not done by the strength of men,
but was accomplished by Heaven, The advance-guard of one thousand
two hundred and fifty men took Hang-chou; so it was not done by
10
the strength of men. THE PEOPLE OP HANG-CHOU COULD HOT ESCAPE
THEIR PREDESTINED PATE.
My target was not really Hang-chou. I saw how Generals Ho
[Ch’un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] were besieging the capital in which
my Sovereign and my mother were. I knew that the supplies for
Generals Ho and Chang’s armies all came from Su-[chou], Hang-[chou],
Kiangsi, Fukien and Kwangtung. “ This is why I took special
troops and made sure of a victory. The plan was to draw off
General Iio and General Chang’s troops from Chiang-nan, so that I
could turn back and raise the siege of T’ien-ching. I was not just
intending to take Hang-chou.
After entering the city we fought for several days without
IItaking the Manchu garrison. Then, as expected, General Ho and
General Chang sent troops from Chiang-nan for the relief of
Hang-chou, under the command of Chang Yii-liang.^ At the Wu-
2ling Gate of Hang-chou the two sides made contact, and we knew 
that Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang]f s forces were divided and 
that they had fallen into our trap. The following day at noon, 
we used flags and pennons newly made in Hang-chou, in order to 
deceive the enemy. This is a device for withdrawing with 
insufficient troops. Unexpectedly Chang Yu-liang fell into the 
trap, and we had been gone for a day and a night before he dared
x
to enter the city. Thus we were able to withdraw without hindrance.
The T'ien Ch'ao was not yet fated to perish, so our plans were 
successful; [but now] its span is accomplished and our plans do 
not succeed. Up until now the same man has been in charge, but 
now our plans no longer work and the capital is lost. One reason 
is that the Sovereign did not have good fortune, while the Ch'ing 
Dynasty does have good fortune. (WITH GENERAL TSENG [Kuo-fan]*S 
DETERMINATION AND PERSISTENCE, THE UNITED WILL OF HIS OFFICERS 
AND SOLDIERS, THE TSENG FAMILY HAD THE GREAT GOOD FORTUNE OF 
HELPING THE CH'ING DYNASTY TO RECOVER THIS CITY, WINNING GLORY 
THROUGHOUT THE EMPIRE. THIS IS THE RESULT OF THE GRAND SECRETARY'S 
PLANNING AND OP CHIU-SHUAI [Tseng Kuo-ch'iian]'S 4 ABLE STRATEGY. 
GENERAL AND MINISTER ACTING UNDER ORDERS ACHIEVED ABSOLUTE SUCCESS).5
I will leave this now and relate the withdrawal from Hang-chou 
in order to go to the relief of T'ien-ching, and the defeat of 
Chang and Ho's army. After that I will speak of the present loss 
of T'ien-ching. THESE MATTERS, ACCUMULATED OVER TEN YEARS, ARE 
DIFFICULT TO MAKE CLEAR ALL AT ONCE, [but I will attempt] TO 
RELATE THEM CLEARLY AND IN THE PROPER ORDER.
After withdrawing from Hang-chou, we went by way of Yu-hang and 
Lin-an, then crossed T'ien-mu-shan and came out at Hsiao-feng,
ry
from which we went to Kuang-te. We were in front and Chang Yti- 
liang's troops were behind. AFTER THEY ENTERED HANG-CHOU, the
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1soldiers looted people's property and did not want to pursue us.
57 It is more than $00 li from Kuang-te to T'ien-ching, Hang-chou
is eight or nine hundred li. So with all the twists and turns it
is more than a thousand li. For this reason Chang Yii-liang did
not have time to get hack to the relief of [;the Chiang-nan H.Q.]
2at Chin-ling. This relief of T'ien-ching was done with the aid 
of Heaven, otherwise we could not have achieved such a wonderful 
success.
I had earlier arranged hy letter with Yang Fu-ch'ing for him
to join forces [with me] to relieve the capital.^ Liu Kuan-fang,
Lai Wen-hung and Ku Lung-hsien also oame in response to my
letters;^- the Shih Wang [Li Shih-hsienl also came,"* and we had a
6
meeting at Chien-p'ing. This was ordained by Heaven; it was like 
the meeting at Ssu-ming-shan.^ THE KINGDOM WAS NOT [yet] FATED TO 
PERISH, THAT IS WHY IT WAS ORDAINED BY HEAVEN.8
After the meeting we immediately made our troops dispositions.
9
Yang Fu-ch'ing took troops to attack ICao-ch'un and Tung-pa;' Li 
Shih-hsien was sent to attack Li-yang, and Liu Kuan-fang went v/ith
10 rhim. Everywhere we were successful. [YangJ Fu-ch'ing took Li-
11shui and Mo-ling-kuan, the Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien took Chii- 
12jung. I came by Ch'ih-sha-shan without attacking any towns on
15the way, and made straight for Hsiuog-huang-chen.  ^ At that time
Generals Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] had positioned their
forces and were encamped in more than ten large stockades. After
Shih Wang arrived we joined forces and took up positions
14against General Chang's army. THE W O  SIDES MET AND FOUGHT 
FROM THE SHEN HOUR [3-5 pm] TO THE yO HOUR [5-7 pm] and Chang's 
troops were severely beaten. We smashed the Ch'ing stockades at 
Hsiung-huang-chen, and their troops were afraid and did not dare 
to fight.
56 The following day we advanced by way of T'u-shan, and the Fu
16
Wang [Yang Fu-ch'ing] came from Mo-ling-kuan to the south gate.
The Ying Wang Ch’en Yii-ch’eng had already withdrawn his troops 
from Ch'ien-fshan] and T'ai-[hu] and had come down to Chiang-p'u 
and P’u-k'ou. I was on the south hank with Yang [Fu-ch'ing],
Liu [Kuan-fang] and Li [Shih-hsien], The Ying Wang came without 
prior arrangement when he heard that our troops had arrived on 
the south hank. He crossed the river at Hsi-liang-[shan] and
1came hy Chiang-ning-chen to T'ou-kuan, Pan-ch'iao and Shan-ch'iao.
2I came hy Yao-hua-men and advanced to the foot of Tz'u-ching-shan.
Ch'en K ’un-shu and Liu Kuan-fang came hy way of Kao-ch'iao-men, the
Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien came to the north gate and Hung-shan;^
the Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing came from Mo-ling-kuan to the south
gate at Yu-hua-t'ai. The Ying Wang Ch'en Yu-ch'eng advanced hy
Pan-ch'iao and Shan-ch'iao. The front and rear parts of General
Chang and Ho's army were unahle to come to each other's aid, and
they were defeated at Hsiung-huang-chen. Chang Yu-liang, who had
taken picked troops to the relief of Hang-chou, had not yet
returned and was cut off outside hy my troops. The grain supply
for [the armies of] Generals Ho and Chang came from Su-[chou],
Hang-[chou], Fukien, ICwangtung and ICiangsi, and these were all cut
off, so that there was no grain in the camps.^ At that time the
5T'ien Ch'ao had many troops and in one sweep we raised the siege
6 V
of the capital. This was for the sixth time.
Though we raised the siege and smashed General Ho and General
Chang's stockades, we did not kill many because the whole army
withdrew in the night and went straight down to Chen-chiang and
Tan-yang, where they encamped. They lost between three and five
thousand killed, hut many more were scattered. Those of Chang and
Ho's troops who ran off to Su-chou and Ch’ang-chou, kept looting
0
the people, so that everyone hated them. At that time the fame 
of the T'ien Ch'ao armies increased greatly; who could guess 
that there would he the present disaster?
The sixth relief of T'ien-ching was not planned hy the Sovereign,
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[but] really [by] ministers [who] were simple and loyal to the 
T'ien Wang. THESE MINISTERS WERE LOYAL, STRAIGHTFORWARD AND 
VIRTUOUS; BUT UNFORTUNATELY1 THEY DID HOT ENCOUNTER AH ENLIGHT­
ENED RULER. HEROES WERE WRONGED,2 INNUMERABLE GOOD MEN DIED, AND 
PEOPLE WERE WRONGLY KILLED. THIS WAS REALLY THE PAULT OP THE 
SOVEREIGN, WHO EMPLOYED MEN WITHOUT FINDING OUT WHETHER THEY 
WERE WORTHY OR NOT, AND DID NOT PUT COMPLETE TRUST IN HIS 
MINISTERS. AGAIN AND AGAIN I MADE STRONG ADMONITIONS5 AND ARGUED 
WITH HIM, BUT HE WOULD NEVER FOLLOW [MY ADVICE], SO WE HAVE COME 
TO THIS PASS.
WHEN I WAS YOUNG, AT HOME, I UNDERSTOOD NOTHING, BUT JOINED UP 
IN THE EXCITEMENT. THOSE WHO COULD UNDERSTAND WOULD RATHER DIE 
THAN DO SUCH THINGS. ONCE YOU ARE RIDING4 ON A TIGER'S BACK5 
IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISMOUNT. I WAS SEPARATED FROM MY PARENTS, 
THOUGH THIS WAS NOT MY WISH. THE SOVEREIGN ESTABLISHED A DYNASTY 
AND FOUND HIS EVERLASTING DESTINY, [but] I was his general and 
served long in the army without a moment of pleasure but with 
plenty of troubles. THERE WERE MARY PEOPLE IN THE T1 TEN CH'AO 
WHO LID HARM TO THE PEOPLE; WHAT COULD I ALONE DO, FOR ALL MY 
COMPASSION? POWER WAS NOT IN MY HANDS, SO WHAT COULD I DO? THE 
GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR, THOUGH OUTSIDE, HAVE GREAT 
60 PERCEPTION AND ABILITY, AND MEN OF SUCH OVERWHELMING AND
UNEQUALLED TALENT MUST HAVE KNOWN THIS FOR A LONG TIME, SO I WILL 
NOT CONTINUE.
After the sixth relief of the capital, the Sovereign was 
exceedingly unreceptive to suggestions and only believed in 
Heaven. His edicts spoke of Heaven but not of men. At this time 
the army had covered itself with glory and there were more 
soldiers than ever. I was daily more and more involved and it was 
increasingly difficult to get away.
After the sixth relief of the capital no edict was pronounced
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praising the generals, the field commanders were not received
1in audience, nor were the court officials. The Sovereign was
not interested in tjae affairs of government, but merely instructed
2
his ministers in the knowledge of Heaven, as if all was tranquil.
HOW THE STATE HAS FALLEN AND I HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER BY HIS 
EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR AND SHUT UP IN JAIL, AWAITING5 PUNISH­
MENT. I AM SAB AND DEPRESSED IN PRISON. MY SOVEREIGN'S CAUSE 
HAS ALREADY COME TO SUCH A PASS THAT ALL I CAN DO IS TO WRITE FOR 
THE INSPECTION OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR, SO THAT 
THEY MAY KNOW iTHE HISTORY OF MY SOVEREIGN'S ATTEMPT TO FOUND A 
DYNASTY. I RELATE THE SOURCES OF ITS DESTRUCTION, CONCEALING 
NOTHING, BUT RECORDING EVERYTHING CLEARLY.
After the sixth relief of the capital, the troops rested for 
three days. [Then] the T'ien Wang in a severe edict, ordered me 
to take my troops and capture Su-[chou] and Ch'ang-[chou], giving 
me a month in which to pacify [the area] and report back.^ Things 
being what they were, and since I was employed by him, I had to 
obey.
I regrouped my forces, and after selecting a day, set out to
61 advance by way of Tan-yang. In three days the army arrived at
Tan-yang, where Chang Kuo-liang*s troops were stationed. The
following day we joined battle outside the south gate of Tan-yang.
WE FOUGHT FOR TWO DAYS, INDECISIVELY ON THE FIRST. THE FOLLOWING
DAY WE FOUGHT FROM THE CH'EN HOUR [7-9 am. ] UNTIL THE WEI HOUR
[1-5 pm.]. Chang's troops were severely defeated and ten thousand
of them were killed,^ General Chang [Kuo-liang] was drowned in
7the river at the south gate of Tan-yang.' I sent officers to
find his body, and buried it in a coffin at the foot of Tan-yang
Pagoda. The two states were at war and each man served his own
8master. Alive he was an enemy, WAS A HERO, dead, I did not bear 
him any hatred. That is why I buried him. IT WAS IN PITY FOR A
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HERO. I DID HOT HATE HIM.1
2After taking Tan-yang we went down to Ch' ang-chou. General
Chang [Kuo-liang]'s infantry and river troops, defeated at Tan-
yang, had gone straight to Chfang-chou, where there were troops
sent from Su-chou. They joined up with Chang Yii-liang's force,
which had returned from Hang-chou, and had fortified more than
forty stockades at Ch’ang-chou, both large and small.
The troops arrived one day and we joined battle on the next.
Chang's troops were again defeated and his stockades all destroyed.
Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang]'s headquarters at Chin-ling was
already lost, and the troops outside had no will to fight, so they
4fled without giving battle. After being attacked for a few days
5
Ch'ang-chou surrendered. After entering the town, we did not 
kill or harm the people, but some were §o frightened that they 
jumped into the water and were drowned. Once the town was taken, 
we immediately pacified the people and rested the troops for two 
62 days, then hastened down to Wu-hsi, where Chang Yii-liang's troops 
from Ch'ang-chou were stationed. Governor General Ho [Kuei- 
ch'ing] stole away with his family by boat, but I do not know 
where he went.®
When our main force reached Wu-hsi, Chang Yu-liang had already 
again prepared his fortifications and was strongly defending the
9
four gates. The Ch'ing oommander at I-hsing, a man called Liu
from Tung-hsiang in Kwangsi - I do not know his rank - came from
10X-hsing to reinforce Chang Yu-liang. His troops came by boat
across Lake T'ai, and had just arrived in Wu-hsi. [When] Chang
Yii-liang's troops and mine joined battle and the two sides met,
we fought for a day and a night. I was not satisfied because
Chang's troops, though defeated, had pulled themselves together
again. He was one of the good Ch'ing commanders. So I took my
11troops and my bodyguard, and went down by Hui-ch'uan-shan, and 
launched a strong attack on the west gate. [Chang's] river troops
and infantry were severely defeated and we took the town of
1 2 Wu-hsi* I then rested the troops and pacified the people.
We rested for two days.
At that time, after Ho Ch'un's Chiang-nan Headquarters had
lost the initiative and the army had been defeated, Generals Ho
[Ch’un] and Chang [Kuo-liang] had gone different ways* General
Chang had intended to remain in Tan-yang in order to protect Su-
chou and Ch’ang-chou. Ho Ch’un went alone down to Su-chou and
3went by boat to Hsii-shu-kuan. LATER he heard that his assistant
commander had been killed at Tan-yang, so Ho-Ch’un hanged himself
4at Hsu-shu-kuan.
HAVING SAID THAT, I WILL GO ON TO TELL ABOUT LEAVING WU-HSI TO
GO DOWN TO SU-CHOU. Having taken Wu-hsi, the following day we
moved on to Su-[chou] Prefecture, and arriving at Ch’ang-men,
5divided up, and invested each gate. Many of the ordinary people
of Ch’ang-men suburb and other villages came to welcome us. On
the doors of homes and shops were notices saying, ’Unite to kill
all the government troops of Chang and Ho! * The people killed
these government troops because from Tan-yang right down to Su-
chou, people's property on land and water had been looted by them
therefore the people hated and killed them. HAVING CLEARLY
RELATED THIS I WILL SPEAK OP HOW WE TOOK SU-CHOU.7
We closely invested the city gates of Su-chou. The garrison
had been transferred to defend [Wu]-hsi and Ch'ang-[chou] when
the emergency occurred there, so that there were no troops in the 
8city. Later it was garrisoned by troops from Chin-ling, and by 
those who had withdrawn from Ch’ang-[chou] and [Wu]-hsi. Only
9
Chang Yu-liang was there. The other Ch’ing commanders, after 
the loss of Chin-ling, Tan-[yang], Ch'ang-[chou] and Wu-hsi, 
knowing that the troops were in bad spirits and afraid, and also 
under attack from the people outside, REALIZED THAT THE SITUATION 
WAS BAD.*^ Then Li Wen-ping, Ho Hsin-i, Chou Wu and others
1
surrendered and gave up the city. They were Cantonese. When 
Chang Yii-liang saw. that the military situation*.;was like this, he 
led his SZECHUANESE SOLDIERS AND HIS2 own troops out by the Pan 
Gate, and went to Hang-chou, retreating several hundred li* Hang­
chou would not open the gates to him, so he was furious and 
stationed his troops outside the Wu-lin Gate, where they despoiled
and maltreated the people. At that time there was enmity between
■z
the two garrison commanders of the provincial capital.
After Li Wen-ping, Ho Hsin-i and the others had surrendered Su- 
chou, I immediately entered the city with my troops and accepted 
the surrender of fifty or sixty thousand of the troops.^ " THIS WAS 
HOT STRANGE. AFTER THE DEFEAT AT CHIN-LING, MANY TOWNS WERE LOST; 
THE COMMANDER WAS DEAD AND THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS HAD NO LEADER. 
THAT IS WHY THEY SURRENDERED, IT WAS ORDAINED BY HEAVEN. THE 
SIXTH SIEGE OF T'IEN-CHING COULD STILL5 BE RAISEDs THE SEVENTH 
BROUGHT COLLAPSE. THIS WAS DUE TO THE GOOD FORTUNE OF THE GREAT 
CH'ING [Dynasty], AND THE BRILLIANT STRATEGY AND GOOD FORTUNE 6 
OF THE GREAT GENERALS, THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR, WHO 
ARE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING.
After I took Su-chou I OBTAINED FIFTY OR SIXTY THOUSAND
7SOLDIERS AND not one person was killed. There were very many 
Ch’ing candidate officials, both civil and military, and many
Q
Manchu officers, but none were harmed. They all wished to Ire turn
home, and if they did not have enough money for travelling
expenses, I provided it for them, and allocated boats for them.
THIS IS NOT SELF-PRAISE TO GIVE GLORY TO MYSELF.9 BEFORE HIGH
HEAVEN I DARE NOT CONCEAL ANYTHING. THEY ALL DISPERSED AND WENT
HOME, AND MANY RETURNED TO PEKING, WHERE THIS MUST BE KNOWN, SINCE
MANCHUS [must have] GIVEN REPORTS OF IT.10
After taking the city I immediately made announcements to the
people, but Su-[chou] people are ungovernable and wicked and
11would not be pacified. Day and night they came looting as far
as the city wall.'*' My officers wanjbed to take troops and kill
them all, but I absolutely refused. I [again] issued pacification
orders, but the people would not obey and the disorders continued
for more than ten days. Finally I was so dissatisfied with this
situation - I had taken the city but had failed to pacify the
people - that I went myself with ten or more boats straight into
the villages. From all sides people came with weapons in their
hands and surrounded me. All the civil and military officials
wit]h me turned pale. I was willing to sacrifice my life if the
people of Su-chou could be pacified; so when spears threatened
my life I did not draw back. X explained everything and the
people were convinced and everywhere ceased their activity and
put aside their weapons. In three days the people of Yuan-ho
were first pacified. FROM THE BEGINNING OF PACIFICATION, in seven
2
days Yuan-ho, Wu-hsien and Chfang-chou were at peace." Far and 
near all other hsien submitted, and gave up fighting and became 
calm. Thus the people of Su-chou and Ch'ang-chou were restored to 
order.^
Chang Yii-liang's troops had retreated to Hang-chou; we gave
chase and took Chia-hsing,^ after which we rested the troops,
pacified the people and did not campaign. Then Chang Yii-liang,
having rested and regrouped at Hang-chou, advanced and attacked 
£
Chia-hsing. The commander of Chia-hsing was Ch'iu-t'ien-i Ch'en
7K*un-shu and Lang-t'ien-i Ch'en Ping-wen. Chang Yii-liang with 
more than 40 ying of various sizes, closely invested the two gates 
south of Chia-[hsing] and breached the town wall. ^ Fortunately 
the officers and men made an energetic and united effort, other­
wise Chia-hsing would have been lost. At this time Chia-hsing 
sent an appeal for help to Su-chou, but suddenly Ch'ing-p'u was 
attacked by foreign devils in the pay of Governor Hsiieh [Huan].^ 
The commander of this hsien was Chou Wen-chia; luckily he was an
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1excellent commander, otherwise Ch*ing-p1 u would have heen lost,
Chou Wen-chia called for aid VERY URGENTLY and I had to take an
army in the middle of the 6th Month [late July] from Su-chou, and
first relieve Ch’ing-p*u. We set off from Su-chou hy boat,
arriving on the following day, and went into action immediately.
The foreign devils came out to give battle and the two sides met
and fought from early morning until noon, and the devils were
severely beaten. Six or seven hundred of the devil soldiers were
killed and more than two thousand foreign guns taken, together
with ten or more cannon and more than a hundred muzzle-loaders,
2and several hundred of their boats. The siege of Ch* ing-p *u was
z
raised and w© passed on and took Sung-chiang; then advanced to 
attack Shanghai. Foreigners from Shanghai had come to invite us, 
and outside there were Han soldiers who were in contact with 
[people] inside [the torn]. That is why we went.^
67 My troops camped at Chou-chia-hui, eighteen li from Shanghai.^ 
Nine 11 from Shanghai there were four Ch’ing stockades. My 
officers Ts’ai Yuan-lung and Kao Yung-k’uan were in command of the 
detachments. On this day, the sky was bright and cloudless.
After advancing to Chiu-li-[ch’iao]J  we were about to join battle 
with the Ch’ing troops; but seeing our army arrive THEY HAD ALREADY 
FLED, giving up their positions without defending them. We were. 
just briskly advancing towards Shanghai, while inside they were 
preparing a respectful welcome for me, when suddenly the bright 
sky became dark and rainy, and there was a storm of wind, rain 
and thunder. Neither horses nor men could move or keep their 
feet; so we did not advance. The foreigners and the Ch’ing troops 
who were ready to welcome me saw that I did not arrive. That night 
Governor Hsueh [Huan] heard that there was contact [between us] and 
again bought the goodwill of the foreign devils with money, and 
hired one or two thousand devils to defend the town. The Ch’ing 
troops failed to make contact with me, THE AFFAIR FAILED and these
1troops were all killed by Governor Hsueh. This having failed,
I lodged for a few days at Chou-chia-hui, in a church belonging
2to the hung-mao.
Then an urgent appeal came from Chia-hsing, and I had to take
my troops back by way of Sung-chiang and [Ch*ing]-p'u-hsien, then
3
by Kuan-wang-miao to Chia-shan and P’mg-hu. There were Ch’ing
garrisons in these two places; but in one battle these two towns
were taken.4 AFTER TAKING THEM we continued on to Chia-hsing,
to raise the siege of the town. The same day AS I ARRIVED AT
CHIA-[hsing] I went up onto the wall to observe the disposition
of the troops, and watch what the Ch’ing troops were doing. The
following day the battle started and lasted for five days, I
sent one detachment to Shih-men to cut off Chang Yii-liang’s
6communications with Chekiang. In the water-bound countryside of
Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] it is difficult for troops to move;
there is water everywhere and no other routes to take. So when
Chang [Yli-liang]’s troops saw that [ray] soldiers had blocked
and cut off their line of retreat, all the officers and men
surrendered and gave up their stockades. Only Chang Yii-liang
gave battle; the others had all surrendered. For this reason
he did not dare to continue the battle, and fled back to Hang- 
7chou*
Having finished raising the siege, I moved ray army back to 
the provincial capital [Su-chou] to rest.® This was in the 7th 
or 8th Month [c. 10 August - 9 October]. Some of the people near 
the city had been pacified, some had not. Outside there were still 
some destitute people, and I immediately distributed grain and 
money in order to relieve them. Outside each gate there were 
people with nothing to carry on their trades with. To them too 
I gave money, distributing more than 100,000 string of cash. The
9
poor were every day given food TO RELIEVE THEM. The grain tax 
which should have been paid by the people of Su-chou was not fully
collected; we also allowed them to draw up registers and pay
land rents without going deeply into the matter,1 For this
2reason I was popular with the people of Su-chou.
(MY TROOPS WERE NOT ALL OF EQUAL WORTH AND I DO NOT DARE TO 
MAKE ALLOWANCES FOR THEM. EVERYONE CAN UNDERSTAND THIS, AND I 
NEED SAY NO MORE. I SERVED THE T’IEN CHTAQ FROM THE TIME I 
JOINED UP RIGHT UNTIL NOW, AND RECEIVED GREAT FAVOURS . HOW 
COULD I LEAVE IT?
WHEN THE T’IEN CH’AO WAS ESTABLISHED, EVERYONE WAS WILLING.
THE MAN CALLED HUNG CAME FROM HUA-HSIEN IN KWANGTUNG, TO KWANGSI, 
MORE THAN A THOUSAND LI. IF WE DID NOT KNOW, HOW COULD OTHERS?
HOW COULD BE TELL PEOPLE BEFOREHAND THAT HE PLANNED TO ESTABLISH 
A STATE? IT WAS ORDAINED BY HEAVEN THAT AFTER LONG YEARS OF 
PEACE THIS MAN SHOULD APPEAR, AND BRING CHAPS EVERYWHERE. NOW 
I HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER; BUT HOW COULD I HAVE KNOWN THAT IT 
WOULD COME TO THIS? IF I HAD FORESEEN THE PRESENT DISASTER I 
COULD LONG AGO HAVE AVOIDED IT AND REMAINED AT HOME AS AN ORDINARY 
PERSON. HOW CAN ONE FORESEE THE FUTURE? KNOWING IT, WHO WOULD 
HAVE FOLLOWED HIM? ONLY WHEN I BECAME AN OFFICER AND HELD 
MILITARY COMMAND DID I STUDY FOR A LONG TIME AND GAIN AN UNDER­
STANDING. THOSE WHO DID UNDERSTAND AVOIDED US AND* DID NOT FOLLOW 
US; HENCE THE PRESENT CALAMITY.
I HAVE NO RESENTMENT. I DID ALL OF MY OWN ACCORD AND NO ONE 
FORCED ME. TO BE FIRST LOYAL TO CH'IN IS THE LOYALTY OF AN HONEST 
MAN; BUT IF CH'U CAN FORGIVE, HE WILL REPAY EVEN UNTO DEATH . [I 
wish to] GATHER UP ALL THE TROOPS IN ORDER TO REPAY GREAT KINDNESS. 
THE REMAINING TROOPS WOULD NOT CAUSE DISORDER EVERYWHERE AND THE 
PEOPLE COULD BE AT PEACE. IT WOULD REDOUND FIRST, TO THE FAVOUR 
OF THE GREAT CH'ING EMPEROR, SECONDLY, TO THE VIRTUE OF THE GRAND 
SECRETARY AND OF THE GOVERNOR, AND INSPIRE TEN THOUSAND GENERATIONS. 
FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT, THE LESSON OF THE PAST IS THAT 
LENIENCY WILL STABILIZE THE EMPIRE. THOSE WHOSE FAME SURVIVES TO
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THIS DAY ARE THOSE OP GREAT SINCERITY AND BROAD WISDOM). THIS 
IS ALSO THE WAY TO STRIVE POR THE STATE.1 (I HAVE NO NATURAL 
ABILITY, BUT PERHAPS AM HONOURABLE AND STRAIGHTFORWARD. WHEN I 
SEE THE RIGHT I FOLLOW IT AND NOTHING ELSE. I SERVED THE T'IEN 
WANG WITH ALL MY HEART AND FOR THAT REASON MY FATHER AND MOTHER,
MY WIFE AND CHILDREN, ARE ALL SCATTERED). IF I HAD NOT BEEN 
LOYAL I WOULD LONG AGO HAVE GONE ELSEWHERE.2 (THOUGH I HAD 
OTHER INTENTIONS, THERE WAS NO OTHER PLACE FOR ME, SO I COME TO 
SUCH AN END.5
I SEE THAT THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR ARE MEN OF 
LIBERALITY, THEREFORE I EXPRESS MY REAL FEELINGS. I AM WILLING 
TO DO MY UTMOST FOR THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR TO 
OBTAIN THE SUBMISSION OF ALL THE T'IEN CH'AO PEOPLE. THEIR 
EXCELLENCIES THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR WISH TO ELIMINATE 
• THIS SCOURGE; I WILL COLLECT THESE PEOPLE FROM ALL PARTS) FOR 
YOU TO DISBAND.4 (THIS WOULD BE A GOOD THING. NOW THAT I AM 
LOST AND THE KINGDOM HAS PERISHED, TO ASSEMBLE THESE TROOPS WILL 
SAVE THE PEOPLE FROM BEING MOLESTED AND WILL SET MY MIND AT EASE.
IT IS FOR THE SAKE OF THE ORDINARY PEOPLE. THE GRAND SECRETARY 
AND THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICERS AND OFFICIALS WILL BE SAVED TROUBLE,
AND THE STATE SAVED EXPENSE. IT IS BECAUSE AFTER BEING CAPTURED
I RECEIVED KIND AND GENEROUS TREATMENT THAT I SPEAK OUT IN A
STRAIGHTFORWARD WAY, WITHOUT ANY OTHER MOTIVE. I REQUEST THAT 
THIS BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED), AND IT WILL BE SEEN THAT IT IS 
TRUE. I SAY THAT IT IS NOT THAT I AM DISLOYAL, BUT BECAUSE THE 
KINGDOM HAS COLLAPSED, I SPEAK THE TRUTH AND RELATE EVERYTHING 
IN DETAIL. (WHETHER OR NOT IT IS GRANTED WILL BE DECIDED AFTER 
71 THE RESPECTED CONSIDERATION OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE
GOVERNOR, NOT BY MY INSISTENCE; BUT 5 HAVING SEEN HOW KINDLY I
AM TREATED I DESIRE TO SPEAK OUT). HAVING SAID THIS, I WILL
SPEAK OF SU-CHOU, AND OF HOW THINGS HAVE NOW COME TO AN END.
After the relief of Chia-[hsing], I returned to the provincial 
capital [Su-chou]; this was in the middle of the 8th Month [last 
week in September]. Then a severe edict came from the T'ien Wang,
r -I 1  2
ordering me to come up [riverJ and urging me to bring my army
5and GO TO clear the north. At that time I had no good plan of 
action; but just at this moment, from Te-an-hsien £n Kiangsi, and
from Sui-chou, I-ning, Wu-ning, Ta-yeh, 
(IT IS A LONG TIME AGO AND I Hsing-kuo,4 Ch'i-shui,5 Ch'i-chou,6 Wu- 
AM NOT SUES OF THESE NAMES, chiang, Chiang-hsia, Chin-niu, Pao-an,7 
SO DO NOT ASK MORE). P'u-eh'i, Chia-yti, T'ung-shan, T'ung-
ch'eng and other places, more than forty 
leaders of risings sent people with petitions to Su-[chou], offering
9
to join us. I reported these facts in a memorial, saying that I
intended to enlist some hundreds of thousands of these people, and
then obey the command to come and clear the north, THOUGH I
ANSWERED IN THIS WAY, the Sovereign did not at first agree, but I
was adamant. I then allocated troops, selected commanders and
set out, having handed over civil and military affairs in Su~[fu]
Province to Ch'en K*un-shu.
After the soldiers and the people were settled and everything
was handed over, I set out with my army from Su-[chou] to the
capital, where I explained the reasons why I did not want to
clear the north. The Sovereign was full of righteous ^  indig-
72 nation, and upbraided me severely. But there was nothing I could
do. No matter whether the Sovereign assented or not, in Su-[chou]
11I had agreed to enlist the people who had risen in Kiangsi and
12Hupeh, so I had to go and meet them. Therefore I went against
the command of the Sovereign and against the ties of friendship
13and trust, and went with my army to Kiangsi and Hupeh.
While in the capital I assembled all civil and military 
officials of the government for a meeting in my palace, and said, 
"Brother Princes! Whoever has gold or silver should buy grain
with it. ho not hoard money; buying grain is the most important 
thing, AND SO ON, Now that we have taken Su-[chou] and Chfang- 
[chou], we will not be attacked f£om down-river, but from above; 
and it will be difficult to withstand. The last siege was the 
sixth, under Generals Ho [Ch'un] and Chang [Kuo-liang]; the 
seventh will certainly be a formidable siege by General Tseng 
[Kuo-fan]. His army has the advantage of the Grand Secretaryf and 
the Governor1 s excellent strategy AND DEEP SCHEMES,^ AND UNDER 
THEIR COMMAND ARE devoted officials and officers. The [Hu]-nan 
troops are steadfast and enduring; the army is always victorious 
and has never been defeated. If An-ch’ing can be held, there is 
no need to worry, but if [An-ch*ing] is not firm, the capital 
will not be secure. Therefore all should quickly buy grain.” 
Though I petitioned in these terms, the Sovereign would not 
change. He upbraided me saying, "You are afraid of death. I am 
the Sovereign with the true Mandate of Heaven, and have no need 
of soldiers to establish peace everywhere. " What could I say? 
(SPEECHLESS) I withdrew and with a sigh, said, "Let Meng Te-en, 
Lin Shao-chang and Li Ch1 un-fa hold the fort 6 at Chiang-tung-men 
and Yii-hua-t'ai ^  - this is the most important task. Everyone 
must buy grain. I leave the capital now [and will be gone] for 
more than four hundred days before you have news of me." Civil 
and military officials in the capital all followed my advice and 
bought grain. Then the Hungs ^  gave an order that no one could 
buy grain without a permit, and if anyone wanted a passport to 
leave the city, he had to pay for it before he would be allowed 
to leave; without money passports were not issued. Even if 
someone obtained a passport and bought grain, he was heavily 
taxed on his return. Eor this reason no one wanted to buy grain 
and bring it to the capital. Thus the present catastrophe, the 
fall of the kingdom, was really caused by the Hungs themselves. 
Enough of that.
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I set out by way of T'ai-p’ing, Wu-hu and Fan-ch’ang, thence
1
to Shxh-tai and I-hsien.
We met and fought with 
Pao [Ch’ao]1s army. (ON 
THE) FIRST M Y  WE WERE 
VICTORIOUS, ON THE FOLLOWING 
DAT PAO t CH'AO]'S AEMT WAS 
VICTORIOUS), killing several 
hundred of my men. So I 
immediately changed my 
route and did not go through 
I-hsien, hut hy way of 
Jo-ling to Hui-chou, then 
hy Tun-ch1 i to Wu-yuan, 
and from there to Ch’ang- 
shan-hsien, where we passed 
the New Year [10 February 
1861].^
At the beginning of the 1st Month of the 11th Year [early
February 1861 ], we set out from Ch’ang-shan and went to Yu-shan,
74 Kuang-hsin and Ho-k1 ou and to Chien-chf ang, where we took up
positions and attacked the town for more than twenty days without
success. Then a Ch’ing force came to its relief, under ’Heaven-
7storming Cannon’ Li Chin-yang. We prepared to do battle with
him, but his troops and mine did not fight, but made a truce. His
troops were few, mine were many: that is why we made a truce.®
Then I withdrew from Chien-ch’ang and went by way of Fu-chou,
[Hu]-wan to I-huang, then to the region of Chang-shu and Hsin-kan,
9where we camped, intending to cross the river. At this time the 
river was in spate, and on the other bank militia were in 
occupation, from Feng-ch’eng to above Chi-an. We could not retreat 
and we could not advance. We had no boats, but there were Ch’ing
(IT WAS BY WAY OF YANG-CHAN-LING THAT 
WE CROSSED, INTENDING TO REACH HSIU- 
NING-HSIEN THROUGH I-HSIEN,2 BUT WERE 
DEFEATED BY PAO’S FORCE, STATIONED IN 
I-HSIEN. THE MAIN H.Q. OF THE GRAND 
SECRETARY’S ARMY WAS AT CH’I-MEN.5 IN 
THIS PART THE MOUNTAINS ARE HIGH AND 
THE ROADS NARROW: ONCE BLOCKED THERE 
IS NO WAY ROUND. I DID NOT INTEND TO 
FIGHT FOR THIS PMCE; I WAS REALLY 
GOING TO HOPEH TO RECRUIT SOLDIERS, 
SINCE REBELS IN HUPEH AND OTHER HSIEN 
HAD ASKED ME TO GO. I DID NOT WISH TO 
BREAK FAITH WITH THEM, THAT IS WHY I 
DID THIS.)
gunboats in the river. We remained in Hsin-kan for several days, 
then suddenly the river dried up completely and I crossed with
my troops.1 THIS WAS AH ACT OP GOD, HOT DDE TO MY ABILITY.
' 2We crossed to Chi-an and went to Shui-chou. We did not intend
to station there, but the people insisted on keeping us, so we
occupied the various hsien in the Shui-chou Prefecture and
pacified the people. The region of I-ning and Wu-ning, and other
hsien in Hupeh were already occupied by [my]troops, so while we
pacified the people, we assembled those who had petitioned to join
us from the region of Hsing-kuo, Ta-yeh, Wu-ch'ang, Chiang-hsia,
T’ung-shan, T’ung-ch’eng, Chia-yu, Pu-chfi [all] in Hupeh, to the
number of about three hundred thousand.
Then Pao [Ch’ao] ’s army withdrew from Su-sung and came up to
Huang-chou-fu,^ and the troops of Governor Hu [Lin-i] of Hupeh
also came to about twenty or thirty li from Chin-niu and Pao-an.
This was in the middle of the 6th Month [end of July]. The newly
recruited troops had never been into battle, for this reason I did
not venture to engage Pao’s army.
My cousin Li Shih-hsien came from Hui-chou to the region of
Ching-te and Lo-p’ing, where he was fighting against Tso Chang-
fang [sic]. The Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien was victorious at
Ching-te, but was defeated at Lo-p’ing and lost ten thousand officers 
8and men. Huang Wen-chin, Ho Ting-wen and Li Yuan-chi, in the
region of Tung-liu, Chien-te and Jao-chou, were opposed by the
Grand Secretary’s subordinate officers AND HELD HP and could not
9
help Li Shih-hsien. The army of Liu Kuan-fang, Ku Lung-hsien
and Lai Wen-hung was behind, and again came across by way of Yang- 
10chan-ling. The Grand Secretary’s army was stationed at Ch’i-men.
Then Liu Kuan-fang's troops were defeated by the Grand Secretary’s;
Hu Ting-wen was killed by a shell, so his army could not exert
11its full strength. This army was also checked by the Grand 
Secretary's force and was unable to do anything.
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My cousin Li Shih-hsien, after his defeat at Lo-p'ing, withdrew
1
to Ch'ang-shan hy way of Ho-k'ou.
(AT CH'I-MEN THE GRAND SECRETARY WAS BESIEGED BY THE T’IEN
CH'AO TROOPS. ONLY THE GRAND SECRETARY COULD HAVE DONE THIS,
NO ONE ELSE COULD HAVE STOOD FIRM IN CH'I-MEN). THIS WAS THE GOOD
FORTUNE OF THE CH'ING DYNASTY AND THE GOOD FORTUNE OF THE GRAND
SECEETARY BECAUSE, SURROUNDED BY [our] TROOPS ON ALL SIDES, IT
WAS NOT A PLEASANT SITUATION TO BE IN. IT IS A THING OF THE PAST
NOW, AND I CAN SAY THAT I AM FULL OF ADMIRATION.2 HAVING SAID
THIS, I-WILL RELATE [the withdrawal] FROM HUPEH, FOR THE PERUSAL
OF THE GRAND SECRETARY.5
Having assembled new troops in Chin-niu and Pao-an, I did not
fight Pao [Ch'ao] and Hu [Lin-i]'s armies, because my troops
were raw, and also because I received a report from Li Shih-hsien
about his defeat at Lo-p'ing, urging me to return. Tseng chiu-
shuai [Kuo-ch'uan] was again besieging An-ch'ing and the Ying
Wang Ch'en Yti-ch'eng was unable to raise the s i e g e s o  I sent
Huang Wen-chin back to help relieve An-ch'ing. Liu Kuan-fang
was defeated by the Grand Secretary's commanders and turned back.
Por this reason I immediately moved all the troops on the same
day from Hu-peh [Wu-ch'ang] and other hsien, in order to protect
Li Shih-hsien's army.^ One column returned by way of X-ning-chou,
777 another by Wu-ning and another by Sui-an,' and all assembled in 
Shui-chou.^
The people of An-i, Peng-hsin and Hsin-ch'ang were causing
trouble and had seized the military supplies and money which I
was transporting to and from Shui-chou. Later, when I passed
through this place, I sentenced the guilty ones and executed
9more than twenty of the ringleaders. This matter being settled,
the whole army withdrew from the district, and the various hsien
10of Shui-chou were also entirely evacuated.
Previously 'Heaven-storming Cannon' Li Chin-yang, v/ith more
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than ten ying of Ch’ing troops, stationed at Yin-kang-ling, had
fought with my commanders T'an Shao-kuang, Ts’ai Yuan-lung and 
1Kao Yung-k’uan. The two armies engaged and Li Ghin-yang1 s
troops were defeated, the officers all taken prisoner and the
whole army scattered* When he was brought to my headquarters,
because he [Li Ghin-yang] was well-known as a brave commander, I
felt pity for a hero, so he was not killed or hurt. I then asked
about his past and whether he wap willing to join us or not. He
replied that captured officers cannot do what they want. From his
2
words I realized that he did not wish to join us. We still
treated him well and did not detain him, but allowed him to do as
he liked. After a few days we offered him sixty-odd liang of
silver for travelling expenses, but he would not aocept. He went
to Kiangsi [provincial capital, Nan-ch’ang]. Later I heard that
he had been executed. This man was not willing to surrender TO
78 THE T ’IEN CH’AO; But had been taken prisoner. OUT OF PITY FOR
A BRAVE MAN WE RELEASED HIM; SIX OR SEVEN OF HIS OFFICERS ALSO
RETURNED. It was a pity he was killed, not having surrendered 
3to us.
After returning from Hupeh I went to Shui-chou, [then]
EVACUATED THE VARIOUS HSIEN, went towards Lin-chiang and crossed 
[the Kan River] at Chang-shu.^ The main army crossed over. My 
cousins Li K ’ai-yun and Li K ’ai-shun went down river on the 
opposite side from Chang-shu.^ I thought that my cousin Li Shih- 
hsien was still at Lo-p’ing and did not know that he had withdrawn 
to Ch’ang-shan. For this reason we went down river on the other 
side from Chang-shu, and by wooden rafts on the river, intending 
to go DOWN TOWARDS^ Kiangsi [Nan-ch’ang] and join up [there].
Then my cousins going down river on the other side suddenly met 
an army under Pao Ch’ao, sent by the Grand Secretary, which was 
encamped in more than twenty stockades opposite Feng-[ch’eng] on 
the other side of a hill. I did not know that the Grand Secretary
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had sent this army. My cousins looked from the hill-top and
saw that Pao [Chfao]fs troops were numerous, so they did not
advance but progressively withdrew their troops until they had
1all been withdrawn, and retreated without turning back. Pao!s 
army gave chase. Our troops all crossed and came to a small
79 river. Previously they had built a bridge here and did not know
that the [local] people had dismantled it; so now there was no
bridge to cross. When the enemy came in pursuit our men swam
across. When the crossing was almost completed PaofCh'ao^s
2
troops arrived and we lost several dozen men. They then 
returned to Chang-shu. THE FOLLOWING LAY a strong wind began 
to blow and boats could not move. THE GEEAT WIND BLEW FOR FOUR 
OR FIVE DAYS;^ Pao's troops could not cross and I was already 
three or four days march away. Only after passing Fu-chou Hu-wan 
did I know that Li Shih-hsien had gone down to Ch*ang-shan.^
After the troops had rested for three days we went down to 
Ho-k'ou; there I saw T'ung Jung-hai, who had come back from
Kwangsi, and reinforced by his men, to the number of more than
6 7two hundred thousand, went down to Chekiang .and divided up.
Q
Li Shih-hsien had attacked Ghin-hua, T'ang-chfi and other places, 
and after the various town in Yen-chou [Prefecture] had been
9
taken we again discussed and decided on the division of forces.
I led the newly recruited troops and T’ung Jung-hai’ s whole army
10to attack Chekiang [Provincial capital, Hang-chou], sending
Li Shih-hsien to attack Wen-[chou], T'ai-[chou], Chfu-chou, Ning-
11po and other places.
I sent troops to take Shao-hsing.12 In whatever hsien our 
array arrived [the enemy] surrendered and gave up the town to us.
80 ONLY at P'u-chiang-hsien did Chang Yii-liang fight AND ENGAGE for 
several days. Once Chang [Yu-liangJ’s array was defeated the Shih 
Wang [Li Shih-hsien] took P’u-chiang, and then went on to Ning- 
po."^ It was in the 9ih Month [11 Oct.- 10 Nov.] that we reached
Chekiang [Provincial Capital].
From Fu-yang-[hsien] we took Yii-hang,'1' then went to Yen-1ing- 
p'i and encamped at Ku-t *ang, about three of four li from the 
city [Hang-chou]. After establishing stockades I disposed my 
forces to attack the gates. We had first occupied the prefect­
ures and hsien outside Chekiang [Provincial Capital]. Yen-chou
o
was garrisoned by the Wang-1sung Li Shang-yang; the Ch1 ing
troops at Ch*u-[chou] had not been defeated.^ Chin-hua was
garrisoned by Chou Lien-te, one of Li Shih-hsien*s own commanders.
Lan-ch*i and T*ang-ch*i were garrisoned by Kwangtung troops. THEY
WEBB BANDITS WHO HABMED THE PEOPLE.4 Li Shih-hsien led. his troops
from Chin-hua to take Wen-chou. HAVING TAKEN WEN-CHOU he went
to Ch*u-[chou] Prefecture and then took T’ai-chou.^ These places
were all taken by Li Shih-hsien; the attack on Ning-po was also
undertaken by Li Shih-hsien*s commanders, the Tai Wang Huang
6Ch*en-chung and the Shou Wang Fan Ju-tseng.
The truth about Ning-po is that the foreign devils deluded 
7us. The army was encamped ten li from Ning-po and the foreign
chief from Ning-po came to headquarters to request us to stay put
for five days, to give time for the goods of the foreign firms
in Ning-[po] to be transported out of the city ENTIRELY AND THEN
our army could enter. THEY ASKED FOR FIVE DAYS. The Tai Wang
8would not agree. He gave them three days to clear out the foreign
firms, [during which time] he was willing to remain camped outside
[if] supplies of grain for the troops were provided by the foreign
9devils and the local people. On the fourth day our armies moved
into the town AMD IMMEDIATELY PACIFIED THE PEOPLE.10 The foreigners
took the Tai Wang to capture Hai-men-t*ing and Chen-hai-hsien. The
11foreign devils provided boats. After taking these two places
he stationed troops there and went back to Ning-po. I cannot
finish what I have to say about this affair and will add more
12later in order to make it clear.
The troops which took Shao-hsing were commanded by the Lai
Wang [Lu Shun-te]; Hsiao-shan was also taken by him. THE TRUTH
IS THAT Shao-hsing was not taken by fighting; the Chfing
commander gave up the city. The wall is high and the moat broad,
and there is water on all sides. One can reach it or attack it
by one route only, and if the town had not surrendered we would
2
not have been able to take it. Hsiao-shan also surrendered after
we had taken Shao-hsing. THEN AT ONCE the Lai Wang issued a
proclamation for the pacification of the people.
82 Hang-chou was cut off. Wu-k'ang and Te-ch.'ing were also held
by the T'ien Ch'ao troops, as were Hsiao-feng, Kuang-te, Ssu-an,
An-chi —  all these hsien. V/e also had troops at Kao-ch'un and
Tung-pa. Li-yang, Ch’ang-chou, Su-chou, Chia-hsing and Shih-men
were also garrisoned by [our] troops.^ Hu-chou was held by
Chao Ching-hsien, but no troops came to his relief. Although
there were Ch'ing garrisons from Hang-chou to Hai-ning-chou and
Hai-yen-hsien, as soon as our troops arrived the garrison
commander of Hai-ning-chou, Chang Wei-pang, gave up the town to
us.^ Hang-chou was cut off. All the surrounding prefectures and
hsien had been taken and there were no troops
THIS WAS THE SECOND to come to the rescue. We were closely
CAPTURE OF HANG-CHOU. investing the four gates. As for outside
relief, there was only Chang Yii-liang's army,
7which came by water by way of Hou-ch,ao-men. But by that time our 
troops had already fortified strong positions at Feng-shan-men, 
two or three li from Hou-chfao-men. When we saw that Chang Yii- 
liang's troops were coming, we set out to intercept them. Hang­
chou was cut off from contact with the outside; though under
o
pressure of attack inside and out, it had not fallen. There was
9
no grain in the city and the people had nothing to eat. The 
morale of both soldiers and people was very unsteady; but the 
Governor of [Chekiang], Wang Yu-ling, had the confidence of the
202
1
troops and people and was very determined to hold out. '
During the siege I had edicts shot [by an archer]* into the
city, addressed separately to soldiers and people, Manchus and
85 Han, appealing to each [and saying that] anyone who wanted to
come over to us could do so, but if they did not wish to come
over it was of no importance. I was willing to release the
Manchu troops under General Jui [Ch*ang],s command. Seven days
before laying siege to the city I had written asking the Tfien
Vang to allow me to spare the Manchu troops and let them return
to their own country. But it took more than twenty days for
letters to go and come back to Chekiang, and before the Imperial
Endorsement arrived I had broken into the city. Pour days later
I had not yet attacked the Manchu city because I was waiting for
the arrival of the edict of amnesty. Meanwhile Itparleyed with
General Jui [Ch’ang] and told him that I was willing to let his
whole army return home; but he would not trust me. The Imperial
Proclamation in answer to my petition to the T*ien Wang then
arrived, permitting me to spare the Manchus, but still he would
not trust me, and opened fire, killing several hundred of my
soldiers. Then I attacked the inner city.^
Many men and women jumped into the water and were drowned,
many were taken prisoner. General Jui [Ch’ang] and the Military
Governor were killed.^ I sent people down to the river to find
7their bodies and buried them in coffins. They did not believe 
in my petition and that I would allow them to go back to their 
country, that I did not want to harm them. I also had a message 
shot into the [Manchu] city, so that the soldiers and the people 
should know. I told them, ’’You have received orders from your 
Sovereign to defend the city of Hang-[chou]; I have received 
orders from my Sovereign to take it. Each serves his own Sovereign 
and you and I have no choice but to obey. If we can achieve a 
truce it will prevent the loss of lives of men, women and children.
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I will provide you with boats. If you have gold and silver you 
may take it with you; if you have none I will give you money.
You will be sent as far as Chen-chiang." (IN PACT THEY WOULD 
NOT AGREE, BUT HAD THEY DONE SO, THESE MANCHUS WOULD CERTAINLY 
HAVE BEEN RELEASED). The people of Manchuria crossed into our 
great country and took the imperial throne; this was ordained 
by fate and not achieved by them. Formerly Manchus treated the 
Han people well; but now we each serve a different Sovereign and 
there is nothing we can do about it. It was with this in mind 
that I did what I did.
I gave an order to each army [unit] that Manchus soldiers who 
were taken prisoner were not to be killed or maltreated when they 
fell into our hands, and that anyone who illegally killed or 
harmed one, would pay with his own life. Those who wished to join 
our army could do so, those who did not would be allowed to return 
to their own country WITH MONEY PROVIDED FOR THE JOURNEY. Then 
the bolder Manchu officers came to my headquarters and spoke 
about this and were given money to return home; but there were 
also some less courageous soldiers who all ran away in the night. 
There were also many who, having come into our camps, after a 
while established good relations with the officers, who themselves 
gave them money and released them. These are not empty words; 
the soldiers and people of Hang-chou know [of this], and amongst 
the Manchus there must be those [who know of it].
At the provincial capital there were innumerable Ch'ing
candidate or expectant officials, who were also given money to 
1return home. The same had earlier been done at Su-chou.
From the time we were besieging Hang-chou, we were fighting 
every day with Wang Yu-ling*s troops. At that time there m s  no 
grain in the city and the people had nothing to eat. The soldiers 
collapsed from hunger and could not fight. There was nothing 
Wang Yu-ling could do. Fighting outside [the city] there was only
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1one of Chang Yu-liang*s [commanders], K ’uang Wen-pang, [who]
fought again and again without success* They could not break
out from inside, in fact there was nothing they could do. Wang
Yu-ling discussed the matter with his secretary and said, "Write
me a letter to the Chung Wang telling him not to harm the
soldiers and people of Hang-chou." The secretary replied, "Your
Excellency, how can X write such a letter? The two states are
at war; how should I address him. If I address him badly it will
bring greater disaster upon your people, if I address him well
the Emperor will accuse you of surrendering to him." Wang Yu-ling
had no answer to his secretary*s words and sighed; "There is no
need to write anything. Hang-chou certainly cannot be held. I
will sit in the great hall and wait for the Chung Wang, to see
what sort of man he is. When I have seen [him] I will die."
The secretary replied, "When this man enters the city he will
2certainly not let you die."
There was nothing they could do. Our troops broke into the 
city over the wall on all sides. I myself went to the city, 
seized a mount and rushed alone to Wang Yu-ling*s yamen to find 
him. I went inside but could find no trace of him. When I 
searched the garden at the back I found him hanging there. I
*
ordered my body-guard to take him down, but he was already dead. 
Then I had him carried into the great hall, where he was placed 
for people to identify him; and I called in his subordinates to 
identify him so that there could be no mistake. Then his body was 
86 put into a coffin. His official hat and court robes were all 
returned to him and put in the coffin; his subordinates were 
told to keep watch over him themselves.
The following day I summoned his subordinates before me and 
announced to them that anyone who wished to join our army should 
do so at once; those who did not wish to do so could please 
themselves. [Wang Yu-ling*s] personal troops were all Fukien
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men, the other troops were mostly from Liang-hu [Hunan & Hupeh], 
They were all spared. SOME 01? THEM WERE WILLING TO JOIN AND 
SOME WERE NOT. THOSE WHO WERE WILLING, JOINED MY DETACHMENTS, 
THOSE WHO WERE NOT, WERE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO THEIR VILLAGES. They 
were allowed to keep the money and possessions they had, my troops 
"being forbidden to stop them.
Later, five hundred men selected from his personal force set 
out with Wang Yu-ling*s body in its coffin from the provincial 
captial. I provided fifteen boats, 3,000 liang of silver for 
expenses, and a pass, and [his body] was sent home.1 Each 
one [of us] serves his own Sovereign, each has his own loyalty.
I admired his loyal determination and regretted this brave and 
righteous man. That is why I took so much trouble. Alive, each
serves his own Sovereign and the two sides are enemies: dead, I
2
felt no enmity towards him. This comes from my feelings. I WAS 
LOATH TO MALTREAT HIM, THAT IS WHY I DID THIS.
There were also Mi Hsien-chao [sic. Mi Hsing-chao] and Lin
3
Pu-hsiang. Apart from them there was Lin Chih, who was Hang­
chou [Chekiang] Provincial Treasurer, and had arrived in Hang­
chou but had not yet taken up his post, which was still held by
4 5Lin Pu-hsiang. These men were also taken prisoner. They were
not killed either, but treated with courtesy and not locked up.
They came to my office to converse with my civil officials.^ In
the quiet evenings I would discuss affairs with Mi [Hsing-chao]
and Lin [Pu-hsiang]. Later I sought out Lin Pu-hsiang*s children
and restored them to him, found Mi Hsien-chao*s horse and
returned it to him. Later Mi Hsien-chao presented this horse to
7my officer Wang An-chun. Lin Chih was a Manchu. He was fright­
ened and ran away the following night, and was not pursued. After 
ten days or so Lin and Mi wanted to leave, being unwilling to 
remain with us. A boat was then prepared for each of them to go 
from Hang-chou to Shanghai, and each was given 300 liang of silver.
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But they dared no accept, and each took only 100 liang . Before 
they left they each wrote a letter bidding me farewell and saying, 
"In this world we cannot repay this friend, but in the next 
world we will not forget,” They also said, ”You, the Chung Wang, 
are an exceptional man. What a pity you did not encounter an 
enlightened Sovereign!" and so on. They left after bidding fare- 
well.1
This was in the 11th of 12th Month of the 11th Year.2 It was
rainy and cloudy and we could not move. In [the region of] Su~ 
[chou] and .Hang-[chou] the rivers are small and shallow and when 
88 ' it snowed the water froze and boats could not move. I remained
5
in Su-chou^for ten days or so before I left. I finished arrang­
ing the enlistment or otherwise of the Ch'ing officers in Hang- 
ohou. I issued more than ten thousand thin wooden coffins for 
those who had died of starvation in Hang-chou, spending on these 
coffins some twenty thousand string of cash. Because the distress­
ed people had nothing to eat, ten thousand tan of grain was 
brought from Ghia-hsing, and twenty thousand string of cash brought 
to Hang-chou.^ The grain was distributed to the poor and each 
poor family which had no means of support was loaned capital for 
their relief. There was no interest, but it was repayable in 
six months. The grain which was distributed as relief was not to 
be repaidd In four months Hang-chou was pacified. This was at 
the end of the 11th Year [l86l]. In the 12th Month I returned to 
Su-[chou], where I spent the New Year [10 February 1862].
We had captured Hang-chou but An-ch1 ing had been taken by the 
troops of Ohiu-shuai [Tseng Kuo-ch!uan] ?  In the city everyone 
was starving, so we lost An-ch*ing. The troops in the city were 
those of the Ying Wang. It was surrounded with deep moats and 
high forts by Chiu-shuai*s army. The city was cut off and the 
Ying Wang was unable to relieve it. Then Chiu-shuai withdrew
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from some of his stockades by the lakeside; in order to leave
89 a road free for [our troops] to withdraw from An-ch’ing.'*'
Contrary to his expectations the Ying Wang Ch*en Yii-ch*eng did 
not withdraw, but transported grain from Shih-pf ai and nearby 
districts into the city. When Chiu-shuai found that they did not 
withdraw, he again took up positions on the lakeside, and once 
more surrounded the provincial capital. The Ying Wang was in a 
predicament. The garrison commanders Yeh Yun-lai and Chang
Ch* ao-chiieh were apprehensive and the Ying Wang was alarmed
because he could not relieve the city.
There were three of my commanders, one of whom had entered the
2city to help with its defence. These officers were in my command. 
When I went up to Hupeh I had left them to hold Liu-ho and T*ien- 
ch*ang, two hsien which were occupied by my troops. I had sent 
the three commanders Wu Ting-ts’ai, Huang Chin-ai and Chu Hsing- 
lung from Su-chou to hold T’ien-[ch*ang] and Liu-[ho]. Then, 
when there was an emergency at An-ch1 ing, the Ying Wang asked for 
them to be sent.
When Chiu-shuai surrounded the provincial capital, V/u Ting- 
ts *ai was chosen to take a thousand men into the city to help 
Yeh [Yun-lai] and Chang [Ch* ao-chiieh] with its defence. The Ying 
Wang and Liu Ch,ang [Tsfang]-lin decided to hold Chi-hsien-kuan, 
while the Ying Wang brought a large force to the rescue. At this 
time the Chang Wang Lin Shao-chang, the Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch*ing,^ 
311(1 ^ e  Tu Wang Huang Wen-chin, the Yuan Wang ^  Wu Ju-hsiao were 
all at T’ung-ch'eng. They sent a message to Chi-hsien-kuan saying
90 that they had received an Imperial Command to come and help to
5
raise the siege of An-ch*ing. At this time I was at Hsing-kuo- 
£
chou, and heard the news of the Ying Wang*s doings, but I knew 
that the provincial capital [An-ch*ing] could not be held. The 
Ying Wang left Liu Ch*ang-lin and Li Ssu-fu to hold the stockades 
at Chi-hsien-kuan and went by night from there to T*ung-ch*eng,^
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having ordered my commander Huang Chin-ai to protect his rear
and follow [him] to T'ung-ch'eng. Unexpectedly this was found
out by the Ch’ing troops at Tiao-p'u, Ch*ing-ts*ao-ke, Huang-ni-
kang and other places, and [Huang Chin-aifs force] was ambushed
slaughtered by General To-[lung-ah] The Ting Wang* s whole army
got through, but Huang Chin-ai*s, which was covering his rear,
was ambushed and slaughtered by General To-[lung-ah] with the loss
of more than a thousand men. Huang Chin-ai*s force was surrounded
2in flooded fields. Those who were killed were all my men* In 
the evening Huang Chin-ai managed to escape from the water with 
a few hundred men. When General To-[lung-ah] saw that they were 
absolutely desperate, he let them pass and they reached T*ung-
•Z
ch*eng.
Then the Ying Wang went himself to the capital and begged the
Sovereign to send relief* Then unexpectedly the stockades of
91 Liu Ch'ang [Ts*ang]-lin and Li Ssu-fu at Chi-hsien-kuan were
attacked by Pao Ch*ao*s army, which had been sent by the Grand
Seoretary, though he failed to take them after several attempts.^
Then Pao [Ch*ao]*s army established positions and dug a long moat
and every day sent out troops to fight. In our stockades they
were short of powder, shot and grain; but our troops fought and
defended [the stockades] day and night* The besieged troops had
a very hard time and finally [Chi-hsien-kuan] was captured by
Pao [Ch*ao]ts army. Li Ch*ang [Ts*ang]-lin and Li Ssu-fu were
killed in battle, and the whole army was destroyed.
7
Then the Ying Wang, with the Fu Wang and the Tu Wang Huang
8Wen-chin, once again had to come to the relief of An-ch*ing.
Chiu-shuai [Tseng Kuo-ch*uan] was again besieging An-ch*ing WITH
AH EVEN TIGHTER CIRCLE OF MOATS AND FORTS; but after several battles
9he still did not succeed. Then at the Ling Hu near the city 
Chiu-shuai made openings in the dyke and put gun-[boats] in, 
cutting communications, so that it was even difficult to get
1
messages in and out, The Ying Wang Ch'en Yu-ch'eng, the Fu
Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing and the Tu Wang Huang Wen-chin were outside
and Chiu-shuai * s troops cut them off from the city. There was
2no grain in the city and it was captured by Chiu-shuai. Yeh 
Yun-lai met his death there, Chang Ch* ao-chiieh escaped hy boat.
Wu Ting-ts*ai and his whole force, which had entered the city to 
help with its defence, perished in the river. The whole garrison 
was lost and only a few escaped. It was a bitter and tragic 
blow.
When the Ying Wang, who was outside, saw that the provincial
capital was lost, he withdrew his troops from Shih-p*ai; the
troops at Huang-[mei] and Su-[sung] all withdrew to Yeh-chi-ho.
[Ch*en] intended to go up to the region of Te-an and Hsiang-yang
4to recruit troops. Une:xpectedly the officers and soldiers were 
unwilling to move. The troops would not follow their commander.
In the night they all withdrew and went down to Lu-chou by way of
Liu-an. The Ying Wang realized that he had no choice but to turn
5back, and so returned to Lu-chou. Everyone was bickering and 
disunited. In face of this state of affairs, and having been 
severely reprimanded by the Sovereign and deprived of his rank 
and authority, the Ying Wang was troubled and distressed. He 
wanted to remain in Lu-chou for good, so did not go elsewhere, 
but sat tight in Lu-ohou, blindly loyal to the Kingdom.
General Tseng1 then sent troops to lay siege [to Lu-chou] and 
it was hard pressed. Having no grain or fodder it was unable to 
hold out for long. Officers and men were already wavering AND 
THEY WERE THEREFORE NOT FIRM and Lu-chou was lost.8 HAVING LOST 
HIS OFFICERS AND MEN, AND WITH NO PLAN OF ACTION [Ch'en Yu-ch'eng] 
fled to Shou-ch*un [Shou-chou], where he was taken prisoner by 
Miao P*ei-lin, who had turned traitor. He was sent to the Ch*ing 
camp, and THIS IS HOW he met his end.^
After the Ying Wang*s death all his troops came under my
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command, I saw that the situation was had, and that they could
not cross over to the south, so I sent for Ch'en Te-ts'ai to
come to Su-[chou] to discuss arrangements personally with me,
95 and ordered him to collect enough troops and return to relieve
the capital within twenty-four months. THIS WAS DECIDED. How
he has been gone for a long time and although letters occasionally
arrived with reports, communications were difficult, and this has
1given rise to the present disaster.
Having said that, I will relate how, in the 11th Year [1861],
after taking the Chekiang [Provincial Capital], I returned to
2Su-chou in the 15th Year. When I went to Kiangsi and Hupeh to
recruit troops I arranged the military and civil affairs of Su-
chou, Chekiang and Chia-hsing, and handed them over to Ch'en K'un- 
3shu. Only then did I leave.
Then, in the 12th Year [1862], when I returned to the Su-[fu
Provincial Capital], the people were dispersed and buildings had
been tom down GRIEVOUSLY. Good people came to petition me with
4tears in their eyes. Ch'en K'un-shu was ashamed that he had let 
me down; when I reached Chia-hsing on my return from Hang-chou 
he had already fled with his own troops to Ch'ang-chou, which he 
appropriated for himself, and bought the title of Hu Wang. This 
man was one of my officers. Because he maltreated the people of 
Su-chou and was afraid that I would punish him, he bought this
5
title in order to spite me.
After the capture of Hang-chou and after the Ying Wang's
troops had come under me, Huang Wen-chin and Liu Kuan-fang also
came -under my command. The T'ien Wang saw that I now had a large
army and feared that I might have treacherous intentions - there
were machinations by jealous ministers as well - and he appointed
94 Ch'en K 1 un-shu to the rank of wang in order to divide and curb my 
6power. My subordinate officers were angry and bore resentment
2 1 1
in the hearts. When the Sovereign saw that I had more than a 
million men under me how could he not he suspicious of me?
The people of Su-[fu] Province had been despoiled by Ch’en 
K fun-shu. When I returned to Su-chou I paid out a great deal 
of money and grain to the people. All shopkeepers and poor 
people who could not make ends meet were given capital. Farmers 
who had not yet planted were ordered to quickly begin cultivation. 
RICE WAS PROVIDED FOR THEIR USE ARD ALL POOR FARMERS RECEIVED 
GRAIN. AFTER THE $vd. MONTH ^ when I was in Su-chou, the people 
were all pacified. But again I distributed more than twenty 
thousand tan of rice and more than a hundred thousand string of 
cash. After the distribution of this money and rice the people 
were contented. Afterwards, when they were prosperous, the people 
all wanted to pay back the loans; we had not demanded this but 
they themselves wished to pay them back. Then we also reduced 
the grain tax for the people of all districts, and the transit 
dues, in order to compensate for their suffering.^
I saw that affairs in the capital were every day changing for 
the worse, and I continually presented petitions; but the 
Sovereign was even less willing to listen. The more I petitioned 
the more angry he became, and jealous ministers stirred up trouble. 
When I saw that my repeated suggestions were ignored I became 
discontented. Master and servant each had his own reasons for 
95 anger. The more I petitioned the more the T’ien Wang mistrusted 
me. HE COERCED ME WITH HEAVENLY WORDS,^ reduced my rank and 
secretly undermined my authority. When my subordinate officers 
saw this they were indignant and lost their fighting spirit; 
each though only of his own future, THROWING ADMINISTRATION AND 
REGULATIONS INTO DISORDER. THE SOVEREIGN SAW THE EXTENT OF MY 
MILITARY POWER AMR WAMTER TO RIVIRE MY AUTHORITY.5
T’ung Jung-hai was one of my officers and was entirely for 
me, but he was induced by slander into betraying and deserting
me. This was the result of the plotting of the Sovereign's 
second brother, who wanted to get control over him, and secretly- 
put about rumours. This is the reason for T'ung Jung-hai's 
treachery.
In the 12th Year [1862] I remained at the provincial capital
[Su-chou] for four months. Then Governor Li Hung-chang went to
Shanghai to take over Governor Hsueh [Huan]'s post, and gathered
2
together some foreign devils to fight against us. Governor Li
had the benefit of the heavy revenue from the Shanghai customs
and had a lot of money;^ he was therefore able to hire [foreign]
4devils to fight against us.
They marched forth and took Chia-ting and Ch'ing-p'u; then 
threatened T'ai-shan, K'un-shan and other districts. Urgent 
appeals arrived. This was between the 4th and 5th Months of the 
12th Year [1862]. I saw that the situation was so bad and the 
threat so serious that I selected about ten thousand crack troops 
and led them myself. The [foreign] devils had good resources 
for attacking towns, and Chia-ting and Ch'ing-p'u are more than 
a hundred li. from the provincial capital. There was no outside 
relief for the towns they were attacking, so after five or six 
shih-ch^en [double hours] they would certainly succeed. Their 
artillery was very effective, a hundred shots out of a hundred 
hit their mark and destroyed the town walls, FLATTENED THE TOWH 
WALLS. Their foreign guns and cannon fired incessantly and [the 
troops] charged straight in, so that I did not have time to come 
to the relief. Though I set out as soon as I received the 
despatch, I did not arrive in time and we lost these two towns.^
The [foreign] devil soldiers then went on to T'ai-ts'ang,
8 9which they immediately invested. Outside there were Han troops
who came to help them do battle, and fought their way into the
town. The [foreign] devils controlled the gates, and when they
saw the Ch'ing troops they would not allow them to take away any
property, but allowed men and women, both young and old, so do
so. The Chfing soldiers dared say nothing. If one of your
Ch'ing dynasty soldiers said too much, no matter what his rank
1
might be, he would be beaten without mercy. It was because of
this [sort of behaviour] that our Tfien Vang was unwilling to
use foreign troops. A thousand [foreign] devils would lord it
over ten thousand of our men, and who would stand for that? So
2
we did not employ them.
By this time the [foreign] devils had already reached T1ai­
ts* ang and had begun the battle. Outside there were more than 
ten thousand Gh*ing troops and three or four thousand [foreign] 
devils. The Ch*ing troops had more than a hundred .stockades 
OP ALL SIZES at Sung-chiang, Ssu-ching,^ Ch*ing-p*u, Chia-ting,
Pao-shan,^ and Shanghai, and each town was garrisoned by [foreign]
5devils. As soon as I arrived at Tfai-ts*ang I joined battle 
with them. Each side formed up and gave battle from the ch*en 
[hour: 7-9 a^] to the wu [hour: 11 am - 1 pm], without a decision. 
Each side had a thousand or more wounded. The following morning 
we again formed up for battle at the east gate. A great battle 
lasted from the ohfen hour to the ssu hour [9-11 am], when we 
fiercely broke through the [foreign] devils* lines, killing 
several hundred. We chased them into the water and more than a 
thousand perished. We also smashed more than thirty Ch*ing stock- 
ades and took innumerable cannon and foreign guns.
The following morning we pursued the enemy*s rearguard and 
besieged the [foreign] devils in Chia-ting town so that they could 
not get out. The [foreign] devils who came to their relief fromQ
Shanghai had been brought from Kwangtung. They immediately came 
to the relief of the [foreign] devils in Chia-ting, by way of 
Ean-hsiang, and engaged us. The two sides met and fought for
9
three days, all indecisively. Each side had two or three thousand 
wounded. THEE I SAW THAT THE SITUATION WAS EOT GOOD and quickly
■brought up the T’ing Wang Ch’en Ping-wen, with about ten
thousand men, and again joined battle. In this battle the [foreign]
devils were severaly defeated, more than a thousand were killed,
and they were unable to relieve Chia-ting. THOSE WHO PLED were
1pursued and more than half were killed.
After recovering Chia-ting town I appointed an officer to 
command the garrison and went straight down to Ch'ing-p'u and 
closely besieged the [foreign] devil.troops there.^ Outside 
there were the foreign devils from Sung-chiang, again sent from 
Shang-[hai] to relieve [Ch'ingj-p'u-hsien, who came by steamer 
TO THE RELIEF.3 THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE WILL OF HEAVEN. I 
had long since positioned cannon and was waiting for them. As 
soon as their steamers appeared I surprised them and opened fire.
The first shot hit a boat and it began to bum; so the attempt 
to relieve the town failed.^- The [foreign] devil troops in 
[Ch'ingJ-p'u then retreated and several hundred devils jumped 
in terror into the water and were drowned. Once off the roads 
there is water wherever you go, and movement is very difficult.
In an emergency it is easy to make a false step which can cost 
one’s life. That is why the [foreign] devils soldiers retreating 
in»terror, fell into the water and were drowned.
After recovering Ch’ing-p’u we went on to attack the stockades 
at Ssu-ching, more than ten of them. We went FROM SSU-CHING to 
Sung-chiang and T ’ai-ts'ang, and destroyed more than one hundred 
and thirty stockades of various sizes. The emplacements outside
7
Sung-chiang were also destroyed. There remained only the single 
town of Sung-chiang, which was held by the [foreign] devils. The 
following day some [foreign] devils came again to the relief from 
Shanghai in boats, carrying foreign powder and more than a thousand 
foreign cannon. My troops came out and gave battle; the [foreign] 
devils were defeated and we were victorious. We captured their
9
powder, foreign cannon and rifles. At this time the foreign
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99 devils did not dare to do battle with me; if they fought they
1were defeated.
We closely invested Sung-chiang, but just as we were about to 
2succeed, General Tseng* s army came down and captured Wu-hu,
Ch*ao-hsien, Wu-wei, Yun-ts’ao, Tung-liang-shan, Hsi-liang-shan
x
and T*ai-p1 ing-kuan—  Ho-chou as well — WITH A SOUND like 
splitting bamboo, reached Chin-ling and threatened the capital.^"
In one day three messengers, with edicts from the T*ien Wang 
urging me to hurry, arrived at Sung-chiang. The edicts were very 
severe, WHO WOULD DAHE TO DISOBEY? ^  There was nothing I could do, 
so I withdrew the troops from Sung-chiang WITHOUT ATTACKING THE 
TOWN, BECAUSE 03? THE SEVERE SUMMONS.
Then I returned to Su-chou and disoussed with my commanders 
and followers as to the best way out of our difficulties.^ I 
knew that General Tseng’s army, coming from up-stream, had the 
advantage of having river-troops, and we were exhausted while they 
were fresh, so it was difficult for us to challenge s them on the 
water. His army was always victorious and was in a very strong 
position, so that I did not want to fight him. £3y advice ABOUT 
THE SITUATION was to send great quantities of grain to the capital 
and take materials, grain, powder and cannon from the provinces 
and prefectures to the capital, to hold out for twenty-four
Q
100 months before fighting them and raising the siege of the capital. 
[I said that] after such a long time his troops would certainly 
have lost their fighting spirit and we would then fight them, and 
so on. I knew that when they arrived General Tseng’s soldiers
would be in fine condition and full of spirit, so I did not wish
9to engage them. Just when we had reached agreement, and were 
about to carry it out, the T’ien Wang again sent a messenger to 
hurry me, with an edict which said, ”1 have three times commanded 
you to come to the relief of the capital, why have you not set 
out? What do you think you are doing? You have been given great
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responsibilities, can it be that you do not know my laws? If you 
do not obey my commands [you will find] the punishment of the 
State difficult to endure! MO SHIH-TS'AI [sic]1 IS SPECIALLY 
COMMANDED TO EXPEDITE THE SEEDING OF TROOPS AND TO MEMORIALIZE 
FOR MY INFORMATION." Under pressure from such an edict I had 
no choice but to act [accordingly], so IT WAS DECIDED to detach 
troops and set out to got there. THUS COMPELLED BY THE SOVERIEGN 
MY HEART WAS NOT IN IT.2 I handed over the affairs of Su-chou and 
Hang-chou to my officers, ahd retained little authority myself.
I even put my mother and family into the hands of the Sovereign 
as surety, to show my unquestioning loyalty.
THE PAPER IS FINISHED BUT THE STORY IS LONG AND I HAVE NOT YET 
COMPLETED WHAT I HAVE TO SAY. I WILL TROUBLE THE SECRETARIES TO 
PROVIDE ME WITH A [fresh] NOTE-BOOK AND A GOOD BRUSH. THIS BRUSH 
IS RUINED. [I have written] NOW THIRTY SEVEN OR THIRTY EIGHT 
THOUSAND CHARACTERS,^ AND THE BRUSH IS USELESS. EiWILL TROUBLE 
THE SECRETARIES TO PASS ON MY REQUEST TO THE GRAND SECRETARY AND 
HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR, TO BE LIBERAL IN THEIR [time] LIMIT,
AND I WILL WRITE AS PAST AS I CAN. ALREADY NOW....4
101 THE FIRST PART HAS ALREADY. BEEN HANDED IN AND NOW I TAKE UP
THE STORY FROM THERE. I FEAR THAT IN WHAT WAS BANDED IN YESTERDAY 
THERE MAY HE PASSAGES WHICH DO NOT FIT TOGETHER, SO I TROUBLE 
THE SECRETARIES TO EXAMINE THE FIRST PART AND ARRANGE IT FOR THE 
GRACIOUS SCRUTINY5 OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND THE GOVERNOR. I 
FEAR THAT THERE MAY BE WORDS WHICH ARE CONTRARY TO PROSCRIPTIONS
AND I WILL TROUBLE [the secretaries] TO CHANGE OR DELETE THEM.
6 7FROM MY EARLIEST DAYS I HAVE NEVER STUDIED 1 SO MY KNOWLEDGE OF
CHARACTERS IN INADEQUATE, AND I DO NOT KNOW THE PROSCIPTIONS.
WHAT I HAVE SUBMITTED UP TO NOW ARE ONLY8 THINGS WHICH I KNOW
THROUGH BEING LONG IN OUR STATE, WHAT I DO NOT KNOW I HAVE NOT
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SPOKEN OP.1 I KNOW [only] WHAT I HAVE SEEN DURING MY LIFE;
WHAT I DO NOT KNOW I HAVE NOT SPOKEN OP. WHAT I HAVE SUBMITTED 
IS A GENERAL OUTLINE OP WHAT I CAN REMEMBER. THE THINGS WHICH 
I KNOW ABOUT I HAVE ALL RECORDED, WITH PEW OMISSIONS. WHAT I 
DO NOT KNOW I THOUGHT IT BETTER NOT TO SPEAK OP. THESE WORDS ARE 
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND SINCERE. THE THINGS WHICH I SHOULD SPEAK 
ABOUT I RECOUNT WITHOUT BEING ASKED. I WILLINGLY PRESENT THIS 
STATEMENT, SEEING THE GRAND SECRETARYfS KINDNESS AND GREAT 
RIGHTEOUSNESS AND THE GOVERNOR'S BENEVOLENCE AND LIBERALITY, AND 
102 RESPECTING THEIR RESOURCEFULNESS. I WOULD BE VERY GLAD FOR THIS 
DEPOSITION WHICH I HAVE WRITTEN TO GO THROUGH THE HANDS OP THE 
SECRETARIES. I FEAR THAT THERE ARE WORDS WHICH MAY GIVE OFFENCE, 
TO I WILL TROUBLE [the secretaries] TO BE SURE TO CHANGE OR 
DELETE THEM. NOW I HAVE FINISHED THE FIRST PART, I WILL CONTINUE 
WRITING.
Having received the strict command which I could no longer
refuse, I made arrangements to detach troops from various places,
2
and selected a day for setting out. Thus coerced by the 
Sovereign I lost all interest in life; but considering that my 
mother, now more than sixty years old, had brought me up, I 
submitted to circumstances and obeyed. Seeing what the situation 
was like, I knew that we could not long survive. The Sovereign 
had not instituted good government, [but I had to] continue to 
the end my lifetime of loyalty to Heaven
Then X handed over all military affairs in Su-[chou] and Hang- 
[chou] to various officers,^ and went with my mother and family 
back to the capital and handed them over to the Sovereign as 
hostages to show my complete loyalty. The reason why I handed 
over my whole family to the Sovereign as hostages, was because 
he had pronounced an edict commanding his own messenger to come 
and accuse me to my face, saying that I was disloyal, saying that
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I had my own ambitions. The court ministers urged me and I had
no choice but to agree. (IN THE STATE THERE WERE GOOD FRIENDS
AND ALSO PEOPLE FOR WHOM I FELT NO FRIENDSHIP. BUT MAN’S HEART
IS MADE OF FLESH, AND AFTER CONSTANT URGING I WAS PERSUADED.
103 THOUGH I DID NOT WISH TO HAVE OVERALL COMMAND, I HAD MORE TROOPS .
THAN ANYONE IN THE KINGDOM AND IT WAS A RESPONSIBILITY WHICH I
COULD NOT EVADE. AT COURT EVERYONE LOOKED TO ME, SO I HAD TO
AGREE. IF I DID NOT TAKE CARE OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR THREE
DAYS, IF MY PALACE GATE WAS NOT OPEN FOR THREE DAYS, ALL THE
CIVIL AND MILITARY, MEN AND WOMEN, WOULD COME TO BESEECH ME);
HOW COULD I STOP? (THE SOVEREIGN DID NOT INTEREST HIMSELF IN MY
AFFAIRS AND I SERVED HIM REALLY ONLY OUT OF LOYALTY).1
Then in the middle of the 8th Month I set out from the
provincial capital [Su-chou],^ passed through Li-yang and con-
sentrated my troops at Tung-pa. Then we came straight down to
Li-shui and made for Yu-hua-t ’ ai by way of Mo-ling-kuan. Others
came by way of Pan-ch’iao and Shan-ch’iao, and we surrounddd and
besieged Chiu-shuai [Tseng Kuo-ch'uan]'s fortifications.^ We
attacked for THIRTY OR forty days continuously, without being
able to break through.^- Chiu-shuai held firm everywhere; the
moats were deep, the forts strong, and there were many wooden 
5
bridges. Their soldiers were better armed and their discipline
was good.^ That is why we attacked for many days without success.
Moreover, it was in the 8th Month [12 September - 11 October] that
we came, and no one had winter clothes. In the 9th and 10th
Months, when it was cold, the army had no provisions. That is
7
why we did not succeed.'
After the failure of the attack, the Sovereign reprimanded me
8severely and cashiered me. He called me into the audience
chamber, publicly reprimanded me and ordered me to advance at once
9
and campaign in the north. I had no choice but to obey, and set 
out in the snow.
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Once across on the north [bank:] I m s  cut off by the [Yangtse] 
river, and my troops in Hang-[chou] and Su-[chou] could be ordered
104 about at will, and my commanders had no choice but to obey. The
officers under my command were subject to the machinations of the
Sovereign's second brother, Hung Jen-ta. Fortunately on the north
bank [my troops] had succeeded in taking Liang-p'u, so that I could
1
cross the river to the north, and advance by way of Ho-chou,
2
which had been taken the previous year by my subordinates. I came 
later by way of Han-shan, Ho-chou and Ch'ao-hsien. In this region 
there was hardship because the people had been despoiled; so I 
immediately commanded Wang Hung-chien, an official of mine,^ to
take money and buy grain and provisions for the relief of the
5people.
From Ch'ao-hsien the troops advanced to Shih-chien-pu, where
we met an army sent by the Grand Secretary, encamped in ten or 
6more stockades. I immediately deployed my forces to give battle,
but [the enemy] would not come out, and merely held his positions,
waiting at ease for us to exhaust ourselves. We attacked for
several days without success. Then it rained for day after day
7without stopping. My troops were exhausted and many were ill.
In one night whole units would be affected, and I saw that we 
were in a difficult situation. We were unable to take [the enemy 
stockades] and could not win a battle. I could think of no 
solution. The Ch'ing troops would not come out and give battle, 
but preferred to hold firm in their strong positions. Then from 
outside relief arrived [for them].^ Many of my men were ill and 
I had not enough troops; so I withdrew my army by way of Lu-
105 chiang, up to Shu-ch1 eng and then to Liu-an-chou.^ At Lu-chiang 
we came up against [enemy] troops; after two engagements the 
Ch'ing force was defeated. We pursued them to the town, but the 
gates were firmly closed.^
11On the following day we hastened to Liu-an. It was before the
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harvest was ripe, I wanted to join up with Ch'en Te-ts'ai's 
army;'*' hut there was no grain in the region and we could not set 
out at once. We had no choice hut to return. We turned hack 
near the herder of Shou-ch'un [Shou-chou]; hut there was no 
grain in this place, and haying heen persecuted for a long time 
hy Miao P'ei-lin's troops, the people were suffering great hard­
ship. So again my troops obtained nothing to eat and many died
of starvation. (MAHY) ate (GEASS) to satisfy their hunger; how
3
could that give them strength.
We returned to the region of T'ien-ch'ang just at the time 
when Chiu-shuai took Yu-hua-t'ai.^" Ch'ao-hsien, which was held 
hy Hung Ch!un-yuan, was taken hy Pao Ch'ao's array, sent hy the 
Grand Secretary. The defeated [troops] withdrew to Ho-chou, and 
there was chaos amongst the soldiers and people. Yu-hua-t'ai 
having heen lost, the capital was in panic, and the T'ien Wang 
sent a messenger with an edict ordering me to return. I at once 
led ray troops hack. It was just at the time when the Yangtse was 
in spate; the roads had heen destroyed hy the floods and there 
was nowhere to march. Then [the troops at] Ho-chou were defeated
7
and Chiang-p'u was lost. The army was in disorder. Combat
officers and troops, and the horses, were first taken across the
river in boats. The crossing was almost completed, hut some old
106 and very young, and horses which refused to embark, were left
on the river bank. At this [time] Chiu-fu-chou was flooded and
the soldiers had nowhere to lodge. [Even if] they had rice,
there was no fuel to cook with, and a great many died of hunger.
Just at this time CHIU-SHUAI^ SENT RIVER TROOPS to attack.10 Hsia-
11kuan was also attacked hy Chiu-shuai. At the loss of this
garrison, Chiu-fu-chou was given up. (i 330 HOT KHOW THE. PATE OP 
THE REST OP THE ARMS', WHO DID ROT GET ACROSS).12
After ray return [i found that] Tseng chiu-shuai had captured 
our Yu-hua-t'ai and was so strongly intrenched there that we could
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recover it. My troops had no provisions and could not stand 
firm, "but dispersed down to Su-chou and Chekiang. Altogether 
in this whole operation we lost several myriad of fighting troops.
I myself lost heart, so the Kingdom was in danger.
Our failures at Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] were due to the 
foreign devils causing trouble, They got rewards from Governor 
Li [Hung-chang] for attacking our towns. The taking of Su-chou 
and other districts CANNOT BE SAIL TO BE DDE TO LI HUNG-CHANG ' S 
ABILITY, BUT REALLY TO THE EFFORTS OF THE FOREIGN DEVILS; (HE 
USED THE CUSTOMS REVENUE FROM SHANGHAI TO HIRE THEIR HELP). These 
[foreign] devils would sell their lives when they saw money.
(THEN2 THESE DEVILS a n d) Governor Li [Hung-chang], seeing that I 
was not in the provincial capital [Su-chou], took the opportunity 
to attack it. If I had not gone to the capital, and had not gone 
north, they would certainly not have been able to attack my city. 
107 [I had not been willing] ^  to go to the capital or to go north
BECAUSE OF THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS. 
THIS WAS IN THE 11th MONTH OF I reported to the Sovereign THE
THE 13th YEAR [13 Dec.-12 Jan.1864] DETAILS OF THE GENERAL STATE OF
AFFAIRS, saying; "The capital 
cannot be defended. It is closely besieged by General Tseng1s 
troops, with deep moats and strong forts. There is no grain or 
fodder in the city, and no relief comes from outside,^ [We should] 
give up the city and go elsewhere."^
7
® ie T'ien Wang was full of righteous anger, and reprimanded 
me [in a manner] hard to bear. I could do nothing but kneel and 
again petition saying, "If you do not follow my advice it will 
certainly be impossible to protect the lives of all the people in
Q
the city. Chiu-shuai has taken your Yu-hua-t'ai and cut off
communications by the south gate, so that YOU cannot go out by
9the gate. They have taken your Chiang-tung-ch'iao, and cut 
communications by the west gate. They have taken your Ch'i-kung-
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ch'iao [sic]*** and have now established a fort outside the east
gate, and have made a deep and long moat. Strong forces are
2firmly intrenched at Hsia-kuan. The roads are cut and the 
gates blocked. In the capital the morale of the people is not
steady. (THERE ARE MANY OLD PEOPLE AND CHILDREN BUT PEW FIGHTING
•2
TROOPS). There are many court officials and civil officials, 
many people who expend food and supplies. If you do not heed the 
advice of your minister, ruin is inevitable."
When I had finished petitioning, the T'ien Wang again sternly 
reprimanded me, sayings "I have received the sacred command of 
God, the sacred command of the Heavenly Brother Jesus,^ to come 
down into the world to become the only true Sovereign of the 
myriad countries under Heaven. Why should I fear anything?
There is no need for you to petition and no need for you to take 
108 charge of the administration. You can do as you like; remain in 
the capital or go away. If you do not serve my invincible 
Kingdom there are those who will. You say that there are no 
troops; but my Heavenly soldiers are limitless like water. Why
5
should I fear the ---  ^Tseng? You are afraid of death and so
may well die. State matters are nothing to do with you. The 
second brother of the Sovereign, the Yung Wang, ^  is in charge;
7
the Young Hsi Wang will issue commands, and the whole court will 
unit to execute those who disobey the commands of the Young Hsi 
Wang."
After being severely reprimanded in this way, I begged the
Tfien Wang before the throne to take a sword and kill me so that
I might avoid the punishment to come. "As the servant of my
Sovereign I have never had a moment's rest. Now, when I petition
on State affairs the Soveriegn scolds me thus. I wish to die
8before the throne, as my final requital to you.” I petitioned 
in this way, but nothing would persuade the Sovereign to agree. 
With tears in my eyes I went out of the palace gate. All the
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officials of the court came to condole with me. The following 
day the T'ien Wang understood that he was wrong and conferred 
upon me a dragon robe in order to pacify me. (AT THIS TIME 
[I did riot]1 DIE ONLY BECAUSE OP MY MOTHER, IT WAS REALLY NOT
FOR THE SAKE OF THE SOVEREIGN).2
3
After this, I remained in the capital for more than a month.
In the 1st Month of the New Year, the 1 4 t h . I  wished to quit
the capital, but the Sovereign was afraid of my leaving. In the
city the morale of the people was shaky and the court officials
begged me to stay. When all the brothers and sisters in the
capital heard I was to leave, men and women in the city all
begged me to stay with tears in their eyes. I agreed and did not
set out. My present misfortune is because OF MY MOTBEB AND
109 [because the Sovereign! would not follow my advice, but behaved
ungovernably and said: "Everything is decided by Heaven and there
is no need for you to scheme. Obey my command, cross to the
north, join up with Chfen Te-[ts'ai]fs force, reconquer the north
bank and report to me." My memorials were not sent up BECAUSE OF
jealous ministers; BECAUSE OF the Sovereigns distrust of my
power, my command was secretly reduced, so that the various hsien
of Su-chou were lost.
At Chin-hua and Lung-yu^ in Chekiang LI SHIH-HSIEN*S AEMY was
completely held in check by Tso Ching [Tsung]-t*ang, who had been
sent by the Grand Secretary.^ Ning-po had previously been taken
with the connivance of the [foreign] devils;^ then at NING-PO
the Ch*ing commander stirred the hearts of the foreign devils with
money, to attack Ning-po. The foreign devils' artillery was
formidable and very accurate, and knocked down the walls of the
town. Our troops could not hold their ground, and abandoned the 
8defence; then withdrew consecutively from Yu-yao and Cheng-hsien 
9also. Then the foreign devils, having received a reward of money
10for taking Ning-po, were offered a reward to attack Shao-hsing,
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For the attacks on these two places the foreign devils received 
[much money] 1 (MORE THAI! FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND IN SILVER. NING- 
PO HAD RICH REVENUE FROM THE CUSTOMS AND THERE WAS A LOT OF MONET 
THERE. THE CH'ING OFFICIALS EMBEZZLED2 MILITARY FUNDS, GOT THE 
FOREIGN DEVILS TO DO THE WORK, BUT TOOK THE CREDIT FOR THEMSELVES. 
IT WAS THE SAME FOR THE ATTACK ON SHAO-HSING), otherwise they 
would not have been able to attack our cities,
110 After this, Chin-hua, Lung-yu, Yen-[chou], Wen-[chou] and T’ai- 
[chou] were abandoned one after the other, and the troops station­
ed at Fu-yang. ^ Tso Ching [Tsung]-tfang!s whole army came down 
and threatened Fu-yang, but fought with our armies for several 
months without capturing it Then once more foreign devil troops 
were invited; they came by water and destroyed the wall of Fu- 
yang with artillery fire. After more than ten engagements the 
[foreign] devils were defeated. Then more [foreign] devil troops 
were sent, and again we fought. Tso Ching [Ts,ung]-t,ang,s troops 
also joined battle; hence the fall of Fu-yang, Shao-hsing and 
Hsiao-shan.^ Our troops withdrew to Yii-hang and established 
positions there. Tso Ching [Tsung]-t'ang's troops arrived and 
there was a battle which went on day after day. We held Yii-hang
7
with all our strength in order to protect Hang-chou.
Having taken Fu-yang, the [foreign] devil troops received their 
money and returned to Ning-po. Then Tso Ching [Tsung]-t'angfs 
troops advanced on Hang-chou by land and water, some fortifying 
positions at Yii-hang, others at Chiu-lung-shan, as far as Feng- 
shan-men, Lei-feng-tfa and Hsi Hu [West Lake], linking up with 
Yii-hang - a distance of more than 80 li. This region is mountain­
ous and with many rivers, and one fort has the strength of ten. 
More than a hundred forts covered this 80 Between Hsi Hu and
111 Yii-hang we had only ten or so forts, all depending on the water 
for their defence. The two sides were in positions facing each 
other; it was a deadlock. Neither side found it convenient to
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give battle. The commander of Hang-chou was the T*ing Wang 
Chfen Ping-wen; Yii-hang was commanded by Wang Hai-yang.*1* The 
fact that Hang-chou held out for several months was due to the 
protection provided by the water.
2
Then the foreign devils attacked Cha-pfu, P’ ing-hu and Chia-
shan, and these three places were lost. Su-chou, Ttai-ts,ang,
K f un-shan and Wu-chiang were all taken ^  by (THE [FOREIGN] DEVILS
IE THE PAY OP) ^  Governor Li [Hung-chang] This was when Chiu-
shuai had taken Yii-hua-t *ai and the capital was in a panic. The
Sovereign would not allow me to go down to Su-[chou] and Hang-
[chou] though I begged him again and again. Then the fort at
7Yin-tzu-shan was lost, and he was even less willing to let me go. 
The commanders in Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] sent urgent calls for 
aid, and every day urgent despatches arrived. I had no choice but 
to petition again. The Sovereign and his ministers wanted me to 
provide 100,000 [liang of silver] for military expenses before 
they would allow me to leave. I had to hand over 100,000 liang
o
of silver and all the jewelry of my whole family. The Sovereign 
gave me only forty days to go to Su-[chou] and Hang-[chou] and 
return. If I did not make up the whole sum of money or return 
within the time limit, I would be dealt with according to the
9
laws of the state. Seeing the urgent state of affairs down there,
1 was willing to agree. I had to get out of the capital and then
think of another plan.^
I had not been gone long when Kao-ch*iao-men was taken by 
11Chiu-shuai. At that time the foreign devils were already close 
to the provincial capital [Su-chou], After the defeat at Kao- 
112 chfiao-men, the Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch1 ing fled back to Tung-pa, and
the Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien returned to Li-yang.
I was at Su-chou fighting against the foreign devils. After 
several days of fighting there was no clear decision, neither side 
being able to move forward. (THERE WERE MARY CANALS AND THE
FOREIGN DEVILS HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF HAVING STEAMERS.1 OUR 
WATER TROOPS COULD NOT STAND UP TO THEM, THOUGH OUR LAND TROOPS 
COULD FIGHT. BUT THERE ARE TOO MANY CANALS AROUND SU-CHOU AND 
NOT ENOUGH DRY LAND.2 THAT IS WHY WERE WERE DEFEATED AND LOST 
GROUND. THIS WAS THE EVIL BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FOREIGN DEVILS.
AT THIS TIME THERE WAS A DEADLOCK).5
I personally led a force out of the Ch’ang Gate to Ma-t'ang- 
ch’iao, intending to deal with [the enemy] from outside, and 
obtain temporary protection for the provincial capital.^ I 
stationed my troops at Ma-tfang-chfiao intending to return to 
[T'ien]-ching to persuade the Sovereign to go elsewhere and not 
to hold on to the capital. But I had only considered this and as 
yet had done nothing [about it].
The commander of Su-chou was the Mu Wang T'ang Shao-kuang, one
c
of my favourite commanders, whom I had left to hold Su-chou.
Also there, were the Na Wang Kao Yung-k*uan, the K*ang Wang Wang
An-chun, the Ming Wang Chou Wen-chia and the t’ien-chiang Chang
Ta-chou and Wang Hua-pan. They were unrighteous traitors. Kao
Yung-kfuan and the others were also officers under my command, who
had been soldiers since their childhood, trained and brought up
until they had achieved the rank of wang. They and Tfan Shao-
kuang were [like] my left and right hands; WHO GOULD HAVE SUPPOSED
THAT THEY WOULD DO THIS? I had long known that Kao Yung-k’uan
and these men intended to go over to the Great Ch'ing, but though
I knew, I did not punish them. In a casual moment I said to Kao
Yung-k'uan, Wang Hua-pan, Chou Wen-chia, Wang An-tiao, Chang Ta~
7chou, Wang Yu-wei and Pan Ch*i-fa: "The Sovereign has fallen on
evil days and his rule cannot last long. You are all men of Hunan 
and Hupeh and can suit yourselves. There is no need for us to 
harm each other. In the present situation I cannot detain you 
if you have other intentions; but I myself am a famous general 
of our Kingdom, and who would dare go bond for me to surrender?
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(I AM LOATH TO LEAVE MY FAMILY AMD MY MOTHER, NOW OVER SIXTY." 
EVERYONE WEPT AND EACH WENT HIS WAY).1 They answered, "The
Chung Wang should set his mind at rest; we can never he unright­
eous, We have been with you since our childhood; how could we 
have such evil intentions? If we had such intentions we would 
not have shared hardships with you for so many years.” I was 
their superior and they my subordinates, and they did not dare 
to speak out. I watched their behaviour and knew that they had 
treacherous intentions; that is why I spoke. But considering the 
situation I did not punish them, because I had long known that 
114 we were near to A LINE AND death STRUGGLE, Because I am a man 
of ICwangsi there was nowhere for me to go; SO I SPARED THEM.
These officers had long been under my command and had won merit in 
battle. I had achieved fame through their efforts and I really 
spoke from the heart. I had not foreseen that these men, who had 
been on bad terms with the Mu Wang T*an Shao-kuang since their 
youth, would later turn traitor, murder the Mu Wang and surrender 
to Governor Li [Hung-chang]. Not three days had passed after
they had given up the city [of Su-chou] when they were killed 
2
by Governor Li. That is why to this day the leaders do not 
dare to surrender.
When Su-chou was lost I was at Ma-t*ang“Chfiao. As soon as I
heard that the provincial capital was lost I went to Ch1 ang-chou
4 3and then to Tan-yang, where I camped. Then Wu-hsi fell. The
armies were in disarray and the people in confusion. I could
think of no plan and remained temporarily in Tan-yang. My cousin
Li Shih-hsien was stationed at Li-yang at that time, and he urged
me to go there and make other plans. ^ He wanted to prevent me
from returning to the capital, but I would not agree. Then he
wanted to come with his army and force me to go there, to stop
roe from going to the capital. But seeing how bad the situation
was, and because of my mother in the capital, from whom I could
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not bear to part - A BLOOD ADD BODE RELATIONSHIP - I went with
X 2a cavalry escort hurriedly "back to the capital by night.
3
115 The following day I went to court and petitioned;^ hut all
the men and women in the city begged me to stay, otherwise I would
4long ago have gone away.
In Su~[fu] province there remained only Tan-yang, Ch'ang-chou,
Chin-t*an, Li-yang and I-hsing. This year [1864] Ch'ang-chou
was also taken by (THE FOREIGN DEVILS IN) Governor Li [Hung-changf s]
(PAY), and all the soldiers in the town were killed.^ After the
capture of Ch’ang-fchou] the Tan-yang garrison also withdrew.^
7Chia-hsing in Chekiang also fell about this time. Only the
garrisons at Hu-chou, Ssu-an and ICuang-te had not withdrawn. The
troops in Chekiang provincial capital [Hang-chou], Tan-yang, Chin-
t*an, I-hsing and Li-yang had nowhere to flee to. I was besieged
in the capital and none of the commanders or wangs knew what to do.
8That is why the move was made into Kiangsi. The commander who 
PLANNED AND led the troops into Kiangsi was my cousin Li Shih- 
hsien; the troops were all from my command in Chekiang. Compelled 
by the pressure of events, they wanted to press forward into 
Kiangsi. The various commanders who led the troops were Li Shih- 
hsien, Liu Chao-chun, Wang Hai-yang, Ch*en Ping-wen, T'an Ying-
116 chih, Ch*en Chfeng-chfi and Li Jung-fa. They are already in 
Kiangsi, so I will leave this matter and speak of bad government 
in the capital which led to ruin.
From this time on [though] the state was about to perish, the 
T'ien Wang utterly refused to listen to anyone. After I, before 
’k*16 Tfien Wang*s throne, had faced the Sovereign with the whole
situation in the kingdom, he became very suspicious and Jealous,
and handed over the administration of the capital to his elder 
brother Hung Jen-ta. To all important gates and strategic points
Hung sent men to inspect and control; I was not in charge of
administration in the capital. If the Sovereign had put me in
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1charge of the administration it would not have deteriorated so.
I remained in the capital only because of my mother. I saw the
predicament of our kingdom: the cities outside [the capital] had
all fallen, every day the situation got worse. The Sovereign did
not concern himself with the soldiers or people of the Kingdom,
but shut himself up in his palace and never came out of the palace
gate. If one tried to petition about affairs of the Kingdom for
the sake of preserving the state, whatever one said, the T'ien
Wang would only talk of insubstantial things and did not consider
the Kingdom. The affairs of state had not really been delegated
to anyone, and everyone had a hand in them. I had long been in
the field in command of troops, and most of my commanders were
outside. In the city there were only the families of those who
were in the field, each with ten, or seven or eight persons.
Seeing that I was in the capital they banded together and formed
2
a squad of more than a thousand. In the 11th Month of the
3
13th Year, when I entered the capital from outside, I also had
my staff of officers, about ten. At that time I was only in charge
of the defence of the city and was ordered to wherever there was
an emergency. The poor in the capital, men and women, all came to 
4
me for help, but there was nothing I could do. The Sovereign did 
not concern himself with this matter. When I petitioned saying, 
"There is no food in the whole city and many men and women are 
dying. I request a directive as to what should be done to put the 
people's minds at ease," the Sovereign issued an edict saying; 
"Everyone in the city should eat manna. This will keep them alive."'* 
But how can manna nourish people in real life? People were to eat 
all sorts of things which grow in the ground, which the T'ien Wang 
called manna. I and the other ministers petitioned saying, "This 
stuff cannot be eaten." The T'ien Wang replied, "Bring and 
prepare some and I will be the first to eat it," Since this was 
what he said there was nothing anyone could do. When none was
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obtained for him to eat, the Sovereign himself, in the open 
spaces of his palace, collected all sorts of weeds, which he 
made into a lump and sent out of the palace, demanding that 
everyone do likewise, without defaulting. He issued an edict 
ordering the people to act accordingly and everyone would have 
enough to eat.
The Tfien Wang long since knew that we would one day run out 
of grain; he had long known that the capital was not secure, but 
because he was arrogant he did not consider everything properly.
118 When he had entered Hanking, he made it into his Imperial capital, 
and he did not want to give up his cause. He relied upon Heaven 
and did not believe in men. Everything depended on Heaven. In 
the two or three previous years he had already ordered everyone 
to store up manna; each family was to provide ten tan, which was 
to be put in store. Some people obeyed and handed it in and some 
did not. The Sovereign himself in his palace had long been eating 
this stuff. Since the Sovereign was like this there was really 
nothing I could do* In the city several myriads of poor people, 
man and women, importuned me to save them and help them to survive. 
But there was nothing I could do. In the 7th and 8th Months of 
the 13th Year [13 Aug. - 12 Oct.1863] I had money and rice AND 
COULD (TEMPORARILY REGISTER AND DISTRIBUTE MONEY AND RICE TO THE
POOR FAMILIES IN THE CITY, AND ALSO TO THE FAMILIES OF POOR
1
SOLDIERS) to save their lives. More than 70,000 poor people
were registered, and all received 20 dollars; THOSE WHO WANTED
2could obtain two tan of rice by going to Pao-yen. Those who 
could do so went to Pao-yen for rice. Families which did not have
the means to do so, received money so that they could engage in
3 4petty trading, in order to survive. I relieved them until the
12 Month of last year [13 Jan. - 11 Feb.1864] and then I could not
continue. I was too poor, and had neither money nor rice. Su-[chou]
and Hang-[chou] were lost as well, the capital was tightly invested
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and we could not hold out however hard we tried. I petitioned
the Sovereign, but he would not withdraw from the city. There
was really nothing to be done, AND I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO BO 
1
THIS. When I had money and rice I was able to distribute relief 
widely to the soldiers and people. After the people of [the
119 region from] Tan-yang to Sah-ch1 a-ho, Lung-tu, Hu-shu, Hsi-ch'i
2were killed by Chfen K'un-shu and Hung Ch* un-yuan, I issued 
money and rice and sent an officer to succour AND RELIEVE THE 
PEOPLE. At this time the Sovereign's second brother and the Hung 
family, seeing that I cared greatly for the soldiers and people, 
feared that I intended to ruin the Kingdom. What they said [in 
secret] BEACHED MY EARS: that I had been loyal once, but had turned 
traitor. They ignored ray bitter lifetime of effort, forgot about 
the diligence of people like me and even said I was a traitor. I 
had been unswervingly loyal to the Sovereign; why should he trust 
in jealous ministers and call me a traitor? Por this reason I 
was disheartened ^ and stayed in th& capital with pent-up feelings 
[determined] to perish with him. IP IT HAD HOT BEEN BECAUSE OP 
THIS, I had several myriad of troops outside and could have gone 
FREE AND UNCONSTRAINED,4 and not have had to suffer this disaster.
I HAD LONS KNOWN THAT HIS FATE WAS SEALED, BUT AS A KWANGSI MAN 
I HAD NOWHERE TO FLEE TO; SO I REMAINED LOYAL' TO THE DEATH. BUT 
PEOPLE LIKE ME, TOO HAD LONG SERVED THE SOVEREIGN AND RECEIVED 
HIS FAVOURS, COULD NOT LEAVE THE CAPITAL ONCE THEY ENTERED IT 
BECAUSE OF THE MACHINATIONS OF THE JEALOUS MINISTERS.5
When I went to the capital everyone was delighted; if they knew 
that I was to leave everyone wept. When I was in the capital the 
Hung family dared not oppress the people and did not venture to 
coerce and deceive too much the people of the city; nor did they 
dare to oppress and cheat the soldiers. When I was not in the 
city they searched every house and took away all grain, money and 
valuables for their own use, and no one dared to resist. Every
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day the population was checked and there was no peace for men
120 or women.
Last year the T'ien Wang changed the system and insisted that
in the whole [state], in and out [of the capital], in all [army]
units whatever their size, [amongst] civil and military, and also
amongst the people, all proclamations and printed [documents]
should have INSERTED the words: ‘Heavenly Father, Heavenly Brother
1and Heavenly King1. Those who did not obey would he tom asunder 
between five horses. The army was to be called the ‘Heavenly 
Army1, the people, the ‘Heavenly People*; the Kingdom, the ‘Heaven­
ly Kingdom*; the battalions, the ‘Heavenly Battalions*; the troops 
were to be called the ‘Royal Troops*. At the time everyone 
obeyed except me and Li Shih-hsien, and Li Shih-hsien still refuses 
to use this formula.^ THEN^ the T’ien Wang saw that Li Shih-hsien 
did not use these terms and immediately cashiered him, and to 
this day his rank has not been restored to him.^
In calling it the Kingdom ‘of the Heavenly Father, Heavenly 
Brother and Heavenly King1, it was the T‘ien Wang’s intention 
TO USE THIS to indicate that the affairs of Heaven were concealed 
from men. The T’ien Wang always used heavenly words to admonish 
people.** We, his officials, did not dare to challenge him, but 
let him give what names he wanted. Calling them ‘Heavenly 
Dynasty, Heavenly Army, Heavenly Officials, Heavenly People, 
Heavenly Commanders, Heavenly Soldiers and Royal Troops,* made 
them all into his personal troops and stopped us from calling 
them our troops.^ Anyone who spoke of ‘my troops’ or ‘my soldiers* 
would be reprimanded thus: "You have treacherous intentions! THIS 
IS THE HEAVENLY ARMY; THERE ARE HEAVENLY OFFICIALS, HEAVENLY 
TROOPS, AND THIS IS THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM. HOW CAN THEY BE YOUR 
TROOPS?" IF ONE DID NOT CALL THEM ‘HEAVENLY SOLDIERS, HEAVENLY 
KINGDOM AND HEAVENLY OFFICIALS' he was afraid that people were
121 going to take his kingdom from him. These are (TRUE) words.
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Whoever dared to speak of *my troops* would he tom asunder 
between five horses*
1The titles of the wangs were also changed. This was a mistake 
on the part of the T*ien Wang. Formerly, after the appointment 
of the Tung, Hsi, Han, Pei and 1^ Wangs, APART FROM THESE, HE 
HIMSELF PROCLAIMED THAT after the killing of the Tung Wang and the 
Pei Wang [he would] never appoint any more wangs* That there are 
other wangs today is because in the 9th Year [1859] his cousin 
Hung Jen-kan came and [the T*ien V/ang] was extremely pleased to 
see his cousin arrive. THE T*IEN WANG WAS DELIGHTED AND GREATLY 
FAVOURED HIS COUSIN.2 He had not been in the capital half a month
5 4.
when he was made chun-shih and given the title of Kan Wang. An 
edict was pronounced throughout the Kingdom that everyone was to 
be under his command. But after the appointment no plans appeared
5
and the T*ien Wang reconsidered the matter. He saw that his 
senior officers, who had won merit and had long served his kingdom, 
were resentful, and realized that the position was unsatisfactory. 
After the I V/ang went off, Ch*en Yu-ch*eng and I were the princip­
al defenders of the Kingdom. At that time the name of the Ying 
Wang was already known, but I had not yet made a name for myself.
I was always hard-working, helping to plan, shirking nothing. The 
T*ien Wang saw that after elevating his cousin - AS SOON AS HE 
ARRIVED HE WAS GIVEH SEHIORITI, TET HE HAD HO ABILITY 6- after 
two months the Kan Wang had planned nothing, [and the T*ien Wang] 
already regretted his error [and found it] hard to face his 
officers who had won merit for themselves. THEN he first promoted 
Chfen Yu-ch*eng to Ying Wang. After promoting Ch'en Yu-ch*eng,
he saw that I was always winning merit in battle, that I was
7diligent in his service, and that he owed me a debt. At that
8time I was defending P*u-k*ou. Li Chao-shou, who had long been 
intimate with me, when he saw that the T*ien Wang had made Ch!en
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122 Yu-ch'eng a wang, - [even] LOOKING AT THE MATTER RROM THE CH'ING
1
DYHASTY SIDE - was indignant, and wrote a letter urging me to 
2join him. This letter reached me just at a time when six or
3seven of the T'ien Wang' s shih-wei ^  came to P'u-k'ou to inspect 
the army. Little did I know that before Li Chao-shou's letter 
arrived, rumours had already reached the capital and the T'ien 
Wang had sent his shih-wei on the one hand to inspect the army, 
but also to find out whether I was up to anything.
Li Chao-shou however, boldly ordered his personal messenger 
to carry the letter. This messenger had once been my standard- 
bearer, and had followed him when Li Chao-shou had joined the 
Great Ch'ing. Having been sent with the letter, he was made 
prisoner by the sentries and there was an enquiry. The messenger 
said, "There is no need to arrest me. I am going especially to 
His Excellency Li [Hsiu-ch'eng] *s place," and so on. The sentries 
then brought him to headquarters. All the troops, who had come 
when [they heard that] an enemy had been taken, saw him and saw 
that a letter was found on his person. When they found the 
letter, the shih-wei were all present. (ON THIS MATTER MA Yll- 
T'ANG CAN BE ASKED; HE KNOWS THE DETAILS).5 When the shih-wei 
returned to the capital everyone knew about it, and it was feared 
that I would turn coat. It was said thay I had long been friendly 
with Li Chao-shou, and that not having been made a wang I would 
certainly turn traitor. At that time my mother was in P'u-k'ou 
and my family also. As a precaution against my certain treachery
123 'the boats at Chung-kuan were completely sealed off to stop my
7troops from coming or going.1 Then someone reported to the T'ien 
Wang. After ten or twenty days, nothing had happened, so the 
T'ien Wang issued an edict proclaiming me 'eternally loyal and 
righteous' and himself wrote in his own hand on yellow satin four 
large characters i? a& Js, , sent the satin to me and appointed 
me Chung Wang. So I am the Chung Wang because of Li Chao-shou's
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letter enticing me [to go over], in order to make me contented 
and prevent me from treason.
After this the number of appointments increased from day to 
day. This person would be promoted for merit and then they would 
think of another who had been diligent and might bear a grudge.
So people were promoted indiscriminately without considering the 
[qualities of] the man. As long as there was a guarrantor, 
approval would be given. The department responsible for recommend­
ations made considerable illicit profit; that is why they 
recommended people. Those with money, who wanted to enjoy them­
selves, bribed this department and were therefore recommended.
Lazy and undeserving men were all made wang. He made no distinction 
[between them and] the officers who commanded in the field, who 
worked hard day and night. Those without influence, who followed 
a soldier's life, were disgruntled at this, and in military 
operations did not strive for achievement. Those who had ability 
were not trusted by the Sovereign, [yet] they were unswervingly
loyal, the pillars of the Kingdom. The Sovereign saw that he
1had made a mistake and created many more wangs. Words are like
124 arrows; once despatched they are hard to retrieve, and could not
be cancelled. That is the reason
2why, after this, the wangs who 
were appointed were all ©ailed
5
lieh wang. Then a great many
lieh wang were appointed, and this
could not be changed; so three dots
were added at the top of the
character making the title M.
6People were even more disgruntled,
and each had treason in his heart. Because of this people,became
7disunited and there was profound discord. THE T'lEN WANG REALLY 
LOST THE COUNTRY AND THE KINGDOM THROUGH HIS OWN FAULT, IN THE
(I SPEAK OUT FRANKLY. IT IS NOT 
THAT I AM DISLOYAL OR SLANDERING 
THE SOVEREIGN. IF THERE IS 
SOMETHING [CONCERNING] THE RISE 
AND FALL OF THE KINGDOM WHICH I 
DO NOT SPEAK ABOUT, IT IS BEC­
AUSE I DO NOT KNOW [ABOUT IT]).4
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EARLY LAYS WHEN [things] WERE CLEAR-CUT"^ in promoting officers
and appointing officials, he selected and employed able men. We
two, Ch'en Yu-ch'eng and Li Hsiu-ch’eng, were favoured by the
Sovereign, and he gave us new names. At home Ch'en Yii-ch1 eng
2wrote his name * Ch'en Pei-ch'eng*. Seeing that he was loyal and 
brave, the T'ien Wang changed his name to Yu-ch'eng. At home I 
wrote my name as [Li] I-wen;^  but when the T'ien Wang employed 
me, when I was made Chung Wang, he changed my name to Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng.^
Previously, when he employed people, the T'ien Wang selected
good men. I HAVE ALREADY CLEARLY SET OUT THE REASONS FOR WHICH
HE V/AS DESTINED TO FALL UPON EVIL DAYS, AND LOSE THE KINGDOM AND
THE COUNTRY, WHICH THE GRAND SECRETARY WILL UNDERSTAND AT A
GLANCE.5 (SUCCESS OR FAILURE, PROSPERITY OR COLLAPSE, GOOD
FORTUNE OR DISASTER WERE ALL DECIDED BY THIS) self-inflicted
chaos. (THERE WAS PANIC INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CAPITAL, WHICH
THE GENERALS AND MINISTERS WERE UNABLE TO PREVENT. IN THE CAPITAL
THERE WAS NO GRAIN, Chiu-shuai' s troops were closely besieging it
6and it was cut off. There was no grain to feed the armies with.
In the capital TROUBLES DAILY INCREASED; poor people, men and
women, crowded in front of the [palace] gates, begging for their
lives to be saved. There was neither money nor grain in the state
treasury, and state affairs were not in my hands. But seeing
so many people in tears and crying bitterly, I had no choice but
to distribute the grain stored in my own home to save the poor
of the city. (AFTER I HAD RELIEVED THE POOR BY DISTRIBUTING GRAIN
FROM MY OWN HOUSE), the troops under my command had not been 
7provided for. There was nothing for it, so I changed all my 
mother's and my wife's jewelry, gold and silver, in order to 
provide for the troops. That is why there is no gold or silver 
left in my home.
After distributing this grain for the relief of the poor people,
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it still did not solve the problem, and later I petitioned the 
T’ien V/ang on behalf of these poor people who could not keep 
body and soul together, begging him to release them. The Sov­
ereign would not agree, but reprimanded me severely: fIYou forget
1the dignity of the state! Do not dare to let our brothers and 
sisters go wandering outside! Everyone should obey the command 
and prepare manna, so that they may eat their fill and prolong 
their lives. Your petition is not granted.1’ I could not argue 
with him, so I left the court* The Sovereign was angry and X 
also was displeased.
All the people in the city, both men and women, were starving, 
126 and every day implored me with tears to save them. I had no
choice, so myself issued secret instructions that poor men and 
women were to be allowed to leave the city, to flee and save them­
selves. While in the city I had heard that Chiu-shuai had estab-
2lished a refugee relief office. This fitted exactly with my
3
intentions and made it possible to save ^  these people; so I 
secretly ordered that they should be allowed to leave. From last 
year to the present, [a hundred and] ^  thirty of forty thousand 
have gone out through the different gates. Unfortunately the 
Hung family used men of Kwang-[tung] ^  to guard all the gates and 
strategic points, and they robbed all the men and women leaving 
the city of all their money, and despoiled these poor people.
When I heard of this I was very angry and went myself to see, and 
found that it was true. I immediately had some OF THESE BANDITS 
V/HO MOLESTED THE POOR killed, and after this they were able to get 
safely out of the various gates for the time being.
After this, retribution came to the state, and all sorts of 
strange things happened. The Sovereign listened to idle talk and
7
did not cultivate good government. The city swarmed with bandits 
and robbers, and at night the sound of firing never stopped as 
people were robbed and killed. Whole families were murdered and
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their money and property stolen. The defeat of the Kingdom
came from these misfortunes. In the 11th. Month of last year
[13 Dec.1863 ~ 12 Jan.1864] Chiu-shuai breached the city wall
at the south gate.^ * At this time there were a lot of soldiers
in the city, and there was still enough to eat, so they were strong.
2There was also the moat between us. For this reason Chiu-shuai1 s 
troops could not break in.
After this, things in the capital deteriorated from day to day. 
Outside Chiu-shuai * s troops daily increased their pressure and
there was extreme anxiety in the capital. There was no one to man
%
the stockades and defend the walls. The penalty for illicit 
communication with the enemy, or failing to report to the T*ien 
Wang the discovery of [such] correspondence with [the enemy] out­
side the city, was the execution of [the offender*s] whole family 
and the confiscation of his property. When Ohiu-shuai1 s army had 
reached the city, the T*ien Wang had already issued a severe edict 
that no one dared to contravene, [against] anyone who disobeyed 
the T*ien Wang*s command, had illicit correspondence with the 
enemy, had treacherous relations or enticed [others to do so].
Those who reported such activity would be promoted to the rank of 
wang; those who knew [of such activity] and did not report it, 
would be as guilty as the traitor himself. The Sovereignfs elder 
brother was ordered to apprehend them and see that they were 
pounded [to death] and flayed; who is not afraid of [such a] 
death? ^
Then the Sung Wang Ch*en Te-feng got in touch with the Provincial 
Commander-in-chief Hsiao*s troops^ outside the east [gate], and 
the Wei Wang Chu T*ao-ying^ was in contact with Ghiu-shuai*s side. 
Ch*en Te-feng and Chu Chao-ying had not said anything about this 
to me, but news of it leaked out and the Sung Wang Ch*en Te-feng 
was arrested by the Sovereign’s elder brother Hung Jen~fa. [The
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Sung Wang] ^  was friendly with me, and his mother, who was more 
than seventy years old, came to beg me [to help him]. I at onoe 
arranged to go bond for him and paid more than 1,800 [ liang] of
128 silver to ranson Chfen Te-feng’s life. Ch’en Te-feng made contact
with the Ch’ing, but he was not successful and he could not save
2his life. These are the facts.
Hot long after this, my wife’s uncle Sung Yung-ch’i, came from
3Chiu-shuai ’ s camp and said ^ that he had spoken with Chiu-shuai * s 
secretary about persuading me to go over, He had an elder brother, 
whose name I do not know, who was a subordinate of the Grand 
Secretary, with the rank of lan-ling, ^  and could go bond for me.
I had never seen the man Sung Yung-ch’i spoke of; I did not know 
who he was and had not met him and [therefore] did not venture 
to assent. This man was said to be in T’ai-chou, but I do not 
know whether this is true or not.
When Sung Yung-ch ’ i returned to the capital from Chiu-shuai * s 
headquarters after more than ten days, he was working with Kuo 
Lao-ssu. Kuo Lao-ssu was a Hanking man. Sung Yung-ch’i spoke 
with me and told me about this, but I did not see any letter from 
Chiu-shuai. He said that he had only discussed it with Chiu- 
shuai *s secretary, and that nothing was settled. This man liked 
to drink. That evening we spoke a great deal. The following 
day he drank to excess with friends and said too much, and then
129 told ;Ch*en Te-feng that the Chung Wang had said such and such. 
Ch'en Te-feng did not know whether to believe it or not, and wrote 
asking me whether it was true. The following day there was a 
meeting in my palace to discuss grain supplies. The Pu Wang
Mo Shih-k’uei, the Chang Wang Lin Shao-chang, the Shun Wang Li 
Ch'un-fa, Hung Ho-yuan, the eldest, son of the Sovereign’s elder 
brother, and his second son [Hung] Li-yuan, and Hung K’uei-yuan, 
the eldest son of the Kan Wang, were at the meeting in my palace. 
Sung Wang Ch’en Te-feng's letter was handed in just at the
moment when the city despatches arrived. Who could have suspected 
that there was a private letter amongst them? Mo Shih-k'uei 
took this letter and opened it, and read about this affair. Every­
one crowded round to look. The letter asked, "Does the Chung Wang 
really have such intentions?” Mo Shih-k’uei then said to me:
’’Have Sung Yung-ch’i sent for and I will question him. I am the 
T'ien Wang’s Minister of Punishments. Since this has arisen HAVE 
YOUR WIPE'S UNCLE SUNG YUNG-CH’I SENT FOR SO THAT I can question 
him. Otherwise I will first memorialize to the Sovereign, and that 
will not be very convenient for you, Chung Wang!” and so on. I had 
no choice. It was impossible for Sung Yung-ch*i to escape. Mo 
Shih-k’uei assembled troops at my palace to await him. The same 
night Sung Yung-ch’i came to my palace, and was discussing this 
matter with my younger brother when he was seized by Mo Shih-k’uei. 
Later Kuo Lao-ssu was also taken. There was a great stir about 
this affair and the whole city was in a turmoil. Luckily I always 
had the troops and the people on my side, otherwise I would long 
since have perished with my whole family. The court ministers 
distrusted each other and dared not vigorously bring me to book. 
Sung Yung-ch’i was thrown into prison and was to have been executed 
but I was a relative of his and could not see him perish, so I 
bribed Mo Shih-k’uei to be lenient with him and not punish him 
but petition for clemency. I was implicated in this affair. 
Fortunately everyone in the kingdom had friendly feelings for me, 
otherwise my whole family would have perished (LONG SINCE).
After this there was always someone keeping an eye on me lest 
I turn traitor. This was about the end of the 3rd or the beginning 
of the 4th Month [mid-May 1864]*^ At this time I was on the wall 
at the east gate.2 (THE T'lEN WANG WAS ALREADY SERIOUSLY ILL AND 
HE DIED ON THE 21st OP THE 4th MONTH [3 June 1864].3 WHEN TBTS 
MAN WAS ILL HE WOULD NOT TAKE REMEDIES, BUT ALLOWED THE DISEASE 
TO GET BETTER BY ITSELP. EVEN IP IT DID NOT GET BETTER HE STILL
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WOULD ROT TAKE MEDICINE. FOR THIS REASON HE DIED OR THE 21st.
OF THE 4th. MONTH).
The Tfien Wang was already dead and Chiu-shuai1 a troops were 
pressing us hard, so that we were in a desperate plight with no 
way out. Then the Tfien Wang*s eldest son, Hung Yu-fu, ascended 
the throne in order to put the people at their ease.^ * (THE TfIER
131 WANG'S ILLNESS WAS CAUSED BY EATING MANNA, AND BECAUSE HE WOULD 
ROT TAKE REMEDIES. THAT IS WHY HE DIED). IT WAS ALSO BECAUSE 
HE DID NOT HAVE GOOD FORTUNE AND BECAUSE HE KILLED THE COMMON 
PEOPLE. AFTER THE YOUNG SOVEREIGN CAME TO THE THRONE THERE WAS 
NO GRAIN FOR THE SOLDIERS, AND THERE WAS CHAOS IN THE ARMIES.2
Chiu-shuai made many tunnels under the wall [of the city].
From the east gate right round to the north gate many tunnels
were dug, and we were unable to defend every point. ^ The Shen-
ts'e Gate was smashed and knocked down twice, and defence was
difficult. The Sovereign was young and had no ability to make
decisions* Outside, General Tseng's troops pressed daily nearer
to the city and no one, civil or military, in the capital, could
think of a solution.
By the 6th Day of the 6th Month [19 July 1864] it was clear
that the situation was desperate and that General Tseng was about
4to break into our city. I immediately selected an advance-guard 
and sortied by night to attack Chiu-shuai * s positions. The attack
*5was not successful and I realized that the city could not be held.
6Our troops had nothing to eat all day and all night, and at dawn 
7they all left. From the top of Tzu-ching-shan General Tseng saw 
that the troops from the city were dispersing in disarray. At 
noon the same day Chiu-shuai blew up the city wall with gunpowder, 
and from Tzu-ching-shan and Lung-chin the whole army entered the
Q
city. Our forces could not hold them.
THIS WAS THE GREAT GOOD FORTUNE OF THE GREAT CH'ING EMPEROR,
132 THE RESUIT OF THE GRAND SECRETARY’S ABIE STRATEGY AND OF CHIU-
SHUAI1S FINE ACHIEVEMENTS, WISDOM AND STRATEGY, AND THE DILIGENT 
EFFORTS OF CIVIL AND MILITARY. IT WAS ALSO BECAUSE THE T'IEN 
CH'AO WAS FATED TO PERISH; THE DAYS OF THE T'IEN WANG DISTURBING 
THE PEOPLE WERE DESTINED TO COME TO AN END, AND THE GREAT CH'ING 
WAS DESTINED TO RESTORE PEACE.
Then Chiu-shuai1s soldiers scaled the walls at the four gates 
and entered [the city]. In the stockades outside, at Chung-kuan, 
when the troops saw that the capital was lost, some of them 
surrendered, some fled and some were killed.
AFTER I JOINED THE T'IEN CH'AO. THE T'IEN WANG EMPLOYED ME 
FOR ONLY1 THREE OR FOUR YEARS, DURING WHICH I WAS OBEDIENT AND 
SCATTERED MY WEALTH. I WAS ANXIOUS TO RELIEVE THE POOR; FOR THAT 
REASON EVERYONE KNEW ABOUT ME. When the wall was breached, every­
one came weeping to me. When I came back defeated from the T'ai-
2p'ing Gate, I went straight to the gate of the palace. The Young 
Sovereign had already come to the palace gate with the two small 
sons of the T'ien Wang. They came forward to ask what was to be 
done; but I had no plan at the time. I took only the Young 
Sovereign, but could not look after the others. The Young Sovereign 
had no horse to ride, so I gave him my war-horse to ride, while I 
took a poor horse. I went straight to my home and bade farewell 
to my mother, my young brother and my nephew; the whole family 
parted from me in tears. I took the Young Sovereign and went to
3
hide in the Ch'ing-liang Shan. There were several thousand civil 
and military officials escorting us. I WAS A MINISTER EMPLOYED 
BY THE T'IEN WANG AHD ALTHOUGH4 HE DID NOT INSTITUTE GOOD GOVERN­
MENT, AND IN ESTABLISHING HIS STATE DID NOT CONSIDER THE SOLDIERS 
AND THE PEOPLE, THE SOVEREIGN RAISED MB TO THE RANK OF CHUNG WANG. 
BUT HE DID NOT GIVE THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY TO ME; THERE WERE 
[other] WANGS APPOINTED BY THE SOVEREIGN, AND GREAT MINISTERS OF 
STATE WHO WERE SENIOR TO MB; THERE WERE ALSO MANY WHO WERE JUNIOR 
TO ME. BUT I WAS WILLING TO BRAVE DEATH IN [his] SERVICE. A
MAW OF FEELING AND PRINCIPLES , I WANTED TO SHOW GRATITUDE FOR 
PAST FRIENDSHIP WITHOUT FORGETTING. SINCE I WAS IN HIS EMPLOY, 
although he had fallen on evil days and had lost the kingdom and 
the country, nevertheless, I had received his favour and could 
not but remain loyal and do my utmost to save the offspring of 
"kk© T'ien Wang. This I did in my unquestioning loyalty.
It was near to nightfall and I could think of no plan. We
wanted to charge out of the north gate and make off, but Chiu-
shuai ' s troops were strongly intrenched there and it was not
possible. The civil and military officials and soldiers who
were with me were paralysed with panic,'1' and everyone was weeping
hopelessly. There was nothing for it, so at the Fourth Watch I
braved death and led a charge, and with the Young Sovereign,
charged out by way of the place where Chiu-shuai had knocked 
2down the wall. The Sovereign and his officials charged out of 
the encirclement at the risk of their lives. FOR ME IT WAS 
BECAUSE OF MY UNQUESTIONING LOYALTY, IN ORDER TO SAVE THE SOVEREIGN 
TOO WAS IN DANGER.3
After breaking out of the city we passed line after line of 
Chiu-shuai*s fortifications, with deep ditches and strong stock­
ades. As the Young Sovereign escaped from the city there was 
firing from all Chiu-shuai * s units and incessant shouting. I 
got separated from the Young Sovereign. Chiu-shuai's troops 
gave chase with cavalry and infantry. Although he got out [of the 
city] I do not know whether he is still alive today. He was a 
young boy of sixteen and had grown up from childhood without ever 
having ridden a horse, and moreover, had never had to suffer 
[such] fright. Chiu-shuai's were pursuing from all sides and he 
must certainly have been killed.^ If Chiu-shuai *s cavalry or 
infantry killed him on the road they would not have known that he 
was the Young Sovereign. He was a young boy; who could have known?
After leaving the city and parting from the Young Sovereign
ray horse could not go on. This horse had been in battle all
day in the city and was not a war-horse in any case, it was not
strong enough. In addition it had not been fed; neither man
nor beast had had enough to eat. By dawn everyone had scattered,
but my horse could not go on. There was nothing to be done, I
HAD NO HORSE AND COULD NOT GO ON. So 1 fled up a deserted hill
1to hide for a time. I had nothing to eat and was hungry and 
absolutely unable to go on. The Young Sovereign had taken my 
horse to ride and now I do not know whether he is dead or alive.
If I had still been riding my war-horse X would have fled else­
where. I took refuge in a broken-down temple on the top of the 
hill.
AFTER I HAD TAKEN REFUGE, the people from the foot of the hill, 
knowing that the city had fallen, assumed that there must be 
people hiding on this hill. The people were poor and wanted to 
profit from this. My life was destined to be ended, THEREFORE I 
WAS NOT ABLE TO ESCAPE.
I had some precious ornaments which I was carrying, wrapped in 
a piece of silk. I cannot think how I can have been so confused 
that day. When I stopped to rest in that broken-down temple I 
hung these pearls and jewelry on a tree so that I could rest in 
the shade. Unexpectedly some local people came searching. When 
we saw this group of people coming, the two or three of us were 
startled and fled, forgetting to take up the jewelry. The people 
chased me, and said, MXf you have money on you give It to us.
We do not want your life." I was hurriedly trying to escape,
BUT I COULD NOT RUN, I could, not move.2 When the people in 
pursuit got close to me they recognized that I was the Chung Wang 
and all knelt down and wept. They had chased me down to the foot 
of the hill. BY THAT TIME THERE WERE A LOT OF THEM. THEN THEY 
MADE ME COMPLY AND go back with them to the top of the deserted 
hill.
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Seeing that the people intended to help me, I was willing 
to return to where the broken-down temple was, and give them the 
pearls and jewelry as a reward for their kindness. But while 
these people had been chasing me, other people had unexpectedly 
followed behind and had taken away my things from the temple.
When I returned with the people, the jewelry was nowhere to be 
seen. But enough of that.
All the people urged me to shave my head,1 but I was unwilling 
to do so. They said, "Unless you shave your head we cannot 
escort you.'1 The people begged me earnestly, so I replied, !,I 
am a great minister. How our Kingdom has fallen and the Sovereign 
is dead. If I cannot get away I will be captured and taken before
p
the Ch’ing commander; in that case there is nothing I can say.
[But] if I am destined to make good my escape, it would be
difficult for me to face my soldiers [with a shaven head].1* So
I was unwilling to shave [my head]. They kept pressing me to
3
shave it, and finally I agreed and shaved it a little. That is
the fact of the matter.
Then this group of people hid me, [but] the other group had
got my jewelry, and they quarrelled over it. The group of people
with whom I was, went and asked the other group to share it [with
them]; but the other group said, "YOU ASK US TO DIVIDE THESE
THINGS, BUT ^  these things are only possessed by great chiefs of
the T’ien Ch'ao NOT BY ANYONE ELSE. [That shows that] you must
have captured this chief." THEY SAID THAT THE PEOPLE I WAS WITH
5WERE GRASPING. Thereupon the two groups quarrelled and consequent­
ly I could not remain hidden, AND BECAUSE OP THIS I was taken 
£
prisoner BY TWO SCOUNDRELS, brought here and locked in this prison 
7cage* Due to the kindness of Chiu-shuai I have been given food 
AND TEA IN SUPPICIENCY. The Grand Secretary hastened from An- 
oh’ing and interrogated me.
(I SEE THAT THE GRAND SECRETARY) IS A MAN OF GREAT RIGHTEOUS-
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NESS, PROFOUND BENEVOLENCE, (AND VAST ABILITY) and am full of 
remorse. IT IS DIFFICULT FOE ME TO REPAY HIS EXCELLENCY THE 
137 GOVERNOR'S GREAT KINDNESS; therefore I am anxious to relate
everything about ora* Kingdom. THIS CRIMINAL COMMANDER REALLY 
HAS NO ABILITY. AT HOME IN MY YOUTH I WAS A POOR PEASANT,
TRYING DAILY TO FIND ENOUGH TO EAT. I DID NOT KNOW OF THE TfIEN 
WANG1 S INTENTION TO ESTABLISH A STATE. SEVERAL MYRIAD PEOPLE 
CAME AND WERE WILLING TO FOLLOW HIM. I WAS NOT' THE ONLY ONE WHO 
WAS STUPID AND CONFUSED. I BECAME KNOWN AND TOOK AN ACTIVE 
PART FOR THREE OR FOUR YEARS BEFORE PEOPLE KNEW THE INSIGNIFICANT 
NAME OF LI HSIU-CH'ENG. NOW THE T'lEN CH'AO IS FINISHED AND 
THIS IS REALLY [due to] THE LUCK AND VIRTUE OF THE GREAT CH'ING 
EMPEROR, AND THE HEIGHT OF GOOD FORTUNE. AS LONG AS I WAS IN THE 
T'IEN CH'AO I SERVED IT FAITHFULLY; BUT NOW THE KINGDOM AND THE 
ARMY HAVE PERISHED.
As the General of the man Hung, all the troops in the field 
came under my command. NOW THAT I SEE THE DEPTH OF THE GRAND 
SECRETARY'S BENEVOLENCE, HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR'S WISDOM 
AND LOVE OF THE PEOPLE, HIS COMPASSION AND GOODNESS, I am willing
1to assemble all my troops on either side of the [Yangtse] River 
in order to repay this kindness. I DO THIS REALLY BECAUSE I 
HAVE SEEN THE GRAND SECRETARY'S BENEVOLENCE. ALTHOUGH I HAVE 
NO ABILITY, FROM THE EARLIEST YEARS WHEN MY RANK WAS LOW, I DID 
MY UTMOST TO SHOW GRATITUDE. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO ABILITY OR 
WISDOM, I COULD [always] STRIVE TO THE DEATH, LOYALLY SUPPORTING 
THE T'IEN CH'AO UNTIL THE KINGDOM CAME TO AN END. I NEED SAY NO 
MOHE. (I AM WILLING TO ASSEMBLE ALL THESE TROOPS),2 in order that 
this criminal and stupid person may pay his debt to the great 
Ch'ing Emperor. If my Sovereign had been SECURE in his Kingdom,
I would be disloyal in doing this. But now the Sovereign is dead 
and the Kingdom has collapsed, and several hundred thousand of 
my troops outside (ARE DISTURBING THE PEOPLE). I cannot defend,
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so am guilty with them of harming the people.**"
1^8 THE T’IEN CH'AO HAS NOW LOST THE COUNTRY, I HAVE RECEIVED
BENEVOLENT TREATMENT, SO I AM ANXIOUS TO ASSEMBLE [the troops]
IN ORDER TO REPAY KINDNESS. HAVING SERVED THE MAN HUNG AS A 
GENERAL, NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN CAPTURED I SHOULD LONG AGO HAVE- 
BEEN EXECUTED, BUT THIS HAS BEEN GRACIOUSLY POSTPONED, AND I AM 
BOUNDLESSLY GRATEFUL.2 NOW OUR KINGDOM IS COMPLETELY DEFEATED 
AND [I wish] TO PREVENT MY TROOPS FROM CONTINUING TO MOLEST THE 
PEOPLE. IP THE GRAND SECRETARY AND HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR 
WOULD AGREE TO THESE MEASURES IT WOULD BRING GREAT HAPPINESS 
TO THE GREAT CH'ING EMPEROR, AND THE WHOLE PEOPLE WOULD ALSO 
BENEFIT FROM THE GRAND SECRETARY'S BENEFICENT KINDNESS. If I 
have the ability to do this [but] it is feared that I have 
treacherous intentions, I can still be executed according to
k
the laws of the state. If I fail to do it, capital punishment 
by state law IS CERTAIN. I DO THIS IN TRUTH BECAUSE I TAKE 
PLEASURE IN PROTECTING THE PEOPLE. I FEAR THAT4 the Grand Sec- 
retary does not trust me to do this, then keep me locked up in 
prison and I will still do it, if people are put at my disposal.
I could stay in An-ch * ing, from which I could deal with both sides 
of the [Yangtse] River. I AM COMPLETELY SINCERE AND HAVE NO 
TREACHEROUS INTENTIONS. IF I RECEIVE THE F A V O U R O F  YOUR ASSENT,
I WILL COMPLETE EVERYTHING SATISFACTORILY AND CERTAINLY WILL NOT 
GO BACK ON MI WORD. I IMPLORE [you with your] LOFTY ABILITY, TO 
CONSIDER WHETHER THIS MAY BE DONE OR NOT. (l HAVE WRITTEN BELOW 
THE PLAN FOR ASSEMBLING [the troops], WHICH I BEG YOU TO PERUSE).6
[The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition ends at this point. The rest
of the deposition, though punctuated by Tseng Kuo-fan, 
was omitted, and should therefore, in accordance with 
the method adopted so far, be in bracketed capitals, except 
for the parts marked by Tseng for deletion. I have 
abandoned this method for the final section in the inter­
ests of readability].
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139 1* I request: be kind enough to spare the men of Liang-kwang. 
do not kill them, but give them permission to return home OR
TO DISPERSE AND ENGAGE IN TRADING. If you are willing to let the 
men of Liang-kwang disperse, THE OTHERS WILL BE EASY TO DEAL 
WITH, BECAUSE THE LIANG-KWANG PEOPLE WERE THE FIRST TO JOIN THE 
RISING. IF YOU ARE WILLING TO SPARE THEM everyone will hear of 
it, and everyone will be willing to submit. [Even] if some are 
anxious to join your army, it would be best not to use them. THE 
SOLDIERS OF OTHER PROVINCES AND DISTRICTS SHOULD ALSO BE SPARED. 
If you follow this suggestion IT WILL BE A GREAT BLESSING FOR 
THE PEOPLE, It will save the Great Ch'ing the expenditure of 
wealth, and will save the efforts of generals and officials.
2. If this suggestion received the favour of his consent, I ask 
the Grand Secretary to send one or two [men] with me to under­
take this mission. If in the capital there are any of my men
in the hands of your troops, allow me to recommend some, each to
1
take away a letter from me. I will first bring over my son.
3. I request: let me first bring over my cousin Li Shih-hsien.
Li Shih-hsienfs mother and his family were all taken from Li- 
yang by Governor Li [Hung-chang] of Su-chou, AND WERE LENIENTLY 
TREATED AND WELL CARED FOR.2 I WANT TO BRING OVER MY COUSIN,
AND THIS WILL QUICKLY SHOW RESULTS. I beg the Grand Secretary 
to write ordering his mother to be brought to An-ch'ing, and I 
will write a letter [to him] and [the matter] can be quickly
140 settled. He is very filial to his mother. Though I have been 
captured I can very easily do this. If I write a letter to him, 
even if his mother has not come, it may take a little longer, but 
it will still succeed.^
4. I want to bring over the T!ing Wang Ch’en Ping-wen.^  Ch'en 
Ping-wen and I were very friendly - the two of us were very
intimate. Now that I am a prisoner here, when my letter reaches
him he will certainly agree. The others will all he willing to
agree and this matter will he successful, because with me here
they will all have a way out of their predicament, and it will
certainly succeed. If Chfen Ping-wen agrees, Wang Hai-yang will 
1
come too. If my cousin agrees, Chu Hsing-lung and Lu Shun-te
2
will certainly agree too. If I do not bring them in, THOUGH THE 
GRAND SECRETARY’S TROOPS COULD EIGHT AND DEFEAT THEM, it would 
he a waste of effort and wealth. They have plenty of space to 
move in. When your troops arrive in one place they will go else­
where and WOULD THEY NOT disturb the people? Even if they are 
closely beset they will still make plans to flee elsewhere. Who 
cannot find an alternative when there is plenty of open space? ^
If you wish me to bring over these men for you, then send 
messengers to them.
5. The question; is being discussed: supposing he did manage to 
get away, what clever plans may the Young Sovereign have? This 
person certainly cannot have any [such plans].^
6. If the Grand Secretary will follow this suggestion and employ
Ma Yti-t’ang and Chao Chin-lung, their going will certainly bring 
5success.
7. I request the Grand Secretary to issue an order to accompany 
my letters. If letters are sent they should not be printed. If 
you use a printed letter it thrill not be believed when it reaches 
my troops, and they will certainly think that the Grand Secretary 
produced it himself in order to deceive them. If I write myself, 
the commanders of my forces will all recognize [my letter] and 
this will be more sure. In the T'ien Ch’ao. when I sent documents 
with a seal affixed, unless there was a secret sign in my own 
hand, the commanders would not obey. After I have brought back
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my cousin and my son, my nephew and my commanders, I will
1bring over Huang Wen-chin. All should be spared and sent home, 
and this will certainly succeed. Even when I am here my troops 
will certainly obey me. My troops are well-disciplined and will 
all obey. MY TROOPS WERE THE MOST NUMEROUS IN THE T'lEN CH'AO,
AND IE I ASSEMBLE THEM ALL TOGETHER, THE OTHERS WILL ALL FOLLOW 
ONCE I WRITE TO THEM.2
8. 1 request the Grand Secretary to stop the slaughter in the 
city of Nanking, no matter whether of wangs or officers, no matter 
where they come from. Pardon their crimes even if they merit 
death. Give them passes and money and let them go. Let them 
spread [the news about] outside so that everyone may know that 
the Grand Secretary and the Governor in their liberality have
142 spared them, and their hearts will be without recrimination, and 
the affair will be quickly settled.
9. IN ORDER TO ASSEMBLE THE T'IEN CH'AO GENERALS SO THAT THEY DO 
NOT TROUBLE THE COUNTRY, IT IS INDISPENSABLE TO BE GOOD-HEARTED 
AND MERCIFUL5 TOWARDS THEM. THE GRAND SECRETARY MAY IN THIS 
WAY BRING THEM BACK HUMANELY, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THIS GUILTY 
GENERAL TO INFLUENCE THEM, WITHOUT CONSIDERING THEIR RANK OB 
THEIR CRIMES. IF THE T'IEN CH'AO TROOPS ARE PERSUADED TO SUBMIT 
BY JUST AND RIGHTEOUS MEANS, THE NIEN REBEL DISORDERS MAY BE PUT 
DOWN EASILY.4 IT WILL BE EASY ONCE YOU ARE IN CONTROL OF THE 
SOUTH AND THE NORTH OF ANHWEI,
r g
10. I request the Grand Secretary to post proclamations in all 
provinces, districts and villages, far and near, giving news 
about Chin-ling, [announcing that] all troops, no matter whom, 
are to be spared and can become [ordinary] people again. This
is the most important thing. TODAY the weapon to be used to 
pacify the country should be benevolence. It is no use to inspire
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awe "by killing. They cannot all he killed; hut kindness can win 
the submission OF THE PEOPLE.
THIS GUILTY GENERAL HAS HO ABILITY OR WISDOM. HOW THAT I HAVE 
BEEN TAKEN HOW CAN MY CRIME 1. . . IT IS REALLY THE GRAND 
SECRETARY'S GREAT KINDNESS AND LIBERALITY WHICH HAVE CAUSED ME TO 
EXPRESS MY REELINGS AND MY SIMPLE SINCERITY.
143 LAST NIGHT I RECEIVED THE FAVOUR OP THE GRAND SECRETARY
COMING TO INTERROGATE ME, AND RECEIVED HIS BENEVOLENT INSTRUCTIONS, 
AND I DO NOT KNOW HOW TO REPAY HIM. THIS GUILTY GENERAL IS BURDEN­
ED WITH REMORSE [because] I DID NOT ENCOUNTER AN ENLIGHTENED 
[ruler].2 BUT NOW THAT I HAVE SEEN THE BOUNDLESS KINDNESS OP THE 
GRAND SECRETARY, THIS GUILTY GENERAL IS RESOLVED TO RESTORE ORDER 
IN ONE PART [of the country] IN REPAYMENT. AFTER LAST NIGHT'S 
PROPOUND KINDNESS AND FRIENDLINESS I AM VERY CONTENTED TO DIE,
AND HAPPY TO RETURN TO THE SHADES.5
The following are the ten disasters of the T'ien Ch’ao:
The first disaster to the Kingdom was the defeat of Li K*ai~fang
and Lin Feng-hsiang, who had been sent by the Tung Wang to sweep 
5the north.
The second disaster was after the defeat of Li IC’ai-fang and
Lin Feng-hsiang[ * s expedition] to sweep the north, when the
chfeng-hsiangs Tseng Li-ch'ang, Gh’en Shih-pao and Hsii Shih-pa
7went to the relief but were defeated at Lin~chfing.1
The third disaster was that after Tseng Li-chfang and the others 
returned defeated from Lin-ch1 ing without being able to relieve
Li K’ai-fang and Lin Feng-hsiang, 
It is a long time ago and I do not the Yen Wang Ch'in Jih-ch’ang was
remember the name of the Ch'ing was sent with troops to the rescue
commander at Yang-chia-tien. but was defeated and beaten back
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r 1144 at Yang-chia-tien [nearj Shu-ch' eng.
The fourth disaster was that Lin Shao-chang should not have been
sent to Hsiang-t'an. At this time Lin Shao-ohang's whole force
2was completely defeated at Hsiang-t'an.
The fifth disaster was the result of the mutual killing of the 
Tung Wang and the Pei Wang, This was a great disaster.^
The sixth disaster was that the I Wang and the Sovereign were not 
on good terms; master and minister were distrustful of each 
other. ^  The I Wang became suspicious and took away with him all 
the good civil and military officials and soldiers of the T'ien 
Ch'ao. This was the greatest disaster.
The sixth [sic] disaster was that the Sovereign did not trust 
other ministers and relied on his eldest brother and his second 
brother. These men had no ability and could not protect the 
state.^
The seventh [sic] disaster was that the Sovereign did not concern 
himself with administration.
The eighth [sic] disaster was creating too many wangs. This was
7
a great disaster.
The ninth [sic] disaster was that the kingdom did not employ men 
of ability.
The tenth [sic] DISASTER WAS THAT THERE WAS WO SYSTEM OP GOVERN- 
MEM.8
DISASTERS TO THE KINGDOM AND TO DIKE AROSE OUT OE THESE TEN [sic] 
DISASTERS, AND [the loss of] LIFE WAS IRREPARABLE.9
145 The roots of the T’ien Ch’ao have gone BUT IP THESE TROOPS CAN
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EE COLLECTED TOGETHER IT WILL PREVENT THE RECURRENCE OF TROUBLE 
IN THE HEART OP THE GREAT CH'ING [Empire]. IT WILL REDOUND TO 
THE FAME AND FORTUNE OF THE GRAND SECRETARY AND OF HIS EXCELLENCY 
THE GOVERNOR. IF THE WORK OF COLLECTING TOGETHER FOR SUBMISSION 
IS SPEEDILY FINISHED, WHAT WILL IT MATTER IF THERE ARE BANDIT 
OUTBREAKS?
The thing to be feared now is that the foreign devils will
certainly take action. Because of the Grand Secretary’s kindness
I will speak of this. The foreigners came to T’ien-ching and 
1suggested to the T’ien Wang sharing the country equally with him,
[for which] they were willing to help him. The T’ien Wang said
that he would not agree. "I strive for China and for the whole
2
of it. If, after we have succeeded, we divide up the country, 
everyone would ridicule us. If we do not succeed, it would merely 
mean letting the [foreign] devils into the country." This was 
said to the court ministers AND HE WOULD [NOT] AGREE. The foreign 
devils said, "Though you, the T’ien Wang,have masses of soldiers, 
they are not equal to ten thousand foreign troops. With thirty 
or twenty thousand of our foreign troops and with steamers, we 
could conquer [the empire] in no time," THE DEVILS SAID, "Ten 
thousand or more of our troops fought their way into Peking and 
then made peace, and they still owe us money. If you do not 
co-operate with us your T’ien Ch’ao will not last long, AS YOU 
WILL SOON SEE PROM OTJR FUTURE ACTIONS." That is what this devil 
chief said after the T’ien Wang had refused.^
146 Now it will not ve very arduous to settle the T’ien Ch’ao
affair, and the first thing to do is to guard against the 
aggression of the foreigners. This is the truth, [The opportun­
ity should be taken] ^  now, before they make a move. THE GRAND 
SECRETARY SHOULD quickly decide to go to Kwangtung and buy 
secretly and bring back plenty of THEIR cannon. First amass 
plenty of their guns, powder and shot, to defend strategic points.
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The gun-platforms must he large. It will be necessary to buy 
the foreign devils1 gun carriages. It is no use having their 
cannon without their gun-carriages.
For defending strategic positions, cannon of three or four 
thousand chin are adequate. It is not necessary to buy too big 
ones. They have shot of fifteen or thirty chin, AND HOW SHOULD 
CANNON BE USED POE PROTECTION ON THE WATER.1 ALTHOUGH WE BAB, 
our Kingdomfs Kwang-[tung] cannon were good, but not as powerful 
as their cannon, [it is necessary to] get hold of one of their 
gun-carriages, find a good craftsman and construct them after 
the same pattern. Then China can make many cannon. One crafts­
man can teach ten, ten can teach a hundred and everyone in our 
country will know [how]. Many people will be able to make and 
operate these things and then our country can make great quantities.
147 At T'ai-ts fang I captured a sample of their big western cannon
2
and made some exactly the same. There are still some of these 
in Nanking. Twenty or more of their big three hundred or four 
hundred chin brass cannon should be bought too. These too are 
guns for use on the land. Select our' good gunners and train 
them secretly in an open place. Use shot and aim at a hill, or 
put up a target on flat ground, in order to train gunners. With 
good training they will be good gunners who will never miss.
They should be well fed and well paid. To fight with the foreign 
devils the first thing is to buy cannon and get prepared early.
It is certain that there will be a war with them.
OUR T ’IEN CH'AO IS FINISHED AND I AM A CITIZEN OF THE GREAT 
CH'ING. I WISH FOR THE GOOD OF THE SOLDIERS AND PEOPLE, TO 
AVOID DISTURBING THE PEOPLE OF OUR GREAT COUNTRY. SEEING THAT 
THE GRAND SECRETARY IS A MAN OF DEEP KINDNESS AND GOODNESS, I 
HAVE SPOKEN STRAIGHTFORWARDLY, WITHOUT A SINGLE FALSE WORD.
The people of Kwangtung, being near the sea, know all about 
the foreign devils* AFFAIRS, ABOUT THE DEVILS' INTERESTS and
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their affairs. Some of them should be selected and employed 
in order to purchase these things. Only Cantonese can do it. 
There are still a number of people who bribe the foreigners,
148 HAVE CONNECTIONS WITH THE ENEMY, doing business with them. They 
can go to and from Kwang-[tung] and buy guns from them. One 
cannot buy these cannon in Shanghai or Ning-po. [Kwang]-tung 
Province is the [foreign] devils1 old base. THE [cannon] NEEDED 
IN THIS PLACE COME PROM ELSEWHERE. IT IS CONVENIENT TO GO TO 
KWANGTUIJG and Hong Kong to buy.1
If one wants to compete with their infantry one must go to 
Hong Kong and secretly buy [their] gingals.2 These take shot 
of ten liang or half a chin or thereabouts. The devils [will]
3
certainly use rifles*^ in infantry battles against us, and they 
fire nruch further than the foreign muskets I bought; therefore 
they did not use gingals much. I bought some [rifles?] and they 
were really advantageous and useful, I speak these stupid words 
because I fought against them, and know ABOUT IT.
NOW OUR KINGDOM IS FINISHED, AND THIS IS BECAUSE THE FORMER 
T'lEN WANG'S [appointed] SPAN WAS ENDED. THE FATE OF THE PEOPLE 
WAS HARD, SUCH A HARD FATE! HOW COULD THE T'lEN WANG HAVE BEEN 
BORN TO DISTURB THE COUNTRY? HOW COULD I, A MAN OF NO ABILITY, 
HAVE ASSISTED HIM? NOW THAT I HAVE BEEN TAKEN AND LOCKED UP, IT 
IT NOT BECAUSE OF THE WILL OF HEAVEN? I DO NOT KNOW MY ORIGINS 
BEFORE THIS LIFE. HOW MANY BRAVE AND CLEVER MEN IN THE EMPIRE DID 
NOT DO THESE THINGS, AND I DID. IT IS REALLY BECAUSE I DID NOT 
KNOW. IF I HAD KNOWN....4
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A P P E N D I X  I
Supplement to Li Hsiu-ohfeng*s Deposition.
This partial record of the interrogation of Li Hsiu-ch’eng "by 
Li Hung-i, P fang Chi-yon and Chou Ytieh-hsiu, members of Tseng Kuo- 
fanfs staff (see Chapter II page 19 ) is known as i  idL [or
'fijf or It came to light at an exhibition of docum­
ents from Kiangsu in 1937» having been kept until that time by the 
descendants of P*ang Chi-yun. It consists of seven pages bound 
together. On the first page there are questions written by Tseng 
Kuo-fan in his own hand for the interrogators to put to Li Hsiu- 
ch*eng. (The fact that he had listed questions is noted in Tseng 
Kuo-fan*s diary for TC3/6/27; see Tseng! Shou-shu .1ih-ohi p.1842). 
To some of these questions P*ang Chi-yun attached a terse summary 
of Li Hsiu-ch’eng's answer. The seoond page consists of two sent­
ences in Li Hsiu-ch’eng's handwriting, the result of the interr­
ogators* difficulty in understanding his dialect. Page three 
contains Li Hsiu-ch*eng,s answers to the rest of Tseng Kuo-fan*s 
questions. Pages four, five and six contain questions and answers 
recorded by Li Hung-i, and page seven has P'ang Chi-yun*s colophon.
For the sake of clarity I have rearranged my translation of 
this document so that the answer is given after each question. The 
answers to some of the questions were not recorded, in which case 
the question has been left in the same order, relative to the other 
questions, as in the original document. The same applies to some 
answers to which no question was recorded.
The text, and the information contained in this and other notes, 
is from Lo: Chien-oheng pp.337-345*
Question: In the 9th Month of HP 4 [22 October to 19 November 1854] 
the garrison commander of T * ien-chia-chen was the rebel
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Yen Wang. Ch’in Jih-kang. A great many rebel documents were 
obtained from a [captured boat; why was the Yen Vang referred 
to as Sun Jih-ch’ang? Was the Yen Wang cashiered and later 
called Sun Jih-ch’ang?
Answers [in Li Hsiu-ch'eng* s handwriting] Ch'in Jih-chfang was Oh1 in 
Jih-kang, the Yen Wang.
Hu I-huang was the Yu Wang* Formerly he was a Hu-kuo-hou 
[marquis], later he was made Hu Wang, [No question recorded],
Q,s Lin Shao-chang was defeated at Hsiang-t’an in HF 4 [1854]. He 
was a man of no ability; in what year was he made Chang Wang?
A, After being defeated at Hsiang-t’an he was oashiered. Two 
years later he m s  again made a ohih-hui, then he was promoted 
to chien-tien, and then to oh1 un-kuan-yu-fu-ch1 eng-hsiang. In 
the 6th or 7th Year, when the I Wang left on his expedition, 
[Lin] remained in the capital in an administrative post. Lin 
Shao-chang did not have much ability, but he could stand much 
hardship. He was made Chang Wang in the 10th Year [i860].
Q: Tseng T’ien-yang returned with Lin Shao-chang to Hunan and 
died at Yueh-ohou, He was an able man and had seniority; why 
had he less power than Lin Shao-chang?
A: Tseng Tfien-yang and Lin Shao-changfs positions were equal.
Tseng was stolid, Lin was bright. He knew a lot and was a hard 
worker, therefore he had slightly more power.
Q: Lin Feng-hsiang died in the 5th Year [1855] at Lien-chen, Li 
K’ai fang died at Feng-kuan-tun, Lin Ch’i-jung died in the 8th 
Year [1858] at Chiu-chiang. Why was Lin Feng-hsiang later 
called the ChViu Wang, Li K ’ai-fang the Ch’ing Wang, and Lin 
Ch’i-jung the Ch’in Wang. In which year were they posthumously 
ennobled?
As Lin Feng-hsiang, Li K ’ai-fang and Lin Ch’i-jung were all ’merit­
orious state-founding ministers’. After their death they were 
posthumously made wangs, their sons inheriting. They were
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ennobled in TC 2 [I863].
Q: Memorials from Kiangsi report that Hu Ting-wen died in the Jrd 
Month of the 2nd Year [April-May, IQ63] at Jao-chou; memorials 
from Chen-chiang report that Lai Kuei-fang died in the 4th 
Month of this year [May-June, 1864] at Tan-yang. Are these two 
really dead or not?
A: Hu Ting-wen died at Jao-ohou. Lai Kuei-fang, a subordinate of 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng, did not die at Tan-yang, He is now in I-hsing.
Qi Were the [following] eighteen people in the city [Wanking] when 
it was breached on the 16th.? Do you know what happened to them? 
The Young Tung Wang, the Young Hsi Wang, the 1 [^S] Wang, Chiang 
Yu-fu, the Hsin Wang, Hung Jen-fa, the Chu Wang, Hung Ho-yuan. 
(Answer: About twenty years old.)
Oh'ung Wang, Hung Li-yuan.
(Answer: Seventeen or eighteen).
The Yuan Wang, Hung K*e-yuan, the Ch'ang Wang, Hung Jui-yuan, the 
Chien Wang, Hung Hsien-yuan, the T'ang Wang, Hung T’ang-yuan, the 
T'ung Wang, Hung T'ung-yuan, the Tz'u Wang, Hung Chin-yuan, the 
.iiEihg Wang, Hung Yii-yhan, the Han Wang, Hung Ts'ai-yuan.
(Answer: None of the above are over ten years old).
The Ghin Wang, Chung Wan-hsin.
(Answer: Over twenty years old).
The K'ai Wang« Huang Tung-1 iang.
(Answer: A child).
The Chieh Wang, Huang Wen-sheng.
(Answer: A child).
The Kan Wang, Hung Jen-kan.
A: Seventeen are in the city, Hung Jen-kan is in Kiangsi.
Q: After Ku Lung-hsien returned allegiance [to the Ch'ing], where are 
Liu Kuan-f ang and Lai Wen-hung now?
A: In Hu-chou.
Q,: Lai Wen-hung was under Gh'en Yu-ch'eng, under whom was Lai Wen-
hung?
A; Under Li Hsiu-ch'eng.
Q: Previously there were no such titles as 'I ] Wang1, 'Fu Wang' 
and 'An Wang1. Why were the 111 ien-i' the 'fu-i* and the 'an-i' 
raised to the nobility?
A: The I Wang ^  ] was Shih Ta-k'ai. Originally he was the _I [|i] 
Wang. Later everyone was pleased at his righteousness and gave 
him the name I ] Wang; but Shih was unwilling to acdept it.
The T'ien Wang's eldest brother was the An Wang, his second 
brother was the Fu Wang. Because of indignation at court the 
An and Fu Wangs were changed to ' t1 ien-an' and *t'ien-fu'.
Q,; After An-ch'ing was surrounded Ch'en Yti-oh'eng again and again 
asked for help from Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Li Shih-hsien. Why did 
they not go to the relief of Anhwei, and only Yang Fu-ch'lng 
went to help?
A: When An-ch'ing was surrounded Ch'en Yu-ch'eng asked for help 
but there were no troops available. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was in Hupeh 
and could not come back to help. But Yang Fu-eh'ing was in Ning- 
kuo-fu, and being close, he went to the relief.
The Li Wang, Chang Ch'ao-chueh is in the city [Nanking], thought 
to be already dead. [No direct question recorded].
Li Shih-chung [Chao-shou] was formerly a subordinate and a friend; 
they used to correspond. When [Li Hsiu-ch'eng] went to Chiang- 
pei last year, Li Shih-chung urged him to surrender. [No question 
recorded].
Q: Why were Tseng T'ien-yang and Lo Ta-kang not posthumously given 
the title of wang?
A: The matter is very confused. There is nothing one can say.
Q: Bo you know what happened to the bodies of Governor Lu [Chien-ying] 
and of [Tartar] General Hsiang [Hou]?
A; Boes not know.
(The above questions were those listed by Tseng ICuo-fan).
A: The rebel Li [Hsiu-ch'eng] stated: Military intelligence reports 
and the word of soldiers captured in battle cannot be relied 
upon. Shaven-headed [ex-Taiping] informers try to get on good 
terms with both sides. Military secrets are not known to the 
soldiers. Even those close to the commander do not hear unless 
they axe told.
Q: Did the foreigners who helped in the defence of Su-chou and 
Chin-ling come of their own accord or were they invited? Did 
Burgevine come to Chin-ling?
A: After Burgevine withdrew his troops he entered Nanking and lived 
in Li Hsiu-ch'eng's home. They were very friendly. Foreigners 
began helping the rebels in the 5ih Year [1855]. Originally 
the rebels did not know how to use foreign guns and cannon, 
because their mechanism is delicate and difficult to use.
Q: Which army did the rebels fear? Which army did they despise? 
What good points do the government troops have? What bad points? 
Amongst the rebels what was good? What was badly done?
A: The rebels all feared the charges and fierce fighting of Pao 
[Ch'ao]'s army, the good training and steadiness of Tseng [Kuo- 
fan]'s army, the flexibility and skillful fighting of To-[lung- 
ah]'s army. In Pao's army the commanders were good but the 
soldiers were no good; their skill in setting up stockades and 
taking advantage of the terrain was not up to Tseng's. Tso 
[Tsung^t'ang] had no fight left after Lo-p'ing. This was because 
the soldiers were all old and ill, and soldiers dread old age.
Li Hung-chang is not an experienced commander. He owed his 
success to the helop of the foreign devils. Ah! these are 
unavoidably very slighting words.
The most important respect in which the rebels were inferior 
to the government troops is that whilst a government soldier is 
executed if he plunders, the rebels lived entirely off plunder, 
and lost the good-will of the people. The government army
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employed many educated men; amongst the rebels there were no 
[or few] educated men.
Q,: Was Huang Wen-chin in Hu-chou waiting for the rebel T'ien Wang 
to break through the encirclement [of Hanking] and escape with 
him? Are the Chekiang troops capable of fighting?
[No specific answer is reported for the first of these questions; 
the previous answer may refer to the seoond].
Q: Are Li Shih-hsien, Wang Hai-yang and the others intending to 
make Kiangsi their lair, or will they go back to Kwangtung- 
Kwangsi? Do their bands intend to remain together or will they 
disperse?
A: When the rebel Shih [Wang, Li Shih-hsien]'s bands infested
Kiangsi, they did so at the order of the rebel Li [Hsiu-ch'eng]. 
Before the 8th Month they were to collect grain in Kiangsi; after 
the 8th Month they were to return, when the autumn rice of the 
Hui-[chou], Ning-[kuo] and Li-[yang] regions would be ripe. The 
intention was to ensure grain supply for Nanking, not to infest 
Kwangtung-Kwangsi or Hunan-Hupeh.
Q: The rebels who have now escaped into Kiangsi, if not making for 
Kwantung-Kwangsi, will enter Hunan-Hupeh; why then have they 
remained so long in T’u-fchou] and Chien-[ch'ang, in Kiangsi]" 
without moving?
[No answer recorded].
Q: In the 10th Month of the 1st Year [1862], when the government 
troops took Yen-ohou, Li Shih-hsien was nearby in Ning-kuo.
Why did he not go to the relief?
A: When eastern Che-[kiang] and Yen-chou fell it was because the 
rebel T'ien Wang would not allow the rebel Shih [Wang] to go to 
its relief, but wanted him to remain close in order to relieve 
Nanking. When Sung-chiang was under siege and soon to fall the 
rebel T'ien Wang withdrew the rebel chief Li [Hsiu-ch'eng] for 
the relief of the capital, so that he had to give up [Sung-chiang]
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and go.
A: Victory or defeat, who can tell? One oan be victorious or be 
defeated - it is a question of ability. A commander who, after 
winning victory after victory, suffers a defeat and cannot 
recover, is not much good. [No specific question recorded].
A: The government .troops kill mostly men from Liang-kwang. This 
unites the rebels and stops them from dispersing, and the fight­
ing will never end. [No specific question recorded],
Q: During the winter of the 1st Year [1862] Li Hsiu-ch'eng drove 
his mob north, presumably in order to penetrate into the interior 
of Anhwei. Why then did they remain so long in Ch'ao-hsien 
without advancing? In the spring of the 2nd Year [186$], after 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself led his mob from Ch'ao-hsien to make a 
fierce attack on Shih-chien-pu, and went from Lu-chiang, T'ung- 
[ch'eng] and Shu-[oh'eng] straight to Liu-an, presumably to go 
into Hupeh intending to raise the siege of Chin-ling, why did he 
turn back at Liu-an and make straight for Chiang-p'u? Was it 
because Yu-hua-t1 ai had been recaptured? Was it also because 
there was no grain?
A: In the winter of the 1st Year [1862] the reason why they remained 
at Ch'ao-hsien and did not advance was because the rebels were 
all ill from the cold (great snow). In the late spring or early 
summer of the 2nd Year [I865] they turned back from Liu-an 
because the troops were withdrawn for the relief [of Nanking] 
after the fall of Yu-hua-t'ai. Moreover, west of Liu-an there 
was no grain to be plundered; it had been finished by the depred­
ations of the Nien-tzu.
A: The rebel T'ien Wang did not like to receive people; he did not 
read military despatches. Although his son had assumed the title 
of Young Sovereign, he too could not see him. According to people 
in the rebel palace, for thirty years [sic, for thirteen ?] he had 
not seen the T'ien Wang. [No question recorded).
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Q: On which occasions did the government troops inflict the greatest 
damage on the rebels? [No answer recorded],
Q: Can the foreigners remain long in China or not? Did the rebels 
also think of fighting the foreigners?
A: Foreigners with foresight say they can remain only eighteen years 
and no longer. The government troops can certainly defeat the 
foreigners; but it is only advisable to fight on land, not on 
the water. It would be well to engage them in fierce battle and 
not compete with them in stratagems. It is better to rely on 
native Chinese cannon, supplemented with foreign cannon, and not 
use foreign cannon exclusively, because they are not willing to 
sell the best foreign cannon to China. Hung Hsiu-ch’uan came 
from the coastal region, from Kwangtung, and knew how untrust­
worthy the foreigners are. That is why he was unwilling to 
join up with them,
Q: The matter of Yang-chan-ling, [Li Hsiu-ch’eng was presumably 
questioned as to why he had failed to attack Tseng Kuo-fanfs 
Headquarters in the winter of I860; see page . No answer 
is recorded],
Q,: Did many take the examinations?
A: In Anhwei only about three hundred persons sat the rebel exam­
inations. In Nanking those who sat the rebel examinations 
numbered not more than ten or so.
Q: What are the Kan Wang’s origins?
A: The rebel Li [Hsiu-ch’eng] had not bothered to read the various 
books compiled by the rebel Kan Wang.
Q: Did many achieve honours amongst the rebels? [No answer recorded], 
Q: Is Shih Ta-k'ai dead? [No answer recorded],
Q: Why did the rebels not go to Li-hsia-ho?[The part of Kiangsu 
south of the Yangtze and east of the Grand Canal],
As Li-hsia-ho is too much intersected by water, that is why it has 
not so far been molested.
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Q,: Are the various rebels of Shantung, Shensi and Yunnan in 
contact with the long-haired rebels [Taipings]?
A: The rebels of Szechwan, Honan and Shantung are all in contact
with the long-haired rebels; those of Yunnan, Shensi and Kansu
are not.
Q: Gan you indicate the places in the city where gold and silver 
is hidden?
[This question is crossed out in the manuscript, according to 
Lo Erh-kang, presumably in preparation for its publication, and 
was not included in any copy of the document until Lo saw it in 
1955* No answer is recorded. The questions was evidently posed 
however, and in a memorial Tseng Kuo-fan quoted Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
as saying that there was little treasure in the Taiping capital; 
see Tseng Kuo-fant Tsou-kao ch.20 p.29a].
Q: How many people were there in the capital when it was captured?
A: When the city was taken there were no more than thirty thousand
in it. Apart from the inhabitants there were no more than ten 
thousand rebel troops; of these no more than three or four 
thousand were capable of defending the wall.
Q: How many were killed at Ch'ang-chou? How many were killed at 
Chin-ling? In the last ten years or so have [the rebels] come 
up against any militia in the various provinces who could fight? 
[Ho answers are recorded to these questions].
[P'ang Chi-yun*s colophon 1
In the 6th Month of the Year Chia Tzu in the T'ung Chih Reign 
[1864], the Earl of Hsiang-hsiang [Tseng Kuo-ch'itan] recovered 
Chin-ling and took prisoner the rebel chief Chung [Wang] Li Hsiu- 
ch’eng. The Marquis of Hsiang-hsiang [Tseng Kuo-fan] moved his 
Headquarters eastward from An-chfing, and the Provincial Judge Li 
[Hung-i] and P'ang Chi-yun, who came with him, were ordered to 
conduct the interrogation. The rebel Chung [Wang] 1 s written
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deposition has already been forwarded for imperial inspection; 
in addition there are several pages of the record of the 
interrogation which are useful for reference. The first page is 
in the hand of the Marquis of Hsiang-hsiang and has small notes 
made during the interrogation by [P'ang] Chi-yun. The second 
page was written by the rebel Chung [Wang] himself at the order 
of Chi-yun because he could not understand [the prisoner's] accent. 
The third page is a record of interrogation written by Chi-yun.
The fourth, fifth and sixth pages contain questions and answers 
clearly recorded by the Provincial Judge Li Mei-sheng at the 
order of the Marquis of Hsiang-hsiang. In the 8th Month of 
the Year Hsin Wei [1871] these [pages] were bound together, at 
Chia-p'ing, on the first day of spring.
[P'ang] Chi-yun.
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A P P E N D I X  II
Chao Lieh-wen's Record of a Conversation with Li Hsiu-oh'eng.
TC3/6/20 [23 July I864] ...In the evening I went with Chou Lang- 
shan to where the rebel Chung Wang is, and spoke with him for a 
long time. He said that he is from T1 eng-hsien in Kwangsi and 
is 42 sui. His family was foverly very poor and burned charcoal 
for a living. When the rebel Hung [Hsiu-ch'uan] went to Kwangsi 
and enticed people into joining the association and worshipping 
God, many followed him and all spoke of him as 'Hung hsien-sheng*. 
After the rising he was pressed into their ranks, under Shih Ta- 
kfai. Seven or eight years later in Chin-ling he was given the 
rebel title of wang. I asked about the ability of the rebel 
leader, and the qualities of the various rebel wangs. He said that 
they were all mediocre and that he respected only Shih Wang [sic. 
for Shih Ta-k'ai], who was, he said, a clever strategist.
I asked i 'At the rebel court it must have been known that he 
[Hung Hsiu-ct^uan?] could not be depended on, or did you think he 
was sure to succeed?'
He replied: 'It was like riding on a tiger - difficult to 
dismount, that is all*1
I said: 'Why did you not surrender long ago?'
He replied: ’One should not betray the trust of one's friends, 
especially since I had been ennobled by him. But wherever my troops 
have campaigned they have never killed indiscriminately. When we 
took Hang-chou Lin Fu-hsiang and Mi Hsing-chao were made prisoner 
but they were treated with respeot. The families of officials in 
the towns which fell to me were given passes and escorted out of 
the territory* You are surely not ignorant of this?'
I said: 'That may be, but the numbers killed by your troops were 
a hundred or a thousand times more than those who were spared. It 
was the duty of the commander to prevent this; and yet you are as
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complacent as if you were innocent and even seem to imply that 
you were.'
He replied: 'In this I really am guiltless. In any case things 
are just the same in the government armies '.
I said: 'You are unrepentant, that is why I make things clear to 
you, so that you may be brought to your senses. How can you be 
blamed for what was common practice amongst the troops?1 I went on 
to ask, 'In the autumn of the 10th Year [i860] you troops reached 
southern Hupeh. If they had advanced further Wu-ch1 ang would have 
been shaken and the siege of An-ch'ing lifted. Why did you retire 
without fighting as soon as you heard of the arrival of General 
Pao [Ch'ao]?’
He replied: *1 had not enough troops'.
I said: 'Your troops were everywhere; how can you say you had 
not enough?'
He said: 'At that time I had Su~chou but not Hang-chou; it was 
like a bird without wings. I went back to plan its capture •'
I said: 'Why did you not take Hang-chou before going to Kiangsi, 
instead of making a march of several thousand li and then changing 
your plan without having achieved anything? Anyway your cousin the 
Shih Wang was in Hui-[chou], from which he could easily have 
attacked Chekiang without troubling you. *
He replied: 'My plan was badly made. At first I wanted to relieve 
Anhwei [An-ch'ing], but then I learned that this would be difficult.
I also heard that the forces in Hupeh were strong. That is why I 
withdrew. Perhaps it was the will of heaven.*
I asked: 'Hung Hsiu-ch'uan only died this year; but we saw edicts 
from the Young Sovereign three or five years ago. What was the 
reason for this?'
He said: 'It was in order to accustom him to administration.'
I asked: 'If the city had not been taken this time would it have 
been able to hold out?1
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He replied: ’There was no more grain. We were relying on 
obtaining grain through Chung-kuan, but very little got in. We 
could not have held out.*
I said: ’In searching the city the government troops have seen 
a lot of grain; how can you say there v/as nothing to eat?’
He answered: ’There may have been some in the palaces of the 
wangs» but it was not used to supply the troops, hence the defic­
iency. That is why morale was bad amongst us.* He went on to 
say: ’How that T’ien-ching has fallen and I have been taken pris­
oner, do you think that there will be no more trouble in the land?’
I replied: ’That depends on the quality of the government, not 
on a victory or on your capture. We have heard that the new Son 
of Heaven is clever and wise; the people yearn for good rule. You 
rebels who disturbed half of the empire have just been wiped out, 
so perhaps peaple will not dare to make the same mistakes.
Li [Hsiu-ch’eng] also said: ’There are stars in the sky which 
predict that barbarian affairs are not settled; we will see this 
in ten or more years.1 I took him up on the names and positions 
of these stars; but it was nothing but old wives’ tales. I 
realized that there was nothing special about him, and asked: ’What 
do you plan to do now?'
He replied: ’To die. But those who have gone to the right bank 
[of the Yangtze] were all my troops before. If I could write a 
letter to disband them, so that they may avoid the fate of plunder­
ing each other, I could die without regret.' These words hinted 
that he was begging for his life.
I said: ’Your crimes are great and you must await the edict.
This is not something which the commander-in-chief can decide. ’
He bowed his head and was silent, and we left.
[Translated from Chao Lieh-wen: Heng-ching ohii-shih jih-chi, in 
T’ai-p’ing T ’ien-kuo shih-Iiao ts’ung-pien chien-chi III pp.374-5]*
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ABBREVIATIONS
Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi 
Chien-chi
Chien: Ch1uan-shih
Chien: Tien-chih t'ung- 
khao.
Fang-liieh
Hamberg
Hummel: Eminent Chinese* 
Kuo: Jih-chih 
Lo: Chien-oheng
Lo: Shih-kao
Lo: Shih-liao k fao-shih 
chi.
Lo: Shih-shih k fao.
Shih-liao.
Shih-lu.
TCHT
TPTK
Tzu-liao
Yin-shu,
Chao Lieh-wen: Neng-ching ohu-shih .jih-chi.
T'ai-p*ing T1ien-kuo shih-liao tsfung-pien 
chien-ohi.
Chien Yu-wen: T* ai-p1ing T1ien-kuo ch1uan- 
shih.
Chien Yu-wen: T!ai-p1ing T1 ien-kuo tien- 
ohih tlung-ktao.
Ch* in-ting chiao-pf ing Yueh-fei fang-liieh.
Theodore Hamberg: The Visions of Hung-Siu- 
Tshuen and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurr­
ection.
A.W.Hummel (ed,): Eminent Chinese of the 
Ch*ing Period.
Kuo T!ing-i: T * ai-p1 ing T1 ien-kuo shih- 
shih .jih-chih.
Lo Erh-kang: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch' eng tau- 
chuan yuan-kao chien-cheng. (4th Ed*)
Lo Erh-kang: T1ai-p1ing T1ien-kuo shih-kao
Lo Erh-kang: Tfai-p1 ing T1 ien-kuo shih- 
liao k fao-shih chi.
Lo Erh-kang: T*ai-p!ing T* ien-kuo shih- 
shih k fao.
Tfai-p1ing T1ien-kuo shih-liao.
Ta-Ch1ing li-chfao shih-lu.
Tsei-ch’ing hui-tsuan in TPTK Vol.III. 
Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih tzu-liao ts*ung-klan 
T1ai-p * ing T*ien-kuo. ed. Hsiang Ta et al.
T1ai-pTing Tfien-kuo tzu-liao.
T1ai-p1ing T1ien-kuo yin-shu.
D A T E S
In giving dates the usual conventions are employed: HF for the Hsien 
Feng reign, TC for the Tfung Chih reign and TK for the Tao Kuang
reign. TT has been used to indicate that the date refers to the 
T1ai-p1ing Tfien-kuo calendar. All date equivalents are taken from 
Lo;Erh-kang: T'ien-li k'ao chi Tfien-li yti. yin-yang li-.jih tui-chao 
piao, Peking 1955 and Hsiieh Chung-san and Ou-yang I: Liang-chfien 
nien Chung Hsi li tui-chao piao, Peking 1957*
Dates of events are taken, unless otherwise specified, from 
Kuo T*ing-i: T*ai-p*ing T1 ien-kuo shih-shih .jih-chih. 2 vols., 
Shanghai 1946. When references are made to this work I have not 
usually given the page number, since this is a chronology and the 
references may be found under the dates in question.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER I
1. In spite of common Western usage, to which I have deferred, 
there is a good case for referring to the T'ai-p*ing Tfien-kuo
as a 'revolution1 rather than a ’rebellion'; not only because an 
offensive sense is attached to the word 'rebellion' in the English 
usage, but also because modem Chinese historians, of both left 
and right, have in the main preferred to use the word 'ke-ming'.
T.T. Meadows in The Chinese and their Rebellions, London. 1856 (p.25) 
wrote that 'revolution is a change in the form of government and 
of the principles on which it rests: it does not necessarily 
imply a change of rulers. Rebellion is a rising against the rulers 
which, far from necessarily aiming at a change of governmental 
principles and forms, often originates in a desire of preserving 
them intact. Revolutionary movements are against principles; 
rebellions against men.' The Taiping movement does not fall 
neatly into either of these categories: the Taipings did rise
against the rulers, tod they did not envisage anything but an 
imperial form of government. Nevertheless, they attacked principles, 
and in challenging Confucianism they were attacking the very roots 
of the traditional Chinese order; even if they did not enforce 
it, their 'Land System*, the T'ien-ch'ao t'ien-mu chih-tu, had it 
been workable, would have so changed the social and economic 
structure as to make the form of government entirely different 
whether they intended it or not.
2. The fullest bibliography on the Taiping Rebellion is Chang 
Hsiu-min & Wang Hui-an: Tfai-p'ing T'ien-kuo tzu-liao mu-lu
(Revised by Chin Yii-fu), which is a supplement to Chung-kuo chin- 
tai-shih tzu-liao ts'ung-k'an (Second Series): T'ai-p'ing T'ien- 
kuo. compiled by Wang Chung-min et al., 8 vols. Shanghai 1952.
In English, a useful annotated bibliography is Teng Ssu^yu: 
Historiography of the Taiping Rebellion, Harvard 1962.
5. William James Hail: Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion,
New Haven. 1927.
4. An elegant facsimile collection of Taiping printed books is
T'ai-p'ing Tfien-kuo yin-shu (20 fascicles in 2 cases), edited 
by the T’ai-p'ing T'ien-guo Historical Museum, Nanking. 1961.
5. My reasons for calling it a 'deposition1 are given in a note 
to page
6. I have borrowed the term from P. W. Wakeman: Strangers at the 
Gate, California 1966, chapter Y. This book gives a fascinating
account of the social disorders in the region of Canton in the 
decade which followed the Opium War.
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at the Gate, pp.117-6.
11. For Hakka and pen-ti strife in Kwangtung, see Wan Lo:
Communal Strife in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Kwangtung, Harvard
Papers on China, vol. 19. In Kwangsi Hakkas were called^ A. ,
12. The point is made by E.J.Hobsbawm: Primitive Rebels, Manchester, 
1959, P.13
15. Liu Ch'ang-yu (1818-1887, see Hummel: p.515): T'ang-fei tsung-lu 
(Supplement to Kuang-hsi t'ung-ohih chi-yao), quoted by Hsieh 
Hsing-yao: T1 ai-p'ing T1 ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Kuang-hsi ti fan-Ch1 ing 
yun-tung, Peking 1950 p.36.
14. 'The tough man, who is unwilling to bear the traditional 
burdens of the common man in a class society, poverty and
meekness, may escape from them by joining or serving the oppressors 
as well as by revolting against them', see Hobsbawm, op.cit. p. 13
15. See pages 130*3 belovr.
16. For a discussion of the question of relations between the 
Taipings and the secret societies, see Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing
T'ien-kuo yii T'ien Ti Hui kuan-hsi k'ao-shih in T * ai-p'ing T'ien- 
kuo shih-shih k'ao, Peking 1955 pp.34-74. See also Teng Ssu-yu:
New Light on the History of the Taiping Rebellion, Harvard 1950 
pp.24-28. The discussion on the identity of Hung Ta-ch*uan also 
has a bearing on this question; for a summary of this discussion, 
see Teng, op.cit. pp.20-24*
17. A useful discussion of Taiping Christianity is E.P.Boardman: 
Christian Influence upon the Ideology of the Taiping Rebellion,
Madison 1952. Wakeman: Strangers at the Gate, pp.127-131 also 
has some brief but interesting comments.
18. See Vittorio Lantemari: Les mouvements religieux des peuples
opprim^s, Paris ^ 62.
19. Theodore Hamberg: The Visions of Hung-Siu-Tshuen and Origin of 
the Kwang-si Insurrection, Hongkong 1854 p. 49t
20. A contemporary observer, the Englishman A.F.Lindley, who 
assisted and warmly supported the Taipings, commented in 1866
on this error:
The occupation of Nankin has proved fatal to the success 
of the Ti-pings hitherto. Insurrection, of whatever kind, to 
be successful, must never relinquish the aggressive movement... 
The Tien-wang, by settling down at Nanking and commencing
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7. Sir J.F.Davis in his book China, A General Description of That 
Empire and Its Inhabitants, 2 vols. London ,1857 II p.412
wrote: 1There can be no doubt whatever of the existing insurrection 
in China having been the result of our own war, A Manchu general, 
in his report, distinctly stated that "the number of robbers and 
criminal associations is very great in the two Kwang provinces, 
and they assemble without difficulty to create trouble; all which 
arises from that class having detected the inefficiency of the 
imperial troops during the war with the English barbarians.
Formerly they feared the troops as tigers; of late they look on 
them as sheep"f.
8. An interesting (undated) memorial is reprinted in T!ai-p1ing 
T * ien-kuo shih-liao (edited by Chin Yii-fu and T'ien Yu-ch'ing)
Peking 1959 (pp*500-504) f^om the Chinese Serial in the British 
Museum. The author was Tseng Wang-yen, of Hsiang-shan, Kwangtung, 
who was at the time an expectant metropolitan official of the fifth 
rank; he was later Governor-general of Szechuan, see A.W.Hummel: 
Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, Washington 1943 p,211. The 
memorial begins:
Banditry has always existed in all parts of Kwangtung, 
but it has never been worse than at present. The reason 
is that year after year secret society bandits ] have
not been dealt with, and the real outlaws have not been 
apprehended; [instead] everything has been hushed up...
Tseng Wang-yen gives several instances of secret society outbreaks 
which were not reported as such. fi{The officials] never dared 
mention the word hui [secret society]'. ♦.
Even when one or two gangs have been arrested, the case 
has just been reported as one of robbery, though no stolen 
property was produced. Even more extraordinary, when it 
was known that there were bandits in a certain region 
troops did not go there to apprehend them: the gentry were
merely ordered to deliver them up. But formerly the gentry 
had no armed men and were incapable of seizing them, so 
that the real bandits could get away. Thereupon [the 
authorities] would carry off in chains the spirit tablet of 
the ancestor from the ancestral hall of the gentry clan in 
question, and imprison it in the yamen.,.,
(A reasonably faithful translation of this memorial is given in 
G.Wingrove Cooke: China: being fThe Times* Special Correspondence 
from China in the Years 1857-58, London 1858. pp.434-443)■
9. See Meadows: The Chinese and their Rebellions pp.l37~S
10. The name T'ien Ti Hui (Heaven and Earth Society) and its 
customary English equivalent, the triads1, is used almost as
a generic term for the secret societies of South China which had 
roughly the same origin and characteristics. See Wakeraan: Strangers
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to defend his position, committed a vital error, and one 
that lost him the empire* If, instead of so doing, and 
affording his enemies time to rally and recover from their 
wild panic, and concentrate their forces, he had aimed at 
the one terminal point, Pekin, beyond all doubt, the very 
eclat of his victorious march would have carried him with 
an almost resistless triumph into possession of the capital, 
and the consequent destruction of the Manchoo dynasty would 
have given him the empire,
Prom Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh, the History of the Ti-Ping 
Revolution, London, 1866, p.152 & p,154*
21. Lo Ta-kang (see note 5 to page 154) is said to have opposed 
the establishment of the Taiping capital at Nanking, see
Mou An-shih: T1ai-p1ing T1ien-kuo, Shanghai 1959 p.114, quoting 
from Ch1ing-shih kao. The collection of 42 essays entitled 
Chien T'ien-ching yii Chin-ling lun (On Establishing the Heavenly 
Capital at Chin-lingTin yin-shu I * 10, may perhaps have been the 
official Taiping answer to doubts or criticisms about this 
decision - all the 42 authors were in favour!
22. Por Tseng Kuo-fa^s original conception of the function of 
the t!uan-lien, see Tseng Wen Cheng Rung ch'uan-chi: Nien~p*u
ch.l p. 14b and Chien Yu-wen: T1ai-p1ing T* ien-kuo ch1 uan-shih,
Hong Kong 1961, 5 vols. II p. 1049 if* Imagination and foresight 
do not seem to have been Tseng Kuo-fanfs strong points, and it 
is unlikely that he had any clear idea as to how the army would 
develop* It was only the success of his early operations which 
made him realize that the force could be used on a larger scale 
and outside his own province. Pranz Michael: The Taiping 
Rebellion, Seattle 1966 I p.97, believes that from the first 
Tseng Kuo-fan had in mind something very different from what the 
court envisaged, which was a local force on more or less traditional 
lines. This may be the view expressed in Lo Erh-kang's study 
of the Hunan Army (Hsiang-chun hsin-chih), which I have not seen.
But Chien Yu-wen does not consider that from the first Tseng Kuo- 
fan intended, to set up an army of a new kind; although Tseng had 
always intended that the force should be supported out of 
government funds rather than from local contributions, it grew out 
of local Hunan Vuan-lien, and only gradually acquired a new 
character. A doctoral thesis by Philip Kuhn, which I have not 
seen, may throw light on this question; as far as I can judge 
Tseng Kuo-fanfs o\m writings do not. He was probably too cautious 
to commit thoughts of this nature to paper.
25. Li Hsiu-ch!eng considered this defeat one of the main reasons 
for the failure of the Taipings, see page 252.
24. See note 2 to page 151, on the Chiang-nan H.Q.
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25. Li Hsiu-ehfeng' s account of this operation is given on 
pages 156-7•
26* See pages 140-2.
27. See page 145*
28. Lo Erh-kang deduces that Li Hsiu-ch1 eng was a Hakka from 
his use of certain dialect expressions in the deposition,
see Lo Erh-kang: Chung-wang Li Hsiu-ch1 eng tzu-chuan yuan-kao 
chien-oheng (4th, revised edition) Peking 1957p*6l. Li Hsiu- 
chTeng apparently told Chao Lieh-wen, after his capture, that 
his family were also charcoal burners, see Chao Lieh-wen: 
Neng-ohing chu-shih .jih-chi in ai-p1 ing T f ien-kuo shih-liao 
tsfung-pien chien-chi (hereafter fChien-ohif) compiled by the 
I*ai-p*ing T1 ien-kuo Historical Museum, 6 vols. Peking 1961, 
vol.Ill p.574. (See Appendix II page 266).
29. 8^'? , an officer of the sixth rank, holding in fact a 
military command, and not strictly an inspector1; for the
origin of the name, see Chien Yu-wen: Tf ai-p1 ing T * ien-kuo tien- 
chih t!ung-k!ao 5 vols, Hong Kong 1958 P*78.
50. $‘J ). See Lo Erh-kang: T1 ai-p1 ing T* ien-kuo shih kao
(Revised Edition) Peking 1957 P*372*
31# ibid.
32. C.G.Gordon wrote of Li Hsiu-chfeng:
He was the bravest, most talented and enterprising 
leader the rebels had; he had been in more engagements 
than any other Rebel leader and could always be distinguished. 
His presence with the Taepings was equal to a reinforcement 
of 5000 men and was always felt by the superior way they 
resisted. He was the only Rebel chief whose death was to 
be regretted.
Prom a manuscript in the British Museum.
33. See page 170.
34* Described in the deposition on pages 178 ff.
35* See Hung Jen-kan's Deposition in TP1K II page.852.
36. ibid.
37* Phis question is discussed in note 6 to page 197.
38. See page 43*
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59* For the history of the Huai Army, see Stanley Spector: 
hi Hung-chang and the Huai Army, A Study in Nineteenth-
Century Chinese Regionalism, Seattle 1964.
40. The controversial question of British official policy towards 
the Taipings is discussed in J.S. Gregory: British Intervention
Against the Taiping Rebellion in the Journal of Asian Studies, vol.
XIX: No.l pp.11-24 and in the doctoral thesis on which the article
is based.
41. A popular, though well-documented life of Ward is Holger Cahill: 
A Yankee Adventurer, New York 1930*
42. The best account of the ’Ever-Victorious Army' and of Gordon’s 
command is Andrew Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army’, A History
of the Chinese Campaign under Lt.-Col. C.G. Gordon, C.B., R.E. and
of the Suppression of the Tai-Ping Rebellion, London 1867*
43* See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition in TPTK II p.853.
44* See pages 214-4, 221, 224 & Appendix I p.260.
45* According to Tseng Kuo-fan: tsou-kao TC5/6/25 ch.20 p.27b.
46. See Ho Ping-ti: Studies on the Population of China,1568-1955, 
Harvard 1959 pages 246-7.
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1. See pages 243-5*
2. See Tu Weh-lan: Tseng Chueh Hsiang p’ing Yueh-ni chieh-lueh in 
Chien-chi I. p.410. Li Hsiu-ch’eng*s account of Hung Hsiu-ch’uan's
de&th is given on page 240 and the various other versions are 
discussed in a note.
5. Chao Lieh-wen (M ), tau Hui-fu (^ , ), 1852-1893, see
TPTK VIII pp.729-762, Ch’en Nai-kan: Yang-hu Chao Hui-fu nien- 
p’u. Chao Lieh-wen’s diary, Neng-ching chu-shih .jih-chi covers 
the years 1858 to 1889. I have used the shortened version given 
Chien-chi III, checking sometimes against the facsimile edition 
in Wu Hsiang-hsiang ed.: Chung-kuo shih-hsueh ts’ung-shu, Taipei 
1965*
4* ^  in the original, the courtesy title of a provincial
governor.
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5. The main part of the ritual for the presentation of a captive'
was that an official from the Board of War conducted 
the prisoner to the She Chi T 'an [Altar to the Patrons of the 
Dynasty], see Ch 1 in-ting Ta Ch1 in# hui-tierx shih~If, Ku'ang.Hsu‘Ed.
ch.353 pp.10b-llb.
6. The junior of Hung Hsiu-ch*uan*s two elder brothers, see p. 130*
7. + ^  in the original: the courtesy title of a Grand Secretary.
8. an Infantry General; he was the highest ranking
officer under Tseng Kuo-ch*uan at the siege of Nanking, for
his part in which he was awarded honours. He was a Hunanese from 
Hsiang-hsiang and there were murmurs of favouritism, see Chien:
Ch1 uan-shih p.2277*
9. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-ohi TC3/6/20 in Chien-chi III p.373* 
Corroborative evidence may be found in Tseng Kuo-ch*uan*s
letter to Li Hung-chang quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng p.30 and in
Ting Kuo-chun: Ho Hsiang Kuan so-yen (Li Hsiu-ch*eng i-shih) ch.l p.6a/b
in Ping Tzu ts*ung-pien, 1936.
10. Chao Lieh-wen1 s record of this interview is translated in full 
in Appendix II.
11. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-ohi TC3/6/23 p.376, and below, page 20.
12. See page 53*
13* See Tseng Wen Cheng Kung shou-shu jih-ohi (hereafter abbreviated 
as Tseng: shou-shu .jih-ohi) TC5/6/23 Vol.5 p. 1839 in the 
facsimile edition in Wu Hsiang-hsiang ed,: Chung-kuo shih-hsiieh 
ts'ung-shu, Taipei 1965.
14. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/25 p.377*
15. See Tseng: Shou-shu jih-chi TC3/6/25 p.1840; Tseng: Tsou-kao 
ch. 20 TC5/7/7 p. 28b; and Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch*uan-ohi, Chia-
hsun TC3/6/26 (dated in error TC3/6/22) to Tseng Chi-tse, Shih-chieh 
Edition, Shanghai 1948 p.41*
16. See Tseng: Shou-shu jih-chi TC3/6/27 p.1842.
17* See Tseng: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7 oh.20 p.28b.
18. Translated in full in Appendix I.
19. This account seems to have originated with Lo Tun-yung: T*ai-
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p'ing T*ien-kuo chan-chi, first published in 1913> the authenticity 
of which is challenged by Lo Erh-kang in 11 ai-pf ing T* ien-kuo shih- 
liao pien-wei chi, Peking 1955 PP*49 If* The story is repeated 
in Huang Hung-shou: Ch* ing-shih chi-shih pen-mo ch. 5, and in 
Liu Yti-sheng: Shih Tsai T'ang tsa-i, Peking I960 p.34*
20. See Tseng Kuo-fan*s colophon [$%> %£> ] to the Chiu Ju T'ang 
Edition in Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch*eng tzu-shu chiao-pu pen
edited by the T*ung-chih kuan of the ICwangsi Chuang Autonomous 
Begion, Peking 1961, p.59&*
21. The document which Li Hsiu-ch*eng wrote in captivity has been 
called by various names in Chinese: ,4* ^ >
if , and4i& • In English it has been called a * confession*, 
an * autobiography * and an * autographic deposition. * Of the Chinese 
appellations, the first four are variations of official usage, 
the character being common to all; the last two, meaning *self 
statement* and * autobiography* are virtually euphemisms to avoid 
the stigma which the word 'confession* attaches to the document.
In fact, the character^ does not in itself imply confession; 
it has the more neutral sense of testimony or evidence. Although 
it could be argued that Li Hsiu-ch * eng * s document has elements of 
confession in it, I see no reason for translating ^  ^  as
*The Confession of Li Hsiu-ch*eng.* If we are to do so, what are 
we to call the document written by Hung Jen-kan, which expresses 
no sense of guilt? The most suitable translation of ^  is 
'autographic deposition,' used by A.F. Lindley, see Lin-Le: Ti- 
Ping Tien-kwoh p.773* I’or the sake of simplicity I have used 
only the word 'deposition', which seems to express adequately 
the judicial nature of such documents, while remaining neutral on 
whether they were confessions or not.
22* Apart from that of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, the following depositions 
of Taiping leaders are extant: Hung Jen-kan (TPTK II pp.846- 
855) > Lai Wen-kuang (ibid. pp.862-3), Shih Ta-k'ai (ibid. pp.780-1), 
Hung Fu-chen [Hung Yu-fu] (ibid. pp.855-6), Hung Jenvcheng (ibid. 
P*857)» Huang Wen-ying (ibid.p.857-8), Ch'en Yii-ch'eng (see Lo Erh- 
kang: T*ai-p'ing T*ien-kuo shih-liao k'ao-shih chi, Peking 1956 
pp.201-2), Huang Sheng-ts'ai (in Shan-timg Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao,
If edited by Chinan Branch of the China Historical Association,
Chinan 1957 PP*5-H; that of Li Shang-yang is also listed in 
TPTK tzu-liao mu-lu p. 37* Except for those of Li Hsiu-ch'eng,
Hung Jen-kan and Lai Wen-kuang, which they wrote themselves, the 
others are records of interrogation.
23* Compare the case of Shih Ta-k'ai, who gave himself up on 13 
June 1862 but was not interrogated by Lo Ping-chang (Governor 
General of Szechuan) until about 25 June, see TPTK II p.785.
27.8;
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24* See General Correspondence, F.0.17 /412, 1864 from Consuls 
at Shanghai, Parkes, Adkins, Markham in the Public Record
Office, London.
25. i.e. P'ang Chi-yun, a member of Tseng Kuo-fanfs secretariat.
26. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/6 p.381
27. See Tseng: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7 ch.20 p.28b.
28. See Tseng: Shou-shu .jih-chi TC3/7/7 pp. 1848-9.
29. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/IO P-382,
30. From Ch'iu Chiieh Chai tsou-shu ch.6 quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng 
P.130.
31. Hsieh Hsing-yao: T*ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih lun-ts'ung 
Shanghai 1935* p.160.
32. This memorial, which is not in Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch'tian-chi 
is quoted from Ch'iu Chtieh Chai tsou-shu ch.6 by Lo: Chien-
cheng, p. 130
33* Li T'ang-chieh: Li WenvQh'ing Kung .jih-chi TC3/7/17 quoted in 
lo: Chien-cheng, p.130
34. See Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu ch.124 (T'ung-Chih) p.47b.
35. Quoted from Ch'iu Chiieh Chai tsou-shu ch.6 by Lo: Chien-cheng 
p.130.
36. See Tseng: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.22a.
37- ibid. This refers to the last section of the deposition, see 
pages 252-255-
38. See TPTK tzu-liao mu-lu p.34*
39. See Shih-lu TC3/12/20 ch.124 p.47b; the third of the 'ten 
requests' is on page 248.
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1. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-ohi TC3/7/7 pages 1848-9, quoted 
above, page 22, i.e. 130 pages each with 216 characters.
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2. See Tseng Kuo-fanfs letter to his son Chi-tse of TC3/7/6 in 
Chia-hsiin p.42, 'I send hack Li Hsiu-ch'eng's deposition today.'
3. See Li Wen Chung Kung ch'uan-chi: P1 eng-liao han-kao ch.5 p.31b 
1905 Edition.
4. See Yang Chia-lo: Li Hsiu-ch'eng ch'in-kung k'ao, Taipei 1962 p. 5
5* A facsimile of this facsimile is reproduced in Chung Wang Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng tzu-shu ohiao-pu-pen; the reason for this is explained 
on the following page and in note 8, below.
6. Except to Ch'en Yin-k'o before the war, but I assume that he did 
not examine the manuscript, since we know of no reaction, see
k°: Chien-cheng p.104.
7. Originally Lo Erh-kang was to have gone, not to bring back the 
ms. but to examine and photograph it; but he was prevented from
doing so by illness, see Lo: Chien-cheng, preface to the Jxd Edition.
8. This copy of the 1936 facsimile, with Lii Chi-i's notes in the 
margins, is reproduced in facsimile in the photolithograph
edition of Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen.
9. Bee Lii Chi-i's explanatory note in Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
tzu-shu ohiao-pu-pen (typeset edition) pp.11-23.
10. See Lo: Chien-cheng p.11
11. Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu: ohiao-pu-pen (facsimile)
Peking 1961, and same title (typeset), Nan-ning 1961.
12. The version in TPTK II pp.787-840 and that in Yang Sung et al. 
ed.: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih tzu-liao hsuan-chi, Peking 1954
pp.150-208 are based on Lo Erh-kang's 1951 edition of Chien-cheng.
13. under the title Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu shou-kao,
Peking 1958.
14. Liang Hu-lu was severely criticized by K'e Feng in a note in 
Li-shih yen-chiu, 1956 No.5 p.110, for having published under
his own name and without acknowledgments, work which was almost 
entirely Lii Chi-i's, and for concealing from his former colleague 
Lo Erh-kang the existence of 15 photographs.
15 • See Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen p.l (Typeset 
edition)'. ~~
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16. Li Hsiu-ch'eng ch' in-kung shou-ohi, Taipei 1961.
17* This is clear from the slight difference in the printing 
of the lines and headings, and from Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s note
at the end of page 100 (yeh 50)> starting, 'The paper is finished...1
18. W.T. Lay: The Autobiography of the Chung Wang, Shanghai I865.
19. A.F. Lindley, an ardent supporter of the Taipings wrote in 
his book (Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.770-1) in 1866:
Confessions were produced which professed to be written 
by the penitent rebel leaders in their dungeons, while 
awaiting their turn to be disembowelled or 'cut into a 
thousand pieces'....Among these seemingly fabricated con­
fessions only one is worthy of any attention, and that is 
the lengthy composition, entitled, 'The Autographic 
deposition of Chung-wang, the faithful king, at his trial 
after the capture of Nankin.' Were it not for the known 
mendacity of the Mandarins, and their particular addiction 
to forging documents of this sort in order to lessen the 
prestige of the revolution by representing its principal 
leaders as in their merciless power, there would be little 
doubt but that the one in question is genuine. In 1852, 
previous to the capture of Nankin by the Ti-pings, the 
Imperial authorities concocted an article they named the 
'Confession of Tien-teh', pretending that it was the 
deposition of the leader of the rebellion, whom they 
falsely declared was their prisoner. It is quite probable 
that the 'Chung-wang's deposition' is of similar truthless­
ness, and was made up by some prisoner of note (who may have 
been pardoned in consequence), and the cunning writers att­
ached to the Governor General of the two Kiang, Tseng Kwo- 
fan. Still it must be admitted that many portions of the 
alleged deposition bear not only the impress of truth (in 
so far as historical events, date, &c., are concerned), 
but expressions closely resembling the well-known 
sentiments of the great Ti-ping general; so that if, as 
we trust, he was not the author, someone pretty intimately 
acquainted with him must have been.
20. In Hua-tung shih-ta hsiieh-pao, 1956 No.4. I have not seen 
this article, and my knowledge of its contents is based
primarily on Lo Erh-kang*s rebuttal of the same.
21..Reproduced first in T'ai-p*ing T'ien-kuo wen-shu, 1935* For 
biographical information on Li Chao-shou, see page 166, n5*
22, See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu .jih-chi, p.1841.
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23• See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-ohi p.378-
24. See Tseng Kuo-fan1s oolophon to the printed edition in Chung 
Wang Li Hsiu-ch1 eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen.
25. Lo Erh-kang1 s case is given in Chien-cheng and in Chung Wang 
tzu-chuan yuan-kao k fao-cheng yti lun k'ao-chu, Peking 1958.
26. See Appendix I page 256 (translated from Lo: Chien-cheng). 
This document is reproduced in Kuo Jo-yu ed.: T1ai-p1ing
T*ien-kuo ke-ming wen-wu t'u lu, hsii-pien, Shanghai 1952 p.49
27. See appendix I page 265, P'ang Chi-yun's colophon.
28. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7, ch.20 p.28b.
29. ibid. pp.28a-29a.
30. ibid. p.27a (Memorial of TC3/6/23).
31. See pages 245 & 252 below. The question of forged additions 
to the deposition is dealt with in Chapter VI.
32. Lo Erh-kang was not aware of Chaloner Alabaster's report,
quoted above, I believe for the first time; this bears out
Lo's argument, not only about the difficult physical conditions 
under which Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote the deposition, but also that 
he did write it.
33. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi, p.386.
34. ibid. pp.374-5•
35* See note 6 to page 143 on Li Hsiu-ch'eng's education.
36. See Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.5 PP*33L-34a
37. See page 221.
38. See Shen Pao-chen's memorial of TC3/IO/I3 (11 November 1864), 
in TPTK II p.861.
39• See Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch*eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen.
40. See page 216 , below.
41. See Tseng Kuo-fan: jih-chi entry for TC3/7/6, page 1848. This 
figure refers to the original manuscript of course, not to the
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copy sent to the Grand Connell.
42. The letter is dated TC3/7/7* see Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-hsiin p.41
43. In Chiang Shih-jung ed.: Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k1 an hsin-kao,
Peking 1959* p.235*
44* See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch *uan-chi, Shu-cha 
ch.28 p.20h.
45. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-ohi, TC3/7/6 p.381.
46. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu .jih-chi TC3/7/6 p. 1848.
47* As stated by Tseng Kuo-fan in the colophon to the printed 
edition, see Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch*eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen.
48. This can he seen from the frontespiece of the Taiwan facsimile, 
Li Hsiu-ch1 eng chfin-kung shou-chi.
49* This includes both * sense' cuts and grammatical cuts. I do
not know why anyone should have wanted to count the deleted
characters at that time, but the figures are near enough to make
one suspect that there is some connection.
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1. The publication of Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s deposition in facsimile, 
reproducing the cuts and changes made by Tseng Kuo-fan
clearly marked in red, which may be checked against the printed 
edition, provide us with a rare example of that bureaucratic 
method of self-defence called $> tk X  %  , the expunging and 
falsification of documents, The term is borrowed from E-tu Zen 
Sun: Ch'ing Administrative Terms p.316 Harvard 1961.
2. In the early part of 1853 > prominent gentry in nine provinces 
were ordered to raise militia. Hooks dating from the Chia
Ch'ing period relating to such matters were reprinted for their 
benefit, see Chien: Ch'uan-shih p.1050.
3. The biography of Chiang Chung-yuan (1812-1854) is given in 
Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.136-7 and that of Lo Tse-nan (1810-
I856 on pp.540-1. Chiang Chung-yuan's 'Ch'u Braves' had fought 
against ithe Taipings in Kwangsi (see note 10 to page 137)> hut the 
idea now was to revive the t 'uan-lien for local control against
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bandits, but did not envisage them fighting against the Taiping 
armies, see Chien: Ch1uan-shih p.1050
4. The Hunan Army had won a notable victory at Hsiang-t'an in 
Hunan on 1 May (HF4/4/5)» see page 2*52, and Appendix I page 257,
and at Yiieh-chou in July the same year.
5. Ch'i Chun-tsao (1793-1866), a Grand Secretary, Grand Councillor 
and Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent, see Hummel: Eminent
Chinese p.125.
6. See Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng: Shu tsai-hsiang yu hsiieh wu chih in 
Yung-an ch*uan-chi, Yung-an hsii-pien ch.2 p.5b (Usually cited .
incorrectly as being from Yung-an pi-chi).
7. See pages 184 ff.
8. Quoted by Fan Wen-1 an: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih I p.!39» 9th 
Edition, Peking 1955*
9. Such as Chang Fei, Imperial Commissioner for Military Affairs 
in Southern Anhwei, Wang Yu-ling, Governor of Chekiang and
Hsiieh Huan, Governor of Kiangsu, see Mou An-shih: T'ai-p 'ing T'ien- 
kuo p.269.
10. See Tseng Kuo-fan's letter to his brother dated HF10/7/12 
quoted by Chiang Hsing-te: Tseng Kuo-fan chih sheng-p'ing
chi shih-yeh, Shanghai 1935 P*63.
11. For the strategic importance of An-ch'ing see note 4 to page 187*
12. Of Su-$hun (I815?-186l) Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.667 says:
'In the last three or four years of his reign Emperor Wen-
tsung turned to sensual pleasures to escape from worry regarding 
the chaotic condition of the empire. Most of the affairs of 
state,idiich previously had been decided by the Emperor in 
conjunction with the Grand Councillors, were now attended to by 
adjutant generals, particularly Tsai-yuan and Tuan-hua. But 
since both had indecisive personalities they often turned to 
Su-shun for advice. In this way Su-shun gradually assumed 
great power.'
13. See page 185*
14. See Hsiieh Fu-ch'eng: Su-shun t'ui-fu Ch'u-hsien in Yung-an 
pi-ohi P-13 (Waa-yu Wen-k'u Edition)
15. See Li Chien-nung: The Political History of China 1840-1928
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(Translated & Edited by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls) Princeton 
1956, pp.88 ff’, gives details of this coup d'etat.
16. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu ch.6 pp.190-1 (Shih-chieh Edition).
17. ibid. ch.7 p.199*
18. This refers to Kuo Tzu-i, the T'ang general who won great 
merit for his part in suppression the rebellion of An Lu-shan
and Shih Ssu-ming.
19. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao, TCl/intercalary 8/12 (15 October 
1862) ch.16 pp 27a/b.
20. Tseng Kuo-fan had done so in his memorial (supplementary p'ien) 
of TC2/4/27, see Tsou-kao ch.18 pp.22a/b
21. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu ch,7 p.209 (Shih-chieh Edition)
22. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.25 p.l6a.
23* See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/4/1 PP*338-*9*
24. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu ch.7 p.213 (Shih-chieh Edition).
25. An analysis of the Tung-hua-lu led Hellmut Wilhelm to the
conclusion that between 1821 and 1895 almost every high
official was punished at least once during his career. Extremely 
severe punishments (execution, banishment, enslavement, corporal 
punishment or imprisonment) were imposed in about 22$> of all 
cases brought to the emperorfs attention, dismissal in 42^, and 
lighter punishments (reprimands, fines, and/or demotion) in the 
remaining cases. Cited by K.A. Wittfogel: Oriental Despotism, Yale 
1957 P.338 n.
26. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha TC3/7/2, ch.24 pp.4b-5a (to Li Hung- 
chang) .
27. See Hung Fu-chen: Deposition in TPTK IX p.856.
28. See page 243*
29. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/5 p.380.
30. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch,20 p.27a.
31. Originally the name of Hung Hsiu-ch' iian' s son was Hung T'ien- 
kuei 0^9;-^ ), later the character# was added. When his
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seal was cut the two characters!^ ('the true sovereign') were 
put below his name, which was consequently misread as £j=L
(Hung Eu-chen), see his deposition, TPTK XI p.855*
32. See page 243*
33* See page 243
34* See Shih-lu ch. 110 passim♦
35* See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.28 p.20b (to Shen Pao-chen).
36. See Wu Hsiang-hsiang: Wan Ch'ing lcung-t'ing shih-chi, Taipei
1957 p.161.
37* See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/4/18 p.350 
38. ibid. TC3/6/23 p.376
39* See Chu Hung-chang: Ts'ung-jung ohi-lueh p.49a in Nien-chu Lu 
ts'ung-k'o, compiled by Hsii Yen-k'uan, 1931*
40. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/23 p.376.
41. ibid. TC6/7/20 p.417*
42. see Chang Ch'i-yun et al.s Ch1ing-shih Vol.8 ch.546 p,6l32 
Taipei 1961.
43- See Wang K'ai-yun: Hsiang-chun chih V p.23a 1886.
44. Tso Tsung-t'ang quoted by Lo Erh-kang: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
k'u-.jou-huan-ping chi k'ao in Li-shih yen-ohiu 1964 No,4 p.47
45* See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC4/4/14 p.348.
46. ibid. TC3/6/23 p.376.
47* See Appendix I page 264«
48. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 pp.28b-29a.
49* ibid. TC3/7/7 pp.28b-29a.
50. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/6/17 p.371*
51. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7 ch.20 p.29a.
Notes to Chapters XV & V.
52. See Shih-lu ch.110 pp.l6b-17a.
53* See Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k1 an hsin-kao p.238 
54. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/5 P*380 
55- ibid. p.586 (TCJ/7/21).
HOTES TO CHAPTEH 7.
1. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu .jih-chi p. 1839
2. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 pp,27a-b.
3. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu .jih-chi p. 1840
4. See Tseng Wen Cheng Kung ch'iian-chi: Chia-hsun (Shih Chieh 
Edition) 1948 p.41
5. Tseng Kuo-fan in his letter to Li Hung-chang of TC3/7/2 (3
August) wrote that 'As soon as the depositions [of Li Hsiu-
ch1 eng and Hung Jen-ta] have been taken they will be executed.1 
See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.24 p.4a/b.
6. See Chao Lieh-\tfen: Jih-chi TC3/7/2 p.378.
7. ibid. TC3/7/4 p.379*
8. ibid. TC3/7/6 p.381. What Chao Lieh-wen wrote was: 1
9. Ling Shan-ch'ing: T' ai-p 'ing T' ien-kuo yeh-shih, Shanghai 1936 
ch.13 p.19 relates a different version of Li Hsiu-ch*eng's
death: Tseng Kuo-fan invited Li Hsiu-ch'eng to a banquet and after­
wards said with a sigh, 'This is to bid you farewell.' Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng replied, 'How should I dare disobey?' then went into a 
neighbouring room and cut his throat. This fanciful version is 
repeated by Chiang Hsing-te: Tseng Kuo-fan chih sheng-p'ing chi 
ch'i shih-yeh (p.88) and probably elsewhere.
10.See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC3/7/6 p.381
11. Li Hung-chang writing to Tseng Kuo-fan on TC3/7/6 said,'[if] 
the edict orders the two rebel chiefs to be sent to the 
capital and they are not already executed they will just have to 
be sent.* See Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.5 p.286.
Notes to Chapter V*
12. See Tao-k*ou yti-sheng (pseud.): Pei-lu chi-lueh in T*ai-
P*ing T*ien-kuo tzu-liao p.213 (Edited by:Chung-kuo K*e-hsiieh- 
yuan li-shih yen-chiu-so ti-san so, Peking 1949* Tseng Kuo- 
fan cited the case of Ch*en Yu-ch*eng as a precedent for not 
sending Li Hsiu-ch*eng to Peking, but I doubt whether he had this 
incident in mind.
15. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao TC3/7/7 ch.20 p.28b.
14. It is curious that both Seng-ko-lin-chfin and Tseng Kuo- 
fan appear to underestimate the court, the former its
competence to 1 defend the honour of the State* and the latter 
its resistance to 1 sweet words*.
15. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC5/6/20 p.373*
16. On the other hand it is difficult to believe that a possibility 
which had occurred to bthers did not cross Tseng Kuo-fan*s
own mind; he was, after all, a keen student of history. It was 
openly said, at least among foreigners in China at the time, that 
he could have made himself emperor if he had wished. (See for 
instance A.E. Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion. London 1891, 
p.463). Lo Erh-kang quotes an interesting story by Tseng Kuo-fanfs 
own daughter to the effect that when a new house was being built 
for the Tseng family in Hsiang-hsiang at the end of the Hsien Feng 
period, a commemorative couplet was attached to the new beam of 
the roof which read *i^ * - *[The rank of]
Governor General of Liang-chiang is really not enough; he should 
go to Nanking and make himself Emperor. * See Lo Erh-kang: Chien- 
cheng Jxd. Edition p. 33*
17* This appears to be somewhat suspicious on the surface,
especially as the content of the imperial edict was known in 
Nanking on 9 August (TC3/7/8). But it seems that this is in fact 
what happened. Tseng Kuo-fan told several other people that 
the edict had not arrived, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.24 p*5a; 
Chao Lieh-wen also mentions this (see Jih-ohi p.381), and confirms 
the fact that the edict did not arrive until 11 August (ibid.p.382), 
as does Tseng Kuo-fan*s letter to Fan Yun-chi (Shu-cha ch.24 p.5b). 
News of the imperial honours for the victors at Nanking and of the 
order to send Li Hsiu-ch*eng and Hung Jen-ta to Peking reached 
Nanking on 9 August through the Tartar General Fu-ming-ah - this 
is confirmed by Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.381 and Tseng Kuo-fan 
wei-k*an hsin-kao p.235*
18. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.378* The edict referred to is in 
Shih-lu ch,107 p.35a.
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19. Tseng Kuo-fan later told the court that according to his 
calculations the edict should have arrived on 7 August,
see Tsou-kao ch.21 p.3a*
20. ibid. ch.20 p.28b.
21. See Chao Lieh-wen; Jih-chi TC3/6/20 p. 315•
22. See Appendix I, page 262.
23. See page 192.
24. See page 176.
25. See page 186. This question is discussed on page 31*
26. See pages 248-251.
27. See page 251*
28. See Lo: Chien-cheng pp.34-55•
29. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.381. Chao added that at the 
execution ground Li Hsiu-ch1 eng wrote a short poem in which he
stated that he had been loyal to the end ^ jL ). For a
long time I was convinced that this poem, which no longer exists, 
expressed Lifs new loyalty, to the Ch*ing Dynasty or to Tseng Kuo- 
fan, on the grounds that if he had expressed loyalty to the 
Taipings, Chao would probably have said so. But in thinking again 
about Li Hsiu-chf eng * s conception • ' of loyalty I came to the 
conclusion that he meant this in the past tense, *1 was loyal to 
the end [of my Sovereigns life].' There is a statement to this 
effect in the deposition, see page 246.
30. Tseng Kuo-fan however, reported to the throne that Li Hsiu- 
ch1 eng had been executed by slicing, see Tsou-kao bh,20 p~.28b.
31. ibid.
32. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch.24 pp.4a, 4h.
33* See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 pp.3a, 3^ .
34. ibid. p.22a
35* Tso Tsung-tfangfs answer to Tseng Kuo-fan*s letter, if any, 
is not known; but he wrote in a memorial on TC3/9/15 that
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Li Hsiu-ch*eng was obviously just trying to protect the Taiping 
remnants, see Tso Wen Hsiang kung tsou-kao ch. 10 p.56b.
36. See page 227*
37. See Li Hung-chang: P leng-liao han-kao ch.5 p.28b.
38. Government policy was reiterated in an edict of TCl/12/1 (19 
January I863) which is reproduced in translation as an
Inclosure to No.25, Mr. Bruce to Earl Russell, January 26,1863,
B.P.P. China. No.3, Papers relating to the Affairs of China, pp.46,
47.
"While, on the one hand, ever since the war in the provinces 
began, orders have been issued to the military to go forth 
and extinguish utterly the cause of that terrible disorder, the 
venomous influence of which was inflicting cruel suffering 
upon the people; upon the other, with equal frequency have 
Decrees from the Throne enjoined upon the Generals conducting 
the different campaigns the duty of greatly compassionating 
those who, constrained by the rebels to join them against the 
Government, had been thrust upon the spears of the army in the 
capacity forced upon them of counterfeit (sc.,rebel) officials; 
and they, the Generals, have been instructed that if any would 
bring over a number of their fellows to their allegiance, they 
should be allowed to reform themselves (unharmed).
"And accordingly, whenever a report has been forwarded from 
any of the armies in the field that certain from among the 
rebels have rescued themselves and have returned to their 
allegiance, we have in all instances forgiven them the past, and 
have oonsidered how best to place them in comfort (or,security); 
nor has any one who, when our forces appeared before it, 
surrendered a city, or who, after returning to his allegiance 
has done us service by destroying the enemy, been left without a 
liberal reward immediately bestowed.
"So it was with Hung Sung-hai [T'ung Jung-hai] and those who 
with,him. brought over, at a moment*s notice, a large number of 
followers, and surrendered a city. Their past offence was 
forgiven them, their merit was recorded, they were liberally 
recompensed. Thus wa,s our graciousness made manifest; nor can 
there be any of our people, even of those who are still in the 
hands of the rebels, who have not seen this and heard it.
"It is but too possible at the same time that our officers 
and troops do not second as they should the goodly purpose of 
the Emperor, whose desire it is that man should live, and that 
when those who are in extremity would present themselves to 
tender their submission, they in some cases notwithstanding meet 
with a violent death.
"Tseng Kwo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-tang, are at the
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head of large forces to destroy the rebels in the Kiang Provinces 
and Cheh-kiang; the terror of their arms fills the rebels with 
consternation. Those in Nanking are in extreme difficulty, and 
very shortly when the troops shall have invested the city on 
all sides, it will fall without further trouble.
"Now, inasmuch as there are in that city, fallen as it were 
between fire and water, a number (it is to be feared no few) of 
our subjects, who though serving the rebels with no good will, 
but forced by them to act, may yet be unable to rescue them­
selves from them, let Tseng Kwo-fan and his colleagues declare 
by proclamation that if anyone now constrained to grow his hair 
and take part in repelling the force engaged in the siege of 
Nanking shall faithfully return before the city fall, to his 
allegiance, his submission shall be accepted, whether he have 
been a long time or only recently on the side of the rebels, and
when he shall have given up his arms and horse, these high
officers shall consider whether he is to remain and serve under 
them against the rebels, following in every respect the 
precedent of Hung Tsung-hai [T'ung Jung-hai]; or if he prefer 
not to serve with the army, the local authorities shall be 
desired to send him to his own district, or otherwise to provide 
for him so that he shall not be without a home. Nor are the 
troops to be allowed to despoil him of any property he may 
bring with him. If they plunder him, or murder him, they shall
be dealt with at once as the military code requires; and if
their misdeeds by not noticed and punished by those commanding 
them, the moment their remissness is discovered we will 
command the Generals their superiors to denounce them, and 
punish them with all possible severity.
"And if in any other quarter in Kiang-su or Cheh-kiang, at 
Soo-chow or Hang-chow, whether in town or country, there be any 
who shall kill a rebel and return to his allegiance, or who 
shall submit himself with his head duly shaven; we command that 
the same course be followed in his case, that his past be not 
inquired into, that he be not wantonly put to death, lest the 
earnest desire to return within the pale of civilization by 
thereby let and hindered.
"When this proclamation, which once more affectionately 
appeals to the people, shall have appeared, it will behove all 
those now constrained to adhere to the rebels to see their error, 
and themselves to find out a means by which their lives may be 
preserved. Let them not tarry till the city is stormed, when the 
gem and the pebble [will be] burned in the same conflagration, 
repentance will be too late.
"Let Tseng Kwo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Tso Tsung-tang print 
this Decree upon yellow paper, and post in every direction, that 
men may know how great is our desire that the living may be over­
shadowed as with a canopy (by our goodness), and that all may be 
allowed to live a new life. Respect thisJ"
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39* See Wakeman: Strangers at the Gate,Chapter XV.
40. See Hu Wen Chung Kung i-chi; Eu-ngo shu-tu, ch.67 p.26a.
41. See Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.508.
42. Hu Lin-i quoted in Tai I: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih kao, Peking 
1958 p.353.
43. See Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion, Seattle 1954 PP*93-5
44. See Hail: Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion p.267n.
45* See Chien: Ch*uan-shih p.1889.
46. ibid. p.1053*
47* See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-ohi HFll/8/13 p.201.
48. See Chu Hung-chang: Ts*ung-chun .jih-chi pp.27b-28a.
49. Pao Ch*ao probably regretted this later; his army mutinied 
on 30 April 1865 (TC4/4/6), see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.399
and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.22 p.lla/b.
50. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha ch. 18 p.l
51. Ts'ai Shou-ch*i, a i^ ould-be impeacher of Tseng Kuo-fan found 
himself impeached, see Shih-lu ch.137 PP*13>18-19•
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1. See Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch*eng tzu-shu chiao-pu-pen p.59a
2. Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-ohi TC3/7/7 p.381 and TC3/7/10 p.382.
3. They were almost certainly omitted from the copy sent to the 
Grand Council as well, since there is only a discrepancy of
192 characters between this version and the An-ch*ing printed 
edition, see page 24
4. It is not immediately clear what Tseng Kuo-fan meant by these 
markings, which do not conform to his usual practice in
cancelling deletions. Cut were usually made by bracketting or
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circling the portion to be .deleted; if Tseng Kuo-fan wanted to 
cancel such a deletion (which frequently happened), he either 
put a mark ( & ) next to each character, or at the beginning 
and end of the deletion, as on pages 48 and 63 for instance.
But on the pages in question there is the b mark at the top 
of each line and a stroke through the brackets at the bottom 
of each line. In other circumstances there wopld be no doubt 
that Tseng Kuo-fan meant these deletions to be cancelled, but 
the fact that the two pages were then entirely suppressed is 
puzzling.
5* Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.22a.
6. See Appendix I page 260.
7. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.6 pp.l4a-17b (TC3/2/20),
8. See note 3 to p.248.
9. This falsification', not being visible on the manuscript itself, 
was entirely overlooked by Lii Chi-i.
10. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 p.27a.
11. ibid. p.28a
12. See page 240 and note 3*
13. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 p.27a.
14. Compare this with Chao Lieh-wen's estimate that not many 
were killed, quoted on page 48.
15. See Appendix I page 264*
16. Li Hsiu-ch*eng believed that he had listed ten 'failures'; 
in fact there are eleven, since two are marked *6*.
17* This point was made in conversation by Mr. Wang Erh-min.
18. Though punctuated by Tseng Kuo-fan, this section, like the 
'ten requests' was omitted from the Grand Council copy and
from the printed edition. Tseng Kuo-fan later had it copied 
and sent to the Grand Council.
19. Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.3a.
20. ibid. p.22a. We do not know what these 'other remarks' were,
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since this document has not yet come to light in the archives, though 
perhaps refers to pp.253-255•
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.
1. A.F.Lindley quotes a proclamation by the Chung Wang posted 
on a Roman Catholic church near Shanghai, ordering that
'not the minutest particle of foreign property is to be injured,1 
on pain of decapitation; the foreigners themselves were to be 
'regarded as brethren;1 see Lin-Le: Ti-ping Tien-kwoh p.299
2. J.H.Teesdale: Lin Sin Cheng [sic], the Chung Wang or 'Faithful 
Prince' (The Faithful and Devoted of a Myriad Years), An
Episode in the Taiping Rebellion, in the Journal of the North China 
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society Vol.LVII, 1926 pp.92-109
3* Quoted by Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng, Jxd Edition, p.34.
4* He did not publish his detailed study until the authenticity 
of the deposition had been questioned by Nien Tzu-min and 
others, see page30*
5. Such as Ling Shan-ch'ing: T' ai-p1 ing T1 ien-kuo yeh-shih,
Shanghai 193^*
6. Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng, 3^ cL Edition p.30
7. See Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu chiao-pu pen, p.l
8. Liang Hu-lu: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng tzu-shu shou-kao,
Peking 1958> preface, p.3
9. The contrary view is put forward in an article by Stephen 
Hhalley, Jr.: The Controversy over Li Hsiu-ch'eng, an Ill-
timed Centenary, in the Journal of Asian Studies Vo. XXV,
February 1966, pp.305-317, see note 33, below.
10. See Li-shih Yen-chiu, 1963 No.4, pp.27-42.
11. This was done by Chang Hsia in an article in Li-shih Yen-chiu 
1964 No.5/6 pp.35-42.
12. See Mao Tse-tung: Selected Works Vol.Ill p.76, London 1954.
13. See note 9 *to page 209.
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14. See page® 225, 239.
15. See Li-shih Yen-chiu, 1964 No,4 pp. 19-80.
16. Lo Erh-kang explained that in using this term he was thinking 
of the captured warriors of old, who would inflict injuries
upon themselves in order to prove their loyalty to their new
masters.
17* See Lo: Chien-cheng plate V,i-ii.
18. See note 1 to page 229-
19. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.11 p.14b (HF10/5/3).
20. This proclamation is reproduced in T1ai-pfing Tfien-kuo wen-shu, 
which I have not seen.
21. Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC2/3/25 p.268 and Tseng Kuo-fan:
Tsou-kao ch.18 p*15b (TC2/3/27).
22. See note 2 to page 232.
23. See Appendix I p. 262.
24. The preface to a Taiping publication, now lost, entitled
Chung Wang hui-i chi-lueh, contained such words, written by
Li Hsiu-ch*eng, according to Hsu Yao-kuang: T'an Che ch.3 in
TPTK VI p.594.
25. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.375, see Appendix II p. 268.
26. According to A.F.Lindley, see Lin-Le: Ti-Bing Tien-kwoh p.770
27. Li Kuo-huai's story appeared in his article, T*ai-p'ing T'ien- 
Kuo Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch'eng kung-tz'u ping pa, published
in the periodical Hsueh Feng VII.5.
28. According to Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s answer in interrogation, see 
Appendix I p. 264*
29. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.372 (TC3/6/I9).
30. This was not known in Nanking until after Li Hsiu-ch*eng's 
death.
31. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-ohi p.375*
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32. An index, published in Shih-hsiiehyueh-k'an 1964 No. 11 
pp.43-44, lists 70 such articles. *
33. A useful, though incomplete survey of the discussion is given 
by Stephen Bhalley Jr.: The Controversy over Li Hsiu-ch'eng
(j.A.S.vol.XXV). But this article is somewhat tendentious and 
misleading. It is true that the discussion was not a purely 
historical one; it took place in the context of a much wider 
discussion on the 'correct' attitude to history as the record 
of class-struggle, and on other philosophical questions. But it 
was not a purely political discussion either, although a number 
of articles were exceedingly didactic and sometimes puerile. I 
know of no grounds for assuming, as the author does, that one or 
other of the articles represented 'the Party line.1
34. See, for instance, the second article by Chi Pen-yii; Tsen-yang 
tui-tai Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti t'ou-hsiang pien-chieh hsing-wei in
Li-shih Yen-chiu, 1964 No.4 pp. 1-18 and T'ien Yu-ch'ing: Kuan-yii 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 9 
September 1964*
. 35* See, for instance, Ts'ai Shang-ssu: Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti keng-pen 
wen-t'i ho yen-chiu fang-fa-ti keng-pen wen-t'i, loc.cit.
1 September 1964; T'ang Ts'an-lcung and K'ung Kung-hsun: Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng shih T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ke-ming-ti p'an-t'u,'loc.cit.
17 September 1964; Peng Yuan-lc'uei, Li Mao-kao & Shen Wei-pin:
Lun "Pang kuei-fan wei hsien," in Li-shih Yen-chiu, 1965 No.5 
PP*47-52.
36. See, for instance, Mou An-shih: Kuan-yii Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti p'ing 
chia wen-t'i in Jen-min Jih-pao, 10 September 1964.
37. ibid.
38. See Li Yen-chii: Chung Wang pu chung in Kuang-ming Jih-pao,
8 August 1964.
39* See, for instance, Su Shu: Li Hsiu-ch'eng shih wei-hsiang huan 
shih t'ou-hsiang?, loc.cit., 2 August 1964.
40. See Chu Chung-yii: Ying-hsiung i shih, hu-t'u i shih,-loc.cit.
8 August 1964.
41. See Pan Shu-i & Lii I-tsu: Li Hsiu-ch'eng-ti p'ing-chia wen-t'i 
in Jen-min Jih-pao, 3 August 1964.
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1. Hung Jen-kan is said to have commented upon Li Hsiu-ch* eng *s
deposition, but his remarks have not survived; see Shen Pao-
chen's memorial of TC3/10/13 in TPTK II p.861
2. Perhaps this also has something to do with the absence of a
tradition of military history, as opposed to military literature,
in China.
3. See Chao Lieh-wen; Jih-chi p.351
4. Prom "Memo, (by Major Gordon, R.E.) on the Events Occurring 
Between the 29th November and 7th December, I863." Published
in the 'Friend of China,' Saturday, 12th December, I863, quoted 
in Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.716.
5. Prom a manuscript now in the British Museum.
6. The great scarcity of references to this document in contemporary 
Chinese sources indicates that it was not widely known, and
can hardly have been very influential.
7. The Taiping Bible was reprinted from the Chinese translation 
of the Bible by the Pomeranian missionary Karl Friedrich August
Gtttzlaff (1803-51).
8. Reprinted in TPTK II pp.728-730.
9. See Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion p. 118.
10. See pages 160 & 178, and TPTK II pp.741-2.
11. See Ts'ang-lang tiao-t'u: Chieh-yu hui-lu p. 160.
12. Samuel B. Griffith: Sun Tzu: The Art of War, Oxford 1963 p.77.
13. See Chien Yu-wen: T'ai-p'ing T' ien-kuo t'ien-cheng k'ao in the 
Journal of Oriental Studies, 1954 Vol.I p.47, quoting Shen Tzu:
Pi-k'ou jih-chi, showing that landowners were at least not excluded 
from a general invitation to return which the Taipings announced 
to all who had fled.
14. Except for the visit of the British interpreter, Chaloner 
Alabaster, whose report is quoted above, page 20 .
15. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p. 372 and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao
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ch.20 p.28b.
16. See Hung Fu-chen: Deposition in TPTK II p.856.
17. ibid. 'Mr. T'ang* had unwittingly befriended the fugitive boy.
18. See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition, in TPTK II p.847* This point 
was made in an article by Su Shu: Li Hsiu-ch'eng shih wei-
hsiang huan shih t'ou-hsiang, in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 2 August
1964.
19. See Chi' Tun-yu: Pu-neng t*i Li Haiu-oh'eng ti t'ou-hsiang 
pien-ohieh hsing-wei pien-hu, in Shih-hsueh Yueh-k'an, 1964
No.10 pp.8-10.
20. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.21 p.3b.
21. ibid. ch.20 p.28b.
22. See Chi Pen-yu: Tsen-yang tui-tai Li Hsiu-ch'eng t'ou-hsiang 
pien-chieh hsing-wei, in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1964 No.4 pp. 1-18
23. See, for instance, Huang Hung-shou: Ch'ing-shih chi-shih pen-mo 
ch.51 p*9a (Taiwan Reprint of 1959)*
24* See also the first page of the deposition (page 130).
25. This judgement is based on a general impression of the depos­
ition as a whole; but one might point to the frequent occurr­
ence of non sequitur, especially in passages dealing with abstract 
ideas, as a sign of the lack of literary training and discipline 
of its author.
26. A. P. Lindley, who was admittedly a great admirer of Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng, and dedicated his book to him, wrote:
I had ample opportunity to notice the exceeding popularity 
of the Chung Wang amongst the country people, for every­
where we passed they turned out to welcome his arrival, 
and all I questioned declared him to be a good and just 
man, who respected and protected the rights of the 
meanest peasant of the land. Many of the Tipping chiefs 
were popular with the civilians, some were disliked, all 
were considered better than the Manchoo, but none were so 
beloved as the Chung Wang.
Lin-Le: Ti-ping Tien-Kwoh p.496.
27. See for instance: Hua I-lun: Hsi Chin t'uan-lien shih-mo shu,
in Tzu-liao pp,123,127; Ts1ang-lang tiao-t!u (pseud.): Chieh-yu 
hui-lu p.150; Anon: ICen& Shen pi-nan .1 ih-chi, in Chien-ohi IV 
p. 4-85; Chao Li eh-wen: Jih-chi p. 217-8, and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao 
oh.21 p.5a.
28. See Shih Ta-k* ai1 s letter to the Brigade-general Tfang Yu- 
keng, in TPTK II pp.759-760, his deposition (iMd,pp.780-2), 
and Lo Ping-changfs memorial (pp.782-6),
29* A point made in conversation by Mr. Su Cheng.
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NOTES TO THE DEPOSITION 
(Numbered by the page)
Notes to Page 1^0,
1. For read
2. For 17 read f &  . The courtesy title of the governor of a 
province. Throughout the deposition this refers to Tseng Kuo-
ch*uan, who was at the time Governor of Chekiang.
3. ^ ^  in the original, the courtesy title of a Grand Secretary, 
in this case, Tseng Kuo-fan, who was given the title in 1862.
4. Tseng Kuo-fan arrived at Nanking from An-ch'ing on 28 July 1864 
(TC3/6/25), and in the evening briefly interrogated Li Hsiu-
ch'eng, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu jih-chi Vol.Ill p.1840
5. For 'S read ^  , for &  read .
6. Such a publication has not yet come to light. It is known 
however, that a Taiping decree Bureau1 (i% existed
before the Taipings established their capital at Nanking, see 
Chang Te-chien et.al.: Tsei-chfing hui-tsuan (hereafter abbreviated 
as TCHT), 1855> reproduced in TPTK III pp.25-348. Other references 
exist to *decrees* of the kind mentioned by Li Hsiu-ch*eng, see 
Chang Hsiu-min et al.: T*ai-p*ing T*ien-kuo tzu-liao mu-lu p.64 
and Lo Erh-kang: k*ao-shih chi pp.83-86. The only document of 
this nature which survives the T*ai-pfing T*ien-,iiht which 
is reproduced in Tai-p*ing T*ien-kuo yin-shu, edited by the Nanking 
T*ai-p*ing T*ien-kuo Historical Museum, Shanghai 1961 1.1; the 
original is in the Cambridge University Library.
7. For biographical details of these two men, see Lo Erh-kang:
T1ai-p1ing T*ien-kuo shih-kao (Revised Edition) Peking 1957,
pp.390-9 *
8. The main source of biographical information on Hung Hsiu-ch*uan 
and his family is Theodore Hamberg: The Visions of Hung Hsiu-
ch*uan and Origin of the Kwang-si Insurrection, Hong Kong 1854, 
which is based on verbal and written information given to Hamberg 
by Hung*s cousin, Hung Jen-kan. Chien: Chluan-shih Vol.I draws on 
this work and supplements it with details of Hung*s family history 
which he learned from local people during a visit to Hua-hsien in 1942.
Notes to sage 150.
9. This does not agree with Hambergfs account, which is that all 
three children were bom of the first wife, see Hamberg p. 2.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng probably assumed that^*^f %■ &  (the Huler!s mother Li), 
as she was known in the Taiping capital, was his real mother, 
see Chien: Gh1uan-shih I p.14*
10. This sentence is interlinear and contains an illegible mark 
after father1.
11. The date of Hung Hsiu-ch*iian*s birth is Chia Ch*ing 18/12/10 
(l January 1814), see Chien: Ch*uan-shih I pp.1-5*
12. Irlii^in the original. These meetings were not only used
for religious indoctrination, but seem to have been the Taipings1 
principal method of communicating with the people. They probably 
played an important role in early Taiping successes. Unfortunately 
such records as exist of what was said at the preachings1 are very 
brief and generally hostile, "...they build a high stage and 
exhort the people to unite and win the empire. This they call 
fchiang tao-li. * Each time, they urge their people not to think 
of their homes, that life and death are governed by fate, that 
wealth or poverty is^decided by Heaven, that bitterness oomes 
before sweetness and sorrow before joy, and so on.11 See Yu I-*ao: 
Chien-wen-lu in Ghien-chi II p.128.
A.F.Lindley gives the following account: "Once during each
month, the whole of the people are assembled - soldiers, civilians, 
men, women and children, in some prominent locality under the 
canopy of heaven; a platform is erected, and their chief Wang or 
governor preaches to them, and gives a general lecture upon the 
subject of all orders, military, civil, and social administration. 
This mass meeting is also practised previous to any grand or 
important movement taking place." See Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh 
p.522.
The authors of TCHT, in a much more hostile judgement, record 
that such preachings* took place before public executions, 
conscription drives, before selecting beautiful women, before 
sending rebels on particularly difficult assignments and so on.
See TCHT ch.$ pp.226-228.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng1 s letter to Lu Te-shun [sic - his name was in 
fact Lu Shun-te], written before the attack on Shanghai in I860, 
ordered him to select a place which could hold ’several myriad 
people* and conduct a meeting there. See Shih-liao p.164*
15. According to Hamberg, p. 5 , Hung Hsiu-ch*iian attended the 
village school from 1819 to 1828, after which his help was 
needed at home.
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14* For biographical details on Feng Yun-shan see note 11 to p.132.
Notes to page 131*
1. Hung Hsiu-chfuan*s illness was brought on by his third failure 
in the examinations at Canton. The first attempt was in 1828
(TIC 8) after he had passed the hsien examination; the second was 
in I836 (TIC 16). After the third failure in 1837> he fell ill 
and had to be carried back to Hua-hsien in a litter, see Hamberg,
p. 9.
Although Li Hsiu-ch1 eng wrote that the illness lasted seven 
days, the usual Taiping version is forty days; see Hamberg, p. 
Tfai-pTing Tfien-.jiht p.la; Hung Jen-kan: Hung Hsiu-ch*uan lai-li 
(1852), reprinted in TPTK II p.689ff (the original is in the 
British Museum); Wang chang-tz *u-hsiung ch1 in-mu ch1 in-erh kung- 
fu-yin in Yin-shu II. 16, which is the account written by Hung 
hsiu-ch*uan*s brothers, and Ying-chieh kuei-chen (1861) in Yin- 
shu 11.19. A psychiatrists opinion, based on the historical 
sources, is given by P.M.Yap: The Mental Illness of Hpng Hsiu- 
ch *uan (Far Eastern Quarterly XIII, 1954). Morefruitful however, 
would be a comparison with similar hallucinations amongst religious 
leaders of popular revolt, described for instance in Vittorio 
Lantemari: Les mouvements religieu& des peuples opprimes, Paris 
1962.
The illness of Hung Hsiu-ch1 ilan became part of Taiping mythology. 
He found an explanation for his dreams when, in 1843» his cousin 
drew his attention to a collection of Christian tracts in Chinese, 
which Hung had acquired, though not read, six or seven years 
earlier. See E.P.Boardman: Christian Influence upon the Ideology 
of the Taiping Rebellion, 1851-1864, Madison 1953- 1Forty days
in the wilderness* may have been what led to the legend of Hung 
Hsiu-ch * uan * s forty-day illness.
2. The characters for 'Cod* are elevated four places, according to 
the Taiping custom.
3. The last character of the first page of the facsimile is missing, 
the Chiu Ju T*ang Edition gives .
4. Hung Hsiu-ch1 tian was bom in Fu-yuan-shui, Hua-hsien, Kwangtung; 
but his family soon moved to ICuan-lu-pu, about 60 li southwest
of Hua-hsien and about 100 li north of Canton, see Chien Yu-wen:
T1 ai-p*ing-chun Kwang-hsi shou-i shih, Chungking 1944 p.57. The 
population of K^an-lu-pu was about 400 in Hung Hsiu-ch* uan *s time. 
Hung Hsiu-ch*tian and Feng Yun-shan*s family tombs were destroyed 
at the order of the court in the winter of 1851, see Ting Shou-
Notes to Page 131
ts'un: Ts'ung-chun jih-chi (HFl/lO/13) in Chien-chi II p.297*
The village school and part of the village itself was razed in 
1854, see Chien: Ch1uan-shih p.14.
5# For 9]| read .
6. Li Hsiu-ch'eng undoubtedly meant that these places are a great 
distance from Hua-hsien in Kwangtung, not that they are a great
distance apart. There is no evidence that Hung Hsiu-ch*uan went 
to all these places himself, preaching the faith. According to 
his own account in the T'ai-p*ing Tf ien-.jih (pp,22a-36a), he did 
not leave home until 2 April 1844 (TK24/2/15), accompanied by Feng 
Yun-shan. After travelling widely in Kwangtung, they went to 
Tz'u-ku-ts'un in Kuei-hsien (Kwangsi), only passing through T'eng- 
hsien on the v/ay. Hung Hsiu-ch'tian went home to Hua-hsien in 
November, leaving Feng Yun-shan in Hsun-chou-hsien, and remained at 
home until March 1847> when he spent several months at Canton, 
receiving instruction from the American missionary Roberts. In 
July, Hung Hsiu-ch*tian went back to Kwangsi, again passing through 
T*eng-hsien, and was re-united with Feng in August. In October 
they went to Hsiang-chou, where they destroyed a temple. Thus, 
of the places listed by Li Hsiu-ch*eng, Hung himself only records 
having visited Hsun-chou, Hsiang-chou and T'eng-hsien. If all 
the other places *knew about Hung hsien-sheng* (p. 133), it was 
because of the missionary activity of Feng Yun-shan and the others.
7. He is usually known as Ch*in Jih-kang. After Wei Ch * ang-hui 
was given the title Pei Vang, the last character of Ch'in's
name was changed to 'lcang* T S  ) to avoid % , which was taboo.
The title 1 wang' - king or prince - was not given to these 
men until December 1851 (see note 5 to page 138). ' Ch * eng-hsiang1 
M  ) might be translated 1 secretary of state *. There were 24 
ch*eng-hsiang, the title being prefixed by one of the characters 
» ijL 9 and further divided into ranks of ,
%'J > ’ *%>']• ^ee Lo: Shih-kao p.196.
8. In his deposition Shih Ta-k'ai stated that the seven original
leaders had 'elected' (*#& ) Hung Hsiu-ch'tian as their leader,
see TPTK II. p.780. This deposition however, unlike that of Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng, was merely the record of his interrogation and was 
not written by Shih Ta-k'ai himself; too much weight should not 
be attached to precise wording.
9. Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written here - a Kwangsi dialect 
expression; Tseng Kuo-fan changed it t o j ^ ^ . * •
Notes to page 132
Notes to Page 132>
1, The T'ien-oh'ing tao-li-shu p.9t> in Yin-shu 11.12 gives the 
Tung Wang (Eastern King)'s home as P*ing-tsai-shan (-? &  iU ); 
in fact the place is called P'eng-ai-shan (®| ), according
to T1ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch1i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao (Report of Field 
Investigations into the Taiping Uprising), compiled by an invest­
igation team. Peking 1956* P«58. Most of the inhabitants of this 
place made a living by charcoal burning. Yang Hsiu-chf ing seems 
to have been something like a local boss, see Chien: Ch1uan-shih
1. p.135* based on Kuei-pfing hsien-chih. He was related by 
marriage both to Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, who acted as his lieutenant, 
and to the Tseng family of P'eng-ai-shan, with whom Peng Yun-shan 
lodged in 1846. It is probable that he was£,a convert of Peng's. 
Before the rising he had already organized an armed band which 
beat up tax-collectors. Local tradition says that when they 
moved about the hills at night, each man in the band carried four 
lanterns, giving an impression of great numbers, see T1ai-p * ing 
T'ien-kuo oh'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao p. 39* According to TCHT p.45* 
he was virtually illiterate.
2. % in the original. This might also mean 'he had no
military skill.'
3. Nor could his opponents. "The rebel chief Yang Hsiu-ch*ing 
obtained zodiacal battle plans for the art of war by consulting
a spirit..." see Chou Chen-chun: Pen-shih tsa-ohi in Chien-chi II 
p.17.
4. He later moved to P'eng-ai-shan, not far from where Yang Hsiu- 
ch* ing lived, see T*ai-p*ing T*ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch*a pao-kao
p.38. He came from a poor peasant family and, like Yang Hsiu-ch*ing, 
was a convert of Peng Yun-shan. He owed his high position in the 
early Taiping hierarchy to his claim, made at a time when Peng Yun- 
shan was in prison, to speak with the voice of Jesus. Yang Hsiu- 
ch* ing claimed at the same time to speak with the voice of God, 
see Lo: Shih-kao pp.288-9 & p.281.
5. Peng Yun-shan came from Ho-lo-ts'un (A* ) according to a
secret investigator*s report taken from Canton in 1858 and now
in the Public Record Office (P.O.682/68/4). This village was very 
near to Hung Hsiu-ch1uan*s home. Prom the beginning Peng Yun-shan 
was Hung Hsiu-ch*iian*s righ-hang man; but his early death, the 
subsequent domination of Yang Hsiu-ch*ing, and the virtual 
deification of Hung himself, have tended to overshadow the importance 
of his role in the early years of the Taipings. It was he who 
founded the God-worshippers' Association, while Hung Hsiu-ch'uan
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was at home in Hua-hsien, see Hamberg, p.28 . The authors of
the TCHT state that 'all the rebel doctrinal rules and military 
regulations' were his work, see TPTK III p. 47* The Taiping 
calendar is said to have been worked out by him while in prison 
in 1848, see Pan-hsing li-shu in TPTK I. p.205.
6. Wei Ch'ang-hui, the Pei Wang or Northern King, was formerly
known as Wei Cheng or Wei Chih-cheng. He was of Chuang minority 
origin, see Chien: Ch'uan-shih I p.138. There are differing reports 
as to the wealth of his family, see Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng p.140, 
T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao pp.40-41* and TCHT 
p.47• The T'ien-ch1ing tao-li-shu (in Yin-shu 11.12), probably 
the most authoritative source, confirms that he came from a wealthy 
family.
The Hsdn-chou hsien-chih, (cited by Lo in Chien-cheng, p.140) 
records basically the same story as that reported to Lo Erh-kang, 
Chien Yu-wen and members of the investigation team by local people. 
Wei Ch'ang-hui,according to them, had wealth but not honour, and 
so bought for his father the degree of chien-sheng (Student of the 
Imperial Academy), not for himself, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng states. On 
his father's birthday, We put up outside his house what the local 
gentry considered was a presumptuous tablet commemorating the 
event. This was defaced during the night, and members of the Wei 
family were later subjected to insults if not to injury. Wei 
Ch'ang-hui appealed to Peng Yun-shan, and the God-worshippers 
helped him to revenge himself by pillaging the offending gentry.
This bring us to the question of Wei Ch'ang-hui's occupation. 
Chien Yu-wen suggests that one of the reasons why Wei wanted to 
buy a degree for his father was because he was anxious to blot 
out the stigma of having been a yamen employee. Local tradition, 
according to Chien: Ch'uan-shih p.176, has it that Wei had been 
a yamen clerk who went round the villages collecting taxes. Prom 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng's wording it is not clear what Wei's relations 
with the yamen were; he merely says &  % JL x  ^  fa $$ ^  , which I 
have translated, 'he was in and out of the yamen on business.'
It is unlikely that Wei had any influence with the yamen, as in 
this case he would not likely to be maltreated by other gentry*
The investigation team was not able to throw further light on 
this matter, but put forward two hypothetical questions: first, 
was not the degree of chien-sheng probably bought for Wei Ch'ang- 
hui himself, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng stated, rather than for his father, 
who was old and could hardly benefit much? secondly, was not Wei's 
connection with the yamen perhaps limited to the negotiations for 
the purchase of the degree?
7* The.. I Wang (Assistant King), Shih Ta-k'ai's family moved from 
Ho-p'ing-hsien (Kwangtung) to Kuei-hsien (Kwangsi), where they
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lived at Na-pang-ts'tin, not at Fai-sha as Li Hsiu-ch*eng wrote, 
although Shili*s grandfather had lived there for a time. His 
mother was of the Chuang minority, see T*ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo 
oh*i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao pp.43~4. According to his own deposition, 
Shih Ta-k'ai*s studies came to nothing and he earned his living 
as a farmer, see TPTK II p.780* The T'ien-ch1ing tao-li-shu (in 
Yin-shu 11.12) says only that his family was wealthy. He was 
about 33 sui at the time of his death in 1863 and can only have 
been about 20 at the time of the rising. This may account for 
his low position in the Taiping hierarchy,
8. Little is known of Ch'in Jih-ch'ang's early days apart from 
what Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote here. According to T*ai-p'ing T'ien- 
kuo ch'i-i tiao-ch'a pao-kao pp.87-8, he was a Hakka from a 
village called Tuo-chu-t'ang, near Pai-sha.
Notes to Page 155•
1. According to the Hsun-ohou fu-ohih, quoted by Lo Erh-kang in 
T*ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-shih k'ao pp.17-18, it was the
arrest of the rebel Ch'en Ah-(or Ya-)kuei (see page 144)» which 
provoked the Taiping rising. Troops sent to arrest Ch'en insulted 
and molested members of the God-worshippers' Association in the 
villages through which they passed, perhaps because it was known 
that Ch'en had already agreed to join the God-worshippers. On 
hearing of this Peng Yun-shan is said to have announced that if 
they were going to be killed anyway, it would be better to revolt. 
This tends to confirm Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remark that strife between 
militia and the God-worshippers 'forced a rising.1 Hung Jen-kan 
said in 1852 that the original intention was not rebellion, but 
that oppression by officials and soldiers forced the God-worshippers 
to revolt. But he also contradicted himself in saying that Hung 
Hsiu-ch'tian realised that he was bound to clash with the government.
2. Interlinear.
3. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has '6th Month,' and error not noticed 
by Lii Chi-i, This has complicated the problem of the date of
the rising, since is was accepted as Li Hsiu-ch'eng's record of 
the date. The question is argued at some length by Lo Erh-kang 
in his article Chin-t'ien ch'i-i k'ao in Shih-shih k'ao pp.9-53> 
and by Chien Yu-wen in Ch'uan-shih I. pp.224-228 and in his T'ai- 
p'ing-chun shou-i shih pp.203-207. Both specialists agree that 
the date of the rising was 11 January 1851 (TK30/12/10), Hung Hsiu- 
ch'iian's birthday; but neither knew when they wrote their studies 
on this question that Li Hsiu-ch*eng had originally written '10th 
Month.' It is doubtful however, whether this would have changed
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their opinions, Li Hsiu-ch1 eng*s date probably refers to the 
beginning of mobilization and assembly at Chin-t'ien. Meng Shih- 
yung recorded in a letter that this process of concentration 
began in the *9th Month* (i.e. between 5 October and 3 November), 
see Meng Shih-yung chia-shu in TPTK II p.755* Groups of God- 
worshippers from Po-pai, Lung-shan, Kuei-hsien and Kuei-p'ing 
did, it is true, all arrive on the same day, 31 December 1850 
(TK30/11/28), and the first military engagement was on the 
following day, see Chien: Ch1uan-shih p,222.
4. Hu I-huang came from a well-to-do family, and had passed the 
hsien examination, see TCHT ch.l p.50. Other biographical
details are given in Chien: Ch1uan-shih I pp.140-1, Shan-jen- 
tsfung was near Hua-chou in P'ing-nan-hsien, see T * ai-p1 ing T* ien- 
kuo ch'i-i tiao-chta pao-kao, p. 47*
5. The commander of the government troops who surrounded Shan-jen- 
ts'un (see below, note 2 to page 134) was apparently not
aware that it was the rebel leaders who were at Hu I-huangfs home, 
or even that they were in the village.
6. This passage was overlooked by Lu Chi-i.
Notes to Page 134.
1. Por 4ft % read %  &  .
2. Li Hsiu-ch1 eng here gives the impression that this was a 
planned and almost ceremonial occasion; in fact, it was a
rescue operation. In mid-November there had already been armed 
conflict between charcoal-burners at P *eng-ai-shan and *braves' 
under the Sub-district Magistrate of Ta-huang-chiang. Earlier, 
at the beginning of November, God-worshippers going to Chin- 
t'ien from Hua-chou and other regions had fought and defeated 
some local troops, and the incident had been reported to the 
provincial authorities. Because of this, a detachment of Yunnan 
troops under Chou Feng-ch'i and Assistant Colonel Li Tien-yuan 
was sent to Ssu-wang-hsu in P'ing-nan-hsien in early December. 
There Li Tien-yuan learned of a 'lair of rebels' at Shan-jen- 
ts'un, and organized the siege of the village by blocking the 
only road out of it. He did not venture to attack the village, 
hoping to reduce it by starvation. Hung Hsiu-ch*lian immediately 
sent a messenger to Chin-t'ien, and Yang Hsiu-ch'ing, after 
arousing the enthusiasm of the followers by 'speaking with the 
voice of God,' despatched a force under Meng Te-en, himself a
30?
Notes to page 134*
a P ’ing-nan man who knew the district well. They attacked and 
routed the enemy on 25 December 1850 (TK30/11/22) and three days 
later Hung Hsiu-ch*uan was brought to Chin-t’ien. See Meng Shih- 
yung chia-shu in TPTK II p*755 and Chien: Ch1uan-shih pp.214-220.
3. This should be £ 16 not -K . He is also refered to as 
(the big-headed imp) in the T'ien-ch’ing tao-li shu 
p.12a, which gives an account of his perfidy. He was a leader 
of the San-ho-hui (Triads), whose real name was Chang Chao.
Hamberg (p. 55 ) states that he would not join because Taiping 
discipline was too strict. He later co-operated with the 
government, after surrendering in February or March 1851; but he 
proved to be an unreliable ally and was executed soon afterwards, 
see Hsii Kuang-chin memorials of HFl/3/28 and HFl/9/2 in Ch * in-ting 
chiao-p’ing Ytieh-fei fang-lueh (hereafter abbreviated as Fang-lueh) 
edited by I-hsin (Prince Kung) et al. 1872. Facsimile edition,
Taipei 19^5> ch.3 P.31& and ch.18 pp.lb-2a.
4* His real name was T’ien Fang ($ ^  ). He was a colleague of 
Chang Chao and suffered the same fate.
5. Originally Lo Ta-wang 9 s. ), of Ch'ao-chou (Kwangtung).
He was a T’ien-ti-hui (Triad) leader, but joined the Taipings
with several thousand men and became one of their trusted commanders. 
He had some dealings with foreigners later, see Meadows: The Chinese 
and their Rebellions p.152. He was killed in battle in 1855* He 
seems to have maintained an interest, if not connections, with 
secret societies, see Lo: Shih-shih-k1ao pp.34-74 (T*ai-p’ing 
T ’ien-kuo yii T’ien-ti-hui kuan-hsi k ’ao).
6. This sentence is interlinear and very ungrammatical.
7. This should read A % vu * , according to Chien: Ch’uan-shih I p. 
122, though Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming ta-tz 'u-tien gives %  .
It is where the Ssu-chiang meets the Hsun-chiang, see T * ai-p * ing 
T’ien-kuo ch’i-i tiao-ch’a pao-kao, map.
8. For Hsiang Jung's biography, see Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.292.
9. This should read ^ , Shuang-chieh-shan.
10.The move to Tung-hsiang was not made immediately. The sequence 
of events was as follows:-
28 December 1850 (TK30/H/25) Hung Hsiu-ch*uan arrived at Chin-t’ien. 
11 January 1851 (TK30/12/10) Proclamation of the rising.
13 January (TK30/12/12) The Taipings went down the Ta-huang River
and took Chiang-k’ou-hsu, a prosperous market town which
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they may have taken mainly to get supplies, make 
weapons and so on. Thence the Taipings intended to 
make for Kuei-lin by boat, but the surrender of the 
pirate Chang Chao (Ta-t*ou-yang) provided Hsiang Jung 
with a *fleet1 and obliged the Taipings to take the 
land route.
8 March (HFl/2/6) The Taipings withdrew from Chiang-k1ou-hsu and 
went towards Wu-hsuan,
23 March (HFl/2/21) Hung Hsiu-ch1uan was proclaimed T* ien-Wang 
at Tung-hsiang (Wu-hsuan), see Pan-hsing li-shu in 
TPTK I, p.206, which was the the Taiping H.Q. for the 
time being, the vanguard being at Sah-li-hsii (30 li
S.E. of Wu-hsuan).
3 April (HFl/3/2) Chou T*ien-chueh and Hsiang Jung attacked at 
San-li-hsii and were defeated. (Chou T*ien-chueh had 
been appointed Governor of Kwangsi in December 1850.
A letter which he wrote at the time gives a vivid 
picture of his troubles, see Chih Krh-nan shu in Chien- 
chi VI p.3; another curious letter, the:original of 
which I have been unable to trace, is given in 
translation in Meadows: The Chinese and their Rebellions
pp.153-160).
(HPl/4/14) The Taipings moved from Tung-hsiang towards
Hsiang-chou. The battle at Miao-wang probably occurred 
about this time.
(HPl/4/17) The Taipings encamped at Chung-p*ing-hs4, where 
government troops under Wu-lan-t!ai, Hsiang Jung and 
Chou T'ien-chueh attempted an encirclement,
(HFl/5/10) Wu-lan-t*ai1s troops were defeated at Ma-an-shan. 
In spite of this the Taipings then evidently gave up 
hope of reaching Kueilin by this route.
(HFl/6/4) The Taipings withdrew from Chung-p*ing,
(HPl/6/10) they arrived at Hsin-hsd (Kuei-p*ing) leaving 
a rearguard at Shuang-chieh-shan, west of Tz*u-ching- 
shan.
(This note is based on Chien: Ch*uan-shih, Mou An-shih: T* ai-p * ing 
Tfien-kuo, Peking 1959 > Kuo T!ien-i: T*ai-p1ing ffien-kuo shih-shih 
jih-ohih, Shanghai 1947 > and Hambergf The Visions of Hung Siu- 
tshuen.y
Notes to Page 135*
1. The encircling operation was completed on 11 August (HFl/7/15)* 
By this time 30,000 government troops and 1braves* were 
involved, but they were not very effective, mainly because their
14 May
17 May
9 June
2 July 
8 July
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commanders were unable to co-operate, see Chien: Ch1uan-shih I p.
295 and Kuo: Jih-chih. Contrary to Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1s statement, the 
Ch!ing commander at Hsin-hsii was Wu-lan-t * ai; Chang Ching-hsiu 
was an intendant, see Fang-lueh ch.7 p.35h.
2. The government attack began on 25 July (HFl/6/27) and the 
important Taiping defence post at Shuang-chieh-shan was lost
on 11 August. This must have been one of the main reasons for the 
decision to withdraw, though in his proclamation of HFl/7/19 Hung 
Hsiu-ch 'uan gave the reason as the lack of salt and the number 
of sick and wounded. This proclamation was a sort of mobilization 
order for the break-out, and confirmed the position of Yang Hsiu- 
ch* ing as commander-in-chief, see T*ien-ming chao-chih shu in TPTK 
!• PP63-4. On 11 September the Taipings went from Hsin-hsii to 
Ssu-wang and Kuan-ts'un (Pfing-nan-hsien) by the only route which 
was not blocked, see Chien: Ch1uan-shih p.303.
3. This should r e a d M  not $  $ .
4. Hsiang Jung had hurried to P'ing-nan-hsien when he heard the
news of the Taiping break-out, and established ten stockades at
Kuan-ts 'un, where the Hsi Wang and the Nan Wang were waiting for 
him. The government troops had allowed their powder to get wet 
and were severely beaten. After this Hsiang Jung retired to 
P'ing-nan township for a month on the pretext of illness, see Chien: 
Ch1 uan-shih I p.304 and Hsieh: T * ai-p* ing Ttien-kuo chfien-hou 
Kuang-hsi-ti fan-ChTing yun-tung p.22
5. This should read ufhit not ^  §5 .
6. Yung-an-chou is now called Meng-shan ^ ).
7. For J- read . The character , by Taiping protocol, could 
only be used for God (j^  ^  ), and in all other cases was
replaced by the character , see Ch1in-ting ching-pi tzu-yang
p. 2b in Yin-shu 11.20. This is the reason for Li Hsiu-ch*engfs 
frequent confusion of the two characters.
8. This and the following paragraph are repeated in more or less 
identical terms later in the deposition (see page 143)* where
the autobiographical section proper begins; annotation is therefore 
given below.
9. In the original M ## X . This could mean no more than, 'After 
I joined the God-worshippers * Association...*
10. This should be ^  H&ij- not .
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11, In February 1850, before he joined the Taipings, Lo Ta-kang 
had already attacked Yung-an at the head of a T*ien-ti-hui 
force, see Chung Wen-tien: T 1 ai-p* ing-chiin tsai Yung-an, Peking 
1962 p,8 n2.
Notes to Page 156,
1. This would be about 20 September 1851.
2, As a rule the property of God-worshippers when they joined the
Association was sold at a low price and the money handed in;
houses were only burned when there was no buyer, according to the 
Hsun-ohou fu-chih, quoted by Chien: Ch1uan-shih I p.205.
5. The Chiu Ju T’ang Edition h a s f o r  •
4. Yung-an was the first administrative town the Taipings took.
It was a small town, difficult of accessi, surrounded by a 
small brick wall. The Taiping H.Q. was established in the city, 
and an outer line of defences was placed at some distance. The 
most important point in this line was at Shui-tou, about 10 li 
south ofthe town. The Taiping occupation, which lasted several 
months, was not without incident. Disagreement between the Ch'ing 
commanders continued and they could not decide whether to surround 
and siege the town, or attempt to dislodge the Taipings and then 
pursue them. The result was that neither alternative was carried 
out with any vigour. The early attempts at blockade were very 
incomplete because the Ch’ing efforts were mainly confined to 
operations north and south of Yung-an, and along the Ch*ang-shou 
River. Although the Ch’ing commanders had some 46,000 troops at 
their disposal, including 1braves1, the eastern front wad almost 
entirely neglected, When Hsiang Jung arrived after his disastrous 
defeat at Kuan-ts’un, he was most unenthusiastic about the plan 
to ’surround and exterminate* and left at the end of October for 
Kueilin on the pretext of ill health. His troops however, managed 
to establish themselves in two of the valleys to the east of Yung- 
an; but on 19 October they were so seriously defeated that they 
withdrew from Yung-an altogether and refused to co-operate with 
Wu-lan-t!ai in a joint attack on Shui-tou, The encirclement does 
not seem to have been so serious as Li Hsiu-ch*eng implies, 
although the Taipings had severe supply difficulties as the result 
of an economic blockade which was fairly easy to enforce. This 
note is base on T*ien-oh*ing tao-li shu p. 12b in Yin-shu 1.12; 
Chung Wen-tien: T’ai-p’ing-chun tsai Yung-an; Chien: Ch * uan-shih 
p.507ff and Wang K’un; Shun-pi sui-wen-lu p.557-6 in TPTK IV.
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5# For rTai! read *Saif FH ), Sai-shang-ah, Imperial
Commissioner Commanding Troops in Kwangsi, see Hummel: Eminent 
Chinese, p.208.
6. Wu-lan-trai was Assistant Commander under Sai-shang-ah, ibid, 
p.293*
7* For^'f read^-f1 . Ku-su-ch*ung is one of the valleys south 
east of Yung-an, about 18 .LL from the town.
8. The garrison at Ku-su-ch*ung consisted of about 1,000 Green 
Standard troops from Shou-chou (Shou-ch,un) in Anhwei, see Lo:
Chien-cheng, p,14B n4.
9. On 5 April 1852.
10. This is confirmed by the Provincial Judge Yao Ying, who wrote 
that although the Taipings could obtain saltpetre, there was
no sulphur, and they had to use their ammunition very sparingly; 
quoted by Chien: Ch1 uan-shih I p.325* At Chin-t*ien the Taipings 
had appointed an officer to be responsible for the supply of 
saltpetre; see TCHT ch.2 p.63. The Taiping destruction of temples 
had an utilitarian aspect: saltpetre was extracted from old bricks 
by breaking them up, soaking and boiling the powder and then 
filtering; see Anon: Keng Shen pi-nan .jih-chi in Chien-chi IV p. 
49 9^ and. elsewhere.
Notes to Page 137*
1 • For -iik © read ik A  .
2. Wu-lan-t1ai1s troops attacked the Taiping rear, which consisted 
mainly of old men, women and children, including Wei Ch'ang-hui's
uncle; see Chien: Ch1 uan-shih p.327. HungTa-oh1 tian (the Tfien Te 
Wang) was captured here, starting a controversy about his real 
identity which continues to this day; see Teng Ssu-yll: New Light 
on the History of the Taiping Kebellion p.20ff,
3. This was on 8 April 1852 at Lung-liao-k*ou, Ta-t'ang-shan. Yao 
Ying, in a letter, reported that 800 of Hsiang Jung!s troops
were killed and some dozens of Wu-lan-t *ai1 s; quoted in Lo: Chien- 
cheng, p.149 n9.
4. In fact Wu-lan-t*ai died at Yang-shuo, according to Lo: Chien-< 
cheng, p.150 n9. The six months which they spent at Yung-an
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gave the Taipings time for a great deal of expansion, organization 
and consolidation: (i) New recruits were enlisted, some of them 
from secret societies; for instance, unemployed miners from Kuei- 
hsien joined the Taipings at Yung-an; see T*ai-p*ing T1ien-lcuo 
ohfi-i tiao-ohfa pao-kao, pp.51-2. At Yung-an the Taiping numbers 
were 37,000 of which five or six thousand were fighting men; see 
TCHT p.290, (ii) The extent of organizational and other changes 
is indicated by the number of important Taiping books which were 
first published at Yung-an:- T Tien-ming ohao-ohih shu, proclamations 
dealing, inter alia, with the communal treasury system; see Yin-shu 
1,3, Tf ien-t1iao-shu and TTai-p1ing chao-shu, containing fundamental 
doctrinal works; see Yin-shu 1.1; T*ai-p1 ing chun-mu and T* ai-p1 ing 
t!iao-kuei, dealing with military organization, see Yin-shu 1.2; 
Pan-hsing chao-shu, consisting of proclamation, including the 
political call-to-arms against the Manchus, see Yin-shu 1.3. A 
brief account of each of these books may be found in Teng: Hist­
oriography of the Taiping Rebellion. The Taiping calendar was 
also adopted at this time, (iii) 1Internal security1 was strength­
ened, not only by these organizational measures but also by the 
case of Chou Hsi-neng, a Taiping traitor, whose unmasking also 
increased the supernatural prestige of Yang Hsiu-ch1ing; see 
T'ien-fu hsia-fan chao-shu in Yin-shu II.3» also published at Yung- 
an, and T'ien-cl^ing tao-li shu p.21b-22b in Yin-shu 11.12.
5. The Chiu- Ju T’ang Edition has & for iu .
6. Kueilin was poorly defended at this time; even the cannon had 
been sent to the Yung-an front. The Taipings had acquired
Ch*ing uniforms, flags and documents from Hsiang Jungfs defeated 
troops, and had intended to take Kueilin by a trick. Hsiang Jung 
however, is said to have seen this force making for ICueilin, and 
hastened there himself with nothing but a bodyguard, taking a short­
cut. He arrived there only half a day before the Taipings, but 
foiled their plans and saved Kueilin from capture and himself from 
disgrace. The wall was high and strong and the garrison determined. 
Twenty buried cannon dating from the Ming dynasty were found and 
put into service, and Taiping attacks both by assault and mining 
failed to win them the city. The siege lasted 33 days, from 18 
April to 19 May 1852; see Chien: Ch1 uan-shih pp.364-372 and Chung 
Wen-tien: T1ai-p1ing-chun tsai Yung-an. The Taipings saved face in 
official pronouncements by saying that theu had not been much 
interested in Kueilin because spies had told them that the store­
houses there were empty; see T^en-cbWing tao-li shu p. 13a in 
Yin-shu XI.12.
7. Now Chfuan-hsien.
8. The Taipings arrived at Chfuan-chou on 22 May (HF2/4/4).
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9. Interlinear.
10. The Taipings had not originally intended to take Ch’uan-chou; 
but a gunner on the town wall could not resist the temptation
of firing on a yellow palanquin which he detected amongst the 
Taipings as they passed by. This palanquin contained Feng Yun- 
shan, who was mortally wounded by the shot, and a terrible 
vengeance fell upon the town of Oh' uan-chou; for having wo\inded 
the Nan Wang and for resisting the Taiping attack which followed 
in a particularly determined manner, the whole population is 
said to have been put to the sword when the town fell on 3 June 
1852 (HF2/4/16). After leaving Ch*uan-chou, the Taipings fell 
into an ambush at So-i-tu (Soh-i Ferry), 10 li north of the town, 
where they were severely defeated in a two-day battle with Chiang 
Chung-yuan1s militia force. Feng Yun-shan died of his wounds 
while the fighting was in progress. The importance of this 
engagement is discussed in Hails Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping 
Rebellion, pp.76-7> and in Chien: Ch*uan-shih, p.409.
11. After their defeat at So-i-tu, the Taipings seem to have made 
for Yung-chou, but the bridge there had been destroyed and
all boats moved to the other bank of the river; see Chien: Ch*uan- 
shih, p.411* They then moved on to Tao-chou. which was given up 
to them without a fight on 11 June (HF2/3/25); they remained 
there for two months, during which they replenished their supplies 
and enlisted large numbers of new recruits, many of whom were 
members of secret societies, particularly the T*ien-ti Hui. The 
three Taiping proclamations published tinder the title Pan-hsing 
chao-shu (in Yin-shu 1.3) were issued at this time and were perhaps 
primarily addressed to secret society members.
Li Hsiu-ch*eng’s figure of about 50>000 enlisted in this region 
is confirmed to some extent by (a) Huang Sheng-ts’ai’s deposition 
(in Shan-tung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao, p.7)» (h) Tseng Kuo-fan*s 
memorial of HF3/2/12, which reads in part: ’Everyone knows how 
numerous secret society bandits are in Hunan; last year, when the 
Yueh rebels entered Hunan, most of the T’ien-tu Hui members joined 
and followed them,* see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.2 p.lb.
Chiang-hua was captured on 24 July (HF2/6/8) by a force of 
about 1,000, in an operation in which secret society members 
played an important part. The town was entered by a trick; a 
secret society leader gained entry disguised as a Ch’ao-ohou 
’brave* and killed the hsien official in his yamen; see Fang- 
lueh ch.15 p.6a-b. Chinese documents in the Public Record 
Office, filed under F.0.682/112/4, also contain material on these 
events.
At this time there were evidently a number of Taipings who 
wanted to go back to Kwangsi by way of Kuan-yang; only Yang Hsiu-
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ch!ing opposed the idea, according to TCHT oh.11, pp.290-1, and 
insisted that they make for Nanking. There was also a possibility, 
it appears, of a southward move into Kwangtung. Spies disguised 
as merchants, nearly all local T*ien-ti Hui men, were sent to 
Lien-chou to find out how strongly it was defended; see Fang- 
lueh, ch. 16 p. 6a ff;(this is Teh Ming-ch1 en’;s memorial, partly 
based on the depositions of captured rebel spies. The copies of 
some of these are in the Public Record Office - F.O. 682/112/4.
12. Chang Kuo-liangfs name was formerly Chang Chia-hsiang (&v M  ) • 
He had been a T’ien-ti Hui leader of the biggest pre-Taiping 
rising in Kwangsi, in the spring of 1848. This covered not only 
parts of Kuei-hsien in Kwangsi, but also Ch1in-chou and Ling- 
ch'uan in Kwangtung. At the height of the rising Chang Chia- 
hsiang is said to have had over ten thousand followers, attracted 
by such slogans as4sj^$L$ (take from the rich and save the poor), 
(kill officials but spare the people) and X  f 
^ 9k T % ^ )A. 9) (the upper class owes
us money, the middle class should wake up; lower classes come with 
me! It is better than hiring an ox to plough thin land!); quoted 
in Liang Jen-pao; Ching-t*ien ch'i-i ch1ien Kuang-hsi nung-min 
ch * i-i in Li-shih ohiao-hsueh, 1957 No.l. In the winter of 1848, 
in* spite of these resounding slogans, Chang Chia-hsiang struck 
a bargain with the forces of law and order, and went over to the 
government side with a number of his followers. For the rest of 
his life he fought against the Taipings under Hsiang Jung and Ho 
Ch’un, having changed his name to Chang Kuo-liang,
13* This should read-^F^^.
14. Ch^n-chou was taken on 17 August (HF2/7/3) with inside help 
from the T'ien-ti Hui. Two other towns, Chia-ho and Lan-shan,
had been occupied a few days earlier; see Fang-lueh ch.15 p.3^h. 
Chfen-chou was a prosperous town and an important communication 
centre between Kwangtung and southern Hunan; the Taipings stayed 
there for more than a month, besieged and surrounded by armies 
under the command of Ho Ch*un, which had followed them at a 
discrete distance; see Fang-lueh ch.15 p.32a-b and Anon: Yueh-fei 
fan Hu-nan chi-lueh p. 63 in Chien-chi I. Ch * a-ling-chou was taken 
on 3 September (HF2/7/20)
15. The Taiping force was evidently a small one. Anon: Yueh-fei 
fan Hu-nan ohi-lueh p.63 gives 3,000+; Kuo: Jih-ohih p. 187
gives 3,000 to 4,000; Chien: Chfuan-shih, p.420 gives 2,000.
The Taipings had probably received information that Ch!ang-sha 
was weakly defended; in fact there were no more than two or three 
thousand troops and some * braves;1 see Vang K'ai-yiin: Hsiang-ohun 
chih I p.3h. The government commanders were expecting the attack
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to come through Lei-yang and Heng-chou (now Ileng-yang), where 
troops were consequently stationed. Nevertheless, the Taiping 
force was too small to surround the city, and its attack, throughout 
the campaign, was limited to the south and west sides of Chang­
sha, and they were unable to prevent relief from getting into the 
city; by the middle of November a Ch'ing force of fifty or sixty 
thousand was defending Ch'ang-sha; see Chien: Ch'uan-shih I p.428.
The first engagement was on HF2/7/28 (13 August) at Shih-ma-p'u, 
10 IX from the city. A Ch'ing force had been hastily posted there, 
consisting of about 2,000 Green Standard troops from Shensi. Li 
Ju-chao: Ching-shan yeh-shih p.5 in TPTK XXX gives 3,000 troops 
and 480 1bravesT, of whom some 1,700 men and 90 officers were 
killed. Other reports say that 600 were killed and 500 *braves' 
fled; see Anon: Yueh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lueh p. 64, and Fang- 
lueh ch.16 pp.25b-26b. The Taipings claimed *2,000 + 1 dead, 
dozens of officers killed, and the capture of 4,000 loads of 
powder and innumerable mules and horses; see the letter from 
Tseng Shui-yuan et al. to the T'ien Wang and the Tung Wang, in 
the Public Record Office (copy) F.0.682/279/A3.
16. The Hsi Wang, Hsiao Chfao-kuei, was wounded on 12 September
The date of his death is not known exactly, but 
was probably within a month of his being wounded; see Kuo: Jih-chih 
p.187. The report announcing this disaster was sent on the same 
day, under the names of Tseng Shui-yuan, Lin Feng-hsiang and 
Li K'ai-fang. The main army, with Hung Hsiu-ch*uan and Yang Hsiu- 
ch* ing, set out from Ch*en-chou on HF2/8/12, according to Kuo: 
.jih-chih, on HF2/8/15, according to the author of Yueh-fei fan 
Hu-nan chi-lueh, p.64, and arrived at Ch*ang-sha, according to 
Kuo, on HF2/9/I (13 October). There was a battle on 14 October 
in which the Taipings suffered considerable losses; see Chien:
Ch*uan-shih p.431*
Notes to Page 138.
1. In Tao-chou, Ch*en-chou, Kuei-yang and Lei-yang, several 
thousand coal miners had been enlisted by the Taipings and 
organized into a sappers' battalion (J^  ^  ); see TCHT ch.4 pp.138- 
9 and ch.3 p.107, also Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih pp.601-2 
in TPTK IV. The sappers saw action at Kuei-yang, Han-yang, Wu- 
ch'ang, and also at Ch'ang-sha and Nan-ch'ang, but here their 
efforts were not successful. The defenders foiled their attempts 
by counter-tunnelling and pouring water and filth into the Taiping 
tunnels; see TCHT ch.4 p.138. In the defence of Nan-ch'ang, blind 
men were used as sound detectors, and when the Taiping tunnels
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had been located, they were destroyed by dropping iron balls 
from the city wall, or by pouring in boiling oil; see Ma^Lung-pao: 
Chien-wen tsa-chi p.78 in Chien-chi Vol.II, The Taipings 
sometimes beat drums to cover the sound of tunnelling. For 
other details of mining techniques, see Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang 
ohi-shih pp.601-2 in TPTK IV.
At Ch'ang-sha about ten tunnels were dug but only three were 
successful, each destroying part of the wall; see Anon: Yueh-fei 
fan Hu-nan chi-lueh, p.65 and Chang Yao-sun; Ch'u-k'ou chi-lueh, 
p.71 in Chien-chi I. Chien; Ch'uan-shih states that 5 tunnels 
blew up as intended.
2. The proper name for Sha-chou ('the sand shoal') is Shui-lu- 
chou; it is opposite to Ch'ang-sha on the Hsiang River. Shih
Ta-k'ai's troops were stationed there. Hsiang Jung, with 3,000 
troops, attacked on 31 October (HF2/9/19) the northern end of the 
island, and were ambushed by the Taipings in the woods as they 
marched southwards, Hsiang Jung lost a third of his force and only 
got away himself because he was mounted; see Los Chien-cheng p. 153 
nl4. Most of the mining of Ch'ang-sha was done after this battle, 
which the Taipings hoped would distract enemy attention from the 
city itself.
3. This is confirmed by Li Ju-chao; Ching-shan .yeh-shih, p.5 and 
in Fang-lueh ch.19 P*5b.
4. This sentence \?as overlooked by Lu Chi-i.
5. A jade seal was found when Nanking fell in 1864, but it is not 
certain that it was the one to which Li Hsiu-ch'eng refers here;
see Lo-Erh-kang: T*ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo wen-wu t'u-shih p.27. A 
gold seal, found at the same time, has not survived. According 
to a story which Chao Lieh-wen heard at the time, it was stolen 
from the Grand Council by Mu-chang-ah's son, who had it melted 
down; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi TC5/2/7 pp.400-1. (Chien Yu-wen:
T' ai-p 'ing T'ien-kuo tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I p.191, gives a 
slightly different version. As to Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s statement that 
T'ien Wang was proclaimed Emperor, and the other Wangs appointed 
at Ch'ang-sha, this does not agree with the T'ien-ming chao-shih 
shu (TTl/lO/25) in Yin-shu 1,3 pp.lla-13b, which states that this 
was done at Yung-an.
6. The Taipings withdrew on 30 November (HF2/10/19) on a rainy 
night, after throwing a pontoon bridge over the river; see
Fang-lueh ch.19 p.4a/b. Government troops pursued them in the 
wrong direction as far as Hsiang-t'an, before realizing that they 
had gone north west; see Kuo: Jih-chih p.197*
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7. Tseng Kuo-fan changed Honan to Hunan, although it is clear 
from what follows that Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant the former.
8* The Taipings took I-yang on 3 December 1852 (HF2/10/11), after 
constructing a pontoon bridge over the Tzu-shui; see Chien:
Ch1 uan-shih p.437* They were welcomed in the town with incense 
and flowers, Anon: Yueh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lueh p.65. There are 
different estimates of the number of boats captured: Huang! Sheng- 
ts'ai, in his deposition gives * 1,000-}-* (Shan-tung ohin-tai-shih 
tzu-liao p*7); Wang K'un: Shun-pi sui-wen lu p. 365 says that
3,000 boats were taken at Lin-tzu-k'ou; Hung Jen-kan in his 
deposition says ’several thousand;’ see TPTK II p.851.
9. For M'Z'v read We ~S ^  . This is where the Tzu-shui flows into 
Tung-t’ing Lake* The Taipings arrived here on 7 December and
left on the 10th, some by land and some by boat; see Anon: Yueh- 
fei fan Hu-nan chi-lueh, p.65.
10. Yueh-chou was taken on 13 December 1852 (HF2/11/3). (Li Ju-chao: 
Ching-shan yeh-shih, p.5 gives 15 December as the date).
Although the governor of Hupeh, Oh’ang Ta-ch*un, had emphasized 
the importance of holding the ifeown, ’the screen of the whole 
province of Hupeh,' Fang-lueh ch.15 -.22a, the Taipings got the 
gate open by pretending to be Hsiang Jung’s troops and took the 
town without a fight. The Tartar General had hastened off to 
Wu-ch’ang as soon as the Taipings attacked Ch'ang-sha; see Anon: 
Yueh-fei fan Hu-nan chi-lueh p.65. The people 'welcomed the rebels 
into the town,' according to Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch’ang chi-shih 
p.583.
Yueh-chou was an important military transit centre, hence the 
stock of ancient arms. Wu San-kuei (1612-1678) revolted in 1673 
and had some success in Hunan. The arms stored in Yueh-chou were 
probably cannon, though one record says 'cannon and powder,* see 
Li Ju-chao: Ching-shan yeh-shih p.5; but it is difficult to 
believe that powder can have been of much use after 174 years. 
Several thousand more boats were captured here, and T'ang Cheng- 
ts'ai was appointed ’tien-shui-chiang* (4ft £ ) to be responsible 
for them; see Chien: Ch’uan-shih I p.438.
The ineptitude of the Ch'ing officials at Yueh-chou is typical 
of the conditions which made possible the rapid Taiping advance.
The Sub-prefect of Han-yang, Chang Yao-sun, urged the importance 
of holding Yueh-chou upon the Governor of Hupeh, who went himself 
to the town to organize its defence. He had boats full of boulders 
sunk in the river in order to block the entrance to Tung-t’ing 
Lake, and was highly satisfied with the result, confident that 'not 
a sail could get past.' Chang Yao-sun suggested that troops be 
posted at the barrage as well, otherwise, 'if we can block, the
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rebels can un-block.1 The Governor replied that it had taken them 
two weeks unceasing work to make the barrage, and the rebels would 
not be able to remove it in less than a month. So only 1,000 
troops were left in Yueh-chou. When the Taipings arrived they fled, 
and it only took the rebels one day to open the channel; see Chang 
Yao-sun: Ch'u-k'ou chi-lueh pp.71-73* The Taipings left Yueh-chou 
on 17 December 1852.
11. The Taiping advance from Yueh-chou was by land and river. The 
land route was on the south bank of the Yangtse. Han-yang
was taken on 25 December (HF2/11/12). A pontoon bridge of large 
timbers, joined by hausers, and later strengthened by anchors, was 
thrown across the Han River; see Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih 
pp.594,59^. The Taipings crossed over and took Hankow on 29 
December.
12. Wu-ch'ang had only a small garrison of 5,000 troops and 1,000 
'braves'. The military commander, Shuang Fu, had from the
first decided upon passive defence. For this purpose, he determined 
to raze all buildings in the suburb^ which could provide cover 
near the city wall for the attackers. The suburban population, 
which must have been considerable, objected to this and offered to 
raise money to build an extra wall of earth. This was done. 
Nevertheless, destruction of the suburbs began on 16 December 
and continued until the 25th, when the Taipings arrived and found 
the fires still burning. Only two gates had been left open and on 
the day when the destruction of the suburbs began, people had been 
crushed to death trying to get into the city. On 21 December 
there was nearly a riot when a rumour circulated that even inside 
the city wall buildings were to be destroyed. So before the 
Taiping attack began the Ch'ing authorities were already very 
unpopular, and the people could easily be 'enticed* to join or 
help the Taipings. Although Hsiang Jung and his army arrived 
long before the city fell, they were not able to get close to 
Wu-ch'ang, where the commanders refused to make any attempt to 
link up with them. No sorties were permitted. The Taipings 
eventually took the city by mining. Although the defenders used 
blind 'mine detectors,' the officials were so afraid of allowing 
troops out of the city, that the sounds which the blind men heard 
were dismissed as 'someone chopping wood.' The city fell on 
12 January 1855 (HF2/12/4). See Mao Lung-pao: Chien-wen tsa-chi, 
p.72 in Chien-chi II, Ch'en Hui-yen: Wu-ch'ang chi-shih, pp.585- 
587.
15. There was great slaughter in the first two days after the
city was taken, the Tung Wang having announced that 'officials 
and soldiers must not be spared; the people must not be injured.'
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But after two days of street fighting a new order was given that 
government officials and soldiers could be spared as long as 
they did not resist. Large numbers of people joined the Taipings 
at ¥u-ch'ang, 'nine out of ten men and one or two out of ten 
women,1 according to one source, (Oh*en Hui-yen: ¥u-ch*ang chi- 
shih p.572). All accounts say that these people were forced 
to join, but the authors were all hostile to the Taipings, and in 
view of the unpopularity of the government and the growing 
prestige of the Taipings, who had taken their first provincial 
capital, it is reasonable to suppose that coercion was not 
always necessary. ¥hen they left ¥u-chfang the Taipings are 
said to have numbered 5°0*000; see TCHT p.2$6,
Notes to Page 159*
1. Huang-chou was taken on 11 February 1853 (HF3/I/4); Ch'i- 
shui on 16 February (HF3/I/6) or possibly earlier; Ch'i-chou
on 24 February (HF3/1/17); Chiu-chiang (Kiukiang) on 18 February 
(BF3/1/11) and An-ch'ing (Anking) on 24 February (HF3/I/I7).
2. A force of a thousand troops sent earlier to Huang-chou
to get grain, had brought back to ¥u-chfang 100 boat-loads, 
see Huang Sheng-ts1 ai1 s deposition in Shan-tung chin-tai-shih 
tzu-liao p*7* There was virtually no resistance in any of 
these towns; but on 15 February there was a battle near ¥u- 
hsueh in Hupeh in which a force of about 6,000 government 
troops under Lu Chien-ying (Governor General of Liang-chiang) 
was defeated. It is said that the Taipings had captured a 
messenger whom Lu Chien-ying had sent to Hsiang Jung, and had 
then sent back a bogus messenger with a forged document asking 
Lu to advance immediately; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao ch.l 
p. 37 in TPTK YII and Lii Chien-lieh: Chi (¥u-hsi) hsien-ch1 eng 
shih-shou k'e-fu pen-mo p.245 In TPTK V. At Chiu-chiang the 
garrison of 2,000 fled, and it is said that the town was taken 
by five members of the Taiping 'Childrens1 Brigade1 - see Chien: 
Ch1 uan-shih I p.468. An-ch'ing was abandoned to the Taipings, 
leaving an immense stock of grain and treasure; see Hsiang 
Jung: Tsou-kao p.59*
3. For biographical details on Lai Han-ying see TCHT p,71 and 
Lo: Shih-kao pp.334-5*
4. Lu Chien-ying returned to Nanking after his defeat at ¥u~ 
hsueh without organizing resistance elsewhere; he then shut
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himself up in his residence and refused to see anyone or do 
anything. He was cashiered by the edict of Hf3/l/27 (Fang-liieh 
ch.26 pp.l2b-13b) and replaced by Hsiang Hou (ill. ); but Nanking 
was already surrounded, and the order never reached Lu and Hsiang. 
The garrison, was very small, about 10,000, with only 3>900 Manchu 
bannermen and 1,000 Green Standard troops; the rest were Graves.' 
This was totally inadequate for the defence of the city, which was 
96 M. (about 34 miles) around the wall. The error of purely 
passive defence was repeated with even greater incompetence and 
stupidity than at Wu-chfang. The Governor, Yang Wen-ting, would 
not let anyone leave the city, on pain of death, but fled himself 
to Chen-chiang. The Provincial Commander-in-chief, Fu-chu-ah, 
took 500 troops who were fas weak and timorous as women,* to Yu- 
hua-t'ai, a strategically placed hill south of the city, where they 
laid up a large stock of munitions. At the first alarm they fled, 
leaving the arms for the Taipings; see Chiens Chfuan-shih, citing 
Wang Shih-to: I Ping .jih-chi.
The Taiping vanguard arrived on 6 March (HF3/I/27) and the 
main force started arriving on the following day; see Huang Sheng- 
ts fai*s deposition in Shan-tung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao p.7* The 
walls of Nanking were so high and so strong that there was little 
to be done except to attack by mining. This was concentrated at 
the I-Feng Gate (north west of the city), where thtee tunnels 
were started from the Ching-hai Temple. In the city itself, an 
efficient 1fifth column* spread alarm and despondency. Three 
thousand Taiping agents are said to have previously entered the 
city disguised as monks; see Chien: Ch*uan-shih, quoting from 
Yueh-fen chi-shih by Hsia Ilsieh.
On 18 March (HF3/2/9)> the Taipings staged a dramatic diversion 
outside the soiiith gate, where several hundred cavalry, enveloped 
in a sheet of flame, charged towards the city. On each horse there 
was a lighted scarecrow clothed in red, Under cover of this 
diversion the tunnels at the I-Feng Gate were completed, and the 
following day two of them were exploded simultaneously. The third 
failed to go off until later, by which time there were already 
several hundred Taipings in the breach, who were killed by the 
blast. Those who broke into the city were beaten back in street 
fighting, and the breach was mended, Lu Chien-ying however, had 
been killed, and the news of this, added to the knowledge that the 
wall had been breached, was sufficient to make most of the garrison 
give up the fight. Three gates were abandoned and the Taipings 
entered by scaling the wall.
On the 20th March only the Manchu garrison, the inner city of 
ming times, remained to be taken. When this fell, most of the 
population of 40,000 were massacred; see Chien: Ch1uan-shih pp.
480-491.
The capture of Nanking took 12 days, not 7> as Li Hsiu-ch*eng 
states.
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5. It is a reflection of the poverty of the source material on
many of the most important aspects of the history of the Taipings 
that this semi-fictional account is one of the few records dealing 
with this vital question of early Taiping strategy. The story of 
the "boatman is repeated in at least two other sources. One is 
Shen Mou-liang: Chien-nan ch1 un-meng-an pi-chi in TPTK IV, which 
was first published in the late 1870*s. Here the boatman is 
identified with the Gh'uan Wang (-fc £* ), T1 ang Cheng-ts1 ai. Lo 
Erh-kang however, has demonstrated that this book, which pretends 
to be the personal observations of a scholar who was a prisoner of 
the Taipings for several years, is in fact a clever concoction 
from a number of identifiable published sources. The story of 
the boatman in this book seems to have come from the edition of 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s deposition which was published by Tseng Kuo-fan 
in 1864. T'ang Cheng-ts'ai was neither a boatman, nor a Ilunanese, 
nor - at that time - an old man. He was in addition, well-known 
to Li Hsiu-ch'eng, who would no doubt have said so if he had been 
the boatman in question; see Lo Erh-kang: T! ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo 
shih-liao pien-wei chi pp.5-37* Another version is in Pan-wo 
chu-.jen (pseud.): Yueh-k'ou ch'i-shih chi-shih p. 15 in Chien-chi 
I, in which the boatman is identified as a man called Chiang.
Stripped of its semi-fictional character, Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s 
version is that it had been the intention of the Taipings to pass 
to the west of Tung-t'ing Lake and go north to Honan to make their 
base there, presumably for an attack on Peking. But the unexpected 
acquisition at I-yang of several thousand boats with their boatmen, 
not only presented the Taipings with a tempting alternative to the 
arduous march north, but also created within their ranks a 
powerful lobby which encouraged the adoption of this alternative.
The effectiveness and compliance of these new adherents depended 
upon their being allowed to remain in the Yangtse valley.
Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not at this time party to the inner councils 
of the Taipings, and we cannot be sure that the decision was made 
at I-yang. It was more likely to have been made at Wu-ch'ang, at 
the point where a decision could no longer be delayed. Here too, 
more detailed intelligence would be available as to the strength 
of government garrisons at various places. The story of the boatman 
would seem to indicate that the decision was not made without a 
great deal of discussion and disagreement.
It is often assumed by historians that from the earliest times 
the Taipings had earmarked Nanking as their capital. At Yung-an, 
or earlier, the Taipings are said to have taunted government 
soldiers by shouting, 'We are going to take Ghin-ling: what have 
we to fear from you?' from Tz'u-ching shih-ltieh in Hsun-chou fu- 
ohih (TC13) quoted in Chung Wen-tien: T'aip'ing-chun tsai Yung-an 
p.120. Taiping proclamations from Yung-an announce their 
destination as 'the Little Paradise' O' £ 'M. ); see T'ien-ming 
chao-chih shu in Yin-shu 1.1 pp.7b, 9b, 10b, but they do not
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tell us where it is. Finally, Chung Wen-tien: op.cit p.120, 
quotes a folk rhyme he heard from an old ,man of Yung-an, which 
identifies kittle Paradise1 with Nanking.
But this evidence does not prove that Nanking had been chosen 
as the Taiping capital. The only sources which identify 'Little 
Paradise1 with Nanking, do so retrospectively, being written 
long after the Taipings were installed there. The same applies 
to the account of the execution of Tseng Shui-yuan, a Taiping 
leader whose brother deserted because, in spite of promises, 
family life had not been restored after the Taipings reached 
'Little Paradise;' see Lo: chien-cheng p.158.
When they were in Tao-chou, many of the Taiping leaders are 
said to have wanted to go home to Kwangsi; only Yang Hsiu-ch'ing 
insisted that they should press on to Nanking, (see note 11 to 
page 137). But this too was recorded in the TCHT in 1854 without 
quoting the source, and does not agree with Li hsiu-ch1 eng's 
statement that the Taipings intended to go to Honan through 
Ch' ang-te.
Another interesting account, which seems to have been written 
not long after the Taipings left Ch'ang-sha is: 'Those who have 
come from among the rebels say that they plan to swarm north, 
some day to disturb Honan, others say to press forward their 
depredations from Chiang-nan.' See Anon: Yueh-fei fan Hu-nan chi- 
lueh p.66. Even when the Taipings were in Wu-ch'ang the 
government had no idea where they were going next; see Hsiang 
dung: Tsou-kao p.31 In TPTK VII. The main preparations were 
made in the Yangtse valley and in Honan; see Fang-lueh ch.20 passim.
Whether the Taipings had even intended to establish their 
capital in Honan we do not know. Nor do we know whether they 
had already decided on Nanking when they set off down the Yangtse 
from Wu-ch'ang, or whether they merely intended to hold the city 
for a short period before pressing northward. If this was so, 
the glory of establishing their capital at once in the old Ming : 
capital was irresistable. Apart from the economic advantages, 
it had the extra political advantage of strengthening the Taipings* 
claim to be a Chinese dynasty; it must also have pleased the 
powerful T'ien-ti Hui groups, who were, at least on paper, devoted 
to the idea of restoring the Ming.
6. On 29 March 1853 (HF3/2/20). There is a colourful description
of the evertt in Shen Tzu: Yang-cho-hsuan pi-chi in Chien-chi
II. p.266.
Notes to Page 140.
1. The first 'Proclamation for the Pacification of the People'
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(-*# & %  issued in Nanking announces that the Taipings had 
received Heaven's Command to chase out the Manchusr, who had 
misruled for 200 years. The people are urged to remain in their 
respective occupations. All are ordered to paste up the character 
'shun' (# : obedient) on their doors, to worship God and so on.
After the rounding up of remaining 'imps' : the Taiping 
pejorative for government officials, soldiers and so on), the 
prisons and stores were opened up and the archives burned. 
Contributions could buy exemption from labour service; see Chien: 
Oh'uan-shih p.501ff.
2. The segregation of the sexes began at Chin-t'ien as a measure
of military discipline, made necessary by the fact that whole
families joined, but reinforced, no doubt, by protestant attitudes. 
The T'ien-ch'ing tao-li shu emphasizes the contrast between this 
strict discipline and the indiscriminate rapine practised by the 
local Kwangsi bandits; although family life had still hot been 
restored after the establishment of the capital, what glory had 
been achieved! This was because the State had been put before 
the family, public interest before private; see Yin-shu 11.12 pp. 
21a,27a,29b.
When the Taipings took Nanking marriages were forbidden and 
husbands and wives were not even allowed to meet. The Tung Wang 
announced that this was to be a temporary measure only, until 
Chih-li had been conquered. (During a general strike of 
Andalusian anarchist peasants in 1902 marriages were postponed, and 
not merely for economic reasons; see Hobsbawm: Primitive Rebels 
p.84)* Although the rule undoubtedly contributed to discipline 
and order, and probably impressed the population as long as it 
did not apply to themselves, such an inhuman law inevitably 
aroused opposition, and was rescinded in January 1855* Temporary 
segregation continued to be practised for the first few days 
after the Taipings took a town. For such measure in Shao-hsing, 
see Li Hsiu-ch1 eng's letter (l86l) to his nephew and son in TPTK 
II p.740, and Lu Shu-jung: Hu-k'ou jih-chi in TPTK VI p.789ff.
As a short-term measure this may have been more or less acceptable, 
especially as the usual sequal to the capture of a town in Chinese 
warfare was large-scale rapine. There is no evidence that there 
was ever a women's regiment as such, although there are many 
accounts of women taking part in fighting. In Nanking women 
participated in fairly rough work, carrying water, earth or 
bricks; but also formed an 'embroidery ying' and sometimes
helped with guard duty; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu 
ch'u-t'an. Revised Edition, Peking 1963 pp.205-6; Shih-liao p.518;
Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo-ti fu-nu in Shih-shih k'ao pp.317- 
340; Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao, pp.1187-1276.
3. A distinction should be made between the offices of the
Notes to page 140
&  IT (f various control officers1 - ke-tien-lcuan), see TCHT ch. 3, 
whose offices were called *ya* (#? ) and whose function was to 
provide supplies and services to the^hole Taiping organisation, 
both civil and military, and theilii'C (*various artisans* ying - 
chu-chiang-ying), to which Id Hsiu-ch1eng seems to be referring 
here. The latter, unlike the former, were purely productive in 
nature, but the relationship between them is far from clear* The 
1 chu-chiang-ying* were only established at Nanking and it is 
possible that they took over the functions of the *ya*. There were 
six ying: for carpenters, weavers, gold and silver smiths, cobblers, 
wood-block engravers, and an * embroidery and brocade ying* )
which, according to one source, consisted of male embroiderers, 
but which Lo Erh-kang believes to have been made up of painters 
and decorators* The *Vu-ying* had been set up earlier (see note 
1 to page 13®), and included masons; building at Nanking was 
done by the 1 t*u-yingf and the *mu-yingf %  ) together. The 
organization of the &ohu~chiang-ying1 was para-military; the 
carpenters* ying was also responsible for guarding the T*ien Wang*s 
palace; see Li Ch’un: Tlai-pting T*ien-kuo ohih-tu ch*u-t*an, pp. 
140-151; Lo: Shih-kao, pp*121-130; and Chang Chi-keng i-kao in 
TPTK IV pp*765,775*
All able-bodied males who did not join the Taiping army were 
allocated to work either in the various *yaf or in the 1chu-ohiang- 
ying* * The old and disabled were supported by the state in units 
of 25 called * (p*ai-wei-kuan); those who could, did
light work such as sweeping the streets or picking up waste paper; 
see TCHT pp.653,654,621,717. Nominally all children under 14 or 
15 were similarly distributed in the 1 p1 ai-wei-kuan; * but in 
practice, small children went with their mothers into the women*s 
ying. Large numbers of children were employed as servants and 
sometimes took part in battles. Presumably because of the absence 
of family life, it was common for children to be adopted by 
Taiping officials and soldiers, though this practice was forbidden 
by Taiping military law; see TCHT p*228.
These organizations were an integral part of the Taiping system 
of military communism, and followed the provision in the *Land 
System * fjn) w &’J /fc ) for the establishment of groups of peasants 
with skills, which would provide goods, or services such as building 
in the slack farming season; see Yin-shu 1.9 P*3a. In Nanking 
the * chu-chiang-ying* were closely connected with the suspension of 
family life, the confiscation of private property, and equal state 
support for all. All commerce was stopped and there was gradual 
confiscation of private property as the ability of the Taiping 
administration to provide for the population increased. Distrib­
ution was through the * tien-kuan1 organizations (ya); but the 
problem of supply was so great that in 1854 the Taipings were 
obliged to restore private,7thpugh. strictly controlled trading;
325
Notes t&bPages 140 & 141
see Shih-liao p.138; Chang Ju-nan: Chin-ling sheng nan chi-liieh 
in TPTK IV pp.716-717, Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu 
ch'u-t'an p.493* At first, people only needed to register in 
order to get as much grain as they needed )• see Hsieh
Chieh-ho: Chin-ling Kuei Chia chiV-shih lfieh in TPTK IV p.656.
But a grain shortage soon developed. Houses in the city were 
allocated by the regime and land in the city was 'nationalized.' 
People were allowed to keep their bedding and other personal 
property, but private grain, the stock of shops and so on, were 
all confiscated; Li Ch'un: op.cit. pp.494-497*
4. This is confirmed by Hsieh Chieh-ho: Chin-ling Kuei Chia chi- 
shih lueh p.665 and by Chang Ju-nan: Chin-ling sheng nan chi- 
lueh, p.712.
5. To prevent people from moving property out of their reach,
the Taipings only allowed them to retain what they could
carry, such as clothes and bedding, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing 
T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, p.495* In Su-chou in I860, people 
were allowed to leave the city, but if they carried bundles they 
were considered to be fleeing and stopped; see Pan Chung-jui: 
Su-t'ai mi-lu chi, ch.l in TPTK V p.284.
6. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote ' 4 $ ^  the last character probably
being an error for 1 ;' but even then the sentence does not
make much sense.
7. Li Hsiu-ch*eng originally wrote ' J i l ^ a n d  then
crossed out * but it was left in the printed edition.
Notes to Page 141*
1. Only Hung Hsiu-ch'iian was entitled to the acclamation 'wan sui* 
(a myriad years). Yang Hsiu-ch'ing was formerly entitled to
'nine hundred years' and the other wangs to 'one thousand.'
2. Li Hsiu-ch'eng probably meant 'to kill the three brothers.'
It is not clear whether they were brothers or cousins. Yang
Pu-ching, who was not in the capital at the time, and thus escaped 
death, seems to have been a cousin; another was Yang Yun-ch'ing, 
see Lo: Shih-kao p.425, and yet another was called Yang Hui-ch'ing, 
see Chao Lieh-wen: Neng-ching ohtL-shih .jih-chi, p.318.
3* The Ch'ing commander at the siege of Ning-ltuo (now Hsuan-ch’eng) 
was Teng Shao-liang. He was killed in battle against Li Shih-
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hsien on 15 December 1858 (HF8/11/11); see Kuo: Jih-chih. Li 
Shih-hsien was not killed until I865.
4. Interlinear,
Motes to Page 142,
1. The lack of reliable source material on this outbreak of
internecine strife, probably the most important single event 
of the whole rebellion, is another indication of the general 
dearth of internal evidence, which affects several aspects of 
Taiping history. Three things make it impossible to put together 
a full and coherent account of what occurred at this time. First, 
the lack of source material. (The most reliable accounts seem to 
be those of the missionaries Macgowan and Bridgman in the North 
China Herald, which were based on the reports of foreigners in 
Taiping service). Secondly, the accounts given in contemporary 
Chinese sources are so fictionalized or romanticized as to arouse 
considerable scepticism. Thirdly, the Taipings themselves were 
extremely reticent about the event, and probably played down 
Hung Hsiu-ch*uan's role in it,
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s account, for all its brevity, is the fullest 
Taiping record of the event which survives. Shih Ta-k'ai*s 
deposition and that of Hung Jen-kan, given even shorter versions, 
the latter having no more than a passing reference to the deaths 
of Yang Hsiu-ch*ing and Wei Ch*ang-hui; see TPTK II pp.781-785, 
846—858.
That Wei Ch*ang-hui (the Pei Wang), Shih Ta-k'ai (the I Wang) 
and Oh*in Jih-kang (the Yen Wang) were resentful of Yang Hsiu- 
ch* ing is not in any doubt, Shih Ta-k*ai*s deposition confirms 
Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s account of Yang*s overbearing nature; but in 
Li Hsiu-ch * eng * s version of the killing of Yang and of the events 
leading to it, Hung Hsiu-ch*tian is assigned only a passive role.
This is the crux of the question. Did Wei Ch*ang-hui kill Yang 
Hsiu-ch*ing on his own initiative, by arrangement with Shih Ta-k*ai, 
or did he do so at the command of Hung Hsiu-ch*uan? Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s 
statement seems unequivocal; Hung is not mentioned even as having 
given tacit consent to the killing.
Kuo T*ing-i believes that Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s version is the true 
one, and gives evidence to support his view. That Hung Hsiu-ch*uan 
was not party to the plan to kill Yang is born out, in Kuo’s
opinion, by the fact that Yang Hsiu-ch*ing was posthumously
honoured by the Taipings, the day of his death being commemorated
as *the day the Tung Wang ascended to Heaven,* and that his son
was allowed to inherit the title of 'Young Tung Wang,' while Wei 
Ch'ang-hui, on the other hand, was not even mentioned in Taiping
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documents afterwards, and his title lapsed. Moreover, Kuo**Tfing-i 
points out, one record (the Chin-ling sheng nan chi-liieh) says that 
Hung Hsiu-ch1 uan reproached Wei for killing Yang, and Li Hsiu- 
ch1 eng relates (see page 164) that the Tfien Wang wanted to have 
Weifs brother executed; see Kuo: Jih-chih pp,484-491*
Lo Erh-kang does not agree with this theory. Curiously enough, 
he too, like Kuo Tfing-i, relies on Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1 s account, but 
he uses it to prove the exact opposite* Lo takes as unmistakably 
implied in Li Hsiu-ch1 eng *s remarks about the killing of Yang Hsiu- 
ch1 ing, that it was done on Hung Hsiu-ch,uan1s orders, The fact 
that the same remarks can be used to support two opposing theories 
is an indication of the neutral nature of those remarks. They 
cannot be taken as convincing evidence of Hungfs passive role: 
even less can they be considered as firon proof1 of the opposite, 
as Lo Erh-kang believes. It is true that Li Hsiu-ch1 eng was not in 
a senior position at the time of the internecine strife, nor was 
he in the capital; on the other hand, in the high position to 
which he later rose, he would surely have known the truth. The 
other arguments which Kuo Tfing-i cites to support what he considers 
as Li Hsiu-ch1engfs claim that Hung Hsiu-chfuan was not implicated, 
prove* nopmore than: thetfact that Yang Hsiu-ch1 ing was not posth­
umously dishonoured, and that Wei Gh1 ang-hui was subsequently 
considered the villain of the piece.
The evidence for Hung Hsiu-ch1 uan1 s initiative in the matter 
is fairly strong. Even if we admit that Hung Hsiu-ch1uan1s mind 
was somewhat deranged, we cannot easily believe that he would have 
passively submitted to Yang Hsiu-ch1 ing1 s usurpation of his throne. 
Moreover, the fact that of the original leaders Hung Hsiu-ch1uan 
was the only one to come out of the struggle personally unscathed, 
(Yang, Wei and Chfin were killed, Shih forced to defect) indicates, 
though it does not prove, that it was his authority in the end 
which prevented his dethronement. The case for his complicity is 
strengthened by the accounts of Bridgmen and Macgowan, who say 
that Wei and Shih (Macgowan adds Ch’in) were summoned by Hung to 
deal with his dangerous rival; and also by Chang Ju-nan: Chin-ling 
sheng nan chi-lileh, I-liangfs memorial of HF6/11/3 (kang-lueh ch. 
163) and that ofKuan Wen of HE6/11/2 (ffang-lueh ch.165), and by 
two accounts in Wang Shih-to: I Ping nih-chi(all cited by Lo Erh- 
kang), which record the arrival at _An-chfing of orders from Hung 
Hsiu-ch1 uan for the execution of Yang Hsiu-ch1 ingfs brother, and 
confirmatory intelligence received by Chang Eei (former Governor 
of Kiangsi).
That Yang Hsiu-ch1 eng had insisted on being acclaimed fwan sui1 
is bom out by several different accounts. Shih Ta-k'ai in his 
deposition merely said that Hung Hsiu-ch1 uan had promoted Yang 
hsiu-ch1ing, see TPTK II p.781 (Unfortunately this deposition is 
merely a secretary1s abbreviated account of what Shih said in 
interrogation). Chang Ju-nan records that after the Twan sui1
©
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incident, Yang intended to go to Hung's palace to depose him, but 
that as soon as he left his residence (insufficiently disguised 
perhaps?) a retainer let off firex^ orks - de rigueur at each public 
appearance of the Tung Wang - and the unexpected commotion gave 
warning to Hung Hsiu-ch*uan; see Chang Ju-nan: Chin-ling sheng 
nan chi-liieh, p.703*
Wei Ch'ang-hui arrived at Nanking on 1 September 1856 (HF6/8/3) 
with about 3,000 troops in 200 boats; see Chang Ju-nan: op.cit, 
p.703 and Fang-lueh ch,l6l p#20a. After some slaughter, including 
that of the Tung Wang, the remainder of his troops, numbering 
several thousand, were tricked into a brutal and machiavellian trap.
It was announced, according to the accounts in the North China Herald, 
that Wei Chfang-hui and Ch*in Jih-kang were to be publicly punished 
in front of Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's palace for exceeding their duty.
The remainder of Yang Hsiu-ch*ing*s troops were invited to attend 
the humiliation of the assassins. Once they had been lulled into 
a false sense of security by a staged execution of *400‘strokes' 
on Wei and Ch'in, they were invited to unburden themselves of their 
arms and rest in two temple halls which had been prepared for the 
purpose. As soon as they were inside they were massacred.
According to Bridgman's informant, Wei and Ch'in killed between
20,000 and 30,000 people after the assassination of Yang. (This high 
figure is confirmed to some extent by Wang Shih-tuo: I Ping .jih-chi 
(cited by Lo Erh-kang) and by official Ch'ing reports, see Fang- 
Lueh ch.162 p.26a.
Shih Ta-k*ai arrived back in the capital to stop the killing 
at the end of September or the beginning of October, but had to 
flee almost at once.
Li Hsiu-ch'eng relates the date of Wei Ch'ang-hui's death to the 
time when Shih Ta-lc'ai was at Ning-kuo, but it is not clear whether 
he means before or while Shih was there. According to Fang-lueh 
ch.I63 p.26b and Ch. 166 p*6b, Shih Ta-lc'ai was at Ning-kuo between 
10 and 28 November. Macgowan records that Shih Ta-k'ai asked the 
T'ien Wang to have Wei Ch'ang-hui killed and that he refused until 
he discovered how popular Shih was. Two other accounts say that 
Wei Ch'ang-hui had attacked the T'ien Wang's palace, (Chang Ju-nan; 
op.cit,, and Li Kuei: Chin-ling ping-shih hui-juen) but neither is 
entirely reliable. The killing of Wei and Ch'in seems to have been 
accomplished without much slaughter.
Shih Ta-k'ai returned to Nanking in early December, having 
received Wei's head preserved in brine. But he was dissatisfied 
with the state of affairs at the capital and left again towards the 
end of May 1857 > posting up proclamations that he was leaving 
T'ien-ching 'never to return'; see Ho Kuei-ch'ing's memorial of 
IIF7/5 intercalary/3 in Fang-Iiieh ch. 175 P-15& and that of Fu Chi &
Cheng K'uei-shih, ibid, ch.176 p.6b., the proclamation is in Tzu-liao.p.6
This note is based on Lo Erh-kang: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo ling- 
tao chi-1'uan nei-hung k'ao in Shih-shih k'ao pp.239-316; Chien:
Notes to pages 142 & 143
Ch'uan-shih II ch.17; Kuo: Jih-chih pp.484-491; Chia Shu-ts'un & 
Hsu Sheng: Kuan-yu T'ai-pling T'ien-kuo Hung, Yang, Wei, Shih shih- 
chien-ti chi-lco wen-t'i in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 26 April 1964; Kuo 
I-sheng: T'ai-p'ing T*ien-kuo "Nei-hung" shih-chien tsa-k'ao, ibid. 
19 December 1964; Mr. Bridgman's Correspondence, in North China 
Herald, 3 January 1857; Mr* Macgowan's Correspondence, ibid.
9 May, 1857f
Nor the results of the internecine strife, see page 12.
2. Nor read .
3. After extensive campaigning with a large army, cut off from the 
Taiping government, Shih Ta-k'ai was captured and killed in
Szechuan in I863 and his army destroyed; for biographical material 
on him, see Lo: Shih-kao p.302ff; Chien: Ch!uan-shih ch.18
4. Nor jfc. read^ ^  .
Notes to Page 143*
1. This passage was overlooked by Lii Chi-i.
2. At the time of his capture Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave his age as
42 sui, which means that he was probably born in 1823, see Chao 
Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.374. He was probably a Hakka, see Lo: Chien- 
cheng, p.61.
3.. He was eventually given the title of Yang Wang ^  ). He 
succeeded in escaping from the capital when it fell in 1864, 
and was last heard of fighting with Wang Hai-yang in the summer 
of 1865; see Lo: Shih-kao, p.77*
4. This probably means the cultivation of trees for charcoal
burning.
5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng told Chao Lieh-wen in 1864 that his family had 
made a living by charcoal burning, see Chao: Jih-chi p.374.
6. With about three years of education Li Hsiu-ch'eng x^ ould
presumably have got through the Nour Books and the Five Classics.
There is a local tradition in his native place that he was 
employed as a cook in the village school, and learned the lessons 
by listening as he worked. So good was his memory that he was able 
to recite the lessons better than the pupils; from T'ai-p1ing
330
Notes to Pages 145 & 144
T* ien-kuo ke-ming tsai Kuang-hsi tiao-ch*a tzu-liao hui-fcien, cited 
in Li P*ei-jan & Ch*en Jen-hua: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch* eng ts*an- 
chia ke-ming-ti tung-chi, in Kuang-ming Jih-pao, 5 September 1^64- 
This seems quite credible in view of Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1s known love 
of reading, (of books banned by the Taipings, according to Ling 
Shan~ch*ing: T1 ai-p * ing T1 ien-kuo yeh-shih ch. 15 P*7)> of 
calligraphy, see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.218. Lo Erh-kang points 
out that by the time he joined the Taipings, Li Hsiu-ch*eng had 
probably forgotten much of what he had learned, otherwise it is 
unlikely that he would have been an ordinary soldier. Lo also 
sees in Li Hsiu-ch * eng* s use of certain phrases, such as ’,
* 3£| * evidence that he had read some T*ang and
Sung prose; but this no more follows, than to assume that a man 
who says something about fa custom more honoured in the breach...* 
has ever read Hamlet; see Lo: Chien-cheng p. 96*
7* This note in the margin is strongly reminiscent of popular
romantic novels, in which heroes obtain supernatural gifts from 
mysterious sages. Such books were banned by the Taipings, but Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng, is said to have been very fond of them; see Ling 
Shan-ch*ing: T*ai-p*ing T*ien-kuo yeh-shih, ch. 13 p.7. His fatalism 
and certain other things in the deposition may be traced to them.
Notes to Page 144«
1. For^r read ^  •
2, For ^  read ,
3* For ^  read . For information on Chang Chia-hsiang (Chang Kuo-
liang) see note 12 to page 137*
4. See note 3 to P&ge 154*
5. His name seems to have been Ch'en; he was a subordinate and 
perhaps a relative of Ch*en Ta-lcuei, see Chien: Ch * uan-shih I.
p.180,
6. I have not been able to identify Lo-mi-ssu and Liu Ssu.
7. For read .
8. See note 4 to page 135*
9* See note 3 to page 140for the organization of the *ya. *
331
Notes to pages 144 & 145
10. On the east side of the city, just south of Hstian-wu Lake, 
see Map
11. t£ ?  (chien-chiin), an officer sixth in seniority after a %  
(commander-in-chief); they were not, strictly speaking,
inspectors, hut held actual military command; see Ohien: T1ai-p1ing 
T*ien-kuo tien-chih t*ung-k*ao, p.78; Li Ch!un: T*ai-p*ing Tfien- 
kuo chih-tu ch*u-t*an, pp.187-188, and TCHT ch.3 p.106.
12. The I-feng Gate was at the northwest corner of the city, see 
Map II page . It is not clear where Kao-ch'iao was; Kuo
T!ing-i doubts whether it was a place-name, see Jih-chih p.267,
13. There is evidence that Shih Ta-k*ai went to An-ch*ing to take 
over the command of the Western Expedition from Hu I-huang,
in September 1853* Either Li Hsiu-chfeng mistook the date when 
he went to An-ch*ing, or else he had forgotten that Shih Ta-kfai 
had preceded him there; see TCHT p.48 and Hu CHien-fu: Feng-hao 
shih-lu in TPTK V p*9» which records the capture by Shih Ta-lc*ai 
of Chi-hsien-lcuan (Anhwei) on 16 October.
Notes to Page 145*
1. Now Ho-fei (Anhwei). At this time it was the temporary 
provincial capital, An-ch*ing being in Taiping hands. The
Taipings* Western Expedition, which had left Nanking in May 1853j 
took An-ch*ing in June, but failed to take Nan-ch*ang in Kiangsi 
after a siege of three months. In September the expedition divided 
into two armies, one to press westwards along the south bank of 
the Yangtse, and another, under Hu I^huang, went north from An- 
ch*ing and attacked Lu-chou in November. The town was defended 
with considerable skill by Chiang Chung-yuan, who had been appointed 
Governor of Anhwei. On 14 January (HF3/12/16) the Taipings 
finally broke into the town, after mining the wall. They were 
helped by the treachery of the Prefect, who had a grudge against 
Chiang Chung-yuan. The latter took his own life after the fall 
of the town. There is a vivid description of the siege and of the 
first few days of Taiping occupation in Chou Pang-fu: Meng-nan 
shu-oh * ao in TPTK V.
2. Added by Tseng Kuo-fan.
3* Chou Peng-fu quotes a *Pacification Proclamation* saying that 
scholars, peasants, artisans and merchants should remain in their 
occupations; those who wanted to join the Taipings could do so, 
those who did not could go home, see Meng-nan shu-ch*ao p.70
Notes to page 145
4. Shih Ta-k'ai left Nanking in June 1857.
5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote this sentence in the lower margin. Kuo: 
Jih-chih p.481 records the death of Ch'in Jih-kang on 22 August
1856 (BF6/7/22) at Chin-t'an. This conflicts with the report of 
Macgowan in the North China Herald of 9 May 1857 » which both Lo 
Erh-kang and Chien Yu-wen follow.
6. For biographical details, see below, note 5 to page 146. The 
rank of chih-hui ) came third below that of chu-chiang
(commander-in-chief); see Chien: T'ai-p'ing T*ien-kuo tien-chih 
t'ung-k'ao I p.75*
7. For biographical details see Lo: Shih-kao pp.397-8. As ts'an- 
t' ien-an ) he was a court official of the 14th rank;
see Chien: op.cit. I p.101.
8. Li Shih-hsien was Li Hsiu-ch * eng' s cousin; for biographical 
information, see Lo: Shih-kao p.4l0ff.
9. There seems to be an error here. At the time when Shih Ta-k'ai 
left Nanking (the summer of 1857)» Li Hsiu-ch'eng cannot have
been a chih-hui, since at the relief of Chen-chiang (see page 150) 
at the beginning of I856, he was already a fu-ch' eng-hsiang, a 
higher rank than that of chih-hui; see Lo: Chien-oheng. pp.166-7.
10. Shih Ta-k'ai left An-ch'ing and passed into Kiangsi on 5 
October 1857 (HF7/8/18), see Kuo: Jih-chih.
11. According to Chiao-p'ing Nien-fei fang-lueh, ch.53 PP*17-18, 
quoted by Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion, Seattle 1954,
p.31, Chang Lo-hsing had 100,000 rebels under him. This may not 
be very accurate either. The question of Nien strength is 
discussed, somewhat inconclusively, in Teng Ssu-yii: The Nien Army 
and their Guerilla Warfare 1858-1868, Paris & La Haye, 1961.
12. Between 50,000 and 70,000 Taipings followed Shih Ta-k'ai when
he defected, according to Ch'en Feng-ts'ao p'in Lu-an-chou tsung- 
chih, a Taiping document recently discovered in the Ming-Ch'ing 
Archives; see Tzu-liao pp.6-7.
13. Ho Ch'un, a Manchu, was Chiang-nan t'i-tu (commander-in-chief)
at this time. After the death of Hsiang Jung (see page 158 below) 
he was appointed Imperial Commissioner in his stead.
Li Hsiu-ch'eng here gives the impression that the loss of Lu-chou 
was the result of Shih Ta-k'ai's defection. In fact the Taipings 
lost Lu-chou in 1855, more than two years earlier. Contrary to
Notes to pages 145 & 146
Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account, Chou Sheng-k'un, the Taiping garrison 
commander, at least managed to get away, see Kuo: Jih-chih p.420, 
Lo: Chien-cheng p.170.
14. This is inaccurate. In fact, after the capture of Lu-chou on 
10 November, Ho Chfun sent a force to attack Shu-ch'eng, which
the Taipings abandoned in the night of 20 February (HF6/1/15). Ho 
ChTun in the meantime led an attack on San-ho-chen, which he took 
on 16 September after a siege of ten months, in spite of Li Hsiu- 
ch f eng fs effort to relieve the town from Chii-jung (see pagel6l , 
below). After this, Ho Ch'un attacked Lu-chiang, which had been 
held by the Taipings since March 1854, and took it on 18 September 
(HF6/8/20). Ho Ch'un did not leave for Chiangt-nan until 4 October; 
see Hu Ch'ien-fu: Feng-hao shih-lu pp. 16-18, Chien-:- Ch'uan-shih II 
pp.1009-1012 and Fang-lueh ch.162 p.21a.
15. This refers to Ch'in Ting-san , Provincial Commander
of Fukien. Like Hsiang Jung, he had been fighting the Taipings
since 1851, see Chien: Ch*uan-shih I p.274.
Notes to Page 146.
1. T'ung-ch'eng had been taken by the Taipings in November 1855 
(HF5/10/14) and came under attack during the siege of Lu-chou
in the winter of 1854. After the fall of San-ho and Lu-chiang, it 
was besieged by Ch'in Ting-san, see Chien: Ch'uan-shih pp.1011,1012.
2. This was in fact because Shih Ta-k'ai had gathered together a 
force to deal with Wei Ch'ang-hui, see Chien: Ch'iian-shih p.1580.
5. A strategically placed town on the border betwen Honan and 
Anhwei. Chang Lo-hsing (I8II-I863) had been a salt-smuggler; 
he began Nien activities in the Chih-ho region in about 1852. 
Although Nien rebels seem to have helped and joined the Taipings' 
Northern Expedition in 1853, more formal co-operation between them 
did not begin until after 1856, when Chang Lo-hsing was elected 
leader of -united and reorganized Nien bands. In 1858 Chang joined 
the Taipings because of lack of supplies; he had co-operated with 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng in March 1857 (see page 148 below)* In a letter 
written in May I860, Li Hsiu-ch'eng refers to him as^X'\^X% , 
(commander-in-chief of the northern campaign). In I860 Hung Hsiu- 
ch 'uan gave him the title of ¥u Wang (IX X  ). This note is based 
on TPTIC pp.721.746, Ma Ju-heng & Liu Shou-i: Kuan-yu Nien-chtin ling- 
hsiu Chang Lo-hsing-ti tzu-shu ho hsi-wen in Kuang-ming Jih-pao 
10 October 1962, and on Teng Ssu-yii: The Nien Army and their 
Guerilla Warfare, Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion.
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4. Li Chao-shou was formerly a bandit in Ku-shih (Honan)* In 
1854 he was pacified* by the Tao-t1 ai, Ho Kuei-chen, whom he
killed the following year on learning that he had orders to dispose 
of the former bandit; see Fan Yii-jun: Hsing-lieh .jih-chi p.92 in 
Chien-chi III* He then joined the Taipings and served tinder Li 
Hsiu-ch*eng at T*ung-chfeng* It is not clear what his relations 
with Chang Lo-hsing were. Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Bebellion 
p.92, implies that they did not co-operate, and even clashed with 
each other. Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s intention to gain Nien support in 
order to hold T*ung-ch*eng was known to the Ch*ing commanders, 
who were considerably shaken by the possibility that the formidable 
Shih Ta-k*ai, who was thought to be in command in Anhwei, might be 
reinforced by Nien rebels; see Fang-lueh ch.164 pp.l4a-15a.
5. Ch*en Yu-ch*eng (18537-1862) was originally called Ch*en Pei- 
ch*eng (g| % &  , see page 236 below), until Hung Hsiu-ch*uan
changed his name* His nickname, on the government side at least, 
was 'the four-eyed dog1 !&$)), and he is often referred to in 
official documents as (the dog rebel). This was because
he had birthmarks under each eye. He was senior to Li Hsiu-ch*eng, 
and his promotion more rapid. In the TCHT (1855) he has seven lines 
of biography and Li Hsiu-ch'eng only one. For biographical 
details see Lo: Shih-kao p*365-370; his deposition may be found 
in Lo; Shih-llao k*ao-shih chi pp.201-202. For Ch*en Yii-ch'eng's 
betrayal and death, see below, page 209*
Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s order of events is at fault in this passage. 
Ning-kuo was taken by Shih Ta-k*ai on 2 May 1856 (HF6/3/28) and 
attacked by a government force under Teng Shao-liang on 6 November, 
The relief of Ning-kuo to which the deposition refers on page 141 
was on 17 December. At this time Ch'en Yu-ch'eng was left in 
command because Shih Ta-k'ai went to the capital to deal with Wei 
Ch'ang-hui. Shih did not leave An-ch'ing for good until October 
1857* Li Hsiu-ch*eng's request for help fromCh'en Yu-ch*eng at 
Ning-kuo was before, not after Shih Ta-k'ai's defection.
Notes to page 147«
1. In response to this appeal Ch'en Yu-ch*eng left Ning-kuo on
23 December 1856 (HF6/11/26), The town fell to Teng Shao-liang
on 28 December (HF6/12/2); see Fang-lueh ch.176 p.32a-b.
2. For 4^ }%, readit^fl, .
3* Ts'ung-yang is 120 11 south of T'ung-ch'eng at the entrance of
Ts'ai-tzu Lake and Pai-t'u Lake. Government officials reported
Notes to page 147
that Taiping troops not only from Ning-kuo, hut also from Wu- 
ch'ang, Han-yang, Huang-mei and Ch'i-chou, to the number of 
thirty or forty thousand, had assembled at Ts'ung-yang; see Fang- 
lueh oh.167 p.44b.
4. Ch1 eng-t1 ien-yu (j& ^ -It.) was one of the six ranks of nobility 
which evolved after the internecine strife; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-
p'ing T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'-t'an pp.237-244
5. The Ch'ing commanders assumed that the relief force would make 
straight for T'ung-ch'eng, presumably up the lake, which would
take them to within about 20 km. from the town. That they were 
taken unawares is confirmed by Fu Chi, Governor of Anhwei, who 
memorialized that the Taipings had unexpectedly gone down the 
Yangtse from Ts'ung-yang, even as far as Yu-ch'i (beyond Wu-hu), 
and had made their way inland from different points along the 
river; see Fang-lueh ch.168 p.l4a/b.
6. According to Fu Chi, Ch'en Yu-ch*eng*s force consisted of 
eighty to ninety thousand men, in 3>000 boats and with 200
gunboats, ibid.
7. Wu-wei, T'ang-t'ou (Ts'ang-t'ou) and Yun-ts'ao were all taken on 
11 January 1857 (HF6/12/16); see Kuo: Jih-chih.
8. For 1% M  read 111 , Ts1 ang-t' ou.
9. Interlinear.
10. Ch'en Shih-chang was sent from Nanking, left the Yangtse at Yu- 
ch'i, and went to Hsiang-an and Yun-ts'ao by water; see Fang-
lueh ch.168 p.14b. The title *ya-t'ien-hou' was one of the six 
ranks of nobility; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T*ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u- 
t'an, pp.237-244*
11. The Huang-lo River flows from Ch'ao Hu (Ch'ao Lake), by way 
of Tung-kuan and Yun-ts'ao into the Yangtse at Yu-ch'i; see
Lo: Chien-cheng p. 171* Tung-kuan is about half way between Yun- 
ts'ao and Ch'ao-hsien, see Map III.
12. The senior commanders under Fu Chi were Ch'in Ting-san (t*i-tu) 
and Cheng K'uei-shih, (tsung-ping).
13* TJie Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has forXf 5^  , all other editions 
follow, and Lit Chi-i did not correct the error. Chieh-ho is 
to the north of T'ung-ch'eng; see Fang-lueh ch. 168 p.38b, but I do 
not know the exact location. Li Hsiu-ch'eng mentioned Chieh-ho
Notes to pages 147 & 148
later in the deposition (see page 171) and the Chiu Ju T'ang 
Edition made no change.
Lu— chiang was taken on 31 January 1857 (HF7/1/6) after a 
siege of two days (ibid. pp.37&“39h). Ch'ing troops had been 
withdrawn from T’ung-ch'eng as soon as Lu-chiang was threatened, 
but they dared not enter the town, and fled back to T'ung-ch'eng 
as soon as Lu-chiang fell. Ta-kuan, 40 li from T'ung-ch'eng, was 
attacked on the same day; see Kuos Jih-chih and Chien: Ch1uan-shih 
III pp.1583-4*
14* This is confirmed by Fu Chi's memorial in Fang-lueh ch.170 p.lib, 
and by Hu Ch'ien-fu: Feng-hao shih-lu p.20.
Notes to Page 148.
1. The date of Li Hsiu-ch' eng' s sortie and the general attack was 
24 February 1857 (HF7/2/1). By this time the Taipings had
established a line of stockades ten li north of T'ung-ch'eng, 
and were reinforced by troops from Wu-hu; see Chien: Ch'uan-shih 
III p. 1584* Fu Chi's version is that forty or fifty thousand 
Taipings had arrived from An-ch'ing on 24 February; he complained 
that all the Taipings from Ning-kuo and Hupeh had descended upon 
him; see Fang-lueh ch.170 pp.llb-12a
2. After the defeat of the government forces, Ch'in Ting-san 
withdrew to Liu-an and Cheng Kuei-shih to Lu-chou. Taiping
troops took Shu-ch'eng on 27 February (HF7/2/4) and Liu-an on 3 
March, after which Ch'in Ting-san also withdrew to Lu-chou.
3. Hu Ch'ien-fu records that there had been a crop failure the 
previous autumn, which led to a serious famine in northern
Anhwei in the early part of 1857* Hungry peasants could not 
get enough to eat even by enlisting as 'braves' and therefore 
gave their allegiance to the rebels, see Feng-hao shih-lu p.20.
4* Kung Te-shu (called Kung Te -Jllf - in Ch’ing documents, and 
nicknames 'blind Kung') was a competent military commander and 
formerly an aide to the Nien leader Chang Lo-hsing; later he 
commanded a Nien banner. Su T'ien-fu, whom Li Hsiu-ch'eng called 
Su Lao-t'ien, was commander of the Nien Blue, or Black Banner; 
see Lo: Chien-cheng p.l73> Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion 
p.26, Teng Ssu-yii: The Nien Army and their Guerilla Warfare p.95.
5. Ho-ch'iu-hsien (Ying-chou Prefecture, Anhwei) was taken by Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng on 18 March (HF7/2/23), after which he unsuccessfully
Notes to pages 148 - 150.
attacked Ying-shang (HF7/4/2) and then withdrew to Liu-an.
6. Cheng-yang-kuan, a strategic point on the Huai River in Feng- 
yang Prefecture, was taken on 11 March (HF7/2/16). Shou-chou
was attacked on 13 March and besieged until the 21st (HF7/2/26), 
when Ch'en Yu-ch'eng withdrew southwards.
7. Ch'en Yu-ch'eng took Ying-shan on 27 April and Huang-mei on 
12 May.
8. This is not entirely correct. In fact Ch'en Yu-ch'eng was
fighting primarily against government troops under Kuan Wen 
(Governor General of Hu-kuang) and Hu Lin-i (Governor of Hupeh);
Li Hsii-pin, with a detachment of the Hunan Army did not cross over 
from Chiu-chiang until 18 August (HF7/6/29); see Fang-lueh ch.176 
p.17b.
9. The Taipingsi. were severely defeated on 18 August in the region 
of T'ung-ssu-p'ai (j, % ¥& ); Li Hsiu-ch'eng* s -fc ^  J^- may be
an error for this; see Fang-lueh ch.178 pp,15b-18b.
10. One of the six ranks of nobility, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing 
T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.237-244*
11. The office of chang-shuai {% $  ), the senior administrative 
officers at court, was created after the defection of Shih
Ta-k'ai and the demotion of Hung Jen-ta and Hung Jen-fa from the 
rank of wang. Meng Te-en seems to have been the first chang-shuai, 
though there is some doubt as to the date of his appointment. His 
son said that it was in I856, 'when Shih Ta-k'ai left the capital,' 
see Meng Shih-yung chia-hsin, TPTK II p.755; but in fact Shih left 
in 1857* In his deposition, Hung Jen-kan wrote that the appointment 
was made in 1858, see TPTK II p.851. See also Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing 
T*ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an p.255
Notes to Page 149*
1. Interlinear.
2. This question is further discussed on pages 233 ££•
Note to Page 150*
1. This refers to the second siege of Chen-chiang, in December 1857>
Note to pages 150 & 151
described in more detail below, pages 150-151.
Notes to Page 151*
1. For the death of Chou Sheng-k’un see below, page 154*
2. We are now back in I856.
3. Ho Ch'un not Chang Kuo-liang was the senior officer under Hsiang 
Jung at this time* Hsiang Jung had been appointed Imperial
Commissioner late in February 1855 (HF3/I/2O). fie had conferred 
with the resilient Ch'i Shan (Kishe^ of Opium War fame, see Hummel: 
Eminent Chinese pp.126-129)* and had decided to establish two 
headquarters, one at Yang-chou (the -A'If or Great Camp of Chiang- 
pei) and another at Nanking (the of Great Camp of Chiang-nan).
Hsiang Jung arrived at Nanking with his army on 18 April (HF2/2/29), 
eighteen days after the Taipings had occupied the city, and 
established his headquarters about 3 km* away, at Hsiao-ling-wei, 
see Map II • From this time until its destruction by the Taipings 
in July 1856, the Chiang-nan H.Q,. laid ineffective siege to Nanking. 
The number of troops never seems to have exceeded about 20,000, 
but this number was often substantially reduced in order to meet 
demands elsewhere, including Chen-chiang and Anhwei (where Ho Ch'un 
was sent early in 1855)* Morale at the H.Q, was bad and Hsiang 
Jung himself was not a particularly talented or active commander.
As operations dragged on the patience of the Emperor wore thin, 
so that when, in January 1854, Hsiang Jung suggested getting 1,000 
cavalry from the Chiang-pei H.Q, he was told in a vermilion 
endorsement: "You have followed the rebels all the way from Kwangsi 
to Chiang-nan at great cost in troops, without having the least 
success to show for it. Now you have got your eye on troops from 
Chiang-pei! How can you have the gall? Certainly not! If you 
must have troops from Chiang-pei, you had better send up your head 
in return." See Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao in TPTK VIII p.258.
4* i.e. the Ming Tombs, see Map II.
5. See Map II . This place is sometimes referred to in contem­
porary documents as Ch * i-v/eng-ch* iao (<£> ), e,*g. Tu Wen-
lan: Tseng Chiieh Hsiang p'ing Ylieh-ni chieh-lueh, in Chien-chi I 
p.401 and Hu En-hsieh: Huan-nan i chia .yen in Chien-chi II p,351; 
but more often as Ch * i-ch* iao-weng ^  ), e.g. Anon: Yueh-ni
chi-lueh in Chien-chi II p.3$; Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.639 and 
Anon: Shih-wen ts'ung-lu in Chien-chi V p. 120
6. Chen-chiang had been taken by the Taipings on 31 March 1853
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(HF3/2/22) and garrisoned by Lo Ta-kang and Wu Ju-hsiao. At the 
end of April, Hsiang Jung sent a force under Teng Shao-liang which 
laid siege to the town in a somewhat indecisive manner until about 
the end of August, when the Taipings at Chen-ohiang began to feel 
the effects of the blockade. A new Ch'ing commander, Yii Wan-ch'ing, 
had replaced Ho Ch'un in December 1853* who had himself relieved 
Teng Shao-liang. In the spring of 1855 Chi-erh-hang-ah (see note 7* 
below) arrived from Shanghai and took command of the siege. By 
this time the town was completely cut off and the siege force 
numbered about 10,000 men. Relief expeditions from Nanking under 
Wei Ch'ang-hui failed to get through in December 1855* see Chien:
Oh'uan-shih pp.1287-15^3*
7. Chi-erh-hang-ah was a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner. He 
was appointed Governor of Kiangsu in 1854. He had been sent
by Hsiang Jung to Shanghai which had been taken over by the Small 
Dagger rebels (^ h 73 ^  ) in September 1853* a^d had succeeded in 
recovering the town on 17 February I855 (HF5/1/1); see Hummel: 
Eminent Chinese pp.118-119.
8. Chiu-hua-shan is also called Ching-yen-shan (^ CifcfL/u), for 
#  (Tang-1 * u) read -JT 44- (Tan-1 * u).
9. For read &  ''&$% .
10. This is possibly an error for T*o-ming-ah (fe sij jfef ), commander 
of the Chiang-pei H.Q.
11. For read •
12. Interlinear; omitted by Lu Chi-i.
13. According to Macgowan's informant, Ch'in Jih-kang was in 
command of the relief of Chen-chiang. This has some confirm­
ation in a memorial by Te-hsing-ah and Teng Shao-liang reporting 
the capture of a Taiping document, quoted by Kuo: Jih-chih p.457* 
but incorrectly cited as from Fang-lueh ch.15 instead of ch.151, 
and incorrectly dated as HF6/4/1*9 instead of HF6/4/9- But from 
most accounts of the operations the name of Ch'in Jih-kang is 
missing; for instance, Ni Tsai-t'ien: Yang-chou yii-k'ou lu in TPTK 
V p.115, Ch'en Ch'ing-nien: Chen-chiang chiao-p'ing Yueh-fei chi
Chien Chi I p. 180 and Hsien T'ung Kuang-ling shih-kao ch.2 p.
39a. It seems likely that even if the Taiping forces were under 
Ch'in Jih-kang*s command, he himself probably remained in Nanking, 
leaving effective control in the hands of other officers, of whom 
Ch'en Yu-ch'eng was the senior, although Li Hsiu-ch 'eng gives the 
impression that he was.
Notes to pages 151 & 152
14. This is an error for Ts'ang-t'ou (Ji 01 )* which is in the 
north of Chu-jung-hsien, and not in Chen-chiang Prefecture.
15. The Taiping relief force set out from Nanking on about
20 January 1856 (HF5/12/25); it consisted of 20,000 troops 
according to Pien Nai-sheng: Ts'ung-chtin chi-shih in TPTK V p.94, 
though this may be an exaggeration. They established a line of 
stockades between Tung-yang, Lung-t'an and Hsia-shu-chieh.
The main fighting, which was indecisive until about April, was in 
the region of Kao-tzu.
Notes to Page 152.
1. This probably refers,' to the battle at Ts'ang-t'ou (il M  ) or 
T'ang-t'ou ($J| %% ), both names are used, on 6 March 1856
(HF6/I/3O). Taiping pressure on Kao-tzu made Chi-erh-hang-ah send 
relief to Chang Kuo-liang from Chen-chiang. A few days later he 
came himself to direct the fighting; see Chien: Chfuan-shih p.1294.
2.*Pien Nai-sheng records that "the rebels were only on the other 
side of the hill and we could hear each other speak;1 Ts'ung-
chun chi*shih, p.96. Li Hsiu-ch1 eng may be referring to this.
Hsiang Jung's dissatisfaction with the deadlock is reflected in 
his replacement of Teng Shao-liang with Chang Kuo-liang as commander 
of the Ch'ing forces at Kao-tzu; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao HF6/3/3, 
p.587.
3. This incident is also mentioned in Ch'en Ch'ing-nien: Chen-chiang 
chiao-p'ing Yueh-fei chi p. 181; but it may have been taken from
the deposition.
4. For %  % read .
5. This refers to the T'ang-t*ou-ch'a-ho.
6. The account of the operation is far from clear, and it is 
difficult to make sense of it without adequate maps. The Ch'ing
stockades were along the Ch'a-ho. The other river, the T'ang-shui- 
shan-pien, flowed from the Yangtse to the Ch'in-huai River, through 
Chu-jung, Lung-t'an and Mo-ling. The Taipings moved up this river 
in order to get to the rear of the Ch'ing army, which moved forward 
to stop them. See Ch'en Ch'ing-nien: Chen-chiang chiao-p'ing Y&eh- 
fei chi pp.180-181.
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Notes to Page 153 •
1. They had been abandoned when the Taipings advanced along the 
T'ang-shui-shan-pien. How li Hsiu-ch*eng*s force got behind
the enemy is made clear neither by his own account or by that of 
Chfen Ch*ing-nien, which is the most detailed one from government 
sources. Official reports were extremely reticent about this 
operation.
2. Ch*en Ch*ing-nien gives the distance between the two rivers 
as 10 li, see Chen-chiang chiao-p*ing Yueh-fei chi p.181.
3. i.e. 2 April 1856 (HF6/2/27).
4. Chin-shan is on the south bank of the Yangtse in Tan-t'u-hsien
near Chen-chiang; Kua-chou is on the north bank opposite to 
Chen-chiang. This operation was chiefly designed to relieve the 
Chen-chiang garrison's shortage of supplies, but was reported as 
a flight in Ch'ing documents, and the loss of 16 stockades on the 
south bank on 2 April was not mentioned. On 29 March, the 
Prefect of Yang-chou announced publicly that the Taipings had been 
defeated at Chen-chiang and that Yang-chou was no longer in danger. 
On 2 April however, a despatch arrived at the Chiang-pei H.Q. from 
Chi-erh-hang-ah, with the warning that the Taipings had seized 
boats and were intending to cross. But it was Lei I-hsien's 
birthday, and most of the officers in the Chiang-pei H.Q. from 
T'o-ming-ah down, were celebrating with him and had no time to 
worry about despatches; see Hsien T'ung Kuang-ling shih-kao ch.2 
p.43a. There was no effective opposition to the Taiping crossing 
because the Ch'ing boats were large and clumsy and only useful 
when the wind was right; see Tu Wen-lan: P'ing-ting Yueh-fei chi- 
liieh- quoted in Chien: Ch'uan-shih p. 1298.
5. Por !■ ^  1% read Air Mi ?£ .
6. Interlinear.
7. This was on 2 & 3 April (HP6/2/27-8), see Hsiang Jung: Tsou- 
kao p.597* T*o-ming-ah and Lei I-hsien did not even send out
troops until a day later, and then the soldiers were 45 days in 
arrears of pay and were hungry; they did not put up much of a 
fight. The Taiping attack on the H.Q. was facilitated by the 
presence of Taiping agents in Lei I-hsien's force; see Hsien T'ung 
Kuang-ling shih-kao ch.2 pp.42-43L.
8. Yang-chou was taken without a fight on 5 April 1856 (HP6/5/I).
842
Notes to pages 154 & 155
Notes to Page 154.
1, Chou Sheng-k*un was killed in battle on 4 April (HF6/2/29) and 
his troops forced to withdraw on 6 April; the Taiping stockades
at Huang-ni-chou were taken on the same day* After this, such was 
the concern caused by the Taipings1 seizure of Yang-chou, that 
several thousand Ch*ing troops were sent to the north bank; see 
Chien: Ch*uan-shih II p.1299; Kuo: Jih-chih and Hsiang Jung:
Tsou-kao pp.597-8*
2. At this time the Taipings had presumably decided to launch a 
combined attack, with Shih Ta-kfai's force, on the Chiang-nan
H.Q. Shih Ta-k*ai began to move eastwards by marching on Le- 
p*ing on 5 April (HF6/2/28), see Kuo: Jih-chih.
5. The Taipings withdrew from Yang-chou on 14 April (HF6/5/IO) and 
took Chiang-p*u on the same day, and P*u-k*ou on the 16 th. The 
Ch*ing' commander of P*u-k*ou fled to Liu-ho, pursued by Taipings.
4. Chang Kuo-liang crossed from the south bank on 16 April and 
attacked the Taipings in the rear. In the meantime Te-hsing-ah
recovered Yang-chou. The small Taiping garrison, who were listening 
to *preaching* at the time, were taken unawares; see Ni Tsai-t*ien: 
Yang-chou yu-k*ou lu p. 116. On 22 April Chang Kuo-liang took P*u- 
k*ou, but after the Taipings had withdrawn eastwards towards Yang- 
chou (see note 5 below) was himself called back to Chiang-nan 
because Ning-kuo was threatened by Shih Ta-k*ai*s advance; it fell
on 2 May (HP6/5/28), see Kuo: Jih-chih.
5. The Taipings took I-cheng on 28 April and gave it up on 4 May
(HP6/4/1). On 26 May they withdrew from San-ch*a-ho to Kua-
chou and from there crossed to Chin-shan on 27 May (HF6/4/24).
6. 4 is a Kwangsi dialect expression meaning to complete some­
thing satisfactorily, see Lo: Chien-cheng p.50
7. Chang Kuo-liang had in fact left the north bank on 16 April 
and was at this time fighting Shih Ta-k*ai in the region of Mo-
ling-kuan, which Shih*s troops had attacked on 18 May.
8. On 29 May 1856 (HF6/4/26).
Notes to Page 155*
1. On 1 June 1856 (HF6/4/29). The official version was that Chi-
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erh-hang-ah was killed by an enemy shot, see Hummel: Eminent 
Chinese p.119. But two other accounts agree with that of Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng, even about the 1 foreign pistol'; see Chao Lieh-wen: Lo-hua 
ch'un-yti-ch'ao jih-chi and Ts'ang-lang tiao-t'u (pseud.): Chieh-yu 
hui-lu, quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng p.185 nlj.
2. This was on 3 June. Missing from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's account is 
the subsequent fighting at Yii Wan^ch'ing*s H.Q. at Ching-yen- .
shan on 5-6 June; see Pien Nai-sheng: Ts'ung-chiin chi-shih p.97> 
which otherwise confirms Li Hsiu-ch1 eng1 s version, except to say 
that only 30+ Ch'ing stockades were destroyed.
3. In fact Chang Kuo-liang returned with some 3,000 men from the
region of Mo-ling-kuan, where on 20-21 May (HF6/4/17) he had
inflicted a defeat on Shih Ta-k'ai.
4. Chang Kuo-liang engaged the Taipings first at Tan-t'u on 8 June, 
then advanced to Ching-yen-shan on 10 June and defeated the
Taipings there on the following day; see Chien: Ch'uan-shih p.1302 
and Kuo: Jih-chih.
5. On 12 June 1856.
6. On 13 June (HF6/5/11) the Taipings gave up all their stockades
outside Chen-chiang and went back to Nanking by way of Kao-tzu
and Kuan-yin-men, in order to join up with Shih Ta-k'ai and deal 
with the Chiang-nan H.Q. Chang Kuo-liang*s army followed them 
back; see Pang-liieh ch. 154 p. 18a
7. Yang Hsiu-ch*ing*s refusal to allow these troops to enter the 
city before the Chiang-nan H.Q, at Hsiao-ling-wei was defeated
may have been connected with other than purely military consider­
ations. There was a. shortage of grain in the capital at the time, 
and earlier (HF5/U)» after the fall of Lu-chou, he had refused to 
allow the troops into Nanking for this reason; see Hsien T'ung 
Kuang-ling shih-kao ch.2 p.34. On this occasion Yang Hsiu-ch*ing's 
decision may also have had something to do with his plan to usurp.
Notes to Page 156.
1, Events proved that Yang Hsiu-ch'ing had been right to insist.
He may have been aware that there were only 5,000 Ch'ing troops
at the Chiang-nan H.Q.; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao (HE6/5/22) p.638.
2. On 17 June (HF6/5/I5).
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3. For% ^ read-^Mo F"3 .
t
4. Chang Kuo-liang had in fact returned from Li-shui on 18 June, 
reaching the Chiang-nan H.Q* on the 19th.
5* For#, readi§ .
6. For read
7* Shih Ta-k’ai and his force returned to the capital after Chang 
Kuo-liang had been recalled to tjie Chen-chiang front (see note 
3 to page 155). Then one part of Shih Ta-lc’ai1 s force took Chiang- 
p fu and another was sent to Li-shui to prevent Ch’ing reinforcem­
ents from reaching the Chiang-nan H.Q. from the region of Su-chou 
and Ch’ang-chou. On 18 June another part of the army occupied Pai- 
hsiang and fortified positions at Yao-hua-men, Hsien-hao-men and 
Shih-pu-ch*iao; see Chien: Ch1uan-shih II p.1308.
Notes to Page 157•
1. For zfe read^ fej .
2. For £> read %  *
3. Hsiang Jung withdrew on 20 June to Ch’un-hua-men and on the 
following day to Tan-yang by way of Chu-jung.
4. This is an error for ’the 6th Year [I856]*.
5* The Chiang-nan military commissariat, taken by the Taipings on 
20 June, does not seem to have been very well stocked, see Hsiang 
Jungi Tsou-kao pp.652-3. Spoil from the camps may have been more 
plentiful.
6. Chu-jung was taken on 27 June (HF6/5/25) by the northern column 
advancing through T'u-ch’iao; the southern column made for Li-
yang; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p*650. The Taipings arrived at 
Tan-yang on 2 July (HF6/6/1)
7. On 2 July, according to Hsiang Jung, six or seven thousand 
Taipings attacked the Ch’ing positions outside Tan-yang. All
the local people having fled, there was no one to conscript for 
the construction of defences and Hsiang was obliged to order a 
retreat into the town; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.653
Notes to pages 157 & 158
8. The Taiping were reinforced from Chen-chiang, but Hsiang Jung's 
estimate of the numbers of this relief force (10,000) is
probably an exaggeration; see Hsiang Jung: Tsou-kao p.667.
9. The Taiping army was defeated on 18 July (HF6/6/17) with a loss 
of 600 men; as a result of this, Ch'in Jih-kang was deprived
of his title of wang; see Chien: Ch1uan-shih p.1313
Notes to Page 158*
1. This is at variance with other accounts. Te-hsing-ah reported 
in a memorial that Hsiang Jung died of illness, see Fang-lueh 
ch.158 p.25b (HF6/7/17)* In his last memorial Hsiang Jung 
complained that he could hardly walk because of pain in the legs, 
see Tsou-kao» p.670.
2* ^  f  is a Liang-kwang dialect expression, see Lo: Qhien-cheng 
p.188 n2.
M l &  , an official of the 7th rank, immediately below the 
chf eng-hsiang; there were 36 chien-tien. see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p * ing 
T';ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.114,122.
4. On 13 August (HF6/7/I3).
5. There is an account of this siege in Ch'iang Ju-hsun: Chin-t' an 
chien-wen chi in TPTK V p.l93> where it is stated that the
attack was a prelude to a move on Ch'ang-chou.
6. This passage was overlook by Lll Chi-i. Chin-t*an was garrisoned 
by a force of 2,000 troops under Li Hung-hstin, but 1,300 of them
were sent to Li-yang before the Taiping attack began. The rest 
were assisted by militia and twenty rusty cannon. But the defence 
was efficiently organized and there seems to have been close 
co-operation between the troops and the gentry. Chang Kuo-liang 
sent relief into the town on 22 August, but as the Taiping numbers 
increased, he decided to come himself, on 4 September. Ch'iang 
Ju-hsun: Ching-t'an chien-wen chi p.200 says that under such a 
commander as Ch'in Jih-kang the Taipings had hoped to take the town 
in two days; but instead, Ch'in had been killed there. Li Pin: 
Chung-hsing pieh-chi ch.28 p.13a (1910 University Microfilms, Xerox 
copy), also says that Ch'in was killed at Chin-t'an; but Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng* s version, supported by Macgowan's report, (that he was killed 
during the internecine struggle) is probably more reliable.
7* The Tung Wang, Yang Hsiu-ch'ing was killed on 2 September. The
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Taipings withdrew from Ting-chiieh-ts 'un (25 li from Chu-jung) on 
4 September (HF6/8/6). Afterwards, Li Hsiu-ch' eng was sent to 
San-ho (see page 161) and Ch'en Yu-ch'eng to the relief of Ning- 
kuo. Chang Kuo-liang took Pao-yen on 19 September (HF6/8/21) and 
re-occupied Kao-ch'un and Tung-pa on the following day; he began 
the siege of Chii-jung on 4 October (I-IF6/9/6). Ho Ch'un had been 
appointed to succeed Hsiang Jung, although Chang Kuo-liang was a 
much more competent commander; he was however, not a Manchu and 
had been a bandit. Ho-Ch'un arrived at Tan-yang in the middle of 
October.
8. For i§ #  read ljt Hjr,
Notes to Page 159m
1. For readife .
2. For kh read M  .
5. For read •
4. This is a quotation from the Lun-yu Y. "The master said: In a 
hamlet of ten houses you may be sure of finding someone quite
as loyal and true to his word as I..." See Arthur Waley: The
Analects of Confucius. London 1958 p.114*
5. The character ^  is missing here.
6. For % read .
7. This passage shows the influence of the popular Ming novel ¥$ ’>% ^  
(Canonization of the Gods), author unknown, which is strongly
fatalistic in character and contains a mixture of Buddhist, Taoist 
and Confucian ideas. This may have been one of the banned books 
which Li Hsiu-ch'eng liked to read, see note 6 to page 143).
8. For read JL •
Notes to Page 160.
1. For ^  readvtiii .
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Notes to Page 161.
1. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has &  (Hung) for (Lan), for which 
in the original, Li Hsiu-ch*eng used the abbreviated character -+jr
Lan Ch*eng-ch*un was Ch * un-kuan-yu-fu- ch * eng-hsiang , according to 
Ti-fu tao-jen (pseud, ); Chin-ling tsa-chi in TPTK IV p.645, he had- 
been a chien-tien with a command in Ho-fei-hsien, Anhwei; see TCHT 
p. 75.
2. San-ho was taken by troops under Ho Ch*un on 16 September 1856 
(HF6/8/18) after a siege of about ten months, Lu-chiang was
taken about two days later; see Kuo; Jih-chih,
5, Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s account now jumps to 1857* The events between 
the loss of San-ho and the fall of Chii-jung are related on 
pages 146-8,
4. Chu-jung was taken by Chang Kuo-liang on 16 June 1857 (HF7/5 
intercalary/25), having been under siege since 4 October 1856
(HF6/9/6); see Fang-lueh ch,177 pp,7*b-9a. After 12 June the siege 
force was joined by Ch'ing units from Li-shui, which had been 
recovered on that day; Ch'in Ting-san had also arrived from An- 
ch'ing on 51'*May» ibid, eh. 177 p.7b & ch. 175 p. 18a.
5. Ho-ch'un attacked Chen-chiang on 26 July 1857 (HF7/6/6); Kua- 
chou was besieged at the same time by an army from the Chiang-pei
H.Q. until 27 November (HF7/10/12), when both towns fell. Relief 
was sent under Hung Hsiu-ch*uan*s brother Hung Jen-fa from Nanking 
on 7 November, who occupied Shih-pu-ch'iao, Lung-t'an and Hsia-shu- 
chieh; see Fang-lueh ch. 184 p.laff; but was unable to make any 
further headway against Chang Kuo-liang's troops. Norv.was the Chen- 
chiang garrison force under Wu Ju-hsiao able to make contact with 
them. About the middle of November or a little earlier, Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng came south from Lu-chou by way of Chao-kuan and Ho-chou, 
and crossed the Yangtse in an attempt to relieve Chen-chiang; but 
he was defeated by Chang Kuo-liang on 14 December, and Hung Jen-fa 
on the 15th. (Hung was incorrectly reported killed). Chang Kuo- 
liang recovered Chen-chiang on 27 December (HF7/11/12), but Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng had managed to get most of the garrison out; see Fang-lueh 
ch.I65 pp.52,54-55*
6. By establishing positions at Kao-ch* iao-men, Lung-po-tzu (Chung- 
shan) and Hsiao-ling-wei on 8 January 1859 (HF8/11/24). The
new Chiang-nan H.Q. was between Kao-ch'iao-men and Ts'ang-po. A 
moat of l-J-2 ohang (17-25 ft.) deep and wide was dug, which event­
ually stretched from outside the Shui-hsi Gate to the Yangtse on 
the north side of the city, a distance of about 100 li. It was not
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completed until the winter; see Fang-lueh ch.191 p*17> Shih Chien- 
lieh do Liu Chi-tseng: Chi (Wu-hsi )-hsien-ch* eng shih-shou k*e-fu 
pen-mo in TPTK V pp.246-7, and Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yueh-fei chi-lueh 
in Chien-chi I p.44*
7. Yang Fu-ch*ing, later the Fu Wang ^), was a cousin of Yang 
Hsiu-ch*ing, and one of the few members of his clan to survive
the massacres of 1856; he was in Kiangsi at the time. In March 
1857 he went from Kiangsi into Fukien, returning in July. In 
November he joined up with Shih Ta-k*ai, but broke with him the 
following year. For other biographical details, see Lo: Shih-kao 
pp.25-4.
8. Wei Chih-ehun was Wei Ch*ang-hui's younger brother, though this 
was not, according to Lo Erh-kang, the reason for his disgrace;
he had been responsible for the loss of Wu-ch*ang in December 
1856; see Lo: Shih-kao pp.296-7, Lo: Shih-shih-k1ao p.503 and 
page 164, below.
9. Lin Shao-chang had been cashiered for his failure at Hsiang-t*an 
in the Spring of 1854, see page 165, and Appendix I, page
Other biographical details are given in Lo: Shih-kao pp.540-2.
10.Lin Ch'i-jung was the garrison commander of Chiu-chiang from 
1854 to 1858, when in May the town fell and the whole garrison
of 17,000 Taipings, including Lin, was wiped out. Tseng Kuo-fan 
said of him that *his endurance was unparalleled*. He was posth­
umously given the title of Ch*in Wang..See Lo: Chien-cheng p.194
11. Huang Wen-chin, later the Tu Wang, was familiarly known as
* Huang the Tiger*. He commanded the Taiping garrison at Hu-k*ou 
for 5 years, until the town fell on 26 October 1857, see Lo: Shih- 
kao pp.424-5*
12. Chang Ch*ao-chueh, later the Li Wang, became second-in-command 
to Ch*ing Jih-kang at An-ch'ing after Shih Ta-lc*ai returned
to Nanking in the winter of 1855» see Lo; Shih-kao p.404 and TCHT 
p.64. Ch*en Te-ts*ai, later the Fu Wang, was a subordinate of 
Ch*en Yu-ch*eng, see Lo: Shih-kao p.450
Notes to Page 162.
1. Hsiao-lcu-shan is in Su-sung Prefecture and Hua-yang-chen is 
in Wang-chiang Prefecture, Anhwei. (Lo: Chien-cheng p. 194)
Notes to page 162
2. Very little seems to be known about Li Ch*un-fa. Pie is first 
mentioned in 1854 as being the secretary of a board (shang-shu).
In I860 he was * ^  M  1 - a title probably created about that time, 
of rank approximately equal to that of the ch1 eng-hsiang; he was, 
with Meng Te-en and Lin Shao-chang, one of the ruling triumvirate.
His specific office was that of ohing-chi t*ung-kuan (itlbM/f ),
which perhaps means that he was 1 mayor1 of Nanking; see Yu-chu Chao-
chih in Shih-liao p. 115; Li Ch*un: T'ai-p^ng T'ien-kuo chih-tu 
chtU"ttan pp.244-5; Lo;Chien-cheng p.194, and Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix
p*22.
3. Commonly called *The Pillars1 by westerners, "At the distance 
of about forty-five miles above Nankin.. .where the river narrows
to about fourteen hundred yards, running between two granite bluffs, 
called the ‘pillars,* of about two hundred feet in height. The 
rebels have fortified the position strongly after their fashion, 
having constructed numerous batteries upon the high slopes, connect­
ing them by a brick wall." See G. J.Wolseley: Narrative of the War
with China in I860, London 1862 p.362
4. The main crossing over the Yangtse at Nanking was from P*u-k*ou 
north bank in Chiang-p'u-hsien; thus, Liang-p*u (the two fp fu).
By 3 April 1858 (HP8/2/20), the only crossing still open was at 
Chiu-fu-chou, which was under water during the stammer months. By 
that time, Ch*ing troops were in control of P*u-k*ou, see Pang-lueh 
ch. 190 p. 13a. Chiang-pfu fell to the government on 12 April (HP8/ 
2/29), ibid. p.l6b, after which the Taiping forts on Chiu-fu-chou 
were attacked.
5. Te-hsing-ah (d.1866) was a Manchu of the Plain Yellow Banner.
At this time he was commander of the Chiang-pei H.Q.
6. But only until 16 April 1858 (HP8/3/3)> when Ho-chou fell to the 
government.
7. Ho-ch*un reported intelligence to the effect that there was 
enough grain in the capital to last until the 7^ *1 Month (early
Autumn), but there was a shortage of oil, salt and other supplies; 
see Pang-lueh ch.195 P*7»
8. This presumably refers to Li Hsiu-ch* eng*s appointment as chu- 
chiang (commander). The title, according to Hung Jen-kan, was
revived by Hung Hsiu-ch*uan in 1858. Before they were given the 
title wang at Yung-an in 1851, Yang Hsiu-ch*ing, Peng Yun-shan,
Hsiao Ch*ao-kuei, Wei Ch*ang-hui and Shih Ta-k'ai were all chu- 
chiang. "In 1858 Ch'en Yu-ch'eng received the appointment of 
ch'ien-chun ohu-chiang % i; Commander of the Pront Division],
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Li Hsiu-ch1 eng, hou-ohiin chu-chiang [4k? ^  Commander of the Rear 
Division], Li Shih-hsien, tso-chun chu-chiang Commander
of the Left Division] Wei Chih-chun, yu-chun chu-chiang 
Commander of the Right Division, and Meng Te-en chung-chun chu-chiang 
[4* ¥  ^  Commander of the Centre Division] with general control
over military affairs.” See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition, TPTK IX p.851, 
This must refer to the first half of 1858, since we know that in 
September 1858 Yang Fu-ch*ing was made chung-chun chu-chiang. See 
^o: Shih-kao p.425* Li Ch’un: Tlaipting Tfien-kuo chih-tu ch!u-ttan, 
pp.249-250.
Notes to Page 165.
1. The passage in capitals is omitted in Lii Chi-i*s copy.
Huang-ch'ih and Wan-chih, in southern Anhwei, were taken by Li
Shih-hsien on 28 February 1858 (HF8/1/15). In the Chiu-Ju Tfang 
Edition this passage reads: ”At this time my cousin Li Shih-hsien 
was employed on the recommendation of a court official, he...”
2. This is not in agreement with what Hung Jen-kan wrote in his
deposition, see note 8 above; both Meng Te-en and Ch'en Yii- 
chfeng were senior to Li Hsiu-ch1eng.
5. Chang Kuo-liang at first concentrated his attacks on the north­
west side of the city; but on 16 April 1858 attacked Ch'i-ch^ao- 
weng and threatened Yu-hua-t’ai, an important strongpoint to the 
south; see Fang-Iueh ch.191 -.17* ch.195 p.la.
4. See note 2 to page 253* & Appendix I p.257*
5. This passage was overlooked by Lu Chi-i.
Notes to Page 164.
1. This may have been on 15 April (HF8/5/2). Ho Ch!un reported 
a sortie of Taipings from the south gate on this day, see
Fang-lueh ch.192 p.la
2. The Taiping attack on Ku-shih (Honan) was on 20 January 1858 
(HF7/12/6), see Chfu Chih-fu: Wan^-ch'iao chi-shih p.97 in
Chien-chi II.
5* , one of the six ranks of nobility which evolved after
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the internecine struggle; see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T1ien-kuo chih- 
tu ch'u-t'an pp.237-244. Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix pp.70-74 lists 
over 80 different t'ien-fu.
4. Wei Chih-chun surrendered to the government in the winter of 
18591 see Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu (Yang Tsai-fu to Tseng
Kuo-fan) in Chien-chi YI p.195 and Lo: Shih-kao p.297* According 
to some of the local people of Chin-t'ien, before reaching home he 
informed the elders of the village that everyone coming to welcome 
him home would receive one dollar, but that he refused to pay out 
when he found that the offer had been accepted by too many people.
He is said to have been inundated by claims for damages, because 
of the destruction of houses in the village belong to anyone who 
had had anything to do with him, by government authorities. He 
did not meet these claims but contributed such thihgs as a bridge, 
and a free ferry for the good of the community. He asked for leave 
to return home late in 1865, when he was a fu-chiang (colonel); but 
this was not granted at the time; see Tseng Kuo-fan: P1i-tu ch.3 
p. 18b. I do not know whether he had been home before 1865 or whether 
Li Hsiu-chfenh was merely misinformed, (see T*ai-p1ing Tfien-kuo 
oh'i-i tiao-oh'a pao-kao p.92*)
5. This passage was overlooked by Lu Chi-i.
6. Te-an, in Hupeh, in now called An-lu. It is not clear what the 
aim of this operation was. If Li Hsiu-ch'eng is correct in
saying that it was to 'assemble enough troops to relieve T'ien- 
ching,' this may mean that Ch'en Yu-ch'eng hoped to enlist Nien 
allies in this region. He had already co-operated with a Nien 
force under Han Ch'i-feng in the attack on Ku-shih; see Chiang Ti: 
Ch'u-ch'i Nien-chun shih lun-ts'ung, Peking 1959 p.l23ff. According 
to Ch'ing intelligence reports based on the interrogation of 
prisoners after the capture of Huang-an (see note 7 below), the 
Taipings intended to make for Hsiang-an, on the Han River; see Fang- 
Lueh ch. 196 p.2, Perhaps there were Nien forces in the Hsiang-yang 
region to be enlisted; it was an old centre of Nien influence. But 
it seems more likely that an attack on Wu-ch'ang from the rear was 
planned.
7. This is an error for 'the 8th Year'; that is between 9 June and 
and 10 July 1858. The Taiping siege of Ku-shih failed on 6 April
(HF8/2/23); Ch'en YU-ch'eng and Wei Chih-chun passed into Hupeh.
They occupied Ma-ch* eng on 24 April (HF8/3/H) and Huang-an on the 
26th. When Chiu-chiang fell to the Hunan Army on 19 May, aid was 
sent, aid was sent which enabled the government forces to recover 
Huang-an on 9 June (HF8/4/28), thus completing the encirclement of 
Ma-ch*eng, which was then abandoned by the Taipings; see Fang-lueh 
ch.192 p.17b, ch.195 PP*lL,13b> ch.196 pp.1-2.
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Notes to Page 165.
1. Kuo T’ien-i: Jih-chih gives 15 or 14 April 1858 as the date of 
the crossing and assembly at Han-shan. This is incorrect, since
Li Hsiu-ch1eng wrote in the subsequent paragraph, that by the time 
they had assembled, Ho-chou had already fallen; this was on 16 
April. The date of the Taiping counter-attack from Han-shan was 
4 May; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.199*
2. Ch’en K*un-shu, later the Hu Wang (see below, page 210 and note 9)> 
Of Hsiao Chao-sheng nothing seems to be known. Chf en Ping-wen
was later made Ting Wang, and surrendered in I864. Wu. Ting-tsfai 
was killed in action at the fall of An-chfing in 1861; see Lo: Chien- 
cheng, pp.197-8.
5. Por read i'#l •
4. This passage was overlooked by Lu Chi-i.
Chao-kuan, a strategic point in Han-shan-hsien, was taken by the 
taipings on 4 May (HF8/5/2I), before the Chfing forces had finished 
taking up their positions. Ho-ts*un-p’u is 20 li north of Ho-chou 
in the direction of Chao-kuan, on a river which flows through Ho- 
chou into the Yangtse. Ho-chou was taken by the Taipings on 9 May 
(HP8/5/26), See Lo: Chien-cheng p.198 and Pang-lueh ch.195 pp*la-5b.
5* The Taipings took Ch’tian-chiao on 11 May, Ch*u-chou on the same 
day and Lai-an on 15 May (HP8/4/1), see Pang-lueh ch.192 p.51.
6. After the Taipings captured Ch’iian-chou and Ch1 u-chou, Te-hsing- 
ah, fearing that they would then advance to Liu-ho and threaten
the Chiang-pei H.Q., sent 2,000 troops to prevent this. His forces 
were severely overstretched, about ten thousand troops covering an 
area of * several hundred li1. He complained that 1 the troops in
Kuang-[chou] and Ku-[shili]”"push 
troops at Ch*i-[chouJ and Huang- 
Anhwei, at [Chiang]-pfu and Liu-
;he rebels into western Anhwei, the 
mei] push the rebels into southern 
ho] they push them from the east
into northern Anhwei, so that the whole of the province is an ocean 
of rebels.1 See Pang-lueh ch,195 pp.3ih-52a.
Sheng kung-pao refers to Sheng Pao; see Hummel: Eminent Chinese
p.508. But he was not present at this battle; he was at Liu-an,
see Pang-lueh ch.195 pp*55b-56a & pp.40a/b.
Li Hsiu-ch’eng gave up Lai-an on 20 May (HF8/4/8).
7. Li Chao-shou came to Ch*u-chou from Nanking on 11 June, Kuo: Jih-
chih.
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1. A contemporary diarist x^ rote, 1 At first the long-haired rebels 
[the Taipings] had very good regulations; when they toolc a
town or occupied territory, after the people were pacified, they 
were well treated, so that they [the Taipings] were able to hold 
half of Chiang-nan. But after they joined up with the Nien bandits 
it is hard to describe how the people were oppressed, and the result 
is the present defeat." See Tao-kfou yii-sheng (pseud.): Pei-Iu 
ohi-lueh in Tzu-liao p.214.
2. This refers to Kwangtung T'ien Ti Hui (Triad) members enlisted 
in Kiangsi by Shih Ta-k'ai in 1855-56, to the number of * several
hundred thousand.' (Pang-lueh ch.369 p.13a). They constituted an 
enormous reinforcement for the Taiping armies, but the advantage was 
probably outweighed by what Li Hsiu-ch'eng called the demoralizing 
effect of this recruitment. Contrary to precedent, these T'ien Ti 
Hui bands were not incorporated into the Taiping military machine, 
and were consequently not subject to Taiping education and discipline. 
Their behaviour damaged the 'public image' of the Taipings, and 
infected the Taiping troops with their own indiscipline. They were 
unreliable allies because they often refused to co-operate, and 
were inclined to come to terms with the government. See Lo: Shih- 
shih-k'ao pp.68-74.
3. Por Taiping local government, see Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing T*ien-kuo 
chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.285-308 Chien: Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I
PP.577-490.
4. Liu is Liu Kuan-fang, a oh'eng-hsiang in 1855 > & chu-chiang in 
1859» he was made Hsiang"~Wang in 186l. He is said to have been
killed at Ch'ang-hsing in 1864, see Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.29; 
but Lo: Shih-kao p.427 says that he was later heard of at the fall 
of Hu-chou, after which not more is known.
Ku is Ku Lung-hsien, later made Peng Wang, though he does not
seem to have held very high rank previously. He surrendered to the
government in southern Anhwei in I863, though he had refused to do
so when Wei Ch'ang-hui turned coat, and had attacked him, in company
with Liu Kuan-fang; see Kuo: Jih-chih Appendix p.29.
Lai is Lai Wen-hung, the Kuang Wang, was killed in 1864 (ibid.)
Por Yang Fu-ch'ing see note 7 to page IM .
Tseng Kuo-fan in a memorial of TC2/2/27 (April I863) remarked that 
Li Shih-hsien, Yang Pu-ch'ing, Huang Wen-chin, Ku Lung-hsien and 
Liu Kuan-fang were 'dispirited and do not always obey the Ttien Wang 
and the Chung Wang's orders; they tend to become wandering rebels 
see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.8b. This is perhaps
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why he asked about Liu, Ku and Lai when interrogating Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng; see Appendix I page 258.
5. Li Chao-shou surrendered to Sheng Pao on 1 November 1858. Y/hen 
he first became a rebel he had sent his wife and mother for
safety to Chou-chia-k*ou in Honan; but their artificial poverty 
aroused suspicion, and they were seized and handed over to Sheng 
Pao, who exclaimed, "Now I have Ch*u-chou and Ch'iian-chiao in my 
hands." Not long afterwards Li Chao-shou was persuaded to surrender 
and was given by the court a new name, Shih-chung (+£ %  ), and the 
rank of ts'an-chiang (lieutenant colonel); see Chang Jui-ch'ih: 
Liang-huai k'an-luan chi in Pan Wen-lan, Chien Po-tsan et al.: Nien- 
chun (Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih tzu-liao ts'ung-k!an No.3), Shanghai 
1955 vol. I p.296. Li Chao-shou remained in control of Chfu-chou, 
Lai-an, Ch'uan-chiao, Wu-ho and T'ien-ch'ang, with some 38,000 
troops; see Chiang Siang-tseh: The Nien Rebellion p.92.
6. Hung Ch'un-yuan, later the Tui Wang, was executed on Hung Hsiu- 
ch'dan* s orders in I863, for the loss of Yu-hua-t'ai (see p. 220);
k°: Chien-cheng p.202
7. It is not true that Li Hsiu-ech'eng did not censure Li Chao-shou; 
his letter of remonstrance, dated 1 November 1858 (TT8/IO/27),
omitting the preamble, reads as follows:
Ever since I (lit. this commander) have been associated with 
you I have been aware of your great ability, and uncommon 
qualities as a commander. Consequently I treasured you and 
regarded you like my hands and feet. Judging from your character, 
[i though] you understood friendship, understood constancy and 
the sharing of difficulties. Little did I think that you were 
a traitor. It is too late to regret that I did not realize this 
earlier. Little did I know you, [one of] my favourite officers.
I instructed you to behave with goodness and urged you to follow 
the ways of virtue, little imagining that you would turn upon 
me, ungrateful for my kindly and righteous feelings. But enough 
of that! Let me ask you, why did you give allegiance to the 
T'ien Ch'ao? Now that you have surrendered to Sheng Pao, can 
you be sure that your past will not be examined? It will be a 
long time before you can live down your past offences. How can 
a man of worth close his eyes to what is before him and not think 
of the evil to come? Moreover, our Sovereign the T'ien Wang 
treated you not ungenerously, and I treated you with friendship. 
You you know that as long as you were in the T'ien Ch'ao I always 
covered up for you, inwspite of your bad behaviour, always 
quarrelling with your comrades in the kingdom, injspite of your 
subordinates who were continually molesting innocent people so 
that soldiers and people were resentful? Now you have surrendered 
to the imps, and everyone [vows to] take and execute you. You
Notes to page 166
may have forgotten my former friendship, but can you have 
forgotten that my cause is to exterminate imps on behalf of 
our Kingdom? Now that you have surrendered to Sheng Pao, your 
immediate plan is to hand over Ch1 u-chou and Lai-an. Thus with 
enmity you repay favours! But this is something which my 
unforgetting heart will not accept. I hope that now you have 
gone over to the imps, you will pit your strength against mine.
Your officers and men were all moulded by me, and I know their 
worth. You want to oppose the T'ien Ch'ao, so I vow to march 
out and punish you* Our friendship is over! The extirpation 
of other imp forces can wait; but Sheng Pao and you must be 
blotted out at once. Consider; do you imagine that you can 
hold out in Ch'-chou, relying on Sheng Pao's protection? Do 
you now know that for all their violence and cruel savagery, 
head imp Hsiang [Jung] at the east gate of T'ien-ching, head 
imp Ch'in [Ting-san] who fought us at T'ung-ch*eng, head imp Te- 
[hsing-ah] who resisted around Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou this year, 
and head imp Li [Hsu-pin] who attacked San-ho, were entirely 
wiped out by our massed armies? I urge you, since you have 
already thrown in your lot with the imps, why go back and forth 
when you could easily hasten into retirement. If you still depend 
on some cunning trick, I fear that you will not be safe.Cfrom two 
enemies. Can it be that the imps are not well-disposed to you 
because you came [to us] after killing an imp tao-t'ai? Do you 
not fear the T'ien Ch'ao will not forgive you for turning coat 
and surrendering to the imps? This abnormal vacillation, can it 
be the action of a man of will-power? Are these the traces he 
wishes to leave behind him in the world? How pityful!
See TPTK II. pp.694-696. The original is in the Palace Museum, Peking.
8. This is an error for 'the 8th Year' - 1858. It was corrected in 
the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.
9. Ch'en K fun-shu eventually bought the title of Hu Wang (see page 210), 
He would have surrendered to the government, but was discouraged
from doing so by Li Sung-chang's slaughter of the wangs who did so 
at Su-chou; see page 227? below and Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao 
ch.4 p.29b. The British Museum has a letter addressed to him from 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng, complaining that no response had been recieved to 
requests to come to the relief of S^-chou, see TPTK II p.764. (A 
translation of this letter is given in Andrew Wilson: The 'Ever- 
Victorious Army1, A History of the Chinese Campaign under Lt.-Col.
C.G. Gordon, C.B., R.E. and of the Suppression of the Tai-Ping 
Rebellion, Edinburgh and London 1868 pp.187-8).
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1. T'an Shao-kuang, the Mu Wang, was assassinated at Su-chou in 1862, 
see below, page 227. Lu Shun-te, the Lai Wang, was betrayed and
executed in 1865, see Lo: Shih-kao p.407.
2. In spite of the hostile tone of the majority of contemporary 
material on the rebellion, it is nevertheless possible to find a
good deal of evidence to support Li Hsiu-ch1 eng !s claim that bad 
behaviour amongst the Taipings armies was the exception rather than 
the rule. Indeed, if this had not been so it would be exceedingly 
difficult to account for their success, particularly in the early 
period. Several contemporaries attribitued this to good discipline. 
See, for instance, Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.8b.
3* *jfc. in the original.
4. This should be Ta-liu-chuang (-h $1} tk i according to Pang-liieh 
ch.195 P.9b.
5. The Taipings took up positions at Ta-liu-chuang on 5 June 1858 
(HP8/4/24). Ch'iao-lin is about 40 li southwest of Chiang-pfu.
6. I can find no trace of any of Sheng Pao's troops having, been at 
this battle. He was at Liu-an at the time; see Pang-lueh, ch. 194
7* Te-hsing-ah1 s memorial reported the victory but not a defeat. He 
claimed to have killed, between 24 May and 6 June (HP8/4/12-25) 
some ten or eleven thousand Taipings, and to have taken prisoner 
1,680. Yet Li Hsiu-ch*eng stated (page I67) that he only had 5,000 
troops, though he may have been supported by Nien auxiliaries. The 
'new stockades' referred to are probably the three established at 
Chlang-chia-k'ou during the night of 4 June,, which were destroyed 
on the following day by Te-hsing-ah. The main Ch'ing victory was 
the destruction of 13 Taiping ying at Ta-liu-chuang on 6 June; 
see Pang-lueh ch.195 pp*9a-llb.
8. Por read .
9. This is an error for 'the 6th Month of the 8th Year', i.e. 10 July 
18 Aiigust, 1858.
Notes to Page 168.
1, Ch'en Yu-ch'eng arrived at Lu-chou on 11 August, and took the town
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on the 23rd (HP8/7/l5)> possibly with inside aid; see Pang-lueh 
ch.201 p.2b.
Por/fe# readj| tfz .
Ch'en Yu-ch'eng had a force of about 20,000, according to 
government intelligence, though one source gives 'several myriads'.
It seems possible that Ch'en's aim was to relieve pressure on An- 
ch'ing, which was under attack by the Hunan Army. If this is so, he 
was successful, since he drew off some of the best troops under Li 
Hsii-pin (see below, page 169). Li Chao-shou, who had already made 
the preliminary negotiations for his surrender, warned Sheng Pao 
$hat Ch'en Yu-ch'eng would give the appearance of making for Liu-an, 
but in fact, his target was Lu-chou, See Pang-liieh ch.199 pp.27b-28a, 
ch.200 pp*10a/b, ch.201 p.2b.
2. Li Chao-shou reported to Sheng Pao that an attack on Ting-yuan
was planned, in which 10,000 Taipings under a commander called 
Ch'ien would join up with a Nien group under Chang Lung at Ch'ih-ho- 
chen; see Pang-liieh ch.201 p.21a* The attack on Ting-yuan was made 
on 21 September (HF8/8/15) • At this time the Nien were glad of 
Taiping co-operation because Chang Lo-hsing and ICung Te-shu had been 
obliged to withdraw from Liu-an, after the town had been given over 
to the government by treachery on 25 May (HP8/4/13); see Ch'ung^halu 
An-hui t'ung-chih p.18 in Pan Wen-lan et al.s Nien-ohiin Yol.II.
3. According to Ch'ing reports, a force of 'several myriad* rebels 
descended on Chieh-p'ai in Ting-yuan-hsien on 9 September. Sheng
Pao's troops killed 'four or five hundred' of them; see Pang-liieh 
ch.202 p.4a. Lo: Chien-cheng p.204 n6 however, gives Chieh-p'ai as 
in Ch'uan-chiao-hsien.
4. The first move towards P'u-k'ou from Ch*u-chou seems to have been 
made on 23 August, but the Taipings were beaten back on the follow­
ing day, after which they presumably decided to await the arrival of 
Ch'en Yu-ch'eng*s force; see Pang-liieh ch.200 pp.21b,22.
5* On 17 September (HF8/8/11) Ch'en Yii-ch'eng moved on P'u-k'ou from 
Wu-i. Relief was then sent from the Chiang-pei H.Q. by way of 
Hsiao-tien, see Pang-liieh ch.202 p.6a. I can find no evidence that 
Sheng Pao's cavalry were present at this engagement.
6. Te-hsing-ah's force numbered about 15,000 in all, Pang-liieh ch. 102 
p.7b.
7. The engagement at Hsiao-tien was on 27 and 28 September (BF8/8/21 
& 22), but it was the yu-chi (jj& ^  ) Peng Tzu-ts' ai who came from
the Chiang-nan H.Q,. with 5>000 men, not Chang Kuo-liang; see Pang- 
Liieh ch.203 p.14b,
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8. I can find no confirmation of this figure, though Te-hsing-ah, 
after withdrawing to Kua-chou, complained that he had no troops
left ($7 ^ x  ^ ), see Pang-liieh ch.2.03 p. 14b.
9. Ch'en Yii-ch'eng took Liu-ho on 24 October (HF8/9/18). Li Hsiu-
ch'eng took T'ien-ch'ang on 30 September (HF8/8/24), I-cheng
on 4 October and Yang-chou on 9 October (HF8/9/3)*
Notes to Page 169.
1. The Prefect of Yang-chou wasHUang Ch'in-nai ^  %  ), see Chien: 
Ch'iian-shih III p.1635.
2. The Taipings withdrew from Yang-chou on 21 October (HF8/9/I5),
3. A government force under Yang Tsai-fu, To-lung-ah and Pao Ch'ao 
began to draw in on An-ch'ing in October 1858. At the same time,
a detachment consisting of the best troops of the Hunan Army, under 
Li Hsii-pin (see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.463-4), moved northeast 
from T'ai-hu, taking Ch'ien-shan on 27 September (HF8/8/21);(Wang 
K'ai-ytin: Hsiang-chiin ohih III p. 12b incorrectly gives the date as 
HP8/9/1), T'ung-ch'eng was taken within a few days; there is 
disagreement as to the exact date. Hu~Ohiien-fu: Feng-ho shih-Iu 
p.20 gives 11 October (HF8/9/5)* (The author was a native of T'ung- 
ch'eng), Ch'u Chih-fu: Wan-ch'iao chi-shih in Chien-chi II p.99 
gives 12 October, and Kuo: Jih-chih gives 13 October. Shu-ch'eng 
was taken on 24 October.
4. The town of San-ho, on the Ta-chieh River, west of Ch'ao Hu, had 
both military and economic importance, being a supply centre for
grain and arras for Anhwei and Nanking, and the 'screen* of Lu-chou.
The Taipings built a wall round the town, protected by nine forts.
Li Hsii-pin began his attack on 3 November 1858 (HF8/9/28), See Hu Lin- 
i: Hu Wen Chung Rung i-ohi ch.31 pp.lb-8 and Wang K'ai-yun: Hsiang- 
chiin ohih III p.13b.
5. San-ho had been taken by Ho Ch'un on 16 September I856, see 
page 161.
6. Pai-shih-shan and Chin-niu-chen are both in Lu-chiang-hsien. 
Chin-niu is about 30 li south of San-ho, Wu Ju-hsiao and Kung
Te-shu came south from Lu-chou and cut off possible relief for Li 
Hsii-pin from Shu-ch'eng. But Li Hsii-pin had already, on 7 November, 
taken the nine Taipings forts which defended the wall of San-ho; see 
Hu Wen Chung Kung i-chi ch.31 pp.lb-8.
Notes to pages 170 & 171
Note to Page 170.
1. This battle took place on 15 November 1858 (HF8/10/10). According 
to Hu Lin-ifs account, Li Hsii-pin marched on the Taiping positions 
at.Chin-niu-chen at the 'Fifth Watch' [3-5 a.m.]; see Hu Wen Chung 
ICung i-ohi ch.31 pp.lb-8.
Notes to Page 171.
1. According to Hu Lin-i's memorial, which was based on reports from 
survivors, the Hunan Army advanced southwards for 15 li before
being attacked in a thick mist in which 'one could not distinguish 
things a foot away.' In the absence of details of the Hunan Army 
dispositions it is difficult to know exactly what Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
meant by the words ^  and f$j?, which I have trandl&ted as 'van' 
and 'base* respectively. Hu Lin-i's account is of little help in 
this matter, being almost equally vague about the positions of the 
various units and the precise order of events. It is clear however, 
that most of Li Hsii-pin's force was cut off after the advance on 
Chin-niu-chen, and could not get back to their stockades, which were 
then taken by the Taipings. Taiping encirclement of the remaining 
Hunan Army units was completed by a sortie from the town of San-ho, 
and by the opening of a dyke on the river, cutting off the line of 
retreat. The battle ended late at night, presumably after the 
death of Li Hsii-pin. Tseng Kuo-fan's brother, Tseng Kuo-hua, was 
also killed at San-ho. See Hu Wen Chung Kung i-ohi ch.31 pp.lb-8.
2. Hu Lin-i stated that a large force under Li Shih-hsien (an error 
for Wu Ju-hsiao) and Chang Lo-hsing joined the San-ho battle,
and brought Taiping numbers to 100,000, probably a much inflated 
figure; ibid. p.3a.
3. Hu Lin-i reported that Li Hsii-pin died in battle, 'covered with 
spear wounds.' ibid. p.4b.
4. This sentence in the original reads 5$ M  ^  5 the meaning
is somewhat unclear. It was overlooked by Lii Chi-i.
5. There are various accounts of the size of Li Hsii-pin's force.
Wang K'ai-yiin: Hsiang-chiln ohih III p. 13b gives it as 13 ying,
which at full strength would be 6,552 men; Hu Ch'ien-fu: ffeng-ho 
shih-lu p.21, gives 12 ying (6,048 men); Hu Lin-i: Hu Wen Chung Kung 
i-chi ch.32 p.2a and Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch. 10 p. 14b, both state 
that Li Hsii-i had 5,000 men at San-ho. But according to Tseng Kuo- 
fan there were 6,000 casualties (ibid.p.15a), though this figure
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includes the Hunan Army losses at T’ung-ch'eng, Kuan Wen (Governor 
General of Hu-ltuang) memorialized that ’at one "blow more than a 
myriad crack troops were lost..,* Pang-liieh ch.209 p.15a. Whatever 
the actual losses, the defeat of the cream of the Hunan Army, -under 
one of its best officers, ('he commanded like a god', according to 
Wang K'ai-yiin: Hsiang-chiin chih III p. 15b), was a grave setback 
for Tseng Kuo-fan. Hu Lin-i spoke of the spirit of the army having 
been completely destroyed by this blow. See Mou An-shih: T'ai-p'ing 
Tv1 ien-kuo pp.2J6-244; Lo: Chien-cheng pp.208-210; Chien: Ch1 iian- 
shih III pp.1657-1645*
6. The Hunan Army commander at T'ung-ch'eng was Brigade General 
Chao K ’e-chang, see Pang-liieh ch.208 p.l6b. He set out to the
relief of Li Hsii-pin at San-ho, but turned back, presumably on 
receiving news of the defeat. Relief was then sent to T'ung-ch'eng 
from the force besieging An-chfing, and from Ch'ien-shan, ibid. p.18b.
7. Li Hsiu-ch'eng can hardly have meant that the territory around 
T'ung-ch'eng was new to him; he had been commander there and had
organized the relief of the town in 1857 > see page 145 ff> above.
He probably meant the territory in the region of Su-sung and T'ai-hu, 
where the proposed campaign would take place.
8. Although this passage was not altered by Tseng Kuo-fan, the Chiu 
Ju T'ang Edition reads, 'Ch'en Yu-ch'eng advanced on T'ung-ch'eng
from K'ung-ch'eng.' Lii Chi-i did not correct this error. Tseng 
Kuo-fan wrote in the margin above this passage, 'The two routes do 
not tally; why should they have separated and then joined up?' I 
do not know the answer to this question.
Notes to Page 172,
1. T'ung-ch'eng was taken by the Taipings on 24 November 1858.
2. An-ch'ing had been under siege for about two months, but after 
the defeat of the Hunan Army at San-ho and T'ung-ch'eng, the
Ch'ing commander Tu-hsing-ah was afraid of being taken in the rear, 
and decided to raise the siege. The government forces under To-lung- 
ah and Pao Ch'ao withdrew on 27 November to Shih-p*ai and then to 
Su-sung and T'ai-hu; see Pang-lueh ch.209 p.lb and Ch'u Chih-fu: 
Wan-ch'iao chi-shih p.100
5. The sentence in the margin (omitted by Lu Chi-i) was probably 
meant to be added to the text, so that it would read, 'Counting 
that of General Hsiang, it was the second relief of the second siege
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of the capital.
4. The Taipings came south from T'ung-ch'eng on 27 November (HF8/10/22) 
through Shih-p'ai, and took Ch'ien-shan and Huang-ni-kang. The
Ch'ing garrison at T'ai-hu had already fled. On 30 November the 
Gh'ing force which had been besieging An-ch'ing arrived at Su-sung 
and Erh-lang-ho. In preparation for their attack on Su-sung, the 
Taipings took up positions in the region of Ching-chiao, but were 
defeated there on 1 December (HF8/10/26) by troops under To-lung-ah.
®ee Pang-liieh ch.209 pp.28b,29b.
5. This was on 27 November (see note 4 above). Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was 
senior in rank to Li Hsiu-ch'eng.
6. Erh-lang-ho is 30 li northwest of Su-sung. Pao Ch'ao's army had 
taken up positions there after withdrawing from the siege of
An-ch'ing; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.212
Notes to Page 175*
1. Pao Ch'ao (1828-1886) held the rank of ts'an-ohiang (Lieut.-Col.) 
in the Hunan Army. His force was known as the T'ing-chiin (his ^
being ^  J L )> see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.609-10.
2. fTso' is an error for 'To', i.e. To-lung-ah (l817-1864i a Manchu 
General, ibid. p.609.
3. This Taiping defeat was on 10-11 December (HF8/11/6-7) at Hua- 
liang-t'ing and Ching-ch'iao, see Pang-liieh ch.210 pp. 11-12.
4. The Taiping New Year was on 8 Pehruary 1859 (HP9/1/6).
5. Hslieh Chih-yuan had been a Nien rebel, and had been given command 
of Chiang-p'u, which had been incorporated into the new Taiping
province of T'ien-p*u (jk )• The mandate of his appointment 
(undated) in Hung Hsiu-ch'lian's handwriting, is reproduced in Chien: 
Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao I p.74; see also TPTK II p.671. In February 1859»
Hslieh Chih-yuan sent a messenger to Chang Kuo-liang offering to
surrender, and Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou) was sent by Ho Ch'un to
accept his allegiance. Thus, on 28 February, P'u-k'ou once more
passed into government hands. The Taipings made a desperate effort 
to save Chiang-p'u, but their attack was beaten off. Hslieh Chih-yuan 
changed his name to Hslieh Ch'eng-liang. In I860 he turned coat again, 
but was killed by Li Shih-chung. See Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-llieh in 
Chien-chi I p.250 & Lo: Chien-cheng pp.213-4*
Notes to pages 173 & 174
6. For read va] .
7. The Taipings began their attack on the enemy stockades outside 
the town on 13 March 1859 (HF9/2/9). Two days later, according
to Ch'ing reports, some seventy or eighty thousand rebels, including 
reinforcements from Chiu-fu-chou and from Li Shih-hsien1 s force south 
of the Yangtse, attacked in six columns. See Fang-liieh ch.215 pp.6b,8a.
8. In March 1859 (HF9/2) Te-hsing-ah, Commander of the Chiang-pei
H.Q., was cashiered for failure to relieve Liu-ho (see page 168),
and Ho Ch'un, who was already commander of the Chiang-nan H.Q. was 
appointed to the command of that of Chiang-ei as well; see Hsiao 
Sheng-yuan: Yiieh-fel chi-liieh pp. 47-8. Chang Kuo-liang was Assistant 
Commander.
Notes to Page 174.
1. Ch'en Yu-ch'eng had taken Liu-an on 8 March; on the 19th and 20th 
he defeated a force under Li Meng-ch'lin at Kuan-t'ing near Lu-chou;
on the 26th, coming from Liang-yuan he attacked Hu-ch'eng, where, on 
the 29th and on 5 April he defeated Sheng Pao's troops. After this, 
he set out for the relief of Liang-p'u; see Fang-liieh ch.216 p.13
2. 15,000 according to Fang-liieh ch.216 -.26b
3. This is an error. Li Hsiu-ch'eng refers here to Li Jo-chu 
who is described as t * i-tu (provincial c-in-c) of Kwangsi by
Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yueh-fei ohi-liieh p.48.
4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng has very much compressed his account of this 
campaign, which lasted much longer than he implies. There were
moreover, two feint attacks on Yang-chou. The sequence of event was 
as follows:- There was a Taiping attack on Liang-p'u on 15 April, 
with 'no less than forty or fifty thousand troops,' according to 
Fang-liieh ch.216 pp.33b-34a. Between 17 and 27 April, Li Jo-chu 
and Feng Tzu-ts'ai attacked, and eventually took the Taiping forts 
at Chiu-f u-chou. On 30 April Ch'en Yu-ch'eng attacked the Ch'ing 
force east of Liu-ho in order to relieve pressure on the town. Mean­
while, reinforcements under Fu-ming-ah and Chang Yli-liang arrived 
from Chiang-nan, see Fang-liieh ch.217 p.29b. On 3 May, Ch'en Yu- 
ch'eng made the first feint attack on Yang-chou (ibid.ch.218 pp,4a,7a), 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng*s reference is to the second one. As a result of this, 
Chang Yli-liang and Ma Te-chao were sent from Liu-ho to protect Yang- 
chou. On 13 May Ch'en Yii-ch'eng went northwest to T'ien-ch'ang, and 
on the 26th, attacked Sheng Pao's H.Q. at Chiu-p'u; but returned
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south again on the 27th, after his troops had suffered a defeat at 
T'ien-ch'ang, and took up positions near Liu-ho at Ling-yen-shan 
and Pa-fou-ch'iao; see Fang-liieh oh.219 p. 10b, oh.220 p.8b. If this 
attack on Yang-chou had been intended as a diversion, which one 
must assume, it was not successful, since the Taipings were once 
again defeated on 15 June between I-cheng and Liu-ho. After this 
Ch'en Yu-ch'eng, together with Wei Chih-chiin, went again to T'ien- 
ch'ang and thence to Hsii-i, where on 26 June they once more defeated 
Sheng Pao and occupied the town. On 2 July Ch'en Yu-ch'eng moved 
south and attacked Lai-an and Ch'u-chou, which was held by Li Shih- 
chung (Li Chao-shou); see Fang-liieh ch. 222 pp. 6-8. Ch'u-chou was 
besieged until 20 August, when Ch'en raised the siege and went to 
Ho-chou and Cft'uan-chiao. In the meantime, in the north, Wu Ju- 
hsiao, in co-operation with Nien rebels, occupied Ting-yiian on 17 
July and Hsii-i on 25 September. On 16 September, Ch'en Yu-ch'eng 
fell out with Wei Chih-chiin (nothing is known of the details of the 
quarrel) and Wei crossed the Yangtse to Ch'ih-chou, which he gave 
over to the government on 22 October. Then Ch'en Yu-ch'eng went 
north, either by way of An-ch'ing, or else through Ho-chou and 
Ch'uan-chiao, possibly because his commander in the north, Wu Ju- 
hsiao, had been wounded on 25 September. (Sheng Pao in fact reported 
him killed, Fang-liieh ch.224 pp.l4b-15a).
5. For -w-readi§ .
Ch'en Yu-ch'eng began the second attack on Yang-chou on 14 
October, and this time relief was sent from Liu-ho under Li Jo-chu 
and Chu Ch'eng-hsien. But on 15 October, Ch'en Yu-ch'eng suddenly 
turned back and attacked Li Jo-chu* s main camp at Hung-shan-yao, 
near Liu-hp; see Fang-liieh ch.225 P*4.
6. This sentence was deleted for grammatical reasons. Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
probably meant that Ch'en Yu-ch'eng had deliberately passed close
to Li Jo-chu*s H.Q., near the east gate of Liu-ho, in order to draw 
off the Ch'ing troops in the direction of Yang-chou,
7. See note 5, above.
8. The battle at Ling-tzu-k'ou was on 23 October (HF9/9/28). The 
Taipings defeated the government troops, under Feng Tzu-ts'ai,
before they had had time to take up their positions; see Fang-liieh 
ch.226 pp.10b-llb,
9. The main Ch'ing losses seem to have been at a later battle, on
1 November, when the Taipings made another attack on the garrison 
at Hung-shan-yao and killed 3,000* Li Jo-chu got away with his own 
battalion only, and was later cashiered for not having led his whole 
force in a break-out; see Fang-liieh ch.228 p. 11. Hsiao Sheng-yuan:
Notes to pages 174 & 175
Ytieh-fei chi-lueh p. 48 records that there were six thousand dead and 
only three or four thousand survivors, as against five thousand dead 
and two thousand eight hundred taken prisoner, which was the official 
figure (Fang-liieh loc.cit.).
10, Chou T'ien-p'ei was Provincial Commander-in-chief of Hupeh.
11. This battle, to which the previous sentence also refers, lasted 
from 16-21 November (HF9/10/22-27) > during which time the Taipings
kept up the pressure on Yang-chou; see Fang-liieh ch.226 p.27, ch.227 
pp.9-10. Chang Kuo-liang came from Chiahg-nan on 18 November (ibid. 
P*5b).
Notes to Page 175•
1. The original reads ^ ; the Chiu Ju Tfang Edition
has ^ ^  -k ^
2, Omitted in Lu Ghi-i's cop#,
3* Chang Kuo-liang engaged a Taiping force under Li Hsiu-ch1 eng at 
Chiang-p'u from 30 November to 16 December with considerable 
success, and went back to Chiang-nan on 26 December (HF9/12/3); 
see Fang-liieh ch.227 PP*23, ch.228 pp.2b,3a, 10b.
4. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has^'0 (the Hunan Army) for .
Tseng Kuo-fan had gone south in the summer of 1858 in order to
organize the defence of Chekiang and Fukien, threatened by the activity 
of Shih Ta-k'ai in south Kiangsi. By August 1859 however, Kiangsi 
was entirely free from Taipings, after Shih Ta-k'ai had crossed into 
Hunan and Yang Fu-ch'ing had been defeated at Ching-te-chen. Tseng 
Kuo-fan then returned to Hupeh, and in late September, together with 
Hu Lin-i, drew up a new plan of action for a simultaneous attack on 
Lu-chou and An-ch'ing by four armies, (i) Tseng Kuo-fan himself would 
command an army which would advance through Su-sung and Shih-p'ai and 
attack An-ch'ing. (ii) Another army under Pao Ch'ao and To-lung-ah 
would advance on T'ung-ch'eng through T'ai-hu and Ch'ien-shan. (iii)
A third army, under Hu Lin-i, would make for Shu-ch'eng by way of Ying- 
shan and Ho-shan. (iv) Li Hsii-i (Li Hsii-pin*s brother) would move 
on Lu-chou by way of Shang-ch'eng and Ku-shih. Tseng Kuo-fan 
arrived at Huang-mei on 26 November, remained there for eight days, 
and then moved to Su-sung on 6 December. See Fang-liieh ch. 227 P«37a 
& Chien: Ch*iian-shih pp.1670-1674.
5. Ch'en Yu-ch'eng withdrew from Chiang-p'u on 21 November. By this
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time he had already been given the title of Ting Wang; but the exact 
date of the appointment is not known, see Kuo: Jih-chih pp.624-6
6. This presumably refers to Chang Kuo-liang’s activities between 
30 November and 16 December; see note 3 above.
7* Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou) reported to Sheng Pao that Li Hsiu-
ch’eng had been taken to the capital (Nanking) in chains, perhaps
because his troops were said to have helped Wei Chih-chiin in his
quarrel with Ch’en Yu-ch’eng, during which several thousand Taipings 
had been killed; see Pang-lueh ch.224 p. 5
8. His appointment as Chung Wang is described in more detail on p. 234.
Notes to Page 176.
1. Por X  read .
2. This presumably means merely *a small escort1, since cavalry can 
hardly have been needed to cross the Yangtse from P’u-k’ou to
Nanking.
Notes to Page 177.
1. ’The Sovereign’s State minister* refers, I assume, to Hung Jen-kan
(1822?-1864). He was a cousin of Hung Hsiu-ch'iian and one of his 
earliest disciples, who did not however, take part in the rising. He 
was an educated man, but had failed the examinations at Canton. In 
1853 he went to Hong Kong, where he became a catechist in the China 
Inland Mission. It was here that he met the Swedish missionary 
Theodore Hamberg, whose book is based on what Hung Jen-kan told him 
at this time. In 1854 Hung failed to get beyond Shanghai in an 
attempt to join the Taipings at Nanking, and went back to Hong Kong.
In 1859 however, he succeeded in reaching the Taiping capital and was 
very soon given high rank, the title of Kan Wang, and made head of the 
whole administration, with powers similar to those previously held by 
Yang Hsiu-ch*ing.
In his deposition, written after his capture in Kiangsi in 1864, 
Hung Jen-kan wrote: "The Chung Wang three times had discussions with 
me about strategy, and I said, ’At this time, when the capital is 
under siege, it will be difficult to make a direct [counter]-attack.
It is necessary to make a determined attack on the weakly-defended 
towns of Hang-chou and Hu-chou in the [enemy] rear, wait until they
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draw off forces for a distant campaign, and then turn back and 
raise the siege, This is certain to succeed. n* See TPTK II pp.851- 
852. In Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s account however, there is no suggestion 
that the plan was not his own. Lo Erh-kang considers this to be 
correct, on the grounds that Hsii Yao-kuang, who saw a copy of the 
Taiping publication Chung Wang hui-i chi-liieh (not since traced), 
wrote that the plan was worked out at a military meeting in Wu-hu; 
see Hsii Yao-kuang: T'an-Che p.594» But this is no proof that the idea 
was Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s, though it is by no means incompatible with 
his military skill. Indeed, such diversionary tactics had been used 
in the relief of Liu-ho (see page 175 above). On the other hand, 
even an unmartial scholar would be familiar with the concept of 
'attacking Wei in order to relieve Chao* ); so the suggestion
may have come from Hung Jen-kan even if his exploits as a military 
commander were undistinguished. Nor was Li Hsiu-ch*eng above stealing 
Hung Jen-kan*s thunder. He was resentful if the latter*s rapid rise 
to overall command, and thought little of him as a planner or as an 
administrator. He considered his writings as not worth reading, see 
Appendix I page 263. If ever the lost book containing the record 
of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s military meetings come to light, we may know 
much more about this, and many other questions. (For other comments 
on Hung Jen-kan, see page 233)*
2. See note 4 to page 175-
3* Yang Pu-ch'ing had taken Ching-te-chen in October 1858 and lost
it the following year on 13 July (HF9/6/14). In the winter of 
1859 he was attacking Ch*ih-chou, which Wei Chih-chiin had given over 
to the government^ He recovered it on 24 December.
Eor-^'^^f read jfe'JtpiHl. Por this place and Tung-liu, see Map V.
4. Porv^ ) ^read^)?^., Nan-ling, in Anhwei.
5* By this time Nanking was almost surrounded. HoCCh'un's emplacem­
ents stretched from Shang-yuan-men, north of the city, to San-
ch*a-ho on the northwest side, a distance of 130 or 140 li (about
45 miles). There were 130 stockades of various sizes along the 
moat, and about 40,000 troops; see Pang-liieh ch.195 P*5
6. Deleted for grammatical reasons, and omitted in Lii Chi-i*s copy.
7. Huang Tzu-lung. later the Ch'ao Wang, was captured and executed 
at the fall of Wu-hsi in 186 3. Ch'en Ts'an-ming was primarily an
administrator; nothing more seems to be known of him. See Lo: Chien- 
cheng p.216.
8. The Taiping forts at Chiu-fu-chou were taken by Chang Kuo-liang 
on 31 January I860 (HPlO/l/9). Li Hsiu-ch'eng must therefore
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have left P'u-k'ou on 5 or 6 January.
Notes to Page 178.
1. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition reads: ' # M  iff % %  "t 4^ .,. ' But there 
is no great significance in the change.
2. He was the son of the Hsi Wang Hsiao Ch'ao-kuei, who was killed 
at Chfang-sha (see page 157)* In I860 he was only 12 or 14 years
old, see Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion p. 118, quoting an 
eye-witness. His power seems to have come from his position as 
chi-tsou-kuan ^  %  ), in which he was responsible not only for 
the forwarding of memorials, but also for deciding whether they 
should be presented or not. He also seems to have had an important 
ceremonial function (ibid.); he was responsible for the transmission 
of the T'ien Wang's orders (see below, page 222). I do not know to 
what extent he was merely a figure-head. See Li Ch'un: T'ai-p'ing 
T'ien-kuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an pp.47,256; Lo: Chien-cheng p.219; Yu 
T'ien Wang Chao in Shih-liao pp. 118-120. (Hake's information came 
from a letter to the Editor of the North China Herald from the 
missionary J.L.Holmes, published on 1 September I860 and reproduced 
in B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860, 
pp.157-144, inclosure 5 in No.72.)
5. Chung Wan-hsin (or Ksing), the Chin Wang, was little more than 
20 years of age in 1864, Huang Tung-liang, the K'ai Wang, was 
still a child. See Lo: Chien-cheng pp.220-1
4. For read .
5. See Map IV.
Notes to Page 179*
1. Kuang-te was taken by the Taipings on 24 February I860 (HFIO/2/5).
2. In fact the troops at Ssu-an were under Chou T'ien-shou, an officer 
under Li Ting-t'ai (Brigade General of Hang-chou) who was later
demoted for having failed to defend Hang-chou; see Fang-liieh ch.252 
pp.5a,4b, 5.
5. Ssu-an, in Ch'ang-hsing-hsien, was taken by the Taipings on 5 March 
I860 (HF10/2/ll),see Fang-liieh ch.252 p. 14. Ch'ang-hsing was taken
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on the same day.
4* F o r r e a d  (Hung-hsing-ch'iao). See Map IV*
5. Li Shih-hsien was made Shih Wang sometime early in I860. Ghien 
Yu-wen suggests that Li Hsiu-chfeng joined up with Li Shih-hsien
before, not after, the capture of Ssu-an, see Ch1 lian-shih III*p.1721.
6. Hu-chou is now called Wu-hsing ( ^ ^ ) .
7. Wu-k'ang was occupied by the Taipings on 9 March (HF10/2/17). On 
the same day they engaged a force of 400 'braves1 under the
Provincial Judge Tuan Kuang-ch'ing at Yu-hang. This detachment had 
been sent from Hang-chou to hold up the Taiping advance. But the 
Taipings engaged the 'braves' with part of their force, and sent 
another part to march on Hang-chou by small paths. See Hsii Yao-kuang: 
T'an Che p.571 and Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou ,jih-ohi in Chien-chi IV p.7
8. For Taiping numbers in this operation, see below, note 10.
This was a surprise attack and Hang-chou was ill-prepared. There 
were only four ying, with about 2,000 men, and about 820 'braves' in 
the city. Outside there were 1,000 troops and 1,000 newly-enlisted 
'braves' together with the 400 'braves' under Tuan Kuang-ch'ing.
Hung Jen-kan in his deposition (TPTK II p.852), implies that the 
intention was to get into the city by stealth, wearing Ch'ing uniforms; 
but because some of the Taipings stole horses and gave the game away, 
they were prevented from entering Hang-chou. Several accounts agree 
that the Taipings took advantage of the fact that it was the birthday 
of the Buddha, and there were maiy pilgrims at T'ien-chu, outside the 
city. Thi^ , and the presence of numerous refugees in the region, 
enabled the Taipings to get close to the city without being detected. 
They probably intended to get in at nightfall, but were discovered, 
and the gates closed. See Li Tz'u-ming: Yueh-man-t 'ang .jih-chi pu 
Shanghai 1956 VII Keng-chi p.53b (HFIO/5/15) and Hsii Yao-kuang: T'an 
Che p.571.
9. According to this, the attack on the city did not begin until 
16 March. This seems to be.correct. There is no record of any
fighting before the 17th, though the suburbs of Hang-chou were 
burned both by the Taipings and by the defenders as early as 11 March. 
On 15 March the Taipings employed a ruse in order to give an impression 
of great numbers and perhaps get the enemy to waste ammunition; they 
took wooden images from temples, dressed them up in Taiping uniforms, 
and positioned them on hills round the city, in stockades, with 
banners flying. Bee Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.8 and Mou Te-fen:
Keng Shen Che-pien chi, quoted in Chien: Ch'uan-shih III p.1725. On 
17 March the Taipings fortified positions on the side of West Lake, 
near the city. Tuan Kuang-ch'ing, who had returned from Yu-hang on
Notes to pages 179 & 180
12 March, attacked the Taipings and was defeated. A relief force 
■under Mi Hsing-chao, which arrived on the same day, fled on seeing 
the enemy. In the meantime, with gongs and drums to cover the 
sound, the Taipings were mining the wall at the Ch’ing-p’o Gate.
The explosion took place in the early morning of 19 March (HP10/2/27) 
and the city was breached. On entering the Taipings were joined 
by some of the ’braves’ who had acted as a ’fifth column’.bytspreading 
alarm and despondency. They identified themselves to the Taipings 
by binding round their heads red cloths which they had previously 
concealed in their garments. Apart from the Manchu garrison, all 
other troops fled. See Pang-lueh ch.233 p.2, Hsu Yao-kuang; T’an Che 
pp.571-574, and Anon: Tung-nan chi-lueh in TPTK V pp.231-238
10. The march on Hang-chou, according to Li Hsiu-ch*eng, was made 
with six or seven thousand men, and the actual capture by the
vanguard of about 1,250. This figure is born out to some extent 
by a contemporary record, which states that on 10 March (BP10/2/18) 
there were only a few hundred Taipings outside the city, and on the 
following two days, though the number increased, there were still no 
more than a thousand; see Pang Chun-hsi: Chuan-hsi yu-sheng chi in 
TPTIC IV p.515* On the other hand, the faot that the Taipings 
established ’more than ten stockades’ near West Lake on 17 March, 
seems to point to the arrival of a larger force. Possibly their 
intervention was not needed to take the city. The Taipings were 
certainly aware of the weakness of the garrison, since for some time 
they had a spy in Hang-chou called Wang Tao-p’ing, disguised as a 
fortune-teller (ibid.p.57l)• See also Shen Tzu: Pi-k’ou jih-chi p.8
11. The Tartar General was Jui Ch’ang; he was obliged by his 
superiors to limit his activities to the defence of the Manchu
garrison, according to Pang Chun-hsi; Chuan-hsi yu-sheng chi p.517.
In this case, and since they did not intend to hold Hang-chou, the 
Taipings attack on the inner garrison must have been fairly half­
hearted .
Notes to Page 180.
1, In response to urgent appeals from the Governor of Chekiang, the 
court ordered Ho Ch’un to send relief to Hang-chou. He seems to 
have been quite aware that the Taipings hoped to divide his forces and 
raise the siege of Nanking, since he wrote to this effect in a memorial 
late in March, which reached Peking on 5 April, see Pang-liieh ch.233 
p. 13a. But it was one thing to understand the enemy’s general intent 
and another matter to foresee exactly how it would be carried out.
The Governor of Chekiang does not seem to have got wind of the coming
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attack on Haxng-chou until after the Taipings had taken Ssu-an on 
3 March; it was after this that within the space of 5 days he sent 
off two appeals to Peking for relief to be sent. But at the same time 
Ho Kuei-ch’ing (Governor General of Liang-chiang) was also sending 
urgent messages to Ho Ch’un, and it was impossible to ignore the 
Taiping threat to Su-chou. Consequently, by about 12 March, Ho Ch'un 
had sent out more than 10,000 troops from the Chiang-nan Ii.Q. (Ho 
Kuei-ch’ing in a memorial gave the figure as 13,000, see Pang-liieh 
ch.232 p.19a). Troops were withdrawn from Chiang-p’u and Yang-chou, 
and sent to I-hsing, Kao-ch’un and Tung-pa. A1 thought Ho Ch’un had 
been ordered, implicitly, to send relief to Hang-chou by routes west 
of T'ai Hu (which might have helped to frustrate the Taiping plan), 
the threat to Su-chou and the appeals of Ho Kuei-ch'ing made him 
recall Chang Yii-liang from Liu-ho, and send him with 2,000 or 2,500 
men from Chiang-nan to Ch’ang-chou and Su-chou on 10 March. See Hsien 
Peng tung-hua hsii-lu ch.90 pp.41a,42a,45; Pang-liieh ch.232 pp.2a,l6a, 
17a; Anon: Tung-nan chi-liieh p#232 and Lo: Chien-cheng p.222-3
2. vfy ix in the original. The sense is not entirely clear, since
Li Hsiu-ch’eng sometimes used such phrases as^'M to mean ’to give
battle?, see page 29 of the manuscript, line 11, for instance.
3. According to Hsu Yao-kuang, the advance guard of Chang Yii-liang’s 
army arrived at P’ing-wang, near the Kiangsu-Chekiang border, on
14 March; but instead of pressing on to Hang-chou, the commander 
was persuaded to encamp and defend Chia-hsing. Chang Yii-liang himself 
arrived at Su-chou on 16 March, and was similarly persuaded by the 
Provincial Treasurer, who had a personal interest, to go to the 
relief of Hu-chou and. not bother with Hang-chou. That Chang Yii-liang 
came at all to Hang-chou was due to the efforts of the Chekiang Grain 
Intendant who, with considerable difficulty, persuaded Chang to come 
by boat with a small force of 600 on 22 March; see Hsii Yao-Ikuang:
T’an Che pp.572-3* Chang Yii-liang then sent a disguised messenger 
into the city to make contact with the Tartar General, and the 
relieving force entered Hang-chou on 24 March, after a small skirmish 
in which 18 Taipings were killed. See Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yiieh-fei chi- 
liieh p.51 and Shen Tzu: Pi-k’ou .jih-chi p.7*
The ’device for withdrawing with insufficient troops’ was used, 
though the need was less obvious, at Shanghai in I860, ’’...some 
gentlemen...discovered that the rebel host was represented by a few 
straw-stuffed figures.” J.W.Maclellan: The Story of Shanghai, Prom 
the Opening of the Port to Poreign Trade. Shanghai 1889 p.45* See 
also Hsiieh Huan’s memorial, translated in B.P.P. Correspondence 
Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860 p.202.
■  I. I SPI — .................I 1 1 1 1  | ^  '  *
4. &  fej) . Tseng Kuo-ch’iian was the ninth child.
5. This passage was omitted in LIX Chi-i*s copy.
Notes to pages 180 & 181
6.This passage was overlooked by Lii Chi-i.
7. Li Hsiu-ch1 eng’ s force arrived at Kuang-te on 4 April (HFlO/3/14)
Notes to Page 181.
1. Tseng Kuo-fan added two characters (3& & ) to replace those 
which he deleted in this sentence, making it read,’Chang*s troops
later took the property of the people of Hang-chou...*
2. In fact Chang Yii-liang did not attempt to get back to the Chiang- 
nan H.Q,. Three different officials strove for his services: Ho
Ch'un wanted him back, the Tartar General of Hang-chou wanted to 
keep him, and Ho Kuei-ch’ing anxious to have his help in defending 
Ch’ang-chou. See Pang-liieh ch.233 pp.24b-25a; ch.235 P*39&, and 
Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi pp.138-9* Chang Yii-liang *s own desire, if his 
subsequent actions may be taken as evidence, was to remain in the 
region of Hang-chou, where he later built a house, while his array 
engaged in looting. See Shen Tzu: Pi-k’ou jih-chi p.24 and Pang-liieh 
ch.235 P.23*
3. Yang Pu-ch’ing came from Ch'ih-chou (see note 3 to page 177) to 
Ning*rkuo on 22 March (HPlO/3/1) and took Hung-lin-ch’iao near
Ning-kuo on 5 April.
4. Liu Kuang-fang, Lai Wen-hung and Ku Lung-hsien were already in 
southern Anhwei and had occupied Nan-ling on 15 January; they
occupied Hsiian-te on 20 February and attacked Hui-chou.on the 28th.
5. Li Shih-hsien had been left attacking Hu-chou when Li Hsiu-ch’eng 
marched on Hang-chou. He raised the siege on 3 April to come to
Chien-p’ing.
6. Chien-p’ing (now Lang-chi) in Anhwei, was an important town controll­
ing communications between Anhwei and Kiangsu. In spite of this,
Ho Ch'un, Ho Kuei-ch'ing and Chang Pei (in charge of military affairs 
in Southern Anhwei) shifted the responsibility for defending it on 
to each other, with the result that no troops were sent to reinforce 
the garrison; see Anon: Tung-nan chi-liieh p.232. The town was taken 
on 8 April (HFIO/3/I8), (or on 11 April,’ according to Pang-lueh ch,
235 P*4h).
7. Ssu-ming-shan is in eastern Chekiang., south of the town of Ssu- 
ming. I know of no account of a military meeting there.
Notes to page 181
8. This sentence is omitted in Lii's copy.
9. The attack was, "broadly speaking, in three column. Yang Fu-ch'ing's 
force was the centre column, which advanced north from Kao-ch'un,
taking Tung-pa on 12 April (HF10/3/22) - a force of 3>000 sent by Ho 
Ch'un did not arrive in time, a similar force sent to Kao-ch'un fled 
without fighting; see Fang-liieh ch.235 PP*4b, 12a; Hsiao Sheng-yuan: 
Yiieh-fei chi-liieh p.51*
10. The eastern column divided into two, of which Li Shih-hsien 
commanded the right wing. He took Li-yang on 13 April (HFIO/3/23).
The town was only defended by 800 troops and relief did not arrive 
in time; see Fang-liieh ch.234 p.24b, ch.235 pp.4b, 12a. Liu Kuan- 
fang, commanding the right wing of the centre column, accompanied 
Li Shih-hsien as far as Li-yang.
11. Li-shui was taken on 18 April (HF10/3/28) and Mo-ling-kuan on 
23 April (HF10/3 intercalary/35*
12. After taking Li-yang, Li Shih-hsien attacked I-hsing on 15 April, 
and then moved on Ch'ang-chou with three or four thousand men
in order to prevent relief from south Kiangsu from reaching the 
Chiang-nan H.Q. Ch'ang-chou was weakly defended at the time, but it 
was presumably not the intention of the Taipings to take it. Later, 
reinforcements were sent in; see Fang-liieh ch.235 pp. 17a,28b. On 
17 April Li Shih-hsien attacked Chin-t'an, to which reinforcements 
were despatched from north of the Yangtse, The Taipings withdrew 
from Chin-t'an on 22 April and moved on Chii-jung, to which reinforce­
ments had been sent from the Chiang-nan H.Q.; but these troops did 
not even man the walls or take up defensive positions. They billeted 
in private houses outside the town and fled when the Taipings arrived 
on 23 April. See Fang-Lueh ch.236 p.4 and Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yiieh-fei 
chi-liieh p.52.
13. Ch1 ih-sha-shan is probably Ch'ih-shan, between Li-yang and Chii- 
jung; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.226. Hsiung-huang-chen, according
to Lo Erh-kang, is the popular name for Ch'un-hua-chen, west of Chii-r 
jung, 20 li from Nanking. Li Hsiu-ch1 eng arrived here on 27 April.
14. Li Shih-hsien arrived on 27 April, direct from Chu-jung.
15. The Ch'ing commander at Hsiung-huang-chen was Chang Wei-pang.
He had a nominal force of 3>000> but in fact there were only
1,000 men. They did not fortify positions, but fled at the approach 
of the Taipings on 27 April; see Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yiieh-fei chi-liieh
P*55*
16. Yang Fu-ch(ing had not yet been made Fu Wang; the title was given
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to him as a reward for his part in this campaign. He reached Mo- 
ling-kuan on 25 April and Yii-hua-t'ai, outside the south gate, on 
29 April.
Notes to Page 182.
1. Ch'en Yii-ch'eng left An-ch'ing early in March I860, passed through 
Lu-chou and Ch1 iian-chiao, and attacked Gh1 u-chou, which was held
by Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou) on 6 March. Captured Taipings 
reported that it was Ch'en's intention to attack the Gh'ing forces 
on Chiu-fu-chou; see Fang-liieh ch.254 p. 18b. If this is so, his 
failure to take Ch*u-chou and Chfuan-chiao may have made him decide 
to come south of the Yangtse on 29 April. Perhaps this is why Li 
Hsiu-ch’eng wrote that Ch'en had come 'without prior arrangement*
(page 182). One contemporary record says that Ch'en Yii-ch'eng 
crossed at Chiang-p'u (see Li ICuei: Ssu-t'ung chi in TPTK IV p.468); 
but Fang-liieh ch.255 P*l5t> confirms Li Hsiu-ch'eng's version.
2. For P3 read .
5. Ch'ing official reports call the place , see Fang-liieh ch.
255 p.51a; but Lo: Chien-cheng p.226 gives Vk m  .
4. The Chiang-nan troops were receiving a month's pay and rations
every 45 days, see Anonj P'ing-tsei chi-1 iieh p.257-
5. More than 100,000, according to Ho Ch'un, see Fang-liieh ch.256
p.20b.
6. The final battle began on 2 May (HF10/5 intercalary/12) when the 
three columns (that of Ch'en Yii-ch'eng being the western column)
reached Nanking. It continued day and night until 5 May, v/hen the 
Ch'ing siege line was broken at the southwest comer of the city.
Late the same night the Ch'ing stockades near the main camp were 
taken. With great difficulty Ho Ch'un was persuaded to get out of 
bed, and he withdrew to Chen-chiang in pouring rain. See Hsiao Sheng- 
yuan: Yiieh-fei chi-1 iieh p.55* Relief of Nanking was completed when 
the Ch'ing gunboats withdrew from Chiu-fu-chou and communications 
were restored with the north bank of the Yangtse. See Li Hsiu-ch'eng's 
letter to Chang Lo-hsing in TPTK II pp.721-2.
7. It is hard to see how this can be called more than the fifth relief 
of Nanking, at the most. The first, 1856 (see page 157)> the second,
1858 (see page 172); the third, 1859 (see page 173), though this was 
no more than the temporary re-opening of communications; the fourth,
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1859, the 'partial relief* (see page 175)*
8. Several contemporary sources confirm this; see, for instance, 
note 1 to page i8’6. See also Chapter IV page 43 for the result 
of this destruction of the Chiang-nan II. Q.
Notes to Page 183*
1. The character ^  is missing in this sentence.
2. For read %  .
3. For if? r e a d .
4. Forreadjf^j- .
5. For 0  read ^  •
6. For Jf- read ^  .
Notes to Page 184.
1. Hung Jen-kan, in his deposition (TPTK p.852) stated that after the 
victory, congratulations were offered at court, presumably by
himself and the generals who took part; after which there was a 
discussion on future campaigns.
2. t  4 f - t f in the original. The Chiu Ju T'ahg Edition reads |
• Lti Chi-i assumed that % was a mistake for-^' , since 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng commonly confused there characters, the pronunciation 
of which is very close in Kwangsi dialect. It is possible'?- that Li 
Hsiu-ch * eng intended to write 'tJ ^  X  4/.
3. For J; read i*] .
4* According to Hung Jen-kan, during the discussion on 11 May, Ch'en 
Yu-ch'eng proposed a campaign for the relief of An-ch'ing; Li Shih- 
hsien wanted to move into Fukien and Chekiang, and only Li Hsiu- 
Ch'eng agreed with Hung Jen-kan's own plan, which was to take 
advantage of their recent successes to press on towards Su-chou, 
Hang-chou and Shanghai. After securing their rear in this way, they 
were to purchase about 20 steamers and advance up-river, sending an
Notes to page 184
army into Kiangsi and another into Hupeh, thus clearing the areas 
on both sides of the Yangtse. See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition in 
TPTK II p.852.
5. The Taipings arrived at Tan-yang in the evening of 18 May 
(HFIO/ 3 intercalary/28). Ch'en Yii-ch'eng in his deposition
implied that he went on this expedition as far as Tan-yang, see Lo: 
Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi p.201. The vanguard was commanded by Liu 
Ts'ang-lin, a subordinate of Ch'en Yu-ch'eng; see Tseng Kuo-fan: 
Tsou-kao ch.13 p.18a.
6. Ho Ch'un went with 3>000 men to Tan-yang on 11 May to support a 
force under Hsiung T'ien-hsi, which had returned from Chekiang.
Chang Kuo-liang had arrived on 24 May in response to Ho Ch'un's call, 
with some 13,000 men; but little preparation was made for the defence 
of the town. Morale in the Chiang-nan army was at a dangerously 
low ebb, partly because the troops had not been paid for some time, 
and partly because of the unpopularity of the Brigade General Wang 
Chiin. It was openly said amongst the soldiers that unless they 
were paid and unless Wang Chiin were dismissed they would refuse to 
fight; but Ho Ch'un refused even to post him elsewhere. As for 
pay, though some money was available, the Treasurer refused to 
distribute it until the records were straight and hew registers had 
been drawn up, the old ones having been destroyed when the H.Q. fell. 
When payment was finally made, after a delay of ten days, each man 
only got 4 liang, and even this was called a loan. There was consid­
erable resentment, since 4 liang was not even a month's pay, and 
they were in arrears of several months. When battle was joined on 
19 May, the Ch'ing troops at first refused to open fire. The Taipings 
did not advance, presumably because they suspected a trap. This 
situation lasted for about two hours, and then the Taipings attacked 
the Ch'ing stockades at the east gate, after which the whole Ch'ing 
force fell into disorder and fled, its commander to Ch'ang-chou. 
Tan-yang then fell to the Taipings. See Hsiao Sheng-yuan; Yiieh-fei 
chi-lueh pp.56-75 Ho Ch'un's official report is in Fang-liieh ch.238 
pp.l2b-l6a.
7. This is confirmed by Ho Ch'un (Fang-liieh ch.238 p. 14b) and by Anon: 
P'ing-tsei chi-liieh p.258. Later there were rumours that he had
been killed by Ho Ch'un, who was jealous of his achievements. Chien 
Yu-wen believes that Chang committed suicide as a result of his defeats 
and because of bad relations with his commander; see Chien: Ch'iian- 
shih III pp.1749-1750.
8. This was written between the lines without any attempt to fit it 
into the text.
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Notes to Page 185*
1. This sentence is omitted in Lii Chi-i's copy*
2. Now Wu-chin ( t&A). The Taiping attack on Ch'ang-chou began on 
22 May (HF10/4/2).
5. Chang Yu-liang had reached Chfang-chou from Hang-chou on 24 April.
Ho Ch'un ordered him to the relief of the Chiang-nan H.Q., but 
Ho Kuei-ch'ing kept him in Ch'ang-chou; see Li Pin: Chung-hsing pieh- 
lu ch.47 P*2a.
4. Ho Chfun and Ma Te-chao withdrew on 22 May, Chang Yu-liang on the 
24th, after some of his troops outside the town had changed sides.
Three thousand Ch'ing troops were killed. See Hsiao Sheng-yuan: 
Yiieh-fei ohi-lueh p.58; Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-liieh p.259 a^d Chao Lieh- 
wen: Jih-chi p.141.
5. There was some stout resistance from the citizens and a small force 
of 500 Graves1. On 25 May the Taipings made a fsweetly worded*
offer of 200,000 liang of silver if the town would surrender, in 
which case the Taipings promised to by-pass the town without attacking. 
If ho\*ever, the town was not willing to change its allegiance, those 
who wished could leave by the east gate. The offer was not accepted; 
but relief did not arrive. When the defenders heard no sound of 
battle outside the town, they realized that the last Ch*ing troops 
had fled. Ch*ang-chou was then taken after some street fighting, on 
26 Lay I860 (HFIO/4/6). See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.154, Anon: 
P*ing-tsei chi-liieh p.259*
6. A British missionary commented that when towns in the southeast 
were taken by the Taipings *.•.more lives are lost by suicide
than by the sword,1 Report of the Rev. Griffith John to the Rev. Dr. 
Tidman, August 16, I860, quoted in Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh p.292.
7. The Taipings attacked Wu-hsi on 29 May I860 (HFlO/4/9).
8. In fact Ho Kuei-ch'ing had bolted from Chfang-chou, not Wu-hsi on 
20 May, on the pretext that it was necessary for him to hurry
back and organize the defence of Su-chou. When the people of Chfang- 
chou heard of his intention to leave, several thousand people 
assembled to beg him to remain. When they refused to move out of 
the way, Ho Kuei-ch'ing ordered his guards to fire, and several 
kneeling citizens were killed. He was followed in flight by more 
than 1,000 1 disorderly soldiers'. He reached Wu-hsi by boat, but 
refused to stay there. When he reached Su-chou, the Governor of 
Kiangsu, Hsii Yu-jen, declined to open the gates to him, perhaps 
because of his predatory retinue, and he was obliged to take refuge 
at Ch'ang-shu and later at Shanghai. He was subsequently tried and
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executed for his failure to hold the Gh1 ang-chou - Su-chou region 
against the Taipings, See Anon: Pfing-tsei chi-lueh p.259, Chao 
Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.141, Shih Chien-lieh & Liu Chi-tseng; Chi (Wu- 
hsi) hsien-chfeng shih-shou k*e-fu pen-mo p. 250; Chien: ChTuan~ 
shih III pp.1776-1781, and Hummel: Eminent Chinese p.620.
9* Chang Yu-liang arrived on 27 May (or 25 May, according to Anon: 
P!ing-tsei chi-liieh p,260),
10, The Ch1 ing commander at I-hsing was the tsung-ping Liu Chi-san.
11, This should be Hui-shan CH, Ja ), see Lo: Chien-oheng p.255
Notes to Page 186.
1. On 50 May I860 (HFlO/4/lO). In Anon: P^ng-tsei chi-ldeh pp.260- 
261, there is an interesting account of the Taiping capture of 
Wu-hsi. On 24 May there was no market, and shopkeepers did no 
business. The only trading was by soldiers, selling what they had 
stolen. On the following day there was widespread looting and burning 
by disbanded soldiers and local bandits. A certain Captain Chiang 
tried to stop these disorders, but was unable to, even after going 
round the town killing looters at sight, until his clothes were red 
with blood. Though Ma Te-chao tried to assemble some of the 
scattered troops with a promise of immediate pay, no one responded.
Ma was left holding the town while Chang Yii-liang and other commanders 
took up positions outside. According to this account, Li Hsiu- 
cVeng’s force arrived on 26 May, but were beaten off at Kao-ch'iao 
by troops -under Tseng Ping-ohung. On the following day the Taipings 
constructed three pontoon bridges, which enabled them to get into 
the rear of the Ch'ing force at Kao-ch1 iao; but again they were 
defeated. On 28 May the Taipings crossed Hui-shan and made a direct 
attack on the west and south gates. Chang Yii-liang and the other 
commanders withdrew as soon as the west gate was taken, and by noon 
the town was in Taiping hands. About 100 of the defenders failed to 
get away in time; half of them were killed by the Taipings, the 
remainder escaped over the wall but were killed by peasants in a 
nearby village. (Peasants at Ch'ang-chou had taken similar vengeance 
on government troops at Chtang-chou, according to Chao Lieh-wen: 
Jih-chi p.141). The Taiping advance-guard galloped through the 
streets of Chfang-chou from east to west and from north to south,
without killing anyone, and then went off in the direction of Su-chou.
The Taiping troops who followed were less orderly; nevertheless, 
people began to return to the town on the grounds that fif the rebels
did not take their property, the soldiers would.T See Shih Chien-
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Iieh & Liu Chi-tseng: Chi (Wu-hsi) hsien-oh'eng shih-shou k*e-fu pen-
mo for another account of the fall of Wu-hsi.
2. "The false Chung Wang Li Hsiu-chfeng made proclamations for the 
pacification of the people, and strictly prohibited disorderly 
acts by the long-haired rebels [Taipings]; several bandits were 
executed and their heads displayed at the town gates, so that the 
local people who had fled were keen to return home. Cunning people 
in the villages started talking of presenting tribute...11 See Hua
I-lun: Hsi Chin t'uan-lien shih-mo in Tzu-liao p. 121.
3* For l£l read \£\ , Hu-shu-kuan, see Map VI; about 30 li from 
Su-chou, and an important customs barrier. Ho Ch'un Vent alone1 
presumably because his troops gradually dispersed, see Fang-liieh 
ch.238 p.lb,
4. Apart for the Governor of Kiangsu' s memorial (Fang-liieh ch.238 
p.20) and another account (quoted by Lo Erh-kang), most other
versions agree that Ho Ch'un committed suicide, but disagree as to 
the means he employed. One may chose between hanging, shooting 
'with a foreign pistol* and poisoning with a mixture of alcohol and 
opium; see Los Chien-cheng pp.235-6*
5. The Taipings arrived before Su-chou on 1 June I860.
6. The people of the Ch'ang-men suburb, and perhaps to a lesser extent 
of the Hsii-men suburb also, suffered particularly because for
several days before the appearance of the Taipings, shops and other 
buildings had been burned on the orders of the Governor, so that they 
could not be used as cover for an assault on the city. There was,of 
course, looting at the same time. According to one source 'several 
myriad* shops were destroyed. See Yao Chi: Hsiao ts'ang-sang chi I 
in TFTK VI p.445* and P'an Chung-jui: Su-t'ai mi-lu chi in TPTK V 
p.271* Contemporary records of the depredations of government troops 
are extensively quoted in Chien: Ch'lian-shih III pp. 1758-1760.
7. This sentence was overlooked by Lu Chi-i.
8. According to Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-liieh p.261, the Taiping army 
in this operation numbered over 100,000, the garrison at Su-chou
less than 4*000.
9. Chang Yii-liangfs troops entered Su-chou on 1 June (or 31 May, 
according to Wu Ta-cheng: Wu Ch'ing-ching t'ai-shih jih-chi in
TPTK V p.329)* Luring his retreat from Ch'ang-chou, Chang Yii-liang
had collected a following of dispersed soldiers, amongst whom there 
were Taipings in disguise. On arrival at Su-chou he ordered that only 
his personal troops be allowed into the city, but in fact, several
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times the permitted number entered, including the Taiping 1fifth 
column*• See P*an Chung-jui: Su-t*ai mi-lu chi pp.271-2. Another 
account has it that the Taiping agents had been in the city for 
several months, see Feng Shih: Hua-chfi .jih-chi in TPTK VI p.661.
10. Wu Ta-cheng saw local people killing government soldiers outside 
Su-chou on 2 June, see Wu Ch*ing-ching t*ai-shih .jih-chi p.530.
Notes to Page 187*
1. Li Wen-ping, from Ohia-ying, Kwangtung, had joined Liu Li-ch*uan,s 
* Small Dagger* (*b 70 ^  ) Bising in Shanghai in 1853 > "but had later
surrendered to the government and had bought the office of Candidate 
Circuit Intendant in Su-chou. When the city was threatened by the 
Taipings, he was given command of some Kwangtung *braves*. He opened 
the Ch*ang Gate to the Taipings on 2 June, enabling them to take 
Su-chou without fighting. For this service he was rewarded with 
high office. See Chien: Ch * uan-shih III pp.1771-3* Ho I-Isin-i was 
a candidate prefect, according to Anon: F*ing-tsei chi-liieh; of 
Chou Wu nothing seems to be known.
At the time there was a rumour that Chang Yu-liaqgg himself had 
come to terms with the Taipings. Chao Lieh-wen heard that Chang had 
agreed to give up Su-chou. Later, in that city, a Taiping remarked 
to someone, "Your Big Chang [i.e. Chang Kuo-liang] is dead, and there 
remains only Little Chang [Yii-liang], who is our man. Who is there 
left to fight us?" See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi pp.147-8.
2. Omitted in Lii*s copy.
3* Chang Yii-liang arrived at Hang-chou on 3 June. Ho Kuei-ch*ing 
and Wang Yu-ling (Governor of Chekiang) reported: "Outside Hang­
chou there are twenty or thirty thousand dispersed troops from Su- 
chou; there is no means of knowing whether there are not spies 
amongst them." See Fang-liieh ch.240 p.24b. This may have been one 
of the reasons, or at least the official excuse, for not letting 
Chang Yii-liang into the city. The *two commanders* to which Li Hsiu- 
ch*eng referred were presumable Wang Yu-ling (the Governor) and 
Jui-ch*ang, the Tartar General.
4. After the final defeat of the Chiang-nan H.Q., the death of Ho 
Ch*un and the disgrace of Ho Kuei-ch*ing, Tseng Kuo-fan was 
appointed on 7 June (HF10/4/18) Governor General of Liang-chiang. He 
was ordered to hasten to the relief of the southeast; if he was not 
able to penetrate the territory, he was to bestride the Yangtse and 
prevent the rebels from advancing northwards. See Helen.’Feng tung-hua
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hsti-lu ch.92 p. 13b. Chang Yii-liang was appointed Imperial Commissioner 
for the Military Affairs of Chiang-nan in place of Ho Ch'un. When 
the news of the fall of Su-chou reached Peking, Chang Yii-liang was 
also dismissed and Jui Ch'ang was given his command. All this time, 
Tseng Kuo-fan was repeatedly urged to advance on Su-chou by way of 
Ning-kuo, Kuang-te and Chien-p'ing. This was contrary to his belief 
that nothing should be done which would hinder the siege of An-ch'ing, 
the key to his strategic plan for the defeat of the rebellion. To 
placate the court, he felt obliged to move his H.Q. south of the 
Yangtse, and he informed Peking that he would advance into the south­
east in three column. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.11 p.14b and 
^ai I: Chung-kuo chln-tai shih-kao I, Peking 1958 p.370*
5. For read .
6. For 4^ read ^  .
7. Elsewhere Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave the figure as twenty or thirty 
thousand, see Li Hsiu-ch'eng's communication addressed to the
British 1Plenipotentiary' at Shanghai, quoted in Chien: Ch*uan-shih 
III p.1794.
8. The Governor of Kiangsu however, jumped into the water with his 
seal of office and was drowned. Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave him a proper
burial, and said he was fa loyal official.1 See Ts'ang-lang tiao-tfu 
(pseud.): Chieh-yu hui-lu p.160.
9. Lii Chi-i read the character^ in this sentence as , Chien: Tien- 
chih t'ung-k'ao III p. 1355> as %  . The sense however is more or
less the same.
10. Tseng Kuo-fanfs deletions in this section are rather confusing. 
First he deleted some parts and then crossed out the deletion
marks; some parts deleted by him were nevertheless included in the 
printed edition. No particular signifiance need be attached to this.
11. The texts of three such proclamations made in Su-chou survive.
See Wu Ta-cheng: Wu Ch'ing-ching tlai-shih jih-chi pp.336,337 and
TPTK II pp.723,724.
Notes to Page 188.
1. Wu Ta-cheng: Wu Ch1 ing-ching tfai-shih jih-chi p.333 confirms this.
2. Yuan-ho, Wu-hsien and Ch'ang-chou 'M ) are hsien in Su-chou 
Prefecture.
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3. This something of an exaggeration. In some regions near Su- 
chou the militia (t fuan-lien) made a show of submission to the 
Taipings, but secretly conserved their organization and even increased 
their strength. This m s  particularly true at Yung-ch’ang, Wu-hsi 
and Chin-kuei, where clandestine anti-Taiping activity continued. The 
preservation of mili&iaagroups was of assistance to the government 
forces in their reconquest of the region in 1863-4*
4* Chia-hsing was taken, with inside aid and by Taipings disguised 
as refugees and disbanded Ch’ing soldiers, on 15 June (HF10/4/26); 
see Shen Tzu: Pi-k1 ou .jih-chi p. 13 and Peng Shih: Hua-ch1! .jih-chi 
p.662. (Jui Chfang and Wang Yu-ling in a memorial gave the date as 
14 June, see Fang-liieh ch.243 P*9&*)
5* Between the Taipings occupation of Chia-hsing and Chang Yu-liang;’^  
attack on that town, the rebels captured several other towns in 
the southeast: on 15 June, K 1 un-shan and Yang-shan; on 17 June T’ai­
ts1 ang and on 22 June Chia-ting (both given up on 26 June); on 30 
June, Ch’ing-p’u; on 1 July Sung-chiang and on 4 July, Chiang-yin.
6, Chang Yii-liang began his attack on Chia-hsing on 5 July.
7* T1 ien-i was one of the six ranks of nobility, see Li Ch’un: T’ai- 
p’ing T *ien-kuo chih-tu ch’u-t’ an pp.257-244*
8. The Chiu Ju T’ang Edition reads ®  * (the west and south
gatesX The character in the original may be an error for 'S? .
Chang Yii-liang did attack the small west gate of Chia-hsing, and 
even broke in, but seems to have fallen into a Taiping trap, who, 
before withdrawing from the town by another gate, scattered a great 
deal of desirable property on the ground; the collection of it ruined 
the discipline of Chang’s force. Later, on 26 August, Chang Yii-liang 
one more broke down part of the town wall, but was prevented from 
advancing by a sudden rain-storm, Chang Yii-liang wanted to commit 
suicide, while Ch’en Ping-\*en said, ’Heaven is on our side.’ See 
Feng Shih: Hua-ch*i .jih-chi pp.665-6.
9. Hsiieh Huan (1815-1880) was Governor of ICiangsu after the death 
of Hsii Yu-jen (i860), until 1862.
According to H.B.Morse: International Relations of the Chinese Empire 
Shanghai. 1910 p.591> the Shanghai tao-t1ai Wu Hsti called on the 
British and French consuls on 23 Hay ’to.request officially that the 
allied ofrces should undertake the protection of Shanghai against the 
Taiping rebels, who had then captured Changchow [Ch’ang-chou] ’. In fact 
Ch’ang-chou did not fall until 26 May. Moreover, letters written to 
Hsiieh Huan by Wang Yu-ling (Governor of Chekiang) on 25 May, just 
before the Taiping capture of Ch’ang-chou, which reached Hsiieh on 27 
May (just after the fall of Wu-hsi), suggest that Wu Hsii did not
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merely ask the foreigners to protect Shanghai, but also asked for 
assistance in defending Ch'ang-chou and Su-chou. See Ching Wu &
Chung Ting (eds.): Wu Hsii tang-an-chung ti T 'ai-p1 ing T1 ien^kuo 
shih-liao hsuan-chi, Peking 1858 pp,44-45*
Su-chou gentry had been agitating for such an appeal to be made 
for some time; but Hsiieh Huan had resisted the suggestion for tradit­
ional reasons: the danger of inviting foreigners into the country and 
so on (ibid.pp,46-7). The answer which Wu Hsii sent back to Hsiieh 
Huan was that the consuls considered that the question of helping in 
the defence of Su-chou could only be discussed face-to-face with Ho 
Kuei-ch'ing, who was both Governor General of Liang-chiang and 
Commissioner for the Affairs of Various Nations, Ho Kuei-ch'ing 
accordingly went to Shanghai and on 9 June, after the fall of Su- 
chou, had a conference with Frederick Bruce 'to attempt an accomod­
ation of our differences with the Imperial Government; and to move us 
to apply our force to the pacification of this province, in the 
welfare of which we had a commercial interest, (B.P.P. Corresp­
ondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860, Memorandum of a 
Conference between Mr, Bruce and Commissioner Ho, pp.68-90 Later 
Ho Kuei-ch'ing saw a representative of the French consul, but neither 
from the British or the French did he receive any satisfaction. 
According to Ho Kaei-ch' ing' s new personal secretary Hsiao Sheng-yuan, 
the answer which the consuls gave was, that 'if the Emperor would 
agree to the fifty-odd treaty claused, [embodied eventually in the 
Tientsin Treaty,-C. A. C] they would be only too willing to bring back 
immediately the steamers which had been sent to Tientsin, first 
re-capture Su-chou and then attack Chin-ling [Nanking] in order to 
obliterate the rebellion and restore the boundaries of the Empire.' 
When Ho Kuei-ch'ing memorialized to this effect, the Emperor's 
Vermilion Rescript was, 'A lot of fraudulent connivance! Not to be 
permitted!' See Hsiao Sheng-yuan: Yiieh-fei chi-liieh pp.58-59* In Ho 
Kuei-ch'ing's memorial however, there is no suggestion of an ultimatum 
of this kind, or that the foreigners had agreed to help in the 
suppression of the rebellion on these terms; see Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih- 
mo, Peiping 1937 > ch.52 pp,15a-17b. There is no mention in Bruce's 
memorandum, quoted above, that he said anything about bringing 
foreign troops back from the north; but he did suggest that the 
Chinese should come to terms at once, which would enable them to 
bring Seng-ko-lin-ch'in and his troops south to suppress the rebellion. 
At this Ho Kuei-ch'ing begged Bruce not to 'joke or trifle'.
Two months after the fall of Su-chou, Shanghai itself was threat­
ened, and on 26 May, Bruce and Bourboulon notified the Taipings of 
their intention to defend Shanghai 'as a purely military measure, 
since the port served as an intermediate base for the troops in the 
north, and disclaiming any political motives'; See Morse: op.cit. 
p.592. After this announcement, preparations were made for the 
defence, not only of the concessions, but of the Chinese tom as well.
In the meantime, a wealthy merchant in Shanghai called Yang Fang,
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known to foreigners as 'Ta-kee', after the name of his firm) and 
some other merchants, with the permission of Wu Hsii, engaged two 
Americans, F.T. Ward and Henry Burgevine, to enlist a force of 
foreigners to take the field against the Taipings, primarily for the 
defence of Shanghai. Ward began enlisting on 2 June, and the first 
operation of this force, which later became known as the 'Ever- 
Victorious Army* (E.V.A.), was an attack 'with about 100 Foreigners, 
mostly sea-faring men* on the town of Sung-chiang, which had been 
taken by the Taipings on 1 July. This resulted in 'a repulse with 
some loss*. See Andrew Wilson: The "Ever-Yictorious Army1* p.6$.
Ward returned to the attack on 16 July, his force augmented by a 
company of Manilamen, and supported by some government troops. On 
this occasion they succeeded in taking Sung-chiang. A colourful report 
of desperate fighting, with 62 killed and 101 wounded, became the 
generally accepted account of this victory. See Holger Cahill: A 
Yankee Adventurer; the Story of Ward and the Taiping Rebellion, New 
York 1930 pp. 117-122. But there is an interesting account of the 
event by Wu Yun, Prefect of Su-chou, who was present on board a 
Ch'ing ^un-boat when Sung-chiang was taken. According to him, there 
were only 40 foreigners there; the rest of the attacking force was 
made up of several hundred 'braves’. The main Taiping force had 
left the town to attack Shanghai,; leaving only several hundred troops 
who were 'old and weak’, who had not even closed the gates of Sung- 
chiang. Ward himself, according to Wu Yiin, was at Shanghai at the 
time; but hurried to Sung-chiang when he heard the news. He had a 
force of only 80 foreigners at this time, and hesitated to show him­
self much because of official disapproval by the British and French.
See Wu Yun; Liang-lei-hbuan ch'ih-tu in Chien-chi VI p.131. (Wu Yiin 
probably provided information for the official version, see Hsueh 
Huan's memorial in Fang-liieh ch.245 P*3)* Whichever account is true, 
'Ward received the ransom of the city and Ta-kee and other patriotic 
merchants were promoted in rank,' see Wilson; op.cit. p.63. On 
12 August however, Sung-chiang was once more taken by the Taipings, 
see Fang-liieh ch.247 p.8a and ch.248 p. 12a.
Ward was then offered a reward for the recovery of Ch'ing-p'u, 
which he attacked on 2 August with 280 foreigners and a force of
10,000 Ch'ing troops under Li Heng-sung (Li Adong) and about 200 small 
boats. Ward's men scaled the wall of the town but were beaten off, a 
failure attributed, typically enough, to the presence of Europeans 
in Taipings service, particularly to the efforts of a man called 
Savage, who assisted in the defence of Ch'ing-p'u. Ward then, 'being 
an irrepressible sort of element,... returned to Shanghai and, despite 
his wound, immediately returned to Slngpoo [Ch'ing-p'u] with two 
eighteen pounders, and 100 fresh men, mostly Greeks and Italians. See 
Wilson: op.cit. p.64.
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Notes to Page 189»
1. Chou Wen-chia m s  formerly a carpenter and was blind in one eye.
He was later made Ning Wang. He was one of the wangs who surrend­
ered at Su-chou and was killed on Li Hung-chang’s orders (page 227 , 
below), see Lo: Chien-cheng p.240.
2. Ward’s second attempt to take Ch’ing-p’u was on 8 August; he 
was defeated on the following day. Li Hsiu-ch’eng's figures for
the number of killed, and for the number of foreign guns and muzzle- 
loaders taken, are much exaggerated. Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer p. 1^0 
gives about 100 killed and the same number wounded. Wilson: The 
"Ever-Viotorious Army" p.64 merely'says that Li Hsiu-ch'eng 'surprised 
and outflanked Ward, took his guns, boats, and a good many muskets, 
and drove him back to Sung-chiang.1
5. On 12 August. Wilson: The "Ever-Victorious Army” p.64 says that 
the Taipings were repulsed, but Kuo T’ing-i: Jih-chih p.699, cites 
evidence to the contrary; see also fang-liieh ch.247 p.8a and Ch.248 
p.12a.
4. The decision to occupy Shanghai is said to have been taken on 
11 May I860, see note 4 to page 184; although in his deposition 
Lai Wen-kuang accused Li Hsiu-ch'eng of attacking Shanghai against 
the orders of the T'ien Wang, see TPTK II p,86j.
from Su-chou Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote to the 'British Plenipotentiary' 
in Shanghai on about 20 June. In this letter, which is dignified and 
friendly in tone, he gave a brief survey of Taiping achievements up 
to that date, which were due 'to the favour of Heaven, the good 
fortune of the Sovereign and the protection of your honourable 
country.' After listing the towns which he had taken after the 
capture of Su-chou, Li Hsiu-ch'eng explained the necessity for taking 
Shanghai: although it was only a hsien, the presence of the foreign
representatives there, and its importance as a centre of foreign trade, 
made it desirable that there should be sone sort of agreement in case 
of inadvertent infringement of foreign interests. The British 
plenipotentiary was therefore invited to come to Su-chou to discuss 
these matters. Just as Bruce and Bourboulon had informed the Taipings 
that they intended to defend Shanghai ' as a purely military measure, * 
so Li Hsiu-ch'eng (who had not received this message) informed Bruce 
that at such time as operations were started against Shanghai, 'it 
would be because my State is at war, and not in order to cause any 
trouble to your honourable country.' This communication is reproduced 
in Chien: Ch’uan-shih III pp.1794-5*
It would seem that after this letter was written, Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
had contact with some foreigners in Su-chou, who encouraged him to 
take Shanghai. Chao Lieh-wen*s brother, who spent four months in
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Su-chou under the Taipings, said that foreigners who came there 
during the summer told the Taipings that Shanghai was virtually 
undefended and could be easily taken. These, or other foreigners 
had also presented the rebels with 'several hundred muskets.1 See 
Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.218.
Li Hsiu-ch'eng certainly appears to have considered that official 
contact had been made with him on the initiative of the foreign 
consuls. He addressed another communication to the representatives 
of Britain, America and Prance on 10 July (TT10/5/3l)> in which he 
referred to the 'Representatives previously sent by your honourable 
countries.' Again they were invited to come to Su-chou, where they 
could meet the Kan Wang (who was in charge of foreign affairs), and 
discuss a treaty of friendship. Li Hsiu-ch’eng also stated that he 
had ordered a swift advance on Shanghai, but that his troops would 
halt before the town to await the reply of the consuls, before 
deciding upon an attack. At the same time, Li Hsiu-ch'eng also 
complained that there were some foreign boats in the river outside 
Sung-chiang, and that help was being given by foreigners to the 
'imps’ in defending Shanghai. See Wu Hsii tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing 
Tlien-kuo 'shih-liao hsuan-chi pp.4-5*
It is clear that Li Hsiu-ch'eng expected that Shanghai would fall 
into his lap; that on approaching the town, the foreigners would give 
him 'a respectful welcome' (see page 189), and that the activity of 
his 'fifth column' in the town, together with the forseeable 
pusillanimity of the Ch'ing troops, would enable him to occupy it 
without the necessity of fighting. This would account for the very 
small force which Li Hsiu-ch'eng took to Shanghai, 'a portion of his 
own body-guard, and some 3,000 irregular troops, more as an escort 
than for any offensive purpose.1 See Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh p.237* 
It would also account for the extraordinary behaviour of the Taipings 
in hardly returning fire when they themselves were fired upon; ibid. 
pp.275~278. After the event, on 21 August, Li Hsiu-ch'eng in a letter 
of reproach indicated explicitly, and by addressing his communication 
only to the British, American and Portuguese consuls, implicitly as 
well, that the French were to blame for what had happened.
"That good faith must be kept is the principle which guides 
our dynasty in its friendly relations with other peoples; but 
deceitful forgetfulness of previous arrangements is the real 
cause of foreign nations having committed a wrong. When my army 
reached Soo-chow, Frenchmen, accompanied by people of other 
nations came there to trade. They personally called upon me, and 
invited me to come to Shanghae to consult respecting friendly 
relations between us in future. Knowing that your nations, like 
us, worship God the Heavenly Father and Jesus the Heavenly Elder 
Brother, and are therefore of one religion and of one origin with 
us, I placed entire and undoubting confidence in their words, and 
consequently came to meet you at Shanghae.
It never occurred to my mind that the French, allowing them-
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selves to be deluded by the imps (the Chinese Imperial 
Authorities), would break their word and turn their backs upon 
the arrangement made. Not only however did they not come on 
my arrival to meet and consult witti me, but they entered into 
an agreement with the imps to protect the city of Shanghae against
us, by which they violated their original agreement.....
If you other nations have not received the money of the imps, 
why did several of your people also appear with the French when 
they came to Soo-chow and invited me to Shanghae to confer 
together? ....
On coming to Soo-chow I had the general command of upwards 
of one thousand officers, and several tens of thousands of 
soldiers... If we had the intention of attacking Shanghae, then 
what city have they not subdued? What place have they not stormed? 
... I came to Shanghae to make a treaty in order to see us 
connected together by trade and commerce; I did not come for the 
purpose of fighting with you.”
The Chinese original of this document is lost, this translation, 
taken from Lin-Le; Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.281-284, first appeared in 
the North China Herald No.527 of 1 September I860. What appeard to 
be a precis of the Chinese original is' in Wu Hsii tang-an-chung ti T’ai- 
p’ing T’ien-kuo shih-liao hsuan-ohi p.5 
Andrew Wilson’s comment on this is:
"In his [Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s] own account of this affair he says 
that he was induced to go to Shanghai ’by some Barbarians 
residing there; ’ and, in a communication which he sent in to the 
Foreign authorities on the 21st August, he expressly accuses the 
French of having deceived him. This is rather curious, and is 
not quite explained away by the Hon. Mr. Bruce when he remarks, 
in his despatch of the 4th September I860, that the French were 
pf all Foreigners the least likely to have made any advances to 
the Taipings. It is well known that the Roman Catholic priest­
hood in China - a very powerful body, with a system of underground 
communication all over the Empire - were bitterly hostile to the 
Rebellion, and it is not at all unlikely that some of their agents 
may have been employed in luring the Chung Wang on to his injury 
by false representations of the ease and safety with which 
Shanghai might be occupied." See The "Ever-Victorious Army"
p.66.
5. This should be%'fe ffl (Hsu-chia-hui), the ’Sikawai* or ’Sikawei* 
of western accounts.
6. Ts’ai Yuan-lung was later made the Hui Wang; he surrendered to 
the government early in 1864; see Lo: Chien-cheng p,241. Kao
Yung-k’uan (or'R 'fC), later the Na Wang (often the ’Lax Wang’ in
western accounts, was one of the Taiping leaders who surrendered
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at Su-chou and was executed (see page 227).
7. Near Fa-hua-chen and Hsu-chia-hui in Shang-hai-hsien; see Lo: 
Chien-cheng p.241.
Notes to Page 190.
1. According to Hsueh Huan, at Sung-chiang a rebel document was 
captured which contained the information that 5,000+ Cantonese 
of Kwangsi soldiers at Shanghai wished to join the Taipings; see 
Hsien Feng tung-hua hsii-lu ch.94 p.20b. ”There was not only the
danger to the settlement from the rebels without, but there was 
danger from within, as the place swarmed with bad and desperate 
characters, both foreign and native.’1 Maclellans The Story of 
Shanghai p.48. In Hsiieh Huan’s memorial reporting the defence of 
Shanghai against the Taipings, which Bruce called 'a tissue of 
unmitigated falsehood from first to last1, he mentioned that Li 
Hsiu-ch’eng was only persuaded to attack Shanghai because a 
Cantonese told him that there was a Kwangsi man in the town who 
was prepared to make a disturbance and open the gates; see B.P.P. 
Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China 1859-1860, Bruce to 
Elgin, 15 October I860, pp.199,202.
2* Hung-mao the Red-heads, refers to the French.
The most detailed account of this Taiping attempt to take 
Shanghai is contained in B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting Affairs 
in China 1859-1860, which includes the letter of Bruce to Russell 
of September 4, I860; Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s letter to the Consuls of 
Britain, France and the United States (inclosure 1 in No.72); an 
extract from the North China Herald, giving Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s letter 
to the Consuls of Britain, the U.S. and Portugal (inclosure 5 in 
No.72); a letter from Lieut. Pritchett to Lieut. Col. March, report­
ing the event of 50 August, and an extract from the North China Herald 
on 25 August 1860 entitled ’The Advance of the Tai-ping Insurgents 
on Shanghae (inclosure 6 in No.72). There are other accounts in 
Maclellans The Story of Shanghai pp.47-49 an& in C.A. Montalto de 
Jesuss Historic Shanghai, Shanghai 1909, pp.104-115*
5. Kuan-wang-miao is in Wu-hsien. This shows that Li Hsiu-ch’eng 
returned to Su-chou after leaving Shanghai and before going to 
Chia-hsing; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.242.
4. Chia-shan was taken by the Taipings on 29 July (BF10/6/12) and 
P ’ing-hu on 1 August (HFlO/6/15).
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5. This is confirmed by the official record. Chang Yii-liang1 s 
force numbered about 30,000, but consisted almost entirely of
dispersed soldiers from Ch’ang-chou and Su-chou. The Taiping army, 
according to the official Ch’ing version, was 100,000 strong. This 
is almost certainly an exaggeration, designed to excuse Chang Yii- 
liang’s defeat; see Fang-liieh ch.249 p.21b and Gh.250 p.23a. Chang 
Yii-liang does not seem to have been very enthusiastic about the 
siege of Chia-hsing. He had built himself a house outside the 
town, ("Was not the town itself good enough for him to rest in?" is 
Shen Tzu’s comment) and seemed to regard the operation as a miniature 
siege of Nanking, which would take a very long time; see Shen Tzu: 
Pi-k'ow jih-chi p.24.
6. This detachment was under the Shih Wang Li Shih-hsien.
7. Some of Chang Yii-liang’s troops were in contact with the Taipings. 
After his defeat, Chang went first to Shih-men and then to Hang­
chou, but his troops were refused entry into the town; see Hsii Yao- 
kuang: T’an Che ch.2 p.576. Chang Yii-liang was said to have been 
wounded in this battle, but this may have been invented to excuse 
his defeat; see Fang-liieh ch.249 p.20a & ch.250 p.2b.
8. Su-chou was the capital of a new province created I by the Taipings, 
called Su-fu (^$4$ ^  ).
9. In accordance with Taiping policy people were discouraged or 
prevented from living in the city. Luring resettlement in the
suburbs people were given a daily ration of rice (5 sheng) for four 
or five days, while they were establishing their own means of live- 
lehood. Those who had not capital to set up businesses were able 
to borrow it from the Taiping administration, or the equivalent in 
goods. 70$ of this was a loan, the remaining 30$ a free subsidy.
See P’an Chung-jui: Su-t’ai mi-lu chi p.276
Notes to Page 191.
1. The question of taxes and land rents under the Taipings is 
discussed in Chien Yu-wen: T’ai-p’ing T’ien-kuo t’ien-chih t’ien-
cheng k ’ao in Journal of Oriental Studies 1954 Vol.l pp.26-68; in 
Li Ch’un: T’ai-p’ing T’ien-kuo chih-tu ch’u-t’an chapter 1; in 
Chien: Tien-chih t’ung-k'ao chapter 9, elsewhere.
2. There is some confirmation for this. "The Faithful King [Li Hsiu- 
ch’eng] then proceeded to Soochow, where the distress of the
people was very great. It is to his credit that he endeavoured in
Notes to pages 191 & 192
every way to relieve them, and was so far successful that they 
erected to him an ornamental arch - a tribute of gratitude which 
caused them considerable trouble, when, afterwards, the city was 
recovered by the Imperialists, bu whom it was pulled down." See 
Wilson: The "Ever-Victorious Army" p.67. This refers to an arch 
erected outside the Ch*ang Gate of Su-chou, on which was written 
* the people cannot forget1 (xkx It was destroyed at the
order of Li Hung-chang in 1865. When Li Hung-chang enquired why 
it had been put up, he was told that it was because of the decrease 
in taxation; in the past taxation was higher in Kiangsu than in 
any other province and that, for instance, the tax quota of Sung- 
chiang alone was higher than that of the whole province of Fukien. 
The people had often appealed against this, but only after the 
occupation of the region by the Taipings had anything been done, 
and the taxes reduced by four tenths. See Ts’ang-lang tiao-tfu 
(pseud.): Chieh-yu hui-lu p.149*
Notes to Page 192•
1. This sentence was clearly marked for deletion by Tseng Kuo-fan; 
see Chapter VI page 70 .
2. This sentence was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan.
3. This seems contradictory: 1other intentions1 ) usually
means treacherous or at least disloyal intentions, yet in the
previous sentence Li Hsiu-chfeng protested his loyalty.
4. Deleted because the meaning is not clear; * in the original.
5. For X fe. read X jMl .
6. Pages 69 and JO in the manuscript, and the first 3 lines of page
71 seem to have been first marked for deletion by Tseng Kuo-fan,
and then these marks cancelled by him (see Illustration I, page 508); 
at least it is clear that similar marking of p.48 of the ms. was taken 
by the printer or copier to mean that the passage was not to be 
deleted. However, similar marking on p.64 of the ms. (line 13) was
not understood in this way, though in this case the marking is less
clear. Again, as a rule when Tseng Kuo-fan intended a passage to 
be cut, he did not punctuate it(see p.32 of the ms. for instance).
The whole of this passage however, has been punctuated by Tseng; it 
is evident moreover1; that certain passages were intended to be deleted 
(see notes 1 and 2 above), being circled in red, and this would of 
course have not been necessary if the whole passage was to be cut.
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I assume therefore that Tseng first marked the whole passage for 
deletion line by line, although sometimes he cancelled large 
passages by tracing a single line round the whole passage (see p. 
100 and p.14a of the ms.); then he decided to let the whole section 
remain, and cancelled the markings at the top and bottom of each 
page, punctuated the text, and marked individually the passages he 
wanted omitted.
The curious thing is that not only was the whole passage omitted 
in the Ohiu Ju T fang Edition, but it was also entirely overlooked 
by Lii Chi-i. (See" Chapter VI page 71 )•
Notes to Page 195*
1. For read .
2. For Mi read ^  .
3. For a discussion of the meaning of this, see note 13, below.
4. For Up read
5- 0 H read
6. »=! O H read #r
7. For % read 1X.
8. For read 4-ft’?.
9. I do not know who these people were, though they were possibly 
Tfien Ti Hui members. The appropriate gazeteers may have the
answer.
10. Tseng Kuo-fan crossed out the character (righteous), 
presumably on the grounds that a rebel was incapable of such
feeling, and replaced it with the character 0L (abundantly).
11* For ^  read %  .
12. For read i$i .
13. According to his own account, Li Hsiu-ch1eng's disobedience
consisted in his refusal to fsweep the north1♦ But it is not
clear that means in military terms. The Ch(ing government
was at the time in the throes of a war with Britain and France, 
whose troops entered Tientsin on 23 %gust; the Emperor fled to
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Jehol on 22 September. It is reasonable to suppose that the Taipings 
may have considered the moment opportune for another expedition to 
the north to unseat the rival dynasty. This is partly bom out by 
the fact that Li Hsiu-ch'eng referred to the Northern Expedition 
of 1853 using the same term ) - see page 251. Both Kuo T'ing-
Jih-ohih p.711, and Chien Yu-wen: Ch'iian— shih III p. 1841, favour 
this view (though they differ as to the role of Jung Hung in the 
matter). The other view, taken by Mou An~shih: T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo 
p.285, &od by Yii Ming-hsia: Kuan-yd Li Hsiu-ch1 eng-ti chan-chi chi 
p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1965 No.2 p.29 is that Hung 
Hsiu-ch'tian's intention was merely that Li Hsiu-ch’eng should 
campaign on the north bank of the Yangtse, in the operation previously 
planned for the relief of An-ch'ing. In the absence of further 
material it is not possible to say which;of these views is the 
correct one. But in either case Li Hsiu-ch'eng could have justified 
his refusal on the grounds that the original plan for the relief of 
An-ch'ing was that he should operate south of the Yangtse (see note 4 
to page 184). Three Taiping leaders, Hung Jen-kan, Lai Wen-kuang 
and Huang Wen-chin, criticized Li Hsiu-ch'eng in their depositions, 
but none of them did so for his conduct in this particular matter.
This may suggest that Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not alone in believing that 
it was undesirable that he should 'sweep the north1. Nevertheless, 
his excuse seems weak, and the real reason for his unwillingness 
was that he was becoming increasingly tied to his own base, and 
tended to underestimate the importance of An-ch'ing. This question, 
and the failure of the campaign to relieve An-ch'ing is dealt with 
in greater detail below, see note 6 to page 206.
Notes to Page 194*
1, See note 7 to page 182.
2. f e i n  the original; may be an error for .
3* Li Hsiu-ch'eng^s subsequent actions show that he underestimated 
the importance of this strategic dictum, see note 6 to p. 197*
4. For M  read $3 & • The fort at Chiang-tung-men was on the
west side of the city, about 3 !£. from the Shui-hsi-men (see 
Map Ilj), and included both Chiang-tung-men and Chiang-tung Bridge; 
see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.295* ®ie Yu-hua-t' ai fort was on a hill 
of that name outside the south gate; it was a large stone fort with 
a watch-tower from which one could see into the city. Yu-hua-t*ai 
was linked with other fortifications outside the south gate. See Lo: 
Chien-cheng p.246 & Tiao-fu tao-jen (pseud.): Ghin-ling tsa-chi p.6 3 3 .
3S2
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F>. This presumably refers to Hung Jen-fa and Hung Jen-ta.
Notes to Page 195«
1. T'ai-p’ing is now called Tang-t'u ^ l). Li Hsiu-ch’eng 
reached Wu-hu on 16 November I860. For-^ 4  reacUfc .
This was the beginning of Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s participation in the 
Taipings' second Western Expedition, which had been planned at the 
meeting in Nanking in May I860 (see note 4 to page 184). The first 
operations were Yang Fu-ch'ing and Li Shih-hsien's capture of Ning- 
kuo on 26 September I860, Li Shih-hsien’s occupation of Hui-chou 
on 9 October, and'on the north bank, Ch’en Yu-ch’eng’s capture 
of Ting-yuan on 10 October. Li Hsiu-ch’eng's later departure, 
which contributed to the failure of the whole expedition, may have 
been due to his disagreement with the T’ien Wang.
The original plan, briefly outlined by Hung Jen-kan in his 
deposition (see TPTK II p.852), was that once the Kiangsu delta 
was conquered and Shanghai occupied, the Taipings would buy 20 
steamers, which would be used to transport an army up the Yangtse 
to Hupeh. Two other armies, on either side of the Yangtse, would 
join this one for an attack on Wu-han. The failure of the Taipings 
to take Shanghai and acquire steamers necessitated some change of 
plan, which may have been worked out between Li Hsiu-ch'eng and 
Ch’en Yii-ch'eng when the latter was in Su-chou (see Chien: Ch1 uan- 
shih III p.1803) and in later discussions in Nanking.
The immediate aim of the expedition was to attack the enemy at 
places to which he was bound to send relief, in this case the cities
of Wu-ch'ang, Han-yang and Han-k’ou, in order to draw off part of
the Hunan Army which was besieging An-ch'ing. It was also part of 
the struggle for control of the middle reaches of the Yangtse - the 
key to the survival of the Taiping regime at Nanking.
In essence it was a gigantic pincer movement on Hupeh. In 
conversation with Harry S. Parkes, Ch'en Yii-ch’eng gave an account 
of the campaign as it had developed up until March 1861:-
”He [Ch'en Yii-ch'eng] informed me that he was the leader 
known as the Ying Wang (or Heroic Prince); that he was charged
from Nanking to relieve Ngan-king [An-ch’ing], and had undertaken
a westward movement with the view of gaining the rear of the 
Imperial force besieging that city on the" western side. So far 
he had been completely successful. Leaving Tung-ching [T’ung- 
ch’eng], a city forty miles to the north of Ngan-king, on the 
6th instant [March], he marched in a northwest direction upon 
the district city of Hoh-shan [Ho-shan], thus avoiding all the 
Imperialists’ posts in the districts of Tung-ching, Tseen-shan 
[Ch’ien-shan], and Taihoo [T'ai-hu]. On the 10th he took Hoh-
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shan, where there was no considerable head of force opposed to 
him, and then turning to the south-west, reached Ying-shan on the 
14th, which fell in the same way. Hastily securing the munitions 
of these two places, of which he stood in need, he passed on to 
Hwang-chow [Huang-chou] and succeeded in surprising;' a camp of 
Amoor Tartars, killing, as the Ying Y/ang said, all the men, and 
capturing all their horses. This, and a small affair at Paho, 
placed him in possession of Hwang-chow, which he entered without 
opposition on the 17th instant.
He had thus taken three cities and had accomplished a march 
of 600 le [li] (say 200 miles) in eleven days, and was now in a 
position either to attack in rear the Imperial force, whose flank 
he had now turned, and draw them off from Ngan-king, or postponing 
that operation, to occupy Hankow, from which he was distant only 
fifty miles. He added, however, that he felt some hesitation in 
marching upon that place, as he had heard that the English had
already established themselves in that port.....
Having put several inquiries to him as to the future plans of 
the insurgents, he readily entered into the following particulars 
relative to the campaign in which he said they were then engaged, 
and to which his information appeared to be limited.
Pour rebel columns are in the field, his own and three others, 
severally commanded by the Chung Wang, Shi Wang [ShihJJang Li Shih- 
hsien] and Poo Wang \Fu Wang Yang Pu-ch’ing]. These three ”V/angs” 
(or Princes) were to leave Hwang-chow [probably an error for 
Nanking, C.A.C.] in the middle of the first month (February), and, 
marching in different directions on the south of the Yang-tze, 
while he, the Ying Wang, moves through the country on the north 
bank, they propose to rendezvous at Woo-chang [Y/u-ch’ang] in the 
third month (April). The Chung Wang is to cross Keang-se [Kiangsi], 
below Nan-chang [Nan-ch’ang], (the capital of that province), and 
march by Suy-chow [Shui-chou] to Yoh-chow [Yueh-chou], on the 
Tung-ting Lake, and thus reach a position to the west of Woo- 
chang. The Shi Wang is to cross the Poyang Lake, and visiting 
or passing by Nan-chang, is to enter Hoopih [Hupeh] by Ning-chow, 
and thus approach Woo-chang on the siouth face. The Poo Wang is 
to make for Hoo-kow [Hu-k’ou] and Kiu-kiang, and embarking his 
force, if he is able to do so, is to ascend the Yang-tze and 
attack Y/oo-chang on the east side; while, as already pointed out, 
the Ying Wang’s force is to close in upon the north side.”
See B.P.P, Papers Kelating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in 
the Yang-tze-kiang River pp.55-56, Report by Mr. Parkes of his Yisit 
to the Ying Y/ang at Hwang-chow.
2. Hsiu-ning had been taken by the Taipings under Li Shih-hsien 
on 12 October I860 (HF10/8/2Q); it was then besieged by units 
of the Hunan Army under Pao Ch’ao and Chang Yun-lan, from 11 November 
onwards.
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3. Tseng Kuo-fan moved his headquarters from Su-sung to Ch'i-men 
on 28 July I860.
4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng arrived at I-hsien on 1 December (HFlO/lO/19) and 
took the town. This threatened to cut off Pao Ch'ao and Chang
Yun-lan's communications with the H.Q.at Ch'i-men; they wheeled 
round and defeated Li Hsiu-ch'eng on the following two days, see 
Wang K'ai-yUn: Hsiang-chun chih V p.5b.
5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force took Wu-yuan on 30 December, Te-hsing on 
1 January, and laid siege to Yu-shan on 8 January. His main
force crossed into Chekiang and took Ch'ang-shan on 10 January, 
leaving other troops besieging Yu-shan until 16 January. It is 
possible that this move into Chekiang had something to do with the 
arrival from Kwangsi of Y/ang Hai-yang, formerly a subordinate of 
Shih Ta-k'ai, who had broken with him and led away a substantial 
number of troops; see Kuo: Jih-chih p.738. Lo Erh-kang however, 
in Shih-kao p.421, says that Y/ang Hai-yang did not "join up with 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng until later in the year,
6. After their New Year (10 February), the Taipings seem to have 
set out immediately; they arrived at Yu-shan on 12 February, at
Kuang-feng on the 15th, at Kuang-hsin on the 20th, and laid siege 
to Chien-ch'ang on 4 March. The town was poorly defended, with 
a garrison, according to Tseng Kuo-fan, of less than a thousand 
troops. Though the Taipings mined the wall, they were unable to 
break in, and the siege was raised on 23 March. See Fang-liieh ch. 
261 pp.7b-8b. This bring up the question as to the size of Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng's force. A. F. Lindley, who claimed to have been with Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng when he set out from Nanking, wrote: "...these two 
brigades, the body-guard of the Foo-wang [Yang Fu-ch'ing], second 
in command, and a small body of cavalry, were all the troops the 
Chung-wang took with him from Nanking; but these were the very 
elite of the Ti-ping forces. The strength of the whole division 
was about 7>500, which was to be considerably increased by 
re-inforcements in Ngan-whui [Anhwei]... At the cities of Y/u-hu, 
Tae-ping-f00, Tae-ping-hien [T'ai-p*ing-hsien] and several others 
we halted and were joined by large reinforcements, so that before 
we approached the neighbourhood of the enemy the strength of our 
army was but little short of 27,000 men..." See Lin-Le: Ti-Ping 
Tien-ICwoh pp.246-7. This figure is confirmed to a certain extent 
by the ^ memorial of Yu K * o, Fang-liieh ch. 264 P • 10b, who reported 
that at Yii-shan there were *20,000+' Taipings, and by Kuan Wen and 
Hu Lin-i's memorial, Fang-liieh ch.266 p.32b, which gives the same 
estimate. At Hsiu-ning Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force consisted of 
'several myriad men', according to Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chueh Hsiang 
p'ing Yiieh-ni chieh-liieh p.367. It is difficult to understand why, 
with such a force, the Taipings failed to take this town. It was
Notes to pages 195 & 196
defended, according to Tseng Kuo-fan, by a force of only 700+ 
troops, see Tseng Kuo-fan to Kuan Wen quoted in Tai I: Chung-kuo 
chin-tai-shih kao I p.577*
7. Li Chin-yang held the rank of fu-ohiang (colonel) in the Hunan 
Army, commanding 1^500 men. He had previously been a Taiping
officer. See Fang-liieh ch.260 p. 10b.
8. For the fate of Li Chin-yang, see below, page 198.
9. The siege of Chien-ch'ang was lifted on 23 March; the Taipings 
set out for I-huang on 25 March, occupied Hsin-kan on 4 April
and Chang-shu on the following day.
Notes to Page 196.
1. It is difficult to believe that such a large river could suddenly 
dry up completely, though Li Hsiu-ch1 eng is unequlvocal on the
point. It is possible that the dry state was normal at this season, 
and that the spate was caused by melting snows.
2. The crossing was made on 8 April; Chi-an was taken on the follow­
ing day. Shui-chou was occupied on 4 May (HF11/4/6). Omitted
from Li Hsiu-ch’eng's account is the attack on Lin-chiang by part 
of his force on 21 April. It was near here that Li Chin-yang was 
taken prisoner. See below, page 198.
3. For $ read 1^44 • Tseng Kuo-fan estimated the number of Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng's new recruits as 'several hundred thousand' or
'near to two hundred thousand', quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng p.252.
Hu Lin-i reported that seventy or eighty thousand had been pressed 
in I-ning and Wu-hing; see Fang-liieh ch,266 p.32a.
4- There are several errors here. In March 1861 Tseng Kuo-fan 
was already proposing to turn Pao Ch'ao's army (the T'ing Chun) 
into a mobile force which could be sent to deal with emergencies as 
they arose, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch. 13 p.9a (HF 11/2/8). On 
4 May Pao Ch'ao left Ching-te-chen to go to the aid of To-lung-ah 
near T'ung-ch*eng in northern Anhwei, where he remained until 22 
June, having won a victory at Chi-hsien-kuan earlier in the month. 
Then he was ordered by Hu Lin-i to campaign in eastern Hupeh, north 
of the Yangtse. He was also asked by the Governor of Kiangsi to 
come south and clear the rebels out of Shui-chou and other places. 
Tseng Kuo-fan*s despatch then arrived ordering him to proceed to 
Shui-chou by way of Chiu-chiang. On leaving Anhwei Pao was not
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certain what he \*as going to do. In the event, he stopped and 
laid siege to Su-sung, hut did not go on to Huang-chou; see Pao 
Ch'ao ohih Huang I-sheng shu in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu 
(Chien-chi VI) p.289. At Su-sung he received Tseng Kuo-fan's order 
to cross to Chiu-chiang and go to the relief of Nan-ch'ang, which 
was then threatened by Li Hsiu-ch'eng, see Tseng Wen Cheng Kung 
Nien-p'u oh.7 p.lb. Pao Ch'ao arrived at Chiu-chiang on 8 August, 
and on 24 August moved to attack Li Hsiu-ch'eng at Feng-ch'eng 
from Shui-chou. (See also Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.15 p.lb).
5. Li Hsii-i came south on 15 June (BFll/5/8) from Huang-lcang on the 
north bank with 5,000 men, and took up positions 20 li east of
Wu-ch* ang, sending troops to attack the Taipings at Hsien-ning, 
P'u-ch'i, Ch'ung-yang and T'ung-shan; other troops attacked Hsing- 
lcuo, Ta-yeh and Wu-ch1 ang-hsien. Three thousand infantry and 
cavalry were also sent to the region of Chih-fang, southeast of 
Wu-ch*ang. Gunboats under P'eng Yu-lin patrolled the Yangtse and
the lakes. Hu Lin-i himself left T'ai-hu on 19 June, and arrived
at Wu-ch'ang by boat on 9 July, to take charge of the defence of
Hupeh. See Fang-Lueh ch.266 p.33t*» ch.267 pp.28a, 29b; ch.269 pp.
2a/b, 3&/b, 4a/b.
6. Por^: read^: ^  . Li Shih-hsien left Hui-chou in the early 
part of December I860, but did not go to the region of Ching-te
and Lo-p'ing until 21 March. Betvreen these dates he was investing 
Ch'i-men, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng mentioned later in the same passage.
7. Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-1885) joined Tseng Kuo-fan's staff at Su- 
sung early in I860 and shortly afterwards was ordered to raise a
corps of 5>000 men for service in Kiangsi and Anhwei. He recruited 
his array at Ch'ang-sha in the summer of I860 and began military 
operations in the autumn, in the region west of Tseng Kuo-fan's
H.Q. at Ch'i-men; see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.762-767.
8. Prom about the end of December I860 until early March 1861, Li 
Shih-hsien was besieging Ch'i-men. On 8 March he moved south
and occupied Wu-yuan, cutting one of the supply routes of Tseng Kuo- 
fan *s H.Q. At Wu-yuan he was attacked by Tso Tsung-t'ang from 16 
March until the 22nd, without any decisive action having taken place. 
On 22 March however, Tso Tsung-t'ang was defeated and withdrew to 
Ching-te-chen and then to Lo-p'ing. Li Shih-hsien occupied Ching- 
te-chen on 8 April, after which he intended to attack Lo-p'ing and 
Ch'i-men; but when Ching-te-chen fell Tseng Kuo-fan decided to 
move his H.Q. to Hsiu-ning. Li Shih-hsien attacked Lo-p'ing from 
15 April to 23 April (HFll/3/14), when he was severaly beaten by 
Tso Tsung-t'ang; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.13 pp,15a-17a. For 
another comment by Li Hsiu-ch'eng on the Lo-p'ing battle, see 
Appendix I, page 260.
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9. Huang Wen-chin and Yang Fu-ch'ing took Chien-te on 15 December, 
and thus cut communications between An-ch1 ing and Tseng Kuo-
fan^ H.Q. at Ch'i-men, until 28 December when the government 
recovered Chien-te. On 20 December Huang Wen-chin and Li Yuan- 
chi occupied P'eng-tse, and on the 22nd took Fu-liang, cutting 
the supply route of the Chfi-men H.Q. Jao-chou was taken on 24 
December by Li Yuan-chi. On 5 January 1861 Huang and Li attacked 
Ching-te-chen and Fu-liang, which made Tseng Kuo-fan despatch Pao 
Ch’ao to relieve Tso Tsung-t'ang’s army. The Taipings were defeated 
at Jao-chou on 7 March with great losses and forced back to Chien- 
te. Huang Wen-chin went north over the Yangtse in May to help in 
the relief of An-ch’ing. See Chien: Ch’uan-shih p.1869*
10. Liu Kuan-fang, Ku Lung-hsien and Lai Wen-hung defeated Tseng 
Kuo-fan fs outer defences at Yang-chan-ling and T1 ung-din-ling
on 28 December I860 (HFlO/ll/17), at the same time as Li Shih-hsien 
attacked Chi-men from Hsiu-ning. They then took up positions near 
I-hsien. Though defeated there and forced back across Yang-chan- 
ling on 50 December, they still threatened Ch’i-men from the north, 
and by 15 February were once again within 60 li of Tseng Kuo-fan's
H.Q. They were defeated on 17 and 18 February at Hungtmen-ch’iao 
and Ta-ch’ih-ling, and thereafter, unsupported by other Taipings 
armies, did not attempt to attack Ch'i-men.
11. The second part of this sentence is omitted in the Chiu Ju T’ang 
Edition, and replaced by ’Huang, Hu and Li's army...’ which is
joined up with the following sentence.
There is some doubt as to when Hu Ting-wen was killed. Lo Erh- 
kang gives the year as I863, following a memorial of Shen Pao-chen; 
see Lo: Chien-cheng p.252, That some uncertainty existed is shown 
by the fact that Tseng Kuo-fan had Li Hsiu-ch'eng questioned on this 
point before he had seen the deposition. The question was whether 
Hu Ting-wen had really been killed in I865 or not. But Li Hsiu- 
ch’eng’s answer, as recorded, was merely that he had been killed at 
Jao-chou. This does not help much since there was fighting at Jao- 
chou in 1861 and in I865. It seems almost certain that I863 is 
right, since there is evidence of his activities after 1861; see 
k°: Shih-kao p.426 and Appendix I page 258.
Notes to Page 197*
1. Li Shih-hsien reached Yu-shan on 29 April and occupied Ch’ang- 
shan on 5 May (HF11/3/24).
2. The whole of this deleted passage was omitted in Lu Chi-i’s copy.
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5* Li Hsiu-oh*eng seems to have overestimated, the strength of 
Tseng Kuo-fan!s force at Chi-men, and consequently he lost an 
opportunity for inflicting a crushing defeat, and probably, of 
taking Tseng himself. When the Taipings broke the outer defences 
at Yang-chan-ling and Tfung-lin-ling, Tseng Kuo-fan did not expect 
to get away alive. This is clear from a letter he wrote at the 
time:
"At present my first worry is the danger to Chang [Yun-lan]*s 
army, the second is that fate of the headquarters at ChTi-men, 
from which the rebels are only 80 li away, a dayfs march, with 
no means of fending them off. We are now studying how to defend 
our stockades. If the rebels arrive we will hold fast and 
await relief; but if anything goes wrong, my determination 
is as ever, and I shall not shirk in the face of difficulties....
Looking back on the fifty and more years of my life I have 
no regrets, except that my studies are not completed; as for 
the rest, I have nothing serious with which to reproach myself." 
The letter ends with exportations to his brothers to look to the 
education of the younger generation. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu 
p,181 (HFlO/10/20). By 15 February 1861 (HFll/l/6) the Taipings 
were again within 60 or 70 li of Chfi-men with a force of over 
100,000; by 19 February they were only 20 li away (see Wang K fai- 
yun: Hsiang-chiin chih V p.6b). But instead of launching a direct 
attack, the Taipings concentrated on attempting to cut the life­
lines of the H.Q,., see Chien: Chfuan-shih III p.1862. The pressure 
on Ch^-men only eased after Tso Tsung-t tangts civtory over Li Shih- 
hsien at Lo-p!ing (25 April); only then did Tseng Kuo-fan feel that 
he could sleep at eq,se. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Chia-shu p.186 (HFll/3/24).
4. Chfen Yu-chfeng had reached Huang-chou on 18 March 1861, but 
returned to Anhwei a month later, reaching T*ai-hu on 22 April.
5. Huang Wen-chin crossed the Yangtse at Wu-hu with 7 >000 men and 
joined with Hung Jen-kan in an expedition to relieve An-chfing.
This was in early May; see Chien: Gh1 iian-shih III p.1869.
6. The failure of the Western Expedition resulted from the withdrawal 
of both the northern and the southern arms of the pincer which
should have closed on Wu-han. Several important questions about 
this failure remain unanswered because of the lack of historical 
documentation. There was, as far as we know, no court-martial or 
inquest, which might have provided documents for historians to 
analyse; so we have to rely upon a number of scattered and often 
superficial references. The problems are surveyed below, but the 
answers are no more than tentative.
The reasons for Ch'en Yu-ch'eng's withdrawal seem simpler and 
more comprehensible than is the case with Li Hsiu-chfeng. Chfen 
arrived at Huang-chou on 18 March, in good time for his rendezvous
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with Li Hsiu-ch'eng, which was to take place in the * third month* 
(between 11 April and 11 May) according to Harry Parkes* report 
quoted above (note 1 to page 195)* He waited at Huang-chou for 
a month, and then went back to Anhwei. In the meantime, as we have 
seen, he was visited at Huang-chou by Parkes, and in the course of 
the conversation told him 'that he felt some hesitation in marching 
upon the latter place [Han-k'ou] as he had heard that the English 
had already established themselves at that port.* Parkes continued: 
"I commanded his caution in this respect, and advised him 
not to think of moving on Hankow, as it was impossible for the 
insurgents to occupy any imporium at which we were established 
without seriously interfering wi% our commerce, and it was
necessary that their movements should be so ordered as not to
clash with oui?s. In this principle he readily acquiesced, and 
said that two of his leaders who had pushed on beyond Hwang-chow 
should be directed to take a northerly or north-westerly course, 
and go towards Maching [Ma-ch'eng] or Tih-gnan [Te-an], instead 
of towards Hankow.**
Then follows, in Parkes*report, the passage already quoted in note 
1 to page 195> describing the components of the expedition. At the 
end of that passage the report continues:
"Returning to the subject of Hankow he observed, that although
he might desist from occupying that place, the other Wangs, being 
uninformed of our position there, might still continue to carry 
out the above plan, and he suggested that both the English and 
the insurgent interest might be accomodated by our taking Hankow 
and Woo-chang, and allowing him to occupy Han-yang.
I explained to the Ying Wang that our objects in coming up the 
Yangtse were strictly commercial; that our recent Treaty with 
the Imperial Government, with whom we were now at peace, gave us 
the right of trade upon the Yang-tze; but as the insurgents 
utterly destroyed trade wherever they went, they would render this 
right nugatory if they occupied those ports that had been 
expressly opened to our commerce. Han-yang was one of the three 
cities connected with each other, and forming one great mart 
commonly called Hankow. The rebels could not take any one of these 
cities without destroying the trade of the whole emporium, and 
hence the necessity of their keeping away altogether. These 
subjects, however, I added, are in the hands of the Admiral who 
commands the English expedition in the river. He is now on his 
way back, and as he passes Nanking will, doubtless, come to a 
distinct understanding on the above points with the insurgent 
authorities there; the latter, it may be presumed, will then 
forward instructions to the Ying Wang for his guidance, and 
until the receipt of these instructions he should refrain from 
making any further movement on Hankow. That as nothing had been 
heard at Kiu-kiang of the advance of Chung Wang, or the other 
leaders, up to the 9th instant [March], it might be presumed
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that at that date they had not yet crossed into Keang-se 
[Kiangsi]. [in fact Li Hsiu-ch'eng had crossed into Kiangsi on 
15 February, and on 9 March was laying siege to Chien-ch'ang; 
it is difficult to believe that this was not known in Chiu- 
chiang at this time, C.A.C.]. He, the Ying Wang, would therefore 
not have the advantage of their support if he moved at once 
upon Hankow, and would have to contend alone with the Imperial 
force assembling for the defence of Woo-chang, as well as with 
the Gan-hwuy [Anhwei] force, which would then close upon his 
rear.
The Ying Wang seemed to concur entirely in what I urged. He 
computed his own followers at 100,000 men, but considered that 
scarcely half of them had yet reached Hwang-chow. He should 
first fortify his position, he said, at Hwang-chow, and then be 
guided by circumstances as to his next operations. Perhaps he 
might attack the Imperialists between him and Ngan-king [An- 
ch'ing] or, perhaps, make an incursion into the north of Hoopih." 
See B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade 
in the Yang-tze-kiang River. April 8. Inclosure in No.17 pp.55-56.
This interview took place on 22 March. After it, as Ch'en Yii-ch'eng 
had apparently promised, one part of his force pushed to the north­
west, towards Te-an, occupying the town on 29 March and Sui-chou 
on 2 April. Another force attacked Ma-ch'eng from Ying-shan and Ho- 
shan on 15 April. No move was made in the direction of Wu-han. On 
21 March Ch'en Yu-ch'eng's forces occupied Kuang-chi and Huang-mei, 
and on the following day Ch'en returned to Anhwei.
It seems clear therefore that there were three main reasons for 
Ch'en Yu-ch'eng's withdrawal. First, he feared that if he had 
waited any longer the enemy would gain ground in the siege of An- 
ch'ing. This is bom out by Hung Jen-kan's deposition, see TPTK 
II p.852. Secondly, he appears to have been influenced by the 
persuasion (or threats) of Parkes to abandon the attack on Wu-han. 
Thirdly, although Li Hsiu-ch'eng was not yet overdue, he may have 
been convinced by Parkes that he was either going to be very late, 
or that he was not going to turn up at all. One might speculate 
that if Ch'en Yii-ch'eng had decided to attack Wu-han as planned, 
not only would the British have been unable to do anything about it, 
but he would probably have been successful in raising the siege of 
An-ch'ing. Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was only about 25 years of age at this 
time and may have been easily influenced.
The reasons for Li Hsiu-ch'eng's failure to carry out his part 
in the original plan are more complex. He himself mentioned this 
matter in two places, in the deposition and in his replies to Chao 
Lieh-wen's questions during the conversation they had after Li's 
capture on 25 July I864. (see Appendix II), There were three main 
reasons for his withdrawal:-
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(1) Li Hsiu-ch'eng claimed that his troops were mostly raw 
recruits with no "battle experience, (see page 197). To Chao Lieh- 
wen he said 'I had not enough troops' (see Appendix II page 267).
But when Chao challenged him on this he apparently had nothing 
further to add. Nevertheless he could perhaps have made a case 
for himself on these grounds. The size of his army on this exped­
ition is discussed in note 6 to page 195; it seems to have been in 
the region of twenty to thirty thousand, excluding the Hupeh recruits. 
This does not mean that they were all fighting men. Lindley gave
the figure for Ch'en Yu-ch'eng's army at Huang-chou as 50*000 men 
but said that it 'did not possess a fighting strength of more than 
half that number, the rest being simply the coolies in usual attend­
ance upon all Chinese armies.' (Lin-Le: Ti-Fing Tien-Kwoh p.548)
If the same proportion applied to Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force, the number 
of his combat troops was comparatively small. This might help to 
explain his failure to take the town of Chien-ch'ang, though he 
may merely have wanted to avoid unnecessary casualties. However, 
the force was sufficiently unimpressive to be described by the 
Governor of Kiangsi as 'decrepit; see Yu K'e to Tseng Kuo-fan, in 
Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu p.210 in Chien-ohi VI.
Li Hsiu-ch'eng had of course enlisted a large number of recruits, 
both in Anhwei and in Hupeh, but they were probably very poorly 
armed and ill-disciplined, and he might well have hesitated to lead 
them into battle against the forces defending the outskirts of Wu- 
ch'ang. It is true that if he had reached Hupeh in March as planned, 
he would have found the provincial capital virtually undefended and 
in a state of considerable panic. See Chiens Ch'uan-shih III p. 1855; 
Fang-lueh ch.261 p.5&, and P'en Yii-lin to Tseng Kuo-fan in Ch'ing 
Ch'ao kuan-yuan shu-tu pp.206-7. But by the time the Taipings 
arrived, reinforcements had been sent and the capture of Wu-ch'ang 
would have been much more difficult.
(2) Another reason given by Li Hsiu-ch'eng was the defeat of Li 
Shih-hsien at Lo-p'ing in April and of Liu Kuan-fang at I-hsien in 
February. But he seems either to have received an exaggerated 
report of the gravity of his cousin's defeat, or else to have 
deliberately exaggerated it himself as an excuse for turning back.
He wrote in the deposition that his cousin had lost ten thousand 
men (see page 196), but Tseng Kuo-fan himself claimed no more than 
'four or five thousand' of the enemy killed; see Tseng Kuo-fan: 
Tsou-kao ch. 15 p.l6b; and even that was probably an inflated figure. 
We have no means of knowing whether Li Shih-hsien really did send an 
urgent appeal for Li Hsiu-ch'eng to return and, if he did, why he 
should have done so. The defeats of Li Shih-hsien and Liu Kuan- 
fang do not seem to us now to justify the abandonment of the Western 
Expedition, though Li Hsiu-ch'eng may have felt that they left his 
rear unprotected.
(5) When further questioned by Chao Lieh-wen, Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
said that he returned in order to take Hang-chou, without which his
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territory was 'like a "bird without wings1; see Appendix II page 267
This seems to be the most pertinent of the reasons he gave for
turning back. He may x*ell have been more interested in enlarging 
his own territory than in the fate of the T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo as 
a whole; he probably considered that the defeat of Li Shih-hsien 
would somehow prevent him from taking Hang-chou if he did not hurry
back at once. It is difficult however, to believe that he was
unaware of Tseng Kuo-fan's single-minded determination to take An- 
ch'ing before doing anything else, and of the fact that there were 
few effective government forces south of the Yangtse anyway. Hung 
Jen-kan wrote later: "Once the Chung Wang had got control of the 
two provinces of Su-[fu] and Hang-] chou," Chekiang], he rested on 
his laurels and bothered no more about the north bank or about the 
capital." See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition in TPTK II p.852. There­
after Li Hsiu-ch'eng did nothing to help Ch'en Yu-ch'eng beat off 
the enemy at An-ch'ing, nor to help him recover the city once it 
had been taken. Instead, his vast army of over half a million men 
remained in Kiangsu and Chekiang, where there was comparatively 
little threat from government forces.
Hung Jen-kan wrote that Li Hsiu-ch'eng turned back because he 
was 'afraid of a slight rise in the water,' (ibid.). This was 
not given as a reason by Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself.an any source that 
I know of. (Franz Michael: The Taiping Rebellion p.154 asserts the 
contrary, but without quoting any source). There is no confirmation 
that this was an important reason. But Li Hsiu-ch'eng does seem 
to have had some difficulty in communicating with Lai Wen-kuang 
across the Yangtse, probably because of tight Ch'ing control of the 
river. He received a letter from Lai Wen-kuang on 15 June at Hsing- 
kuo, giving him some information about the military situation on the 
north bank. He replied to this letter on 21 June, and sent his 
letter by way of Ch'i-chou, but it never reached Lai Wen-kuang.
Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote again on 27 June, and enclosed a letter to be 
passed on to Ch'en Yii-ch'eng. These he entrusted, curiously enough, 
to the British Consul at Hankow, Mr. Gingell, who visited him at 
Hsing-kuo at this time, with the consequence that the letter was 
eventually delivered, hot to Lai Wen-kuang but to the British Museum, 
where it remains. This would seem to indicate, apart from an 
extraordinary naievete, considerable communication difficulties, 
and perhaps a certain amount of indifference about the fate of the 
whole campaign.
Indeed this seems to be the inescapable verdict. It was not that 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not understand the importance for the Taipings 
of holding An-ch'ing; the contrary is clear from his remarks on 
162, 1959 & 194. Hung Jen-kan moreover, wrote that Li was the only 
main commander to agree with his strategy for the Western Expedition, 
see TPTK II p.852. But this was before Li Hsiu-ch'eng had acquired 
the new province of Su-fu. After his conquests in the Yangtse 
delta he was much less enthusiastic about the Western Expedition. One
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may even suppose that he only agreed to command the southern 
route of the expedition because it fitted in with his own plans 
for recruiting in Hupeh. It is possible that he never had any 
intention of attacking Wu-ch'ang, or perhaps that he intended to 
make the decision only when he got there.
Another factor which may have influenced his decision to return, 
was the presence of a large group of about 200,000 troops who had 
deserted Shih Ta-k'ai in ICwangsi, and whom Li Hsiu-ch'eng incorporated 
into his own army on his way back through Kiangsi. It is possible 
that he wanted to intercept them before they could be absorbed by 
anyone else.
(The important problem of Taiping history which is the subject 
of this note is dealt with in Lo: Ohien-cheng pp.255-257; Chien:
Ch1uan-shih III pp.1851-3* 1875-6; Yu Ming-hsia: Kuan-yii Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng ti chan-ohi chi p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Li-shih Yen-chiu 19&5 
No.2 pp.21-42; and P. Michael: The Taiping Rebellion pp.154-7).
7* This is evidently an error for Te-an; corrected in the Chiu Ju 
T'ang Edition.
8. The withdrawal was not in fact simultaneous (see Tseng ICuo-fan: 
Tsou-kao ch.14 P*2b) and began with the recapture by government 
forces of the town of Hsiu-ning on 9 July 1861 (HP11/6/2), whose 
garrison fled to Chin-niu. That Chin-niu and Pao-an were abandoned 
by the Taipings, rather than reconquered, is bom out by a letter 
from P'ergYu-lin to Tseng Kuo-fan, which reads in part:-
"According to reports, there are large numbers of rebels 
at Pao-an and Chin-niu. Ch*eng Ta-chi and Chiang Chih-ch'un 
went there in the certainty of a big fight in which they could 
kill to their hearts' content (i&^-',£j|). But the rebels 
heard the news and fled, and would not fight with our troops - 
it was really exasperating! Now several myriad of rebles from 
Pao-an and Chin-niu have all gone back to Hsing-kuo. It is 
very hot, and Ch'eng and Chiang's troops have to give chase.
If at Hsing-kuo there is no battle, it means that the rebels 
will go back to Kiangsi and will just wear out our troops by 
rushing away. What can one do? Mr. Ch'eng and Mr, Chiang 
are not cruel, they cannot wash Hsing-kuo in blood; but if 
they can completely get rid of all those in that town who have 
collaborated with the rebels, exterminate them root and branch 
and leave no evil behind, perhaps this may preserve order and 
be a warning to future generations. Otherwise, if our troops 
go there, shave the heads of the whole [male] population, roll 
up their banners and put them back to work on the land, once 
our armies withdraw, not only will the peasants and artisans of 
the place all turn into rebels, but even all the scholars and 
merchants will do so as well. Prom being a habit it becomes
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their nature, just like making a living by buying and selling.
It is really the womb of evil in Hupeh, a hot-bed for the 
long-haired rebels in the Empire. If the southeastern half 
of the land has no peace, it is all because of Hsing-kuo.”
See Ch’ing GhTao kuan-yuan shu-tu p.512
The Taipings withdrew from T'ung-ch’eng on 10 July, and from 
Ch'ung-yang on 15 July; from Ta-yeh and Hsing-kuo on 14 July.
9* Li Hsiu-ch'eng originally wrote ..1 Tseng Kuo-fan
took this to mean fwhen 1 passed through this place,1 and 
accordingly changed the character to . I believe that Li in 
fact meant that he inquired into the circumstances of the case (1^ ^.).
10. The Taipings withdrew from Shui-chou on 14 August.
Notes to Page 198.
1. Yin-kang-ling was an important pass between Shui-chou prefecture 
and Lin-chiang prefecture. Li Ghin-yang was indeed captured
at this place, but it was before the Taipings went into Hupeh, not 
after, since he was released and turned up in Nan-ch'ang on 21 
May; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.15 p.20b.
2. Eor 4# % read .
5. After leaving the Taipings Li Chin-yang went to Nan-chfang on 
21 May. He was executed on 9 June for indiscipline and military 
failure; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.15p.20b. Li Chin-yang had 
told the Governor of Kiangsi Yii K'e that he was not prepared to take 
orders from Tso Tsung-t!ang (see Yii K'e to Tseng Kuo-fan, HEll/5/50> 
in Chfing Ch’ao kuan-yuan shu-tu p.210), which may have aroused 
Tso's vindictiveness, since after Li Chin-yangfs arrest, Tso wrote 
to Tseng Kuo-fan suggesting that Li be sent to his H.Q.to be dealt 
with, and expressed the opinion that ’if this kind of man cannot 
be used, he should be killed,1 (ibid* p.215).
4. The Taipings left Shui-chou on 14 August and crossed the Kan 
River on 26 August, near Lin-chiang; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-
kao ch.14 p.6a.
5. Tseng Kuo-fanfs version, reported in his memorial of HFll/8/2, 
is that from Chang-shu Li Hsiu-ch'eng sent a force of about
20,000 under the Yii Wang to attack Eeng-ch'eng, and that Li himself 
crossed to the west bank of the river and advanced northwards; see 
Tsou-kao ch. 14 p*6b. The Yii Wang (Hu I-huang) however, had died in
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1856.
6. Forig read^f *T .
Notes to Page 199*
1* Tseng Kuo-fan claimed that Pao Ch'ao had won a great victory, 
killing seven or eight thousand Taipings, "there were bodies 
everywhere and rivers of blood." See Tsou-kao ch.14 p. 6b. But 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng distinctly implies that there was no engagement, 
and this is b o m  out by the way in which Chao Lieh-wen questioned 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng about this event, asking him, "Why did you withdraw 
on hearing of Pao's arrival?", see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-ohi p.574 
and Appendix II p.267*
2. No changes were made by Tseng Kuo-fan here, but the Chiu Ju 
T'ang Edition reads 'several hundred men',
5. Tseng Kuo-fan added 'for three of four days* to the previous 
sentence, for grammatical reasons.
4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng moved on Fu-chou at the end of August 1861.
5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng withdrew from Fu-chou on 8 September and crossed 
the Fu Shui to Hu-wan; whereupon Pao Ch'ao gave up the pursuit
and went north to the siege of An-ch'ing.
6. After reaching Kwangsi in the autumn of 1859» Shih Ta-k'ai's 
force began to disintegrate. A large group of his troops under
T'ung Jung-hai and Chu I-tien deserted the I Wang on 2 September
1860 at Liu-chou in Kwangsi and made their way back towards Nanking, 
to place themselves under the central command of the Taipings once 
more. They reached Kiangsi late in 1861 and then passed into 
Chekiang. In May 1861 they were in Kiangsi again and on 18 September
1861 (HFll/8/14), met up with Li Hsiu-ch'eng at Ho-lc'ou and were 
absorbed into his force. See Chien: Ch'uan-shih II pp. 1481-1501 
and the memorial of Chi Ch'ing-yuan, Chu I-tien and others addressed 
to the T'ien Wang in Wu Hsii tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo 
shih-liao hsuan-chi pp.5-11.
7. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's plan was for a two-route advance into Chekiang: 
one, under hi s. own command and with T'an Shao-kuang, Kao Yung-
k'uan and T'ung Jung-hai to attack Hang-chou; the other, under Li 
Jung-fa (Hsiu-ch'eng's son) and Ch'i Ch'ing-yuan, to take Ning-po 
and Shao-hsing and prevent the enemy from sending help to Hang-chou.
Notes to pages 199 & 200
See Wu Hsu tang-an-chung ti T'ai-p'ing I ' ien-kuo shih-liao hstian- 
chi. p. 9. (An-ch'ing had fallen to the Hunan Army on 5 September).
8. After moving in to the province in May, Li Shih-hsien had occupied 
a substantial part of western and southern Chekiang: Sui-an on
8 May, Shou-ch'ang on 12 May, Lung-yu on 26 May, Chin-hua on 28 May, 
Sui-ch'ang on 15 June, Sung-yang on 18 June, Ch'u-chou on 25 June, 
Yung-k'ang on 25 June and Yen-chou on 26 July. See ICuo: Jih-chih 
and Anbn: T' ai-p' ing-chjin k'e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien .jih-piao in 
Chin-tai-shih tzu-liao 1965 No.l pp.208-216.
9. Li Hsiu-ch'eng reached Yen-chou-fu on 15 October, where, presum­
ably, he met Li Shih-hsien and made further plans.
10. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's whole force now numbered at least 700,000;
Li Shih-hsien probably had more than 100,000; see Chien: Ch'uan- 
shih III p.1955.
11. There seems to have been little Taipings activity in Wen-chou; 
the Prefec^ftural town (Yung-chia) was occupied for a very short
time early in October, but this was by members of a secret society 
called the Chin-oh'ien Hui (4, ). Yu-huan-hsien in the same
prefecture was occupied by Taipings, but only for one day (14-15 
December 1861), see Anon; T1 ai-p*ing-chiin k*e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien 
jih-piao pp.215-216.
12. See below, page 201,
15. P'u-chiang was taken by Li Shih-hsien on 27 September (HFll/8/25) 
after a siege which started on 7 September. Chang Yu-liang 
himself \*as not present, although the troops were his; he was later 
reprimanded for allowing both Yen-chou and P'u-chiang to be surround­
ed; see Fang-lfieh ch.274 pp.l7&-20a. Chang Yu-liang was at Yen-chou 
at this time, and the commander at P'u-chiang was the tsung-ping 
Wen Jui (ibid. ch.276 p.25). After taking P'u-chiang, Li Shih-hsien’s 
activities were as follows: I-wu taken on 50 September, Tung-yang 
on 1 October, Sui-ch'ang and Sung-yang on 14 October, meeting Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng at Yen-chou on 20 October; he took Iisin-ch' ang on 12 November, 
Shang-yti on 25 November, T'ai-chou on 2 December, Huang-yeh on 7 
Leceipber and Ning-po on 9 December (see below p.200),
Notes to Page 200.
1. The town of Fu-yang was not in Taiping hands at this time; it
Notes to Page 200
was not taken until 15 November, Yu-hang was taken on 20 October 
(HFll/9/17)> see Anon: T'ai-fUng-chun k'e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien 
.jih-plao p,208.
2, Wang-tsung was a Taiping title of the later period,
usually given to relatives of the various wangs, see Li Ch'un: 
T'ai-p'ing T*ien-kuo chih-tu oh'u-t'an p.277- (Kuo: Jih-ohih, 
Appendix p,28 lists Li Shang-yang as the 'Tsung Wang1, but correctly 
on p.967).
5. Ch'ii-chou was attacked by Li Hsiu-ch'eng’s troops on 5 October, 
and besieged unsuccessfully until 11 October, There is an 
illegible character at the beginning of this sentence, deleted by 
Tseng Kuo-fan, which was probably intended in some way to link this 
sentence with the previous one; that is to say, to link the defence 
of Lung-yu with the fact that Ch*u-chou had not been taken,
4. This sentence was written between the lines, as an afterthought. 
It refers to T1 ien Ti Hui (Triad) members; see note 2 to p. 166,
5. See note 11 to page 199.
6. On 9 December 1861 (HFll/ll/8), For descriptions of these two 
men, see below, note 8, Ning-po was surrounded in a pincer
movement, one column going from Cheng-hsien over the mountains to 
Feng-hua and advancing on Ning-po from the south; the other going 
north from Cheng-hsien to take Shang-yii, Yii-yao, Tzu-ch'i and Chen- 
hai. "People say," wrote Hsu Yao-kuang with some admiration, "that 
the rebels use troops like the pincers of a crab. This is true."
See T1an-Qhe p.601. Hsueh Huan's official report stated that the 
rebels entered Ning-po [district] by two routes, helped by local 
bandits, and that there were only 4,000 government troops in the 
town at the time; see Fang-lueh ch.280 p,8a.
7. After describing the assistance given to the Taipings in eastern 
Chekiang by local rebels and by a secret society called the
Lien-feng Tang GiLilt %), Hsu Yao-kuang concludes, "though bandits 
led the rebels to Ning-po, in fact it was the foreigners who yield­
ed it to them." T1 an-Qhe p.602. (Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou ,jih-chi p. 116 
agrees). On 26 November, according to Kuo: Jih-chih, British 
merchants visited Lu Shun-te at Shao-hsing and took a letter from 
him addressed to foreigners at Ning-po, and some Taiping warrants 
which would ensure protections when Ning-po was captured.
8. After Tzu-ch'i (10-12 miles from Ningpo) had been taken by the 
Taipings, the British Consul at Ning-po, Frederick Harvey,
decided to send the gunboat 'Kestrel* to the Taiping commanders of
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each column to find out their attitude to the foreigners at Ning- 
po and to inform the Taipings as to the policy of the foreign 
officials towards them. A meeting was called in Ning-po by Harvey, 
which was attended by William Breck, the U.S. Consul, Leon Obry, 
Commander of the French Navy steamer ’Confucius* and Lieut. Huxham 
R.N., who commanded the 'Kestrel* ♦ At this meeting a document was 
drawn up for presentation to the Taiping commanders. It had four 
points: (l) That the undersigned were neutral, and would claim 
compensation for any injury received, (2) that they urged the 
Taipings 'on grounds of Christianity and humanity* not to commit 
excesses, (3) that the Taipings should keep away from the foreign 
settlement at Ning-po, and (4) that the life and property of the 
foreigners must be respected.
The 'Kestrel* left Ning-po the same day and arrived at Yii-yao 
the following morning. There the British interpreter met the 
Taiping commander Huang Ch*en-chung.
"He received us attired in a yellow silk robe richly 
embroidered, with a hood of the same material and colour 
sitting uneasily on his head; contrary to Chinese 
etiquette and probably with a view to impressing us with
his sense of dignity, he presided, rather than sat, at a
table at the head of the room, occasionally diverting 
himself by sipping almond tea and chewing the areca nut.
He is a native of Kwang-se, near3y40 years of age, and, 
to judge from his appearance and demeanour, has evidently 
risen from a very low walk of life to his present high
position and command. We found him almost incapable of
understanding mandarin, and unable to read several of the 
characters in the letter we handed to him....
We at once informed Hwang of the object of our visit, 
and explained to him fully, and sentence by sentence, the 
four requisitions contained in, and forming the principal 
subject of, the communication to his address.... To every 
one of these he gave his unqualified assent, "although," 
he added, "in the event of the mandarins resisting, and of 
my having to attack Ningpo, I cannot be responsible for the 
lives of any of your countrymen who may remain inside the 
city. Otherwise I will do all I can to prevent their 
being molested, and will at once behead any of my followers 
who dares to offer them any annoyance." ....
He seemed to entertain no doubt whatever of being 
successful in his attack on Ningpo (on which place he 
intended to advance in a week's time at the latest); indeed, 
he appeared to think that the mandarins would offer no 
resistance, though he begged us to urge on them the advis­
ability of surrendering the city without a struggle, should 
they be inclined to attempt to hold it....
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We weighed anchor at Yii-yao at 3 p.m. on Friday afternoon, 
bringing away with us twenty-one rebel Proclamations for 
posting on foreign houses, as well as a reply from Hwang 
to the official communication presented to him in the 
morning, and reached Ningpo the same night,..*
Hwang having informed us that another body of troops, 
also under the She Wang rShih Wang Li Shih-hsien]1 s orders, 
and commanded by one Fang [Pan Ju-tseng], a General of 
equal rank with himself, were advancing on Ningpo from the 
Fung-hwa [Feng-hua] or south-west side, we proceeded up that 
branch of the river early on Monday morning on the 2nd 
instant, and found the said insurgents encamped at a place 
called Pih-too [Li-tu ?], but ten miles from Ningpo.
We went ashore at once, and put ourselves in communication 
with the leader Fang, a man of only 25 years of age, and a 
native of Kwang-se. We hastened to represent to him the 
serious injury to trade that must ensue on the capture of 
Ningpo by his forces, and the consequent loss that would 
accrue to foreign interests, besides the danger, in reality 
no slight one, to foreign life and property, to be apprehended 
both from lawless characters in his own ranks, and equally so 
from the bands of unruly Cantonese and Chin-chew men at Ningpo, 
ever on the look-out for an opportunity for indiscriminate 
plunder. We ended by eagerly dissuading him from advancing 
on Ningpo.
To our two objections Fang replied by assuring us that his 
party were most anxious to keep well with foreigners, who, 
indeed, were not other than their brothers, inasmuch as both 
worshipped one God and one Jesus, and that as for trade, that 
would be allowed to go on as formerly, while he begged us to 
feel quite at ease as to the persons and property of our 
countrymen, any molestation of whom would be followed by 
instant decapitation. Their object being the overthrow of 
the present dynasty, they could not allow Ningpo to remain 
in the hands of the Imperialists.
It was with difficulty that we succeeded in persuading 
Fang to delay his attack on Ningpo for one week; another 
day was to have seen him there, he said, had we not inter­
posed.
One could not help feeling struck with the earnestness 
and apparent sincerity of this young leader. Whilst alive 
to the dangers attending the cause in which he was engaged, 
he seemed confident that the support of Heaven would carry 
them through all their difficulties, and that, so aided, 
they must prevail....
See B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in 
the Yang-tze-kiang River 1862. Mr.; Hewlett to Consul Harvey pp. 
108-110.
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It appears from this account that the British representative 
did succeed in getting the Taipings to postpone their attack 
for a week, although Li Hsiu-ch'eng says that they refused to 
delay for more than three days. Both Lo Erh-kang (Chien-cheng 
pp.262-266) and Chien Yu-wen (Ch'tian-shih III pp.1940-2) believe 
that this was an attempt to play for time, so that measures 
could be taken for the defence of Ning-po. Whether this is true 
or not, it appears that Everything had been done to assist the 
Imperialists in the defence of the town except the use of force 
in their favour,....' see Hope to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 
Dec.22 1861 in B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China 
and Trade in the Yang-tze-kiang River p.90. Harry Parkes, in 
his memorandum on the fall of Ning-po, wrote that 'by foreign 
assistance the city had been places in a complete state of defence.’ 
(ibid. p.92).
9. I can find no confirmation of this.
10. On 7 December the British Consul in Ning-po wrote: "I have 
only to add that the advanced bodies of the insurgent army
are at the present moment under the walls of the city, and that 
the fire has already commenced on both sides. The Imperial 
Commander-in-Chief, Chin, [Ch'en Shih-chang], who lately paid me 
a visit at the Consulate, stated that it was his firm determin­
ation to defend the city as vigorously as his military forces, at 
present much weakened and reduced, enabled him to fight on behalf 
of his Imperial Master.' ibid. p.85- (Harvey to Hammond). But on 
18 December, Harvey had to report, '...from want of a sufficient 
number of soldiers, or, more probably, because those soldiers would 
not fight, this city fell with hardly a blow having been struck in 
its defence...' (ibid. p.89, Harvey to Hammond). In conversation 
with Admiral Protet and Captain Corbett, the Taiping commanders 
said that, 'they had been signally protected by Heaven,... in having 
had only one man wounded in the attack. On the other hand, the 
city had been so easily won that they had not killed more than a 
score or two of their opponents.' (ibid. p.92, Minute of the inter­
view) .
This was the first Treaty Port to be taken by the Taipings; for 
the consequences, see note 8 to page 223.
11. Chen-hai was taken by the Taipings on 7 December, before Ning­
po, not after, as Li Hsiu-ch'eng implies, I know of no evidence
to suggest that foreigners provided transport, but since this was 
before the capture of Ning-po, it could have been done without the 
knowledge of the Consul.
12. See pages 223-4*
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1. Shao-hsing was taken on 1 November 1861 and Hsia-shan on 28 
October, At this time Lu Shun-te was not yet the Lai Vang,
see Li Hsiu-ch’ eng to his Son and Nephew in TPTK II p.740.
2. Lu Shun-te was sent by way of T’ung-lu to take Shao-hsing, 
having first captured Hsiao-shan in order to avoid relief being
sent to Shao-hsing. Li Hsiu-ch’eng’ s son and nephew were sent 
later, in case Lu's force was not sufficiently strong. (TPTK II. 
p.740). The garrison of Shao-hsing consisted primarily of Graves1, 
who did not fight when the Taipings arrived; see Yin-ming-shih 
(pseud.); Yiieh-chou chi-liieh in TPTK VI pp.767-8. Other accounts 
of Shao-hsing are, Yang Te-jung: Hsia-ch’ung tzu-yu and Lu Shu- 
jung; Hu-k’ou j ih-chi, both in TPTK VI.
3. Wu-k' ang was taken by the Taipings on 23 October 1861; Te­
ch1 ing was taken on 18 March but recovered by the government
two days later, and taken once more by the Taipings on 10 June. 
Hsiao-feng was taken by the Taipings on 22 March, lost on 29 March, 
taken again on 4 April, lost on 23 May and taken again by the 
Taipings on 12 October 1861; An-chi was taken on 10 February I860, 
lost on 24 May and taken again on 3 October 1861. See Anon; T'ai- 
p’ ing-chun k'e-fu Che-chiang ke-hsien jih-piao.
4. Shih-men was taken by the Taipings on 10 September 1860, lost 
on 17 September and taken again on 3 April 1861 (ibid.).
5. Ohao Ghing-hsien (tzu Chu-sheng f'T Jk), a former Financial 
Commissioner, organized a militia force at Hu-chou which number­
ed six or seven thousand men, see Fang-lueh ch.274 p.23b. After 
taking Hang-chou, Li Hsiu-ch’eng sent two messengers to Chao, 
inviting him to surrender (see TPTK II p.741)* Chao Ching-hsien 
refused to do so and executed the messengers. When Hu-chou fell
to the Taipings he was taken to Su-chou (June 1862), where he was 
well treated and urged to join the Taipings. He continued to refuse 
and begged to be speedily executed - a fate he claimed to deserve 
for failing to hold Hu-chou. He was allowed a great deal of freedom 
in Su-chou, though the Taipings would not release him. He was 
eventually executed at the order of T’an Shao-kuang (Li Hsiu-ch'eng 
being absent from Su-chou at the time), because he was suspected of 
’Fifth Column' activity. See Hsieh Hsing-yao; T'ai-p'ing T’ien-kuo 
shih-shih lun-ts’ung pp.180-1
6. On 1 January 1862. Chang Wei-pang was a fu-chiang. Ch'en Hsi- 
ch'i; Ytieh-ni 1 hsien-Ning shih-mo chi in TPTK VI p.648 calls him
Chang Pang-wei. Fang-lUeh ch.298 p.l6a however, confirms Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng’s version. There seems to be an error here; Hai-yen had
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been in Taiping hands since 17 April 1861, and Hai-ning was 
not taken by them until 1 January 1862.
7* Chang Yti-liang came from Fu-yang and arrived at Hang-chou on 
7 November, stationing his troops outside the city. Ten days 
later he was killed, in battle according to the official account 
(Fang-liieh ch.280 p.7a); but Hsu Yao-kuang, who was in Hang-chou 
at the time, says that Chang Yu-liang was accidentally shot by 
a Chfing soldier on the wall of Hang-chou as he was seeing someone 
off, see T*ang Che p.587*
8. I do not know exactly what Li Hsiu-ch1 eng meant by this phrase, 
in the original: ^ I - ^  The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition
has i*3 #  . Hang-chou was cut off from 4 November
onwards; see Kuo: Jih-chih, Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s letter to his Son 
and Nephew in TPTK II p.740. Hua Hsiieh-lieh: Hang-chteng tsai- 
hsien chl-shih in TPTK VI p.627 gives the date as 8 November (HFll/ 
10/6).
9. After the Taiping occupation of the region south of T*ai Hu, 
which cut off Hang-chou from Kiangsu, supplies for the city
came from Shao-hsing and Ning-po (Fang-liieh ch.283 p.28a). When 
these towns fell in late October and early November, there remained 
in Hang-chou only enough grain for ten days (ibid. ch.277 p.10b). 
Unsuccessful attempts were made to send in grain and military 
supplies from Shanghai by way of Hai-ning (ibid. pp. 11, ch.280 p.6). 
The problem of supply was considerably exacerbated by the presence 
in the city of more than 100,000 troops, according to Shen Tzu, and 
of refugees from Shao-hsing. When a census was taken during the 
siege, the population was found to be 2,300,000. (Hsii Yao-kuang 
gives the normal population as 600,000, see T'an Che p.588). While 
there was still grain, people had been obliged to underwrite 1 tan 
for the troops from each 10 persons; but when this was called for 
it was not forthcoming and collectors had to be sent. If they 
found grain the offenders were fined, if they found none they were 
imprisoned. People were eventually reduced to eating husks, duck­
weed, roots, leather and so on. Shen Tzu was informed by someone 
who came out of the city after it had been taken by the Taipings, 
that more than 200,000 people had died of starvation; see Pi-k1 ou 
jih-chi pp. 110-1. Wang Yu-ling gave the number of dead as thirty 
to forty thousand; see Fang*-liieh ch.293 There are also
reports of cannibalism, see Hsii Yao-kuang: T’an Che p.588 and B.P.P. 
Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yang-tse- 
kiang Biver Inclosure 1 in No.40 p. 114. It is not surprising if, 
as Shen Tzu reports (Pi-k^u Jih-chi p.99), the people eventually 
opened the gates to the Taipings.
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1. According to Shen Tzu: Pi-k*ou jih-chi p.Ill, Wang Yu-ling’s 
popularity was based on a proclamation he had made when he took
up his post, full of fine phrases and promises. People took this
to mean that the city would be held, so few fled at the approach
of the Taipings, and refugees from Shao-hsing flooded into the city. 
The population was lulled into a sense of false security by 
constant announcements of the imminent arrival of a large army of 
relief, but little was done to defend Hang-chou. Shen’s conclusion 
was that Wang Yu-ling cared for nothing outside the walls of Hang­
chou, and that Jui Ch*ang (the Tartar General) cared for nothing 
outside the walls of the Manchu city, in which there was still 
grain when the Taipings took Hang-chou.
2. Jui Gh,ang (Bordered Yellow Banner), had been Tartar General
(M W  ) °f Hang-chou since 18535 see Chang Po-feng: Ch1 ing-tai
ke-ti chiang-chiin, tu-t'ung, ta-chfen teng nien-piao 1796-1811,
Peking 1965.
3. Bo Erh-kang believes that this is not true. He argues that if 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng petitioned 7 days before attacking Hang-chou,
that would be on 1 November (i.e. 7 days before Hang-chou was 
completely surrounded on 8 November, according to Hua Hsiieh-lieh's 
dating, see note 8 to page 201^  above). If the reply arrived 
within *20+ days1, it would have reached Li Hsiu-ch’eng about the 
end of November, well before Hang-chou fell. Moreover, according 
to a memorial written by Lin Fu-hsiang, there was not a four-day 
interval between the fall of Hang-chou and the attack on the Manchu 
city. See Lo Erh-kang: Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch’eng k tu-.iou-huan-ping 
chi k*ao pp.23-4 in Li-shih Yen-chiu 1964 no.4. Lo Erh-kang was 
falling over backwards in his attempt to prove that Li Hsiu-ch’eng 
wanted to deceive Tseng Kuo-fan into thinking that he was not a 
loyal Taiping. His evidence in this matter is rather unconvincing. 
Li Hsiu-ch*eng (and others) were often very vague about dates, and 
we cannot be sure that when he said * seven days before attacking 
the city* he meant seven days before the completion of the 
encirclement. Nor, in view of similar acts of clemency, do I see 
any reason to doubt Li’s account of this one.
4. On 31 December 1861 (HFll/12/l). According to Shen Tzu, ten 
thousand rebels were killed in the attack on the Manchu garrison,
but this is probably an exaggeration. (See Pi-k*ou jih-chi p.99).
The Manchus eventually set alight to their quarters and many, 
including Jui Ch’ang, perished in the fire; see Ch’en Hsueh-sheng: 
Liang Che Keng Hsin chi-liieh in TPTK p.622 and Chang Erh-chia: 
Nan-ohung chi in TPTK VI p.636. ’
Notes to pages 202 - 204
5* This is confirmed by Shen Tzu: Pi-k1 ou ,1ih-chi p.99
6. The Military Governor referred to was Ghieh Ch'un; see Chang 
Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi p.656.
7. According to Lin Pu-hsiang, the bodies of people killed in 
Hang-chou had been dumped outside the city by the Taipings,
see Pang-liieh. ch.293 p*15h*
Notes to Page 203*
1. According to Hsii Yao-kuang, there were five or six hundred 
.officials below the rank of ssu-tao iSL) in Hang-chou, none 
of whom managed to get away before the city fell, see Tfan Che p.588.
Notes to Page 204»
1. Tseng Kuo-fan changed the character to ; but the former 
is correct. K'uang Wen-pang was a tsung-ping, who took over the
command of Chang Yti-liang's troops after the latter1 s death, see 
Pang-ltieh ch.293 p.10b.
2. According to Shen Tzu, Wang Yu-ling did send a letter to the 
Taipings, saying, "I defend this place on behalf of the State,
because each of us serves his own master. The city has been 
besieged for two months and the people have nothing to eat. I 
myself know that the city cannot be held, but what crimes have the 
people committed? You ought to withdraw 30 li to allow me to 
release the people during one day, and then come into the city 
without harming the people." Shen Tzu relates that the Taipings 
did withdraw, the people flocked out, and afterwards the gates 
were not closed again; see Pi-k1 ou .jih-chi p.105. Ts'ang-lang 
tiao-t'u (pseud.): Chieh-yu hul-lu p. 151 also says that Wang Yu- 
ling wrote to the Taipings. Peng Shih: ffua-ch'i 3ih-chi in TPTK 
YI p.691 records that people were driven out of Hang-chou in 
October because of the shortage of food.
3* Wang Yu-ling's suicide is mentioned by Hsu Yao-kuang: T'an Che 
p.588 and by Chang Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi p.656.
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Notes to Page 205.
1. Not immediately, but about ten days later, see below, note 1 
to page 206.
2. Originally fJulU which does not make sense. Tseng Kuo-
fan changed this to J0L.
5. Mi Hsing-ohao was tsung-ping of Ting-chou. Lin Fu-hsiang (1814- 
1862) was Chekiang Provincial Treasurer. He was a Cantonese, 
who in 1841 had raised a force of fbraves* to defend Canton 
against the British; see Wakeman: Strangers at the Gate pp.59-40
4* According to Chang Erh-chia: Nan-ohung chi p.656, Lin Chih was 
killed at the fall of Hang-chou. Tso Tsurig-t*ang also reported 
him killed in street fighting, see Fang-lueh ch. 540 p.7a. Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng wrote that he ran away but was not pursued, see page 205.
He was evidently killed soon afterwards.
5. For vtf %  read .
6. The Taipings transformed the Governor's yamen in Hang-chou into 
an * Office; for the Recruitment of Talent' ^  ^  ), see Pang-
lileh ch.298 p.16a. (For similar establishments, see Shen Tsu; Fi- 
k'ou jih-chi pp.75-4 and Chien: Tien-ohih t'ung-k'ao I p.279)*
7. Wang An-chiin's rank was that of t'ien-chiang at this time, see 
Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.101
Notes to Page 206.
1. Lin Pu-hsiang's story was that he managed to get away after the 
Taipings captured the inner city of Hang-chou, having collected 
the bodies of Wang Yu-ling, two other high officials, and his own 
son, wife and daughter; see Fang-lueh ch.295 p. 15b. But Hsiieh 
Huan, who investigated the fate of Ch'ing officials in Hang-chou, 
reported that Lin had gone over to the rebels and had received an 
official appointment from them; that Lin Fu-hsiang, Mi Hsing-chao 
and others were in the 'Office for the Recruitment of Talent*.
The fact that Lin and Mi could come unscathed through Taiping 
territory, was very suspicious, Hsiieh Huan said. Enquiries revealed 
that Lin had been seen to go to banquets at the rebel H.Q. in Hang­
chou. He had been well treated by them and ordered by Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng to live at the residence of the Taiping commander of Hang­
chou, Teng Kuang-ming. After Li Hsiu-ch'eng returned to Su-chou
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he sent a letter to Hang-chou, according to Hsiieh Huan, enclosing 
a pass and instructing Lin Fu-hsiang to escort the coffins of 
Wang Yu-ling and others to Shanghai. Teng Kuang-ming had given 
a banquet before Lin Fu-hsiangfs departure on 14 February (TCl/l/15), 
he and his companions had been provided with travelling expenses 
and an escort of 200 soldiers as far as Chia-shan; see Fang-lileh 
ch.298 pp.l5b-18b. Lin Fu-hsiang and Mi Hsing-chao arrived at
Shanghai with 10 boats, flying the flag of a Provincial Treasurer, 
and with an escort of 40 'braves' whose hair had been recently 
shaved - showing that they were rebels, or had just come out of 
rebel territory. The suspicious Hsiieh Huan had the coffins 
opened. The contents were as declared, and Wang Yu-ling was indeed 
clothed in his official robes.
At least one report says that Lin Fu-hsiang bore a letter from 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng to Hsiieh Huan inviting him to join the Taipings and 
offering him a title. Hsiieh is said to have refused, but to have 
kept Lin Fu-hsiang in Shanghai as a sort of insurance in case the 
Taipings turned up there. This is spite of the fact that he was 
urged to deal with Lin and warned that his 40 'braves* were Taiping 
officers in disguise; see Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou jih-chi p.157*
Lin Fu-hsiang and Mi Hsing-chao were later executed by Tso Tsung- 
t'ang at Imperial command; see T'ung Chih tung-hua hsti-lu ch. 11
2. Between 11 December 1861 and 9 February 1862.
5. This must be an error for Su-chou. Li Hsiu-ch'eng remained in 
Hang-chou for about ten days, and left for Su-chou on 7 January, 
according to Chang Erh-chia: Nan-chung chi p.656. (Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou 
jih-chi p.107 gives the date as about a week later).
4. Shen Tzu (op.cit. p.105) records the transport of relief grain 
from Chia-hsing to Hang-chou, and the distribution of food.
See also Li Kuei: Ssu-t'ung chi in TPTK IV p.490*
5. On 5 September 1861 (HFll/8/l), when Li Hsiu-ch'eng was in
Kiangsi, see above, page 199 note 7*
6. Chien Yu-wen lists eight attempts to do so between April and
September 1861, see Ch'iian-shih III pp. 1880-1895.
Tai I: Chung-kuo chin-tai-shih kao, pp.587-9 clarifies this complic­
ated military situation by delineating six layers of military forces, 
so to speak, which were (working northwards):
i. The 'water foroe* of the Hsiang (Hunan) Army, under Yang Tsai-
fu, operating in the Yangtse.
ii. The Taiping garrison at An-ch'ing, supported by forts outside 
the North Gate, five stockades on the south side of Ling Hu,
(a small lake outside the north gate, lying between An-ch'ing
Notes to pages 206 -
and Chi-hsien-kuan) and 13 stockades on the north side 
of the lake, reached by boat from the city. (According 
to Wang Kfai-yun: Hsiang-chun chih, VI p. 17a, the Taipings 
used a pontoon bridge^
iii, Tseng Ruo-chTuan * s siege works between an inner and an 
outer moat; the inner, for defence against attack from 
An-ch*ing, and the outer moat to protect the besieging 
forces from the attacks of Taiping relief armies.
iv. Ch*en Yii-ch* eng*s crack troops under Liu Ts*ang-lin at 
Chi-hsien-kuan.
v. Beyond Chi-hsien-kuan was a Ch*ing force under To-lung-ah, 
also fighting on two fronts.
vi. The Taiping relief force based on T'ung-chfeng, Lu-chiang 
and other places.
Notes to Page 207*
1. i.e. from the side of Ling Hu. I can find no mention of this 
incident in any other source.
2. Wu Ting-ts'ai entered An-ch'ing on 27 April 1861 (HFll/3/18).
3. Yang Fu-ch'ing did not come north until August (see below, note 
7 to page 208;.
4. This should be the Ku Wang (JU
5. Hung Jen-kan was in charge of this relief expedition, though 
Li Hsiu-ch’eng does not mention the fact. He probably crossed
the Yangtse in April 1861. On 1 May (HF11/3/22) Hung Jen-kan and 
Lin Shao-chang joined up with the Taipings from T'ung-chfeng and 
Lu-chiang, and with a force of about 20,000 (including some Nien), 
advanced to the region of Lien-t'ang, were defeated on 2 May by 
To-lung-ah, and retired to T'ung-ch'eng, On 7 May and again on the 
7th and the 11th, they attempted unsuccessfully to raise the siege 
of An-ch'ing. See Kuo: Jih-chih p.749; Chien: Ch'Uan-shih III pp. 
1882-1885; Fang-lueh ch.263
7. See above p.196 and note 8 to p.197*
Notes to Page 208.
1. Li Hsiu-ch*eng wrote ^  in error for ^  .
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2. In the original ffl"f is presumable an error for;l€) .
3, The Taipings reached T'ung-ch'eng on 19 May with five or six
thousand men, see Fang-lueh ch.266 p.3a,.
4* This engagement took place on 19 May (HF11/4/10), according to 
the official report. The commander of the Chfing forces was 
Wen-te-le-k' e (Deputy Lieutenant General), Two of his ying had taken 
a short cut and caught up with the Taipings on the hank of a river 
called Ma-t*a-shih, in front of which the Taipings took up positions, 
thinking that they had only two enemy ying to contend with. When 
four others arrived, they were trapped, and after several hours 
of fighting the survivors had to get across the water as best they 
could; see Fang-liieh ch.266 pp,3a-4a.
5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng originally w r o t e f o r ^ ^ J y J J ^  ; Tseng 
Kuo-fan changed this to H? ^  .
6. Pao Ch'ao and Ch'eng Ta-chi (one of Li Hsu-i's officers) arrived
near Chi-hsien-kuan on 19 May, and began attacking the stock­
ades which Ch'en Yii-ch'eng had established on the north side of 
the pass at Ch'ih-kang-ling on the 20th; they were beaten off by 
the Taipings under Liu Ts'ang-ling; see Kuo: Jih-chih p.776
7* The Fu Wang Yang Fu-ch'ing did not come to the relief of An- 
ch'ing until 6 August, from Ning-kuo. He Joined forces with 
some of Ch'en Yu-ch'eng's troops and went by way of Wu-wei and 
Su-sung to attack T'ai-hu.
8. Several more attempts were made by the Taipings after the fall 
of the Chi-hsien-kuan stockades, to bring relief to An-ch'ing.
On 7 August three columns approached: Yang Fu-ch'ing and Ch'en Yii- 
ch'eng from T'ai-hu; Lin Shao-chang and Wu Ju-hsiao from T'ung- 
ch'eng; and Huang Wen-chin from the east. Lin Shao-chang was 
defeated by To-lung-ah and the i others were unable to make any 
progress. On 17 August Yang Pu-ch'ing and Ch'en Yii-ch'eng were 
again defeated near T'ung-ch'eng. Then, between 21 and 24 August 
Ch'en, Yang, Lin and Huang crossed the pass at Chi-hsien-kuan and 
established 40 stockades to the south of it. They attacked Tseng 
Kuo-ch'iian's outer line of defences between 25 August and 2 Sept­
ember but were severely defeated. See Pang-liieh ch.273 and Chien:
Ch * iian-shih III pp.1891-1892. On 28 August the Hunan Army in this 
battle used 170,000 chin (over 100 tons) of powder and 500,000 
chin (over 200 tons) of shot; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.201.
9. The inner moat was about 2 chang (say 23 feet) across and 3-4 
chang (35~47 ft.) deep. Chao Lieh-wen compared this favourably
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with the moat which Ho Gh'un had dug at Nanking in 1859; see 
Jih-chi p.204.
Notes to Page 209.
1. There appear to have "been Hunan Army gun-boats in Ling Hu at 
least since 1 May 1861 (HFll/3/22), see Fang-liieh ch*265 p.23aff.
2. On 5 September Tseng Kuo-eh'iian got complete control of Ling 
Hu by placing 10 stockades on the north side and four more on
the south side of the lake. The same day, his gun-boats inter­
cepted Taiping boats trying to bring grain to the city, and others 
taking cannon from the city for use outside, see Fang-liieh ch.273 
p. 14b. During the night of 4-5 September (HFII/7/3O - 8/1) Hunan 
Amry troops got into the city after mining the wall at the north 
gate, according to the official report. All the rebel troops 
inside the city and in the stockades were killed; ibid. pp.14b- 
15a. Chao Lieh-wen, who arrived at An-ch’ing immediately after 
its capture, recorded that 'the defending rebels were all dropping 
with hunger and could not resist.' More than 10,000 were killed, 
(20,000 according to the official report, Fang-liieh ch.273 p.7a), 
and all adult males in the city were executed. Ten thousand women 
were carried off by the soldiers. Chao noted that everything 
removable was looted, everything else was destroyed. He and 
several other contemporaries report cannibalism in the city. See 
Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p,201.
The most detailed account of the capture of An-ch'ing is that 
by Chu Hung-chang, one of Tseng Kuo-ch'tian's commanders. Chu 
records that after the Taipings relief force was beaten off, the 
Taipings in the city 'set it alight and escaped by tunnels,' so that 
when the Hunan Army troops entered An-ch'ing it was empty of 
rebels. See Chu Hung-chang: Ts'ung-chfin ,jih-chi p.29a. Neither 
Chu Hung-chang nor Nang K'al-yiin (Hsiang-chun chih V p.8a) make 
any mention of the wall having been breached by tunnelling. The 
North China Herald reported at the time that 'three regiments or 
separate bands of rebels gave themselves up to the Imperialists 
as prisoners of war under the impression that their lives would be 
spared, but they were slaughtered to a man and their bodies thrown 
into the river,' Quoted by Lindesay Brine: The Taeping Rebellion 
in China, London 1862 p.520, and repeated by Lin-Le (A^F.Lindley): 
The Ti-Ping Tlen-Kwoh pp.358-9* Chien Tu-wen concludes that the 
story that the wall had been mined was invented by the Hunan Army 
commanders, and that the Taiping garrison had in fact surrendered. 
See Chien: Ch'uan-shih III pp. 1897-1900. I am not convinced.
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3. Chang Ch'ao-chueh was later made Li Wang; but he does not seem 
to have played an active role in the rebellion thereafter; see
Chien: Ch'uan-shih III p. 1893*
4. Ch'en Yu-eh1 eng withdrew to T’ung-ch'eng when An-ch'ing fell, 
and then to Shih-p'ai when T'ung-ch'eng was taken by To-lung-
ah on 7 September, thence to Su-sung when To-lung-ah gave chase.
On 12 September he withdrew from Su-sung and began to move along 
the Anhwei-Hupeh border in the direction of Te-an and Hsiang- 
yang. He moved back towards Lu-chou from somewhere near Ying-shan.
5. He reached Lu-chou in the middle of September 1862.
6. In a letter to Lai Wen-kuang and others dated TT12/1/14 (23 
February 1862), Ch'en Yii-ch'eng explained that he had been
cashiered for having withdrawn from T'ai-hu and from An-ch'ing, 
for having missed the rendezvous at Kua-ch'e-ho (this refers to 
the attempted relief of An-ch'ing in May), and for the Chang Wang 
Lin Shao-chang having retreated from T'ung-ch'eng, Lu-chiang, Wu- 
wei, San-ho and other places; see TPTK II p.744. Hung Jen-kan 
was also cashiered at this time, ibid. pp.846-7.
7. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to read 'General To' i.e. To-lung-ah.
8. Lu-chou was attacked by troops under To-lung-ah on 28 February 
1862 (TCl/l/30). By this time the greater part of Ch'en Yu-
ch'eng's army, said to number 1,240,000 men at this time (Tao-k'ou 
yii-sheng [pseud.]: Pei-lu chi-lueh p.202) had already departed 
on a new Northern Expedition. By the time that the siege of Lu- 
chou became really serious, the three advance columns of this 
expedition were already far away. The centre column, under Ma Jung 
ho, Chang Lo-hsing and others, was in northifestern Anhwei, and 
crossed into Honan on 1 April. The western column, under Miao 
P'ei-lin, was in the region of Shou-chou, but Miao had secretly 
turned coat once again, and was in contact with Sheng Pao (see 
below, note 9). Ch'en Yu-ch'eng had evidently lost conact with 
these columns; the three despatches he wrote to some of the 
commanders in February all fell into enemy hands. Nor does he seem 
to have been aware of Miao P'ei-lin's treachery, partly because 
his own delegate with Miao's force had turned coat as well. Lu- 
chou held out until 13 May (TCI/4/12). Ch'en Yii-ch'eng broke 
through the encirclement and made north. See Ch'en Yu-ch'eng's 
deposition in Lo: Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi pp.201-2.
9. Miao P'ei-ling, a hsiu-ts' ai of Shou-chou, was formerly a Nien 
rebel. He deserted them in I856 to form his own militia band,
which developed into a large and disorderly force. In 1857 Sheng
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Pao persuaded him to accept official rank and made him commander- 
in-chief of militia in the area to the north of the Huai River, 
Thereafter he was Sheng Pao1 s protege, and one of the causes of 
the latterfs downfall. In I860 he rebelled against the government 
again and allied himself with the Taipings and Nien. In November 
1861 he captured Shou-chou, but on 25 March the following year, 
once more went over to Sheng Pao, when he saw the declining 
influence and power of the Taipings and the advance of the Hunan 
Army against them north of the Yangtse. He was extremely unpopular 
with Ch'ing officials in general and knew that Sheng Pao was the 
only one v/ho would defend him. Early in May 1862 he helped Sheng 
Pao to recover the town of Ying-shang and then returned to Shou- 
chou and wrote to Chfen Yii-ch1 eng in Lu-chou. He knew that it 
was Ch'en*s ambition to take K'ai-feng (Honan) and now offered to 
help him do so. The letter was carried to Ch'en Yii-ch'eng by a 
beggar, concealed in his bamboo stick.
On 15 May (YCl/4/17) Ch'en Yu-ch'eng entered Shou-chou. Accounts 
differ as to the exact method employed to capture him, but it is 
evident that Ch'en took only a small force, possible his bodyguard 
alone, and left the others outside the town. There seems to have 
been no fighting. One account is that Miao P'ei-lin's nephew,
Miao T'ien-ch'ing, knelt to Ch'en Yu-ch'eng and said that his uncle, 
realizing that the future lay with the Ch'ing dynasty, begged him 
to come over too. To this Ch'en replied,- "Your uncle is a miserable 
vagabond! He is like grass growing on the top of a wall, bending 
both ways with the wind. V/hen the dragon is winning he helps the 
dragon, when the tiger is winning he helps the tiger. He will not 
even make a name for himself as a rebel. If this is how things 
are, then do1 your worst! I can only be killed, not humiliated!" 
Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was then sent to Sheng Pao's headquarters. The 
Taipings greatly despised Sheng Pao, and gave him the nickname 
Sheng 'h'siao-hai' ( fjf/P because he played with troops like a 
child, or, instead of Sheng Pao ($§4^) they called him Pai Pao 
($& '$0. Whenever he fought with Ch'en Yu-ch'eng, it was said, he 
was beaten, and this had happened forty times. Therefore, when 
Ch'en was ordered to kneel to Sheng Pao, he retorted, "You Sheng 
hsiao-hai, are nothing but the number-one incompetent lackey of the 
Imp Dynasty! I am one of the honoured founder of the T'ien Ch'ao. 
You alway& fled on meeting me in battle...At Pai-shih-shan I 
smashed 20 of your ying and wiped out your whole force, and you 
fled cringing with a dozen horsemen. I ordered your life to be 
spared. How can I deign to kneel to you, you shameless object!"
Ch'en Yii-ch'eng was ordered to be sent to Peking, but was 
executed at Yen-Aching in Honan on the initiative of Seng-ko-lin- 
ch'in on 4 June 1862 (TCl/5/8). (Sources for this note are, Tao- 
k'ou yii-sheng (pseud.): Pei-lu chi-liieh p.215; Fang-liieh ch.303 
pp.9a-llb; Teng Ssu-yii: The Nien Army and their Guerilla Warfare
pp.100-106.
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Notes to Page 210.
1. Ch’en Te-ts*ai and the western column of the Northern Exped­
ition reached Shensi in April 1862, took several towns and
threatened Sian. They turned back on 25 May to come to the 
rescue of Ch’en Yii-ch’eng. Li Hsiu-ch’eng then sent him again 
to Shensi, possibly to take advantage of the Moslem unrest there.
In 1864, when Nanking was in danger, he started to come east in 
three columns, but was held up on the border between Hupeh and 
Anhwei in June. When Nanking fell, his force was gradually 
surrounded; Ma Jung-ho went over to the enemy and Ch’en Te-ts’ai 
took poison. See Lo: Shih-kao pp.43Q“l*
2. This is an error for ’the 12th Year’ [1862].
3* See above, page 193*
4. Any comment on this would involve an examination of the whole 
complicated question of Taiping administration in the Su-chou 
region, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. I intend to 
make a separate study of this.
5* Ch’en K’un-shu was appointed wang at the beginning of the Spring 
of 1862.
6. This is bom out to a certain extent by the fact that Ch’en 
K*un-shu and T’ung Jung-hai were the first of Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s 
subordinates to be made wang. Their achievements were by no 
means outstanding; their subsequent actions and Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s 
opinion of them (see pages 166 & 211), show that they were not 
appointed on his recommendation. T’ung Jung-hai went, over to the 
enemy (p. 212), Ch’en K ’un-shu nearly did (see note 3 to p. 227) 
The policy of appointing many wangs is discussed by Li Hsiu-ch’eng 
in greater detail below, pages 234*
Notes to Page 211.
1. In this sentence the character %_ may be an error f o r ; in 
which case Li Hsiu-ch’eng probably meant, *1 ordered that land
which had not been planted was to be cultivated immediately. ’ The 
sentence is omitted in LU Chi-i’s copy.
2. Mid-April to mid-May 1862.
3. See note 1 to page 191 and note 4 to page 210.
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4. Omitted in Lii Chi-i^ copy.
5. In deleting this passage, Tseng Kuo-fan may well have heen 
concerned to avoiding encouraging invidious comparison with his
own position.
Notes to Page 212.
1. T*ung Jung-hai surrendered on 16 July 1862 (TCl/6/20). According 
to Shen Tzu, he was discontented with Li Hsiu-chfeng, whose merit,
he thought, was not as great as his own in the capture of Hang-chou. 
TTung was given the title of Pao Wang, but Li Hsiu-chfeng had kept 
it a secret. Shen Tzu presumably means that Li did not announce the 
promotion or inform T'ung of it. Instead, he had Ch*en Ping-wen, 
one of his favourites, promoted to T'ing Wang. As a result of this, 
T'ung Jung-hai left Hang-chou on 25 March with 2,400 men for the 
purpose of campaigning in Kiangsi; but in fact he remained at Yu- 
hang, where his troops engaged in depredation. See Shen Tzu: Pi-k'ou 
jih-chi pp.211-2. (The details of this account are not confirmed by 
other sources as far as I know).
When Pao Chfao attacked Ning-kuo in June 1862, T'ung Jung-hai 
was sent with a relieving force; but instead of fighting he immed­
iately entered into negotiations with Pao Ghfao, offering to give 
up Ning-kuo and deliver Yang Fu-ch'ing, the garrison commander, in 
return for a free pardon and permission to retain his force intact. 
Before the negotiations were completed however, Ning-kuo fell to 
Pao Ch*ao. Tung Jung-hai then went to Kuang-te, which he took over 
when Yang Fu-ch1 ing and Hung Jen-kan withdrew from the town. He then 
offered to give up Kuang-te and come over with 60,000 men. The 
matter was referred to Tseng Kuo-fan, who believed that T*ung could 
be trusted because he was already suspected by the Taiping leaders 
of disloyalty, having killed some Taiping officers in February.
He eventually surrendered to Pao Ch'ao, having killed the officer 
sent by Li Hsiu-chfeng to command the garrison at Kuang-te. He was 
rewarded with official rank; but Tseng Kuo-fan thought his force 
too large, and all but 5>000 were disbanded. See Tseng Kuo-fan: 
Tsou-kao ch.16 p.l6a and p.21.
2. After the fall of Su-chou to the Taipings, many gentry took 
refuge in Shanghai, and constituted a powerful lobby for the
opening of a 1 second front1 against the Taipings in ICiangsu. Feng 
Kuei-fen (see Hummel: Eminent Chinese pp.241-3) played a prominent 
part in urging their case upon Tseng Kuo-fan. The capture of An- 
chfing by the Hunan A^my in September 1861 was -undoubtedly the 
most important single factor which allowed Tseng Kuo-fan to consider
Notes to page 212
the idea at all; but the rich source of revenue to be obtained 
from Shanghai was a vital consideration.
The anxiety of the refugee gentry from inland Kiangsu was 
aggravated when the Taipings over-ran Chekiang and captured Hang­
chou. The local troops at Shanghai did not inspire confidence;
Ward’s force was small and expensive. Although Hsueh Huan opposed 
the invitation of Tseng Kuo-fan to campaign in the area, his 
subordinate Wu Hsii, who held the purse strings, was in favour, and 
so were the foreign merchants.
In the winter of 1861 a representative of the Kiangsu gentry 
lobby, Ch'ien Ting-ming, saw Tseng Kuo-fan in An-ch'ing, perhaps 
after meeting Li Hung-chang and pointing out to him the financial 
advantages of having a base at Shanghai. Tseng Kuo-fan was evident­
ly convinced by Ch'ien's eloquence and Li Hung-chang's interest in 
the idea, although he remained doubtful of the military value of 
sending troops into the Yangtse delta.
Once the decision was made, Tseng Kuo-fan began to pave the 
way for the replacement of Hsueh Huan as Governor of Kiangsu by one 
of his own men. It was not difficult, to convince the court that 
Hsueh Huan should be removed, and Li Hung-chang was designated to 
take his post. In the meantime, Li Hung-chang united local militia
units in Anhwei to form the Huai Army, which moved to An-ch'ing
early in 1862. At the same time, pressure from the Shanghai lobby
began to be applied to Tseng Kuo-fan through the court, and he was
repeatedly urged to send troops to Chen-chiang and Shanghai. He 
hesitated for some time between a land expedition to Chen-chiang 
and the dangerous river voyage to Shanghai, until the arrival of 
steamers fired from foreign firms in April 1862 facilitated his 
decision. Li Hung-chang and his 2,500 troops of the Huai Army 
arrived in Shanghai on 8 April, by May the full complement of 6,500 
had joined them. Li Hung-chang was appointed Governor of Kiangsu 
on 25 April (TCl/3/27). Although his orders were to proceed to 
Chen-chiang at once, he excused himself on the grounds of 'unfinished 
business.' Tseng Kuo-fan supported him in this, realizing the 
importance of his protege intrenching himself in Shanghai in order 
to tap its revenue. See Stanley Spector: Li Hung-chang and the Huai 
Army, Washington 1964 pp.28-51.
3. The Shanghai customs revenue was about 200,000 liang per month 
at this time, according to Spector: op.cit. p.54* Hope to
Admiralty, May 31 1862 gives more than £700,000 in 1861, which is 
more than 200,000 per month; see Further Papers Relating to the 
Rebellion in China p.42.
4. The origin of Ward's 'Foreign Rifles' is discussed in note 9 
to page 188, and events previous to their attack on Chia-ting
in note 2. After his defeat at Ch'ing-p'u in August I860, Ward
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spent some time consolidating his position in Sung-chiang and 
looking after his wounded. He was at this time very -unpopular 
with British and French officials in Shanghai, and especially 
with the naval commanders, because his recruiting encouraged 
desertion from foreign ships. His Chinese backers were disappointed 
with his lack of success. Because of this, and in order to get 
surgical treatment, Ward left for France. When he returned several 
months later he intended to recruit Chinese rather than foreigners; 
but when he put his plan to Hear Admiral Sir James Hope, he was 
promptly arrested. Ward evaded the law, however, by claiming 
Chinese nationality, and was consequently discharged by the 
American Consular Court. In spite of this Sir James Hope continued 
to keep Ward prisoner on his flag-ship. Ward's 'army* defied Hope's 
move to disband it by force, and soon Ward himself escaped from 
custody. When he again put his plan to Hope for recruiting and 
drilling Chinese, and not encouraging deserters, it was approved.
By February 1862 there were about 1,000 Chinese and 200 Manilamen 
in the force.
The previous year in March, Sir James Hope had led an expedition 
up the Yangtse to Nanking for the purpose of 'establishing an 
understanding with the rebel leaders'. One of the results of this 
was that the Taipings had agreed not to come within two days' 
march (about 50 miles) of Shanghai; see B.P.P* Papers Relating 
to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yangtae-kiang River, pp. 
10-15. The Taipings later claimed that they had only agreed to 
keep this truce for one year, though Parkes denied this (ibid.p.105). 
In any case, during February the Taipings began to drawn in on 
Shanghai, and Sir James Hope decided to clear the 50 mile radius; 
see B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China pp.1-6.
In view of the military need and of Ward's new recruiting policy,
Hope became progressively more co-operative, and after the 'Foreign 
Rifles' had distinguished themselves in an engagement west of 
Shanghai in February, joint actions began, in which Ward's force 
fought in concert with British and French naval and military units.
The British army commander, Sir J.Michel, formed a fairly favourable 
opinion of Ward's force, and considered that if it was supported, it 
could be 'the military nucleus of better things', (ibid.p.22). The 
first joint action was at P'u-tung, Shanghai on 15 February.
Aggressive action to clear the 50 mile radius began on 21 February, 
when Ward's force, supported by 700 British and French troops, 
attacked the town of Kao-ch'iao (Kajow), which was held by the 
Taipings. The attack was successful. On 27 and 28 February, the 
same force marched to Min-hang and engaged the Taipings at Hsiao- 
t'ang, at Ssu-ching on 14 March, at Lo-chia-kang in early April, 
and at Ssu-ching and Ch'i-pao on 17 April.
(This note is based on sources cited, and on Cahill: A Yankee 
Adventurer pp.157-172; Kuo: Jih-chih; and Wilson: The "Ever Victor­
ious Army, Ch.VI.
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5. The decision to occupy Chia-ting (leading) and Ch*ing-p*u 
(Tsing-poo), together with Sung-chiang (Sung-keong), Nan­
di* iao (Najaor) and Che-lin (Tsao-lin) was taken hy Sir James 
Hope, Brigadier-General Staveley, and Contre-Amiral Protet on 
22 April, The document which they drew up reads:-
Agreed;-
1st. That it is necessary for the defence of Shanghae to 
occupy Hading, Tsing-poo, Sung-keong, Najaor, and Tsao-lin,
"by which means a district of country will he secured sufficient 
in extent to afford the supplies requisite for the support of 
its numerous population, and to keep the rebels at a distance, 
which will preclude the continuance of that state of alarm 
which has prevailed during the last few months, and which has 
been so detrimental to its commerce.
2nd. Colonel Ward at present occupies Sung-keong, and he 
undertakes, as soon as Tsing-poo is taken, to establish his 
head-quarters there, and to hold it. The Chinese authorities 
have undertaken, and will be required, to furnish sufficient 
garrisons for Hading, Najaor, and Tsao-lin, in each of the two 
first of which it will also be expedient to place 200 troops, 
half English and half French, in support of the Chinese, until 
Colonel Ward*s force is sufficiently augmented to enable him 
to replace them by 200 of his men.
2rd. Previous to the capture of Hading and the other towns 
from the rebels, proper arrangements shall be made to prevent 
any men leaving their ranks for the purpose of pillage; and, 
subsequently, to collect whatever may be of value, in order to 
[ensure] its fair distribution amongst the troops, to whom the 
same is to be made known before the commencement of the operat­
ions.
4th. After the proposed operations have been brought to a 
successful conclusion, it is intended to retain at Shanghai 
500 French Infantry; and of English, a half battery of 
Artillery, 250 European 250 Native Infantry.
(Signed) J. Hope, Vice-Admiral
C. Staveley, Brigadier-General 
A. Protet, Contre-Amiral.
B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.27*
6. This would be about June 1862; in fact these events took place 
between the 2nd and Months by the Taiping calendar.
7. A detailed account of the capture of Chia-ting is given in 
Staveley*s report to the War Office, dated 2 May 1S62; see B.P.P.
Further Papers Belating to the Rebellion in China p.28. Cahill:
A Yankee Adventurer p,177> quotes the following from the account of
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an eye-witness: "The scene was now most picturesque. A shell had 
set fire to part of the city close at hand. The early morning 
sun was shining pleasantly upon the fields, rich with ungathered 
crops. The French band played as the troops scaled the walls."
Ch’ing-p'u was taken on 13 May. Staveley*s report is in B.P.P. 
Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China pp.33-4
8. This is an error; there were no foreign units present in this 
attack on T'ai-ts*ang (Taitsan), which was launched at the
order of Hsueh Huan on 17 May (TCl/4/19)> and made by ’braves* 
under the command of the Prefect Li Ch*ing-ch*en; see Fang-lueh 
ch.304 p.15a*
9. This was changed in the Chiu Ju T*ang Edition to read "Ch'ing 
troops"; all other editions follow.
Motels to Page 213.
1. This possibly refers to events after the capture of Chia-ting, 
since foreigners did not take part in the attack on T'ai-ts*ang.
At Chia-ting, according to the eye-witness quoted by Cahill: A 
Yankee Adventurer p.174, "An immense quantity of loot, consisting 
of silver, precious stones and fine clothing, was found... The 
British said that most of the looting was done by the French:
*Vho seemed to be in the very best of humour that day, for they 
carried off everything that could be got away. It was a romantic 
sight to see the soldiery leaving the city, followed by bullocks, 
sheep, goats, boys and women - all considered as loot. One scene 
especially took our attention, a soldier of the Fifth French 
Regiment d’Afrique, dragging a donkey saddled in the Chinese way, 
loaded down with bundles of clothing and a young Chinese lady 
with small feet riding the same donkey. In fact the French troops 
showed a bad example to the new Chinese levies, committing all 
sorts of cruelties which were laid to Ward’s force.1,1
In a letter to Tseng Kuo-fan dated 19 April (TCl/3/21), Li Hung- 
chang complained that when they operated with government troops, the 
foreigners ’freely insulted and arbitrarily ordered them about - 
behaviour which the Hunan and Huai army troops are not likely to 
tolerate.1 See Li Hung-chang: P*eng-liao han-kao ch.l p.13
2. The Taipings did however employ many individual foreigners, 
the best-known being A.F. Lindley. Other names are given in
Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix pp.175-178*
3. For $ read 33L.
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4. For read 'jfc .
5. In fact there were no foreign troops in Ssu-ching or Pao-shan.
6. In the first of Li Hung-chang’s memorials which mention this 
operation, he reported the loss of the commander and of several
officers, and that there were ’more than a hundred thousand1 rebels; 
see Fang-liieh ch.304 p.!5a/b. Later he memorialized that more than 
half of Li Ch’ing-ch’eng’s force of 5>000 men, had been destroyed; 
ibid.ch.306 p.10a. Sir JamesrHope wrote of this operation:
...Sich fsic, for Hsueh Huan] the late Viceroy, collected a 
force stated at from 7>000 to 10,000 men, formed by withdrawing 
the troops encamped at Bissoo [Ch'i-p'u] and Talciteen [?] and 
part of the garrison at Pao sham [Pao-shan], and advanced upon 
the town of Yaetnean [T’ai-ts’ang], about‘eighteen miles to 
the north-west of Kading [Chia-ting], with a view to effecting 
its capture.
This operation was undertaken without communicating with the 
allies, and as the present Governor [Li Hung-chang] acquainted 
me, against his strong remonstrances to the contrary. The 
result was such as might have been expected; the Imperialist 
troops were defeated, and driven, with great loss, past Kading 
nearly to Pao sham, to which a few returned, the remainder 
having dispersed.
See B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.42 
The remainder of the Ch’ing troops who fled to Wu-sung were only 
saved by the presence of a British gun-boat, which ’repelled the 
pursuing Tae-pings with her shot and shell.' ibid. p.11, Medhurst 
to Bruce.
7. On 21 May the Taipings occupies Nan-hsiang, and cut communications 
between Chia-ting and Shanghai. ’Between that day and the 25th,
when the greater part of their force moved off to the westward, the 
town [Chia-ting] was more or less surrounded by a large number of 
rebels estimated at not less than 25>000, and was attacked on 
several occasions, but without effect; ibid. p. 53-
8. This is incorrect. The relief force, commanded by Brigadier- 
General Staveley, came from Che-lin and Nan-ch’iao by way of
Shanghai, see below, note 1 to page 214-
9. I have guessed at the meaning of
Notes to Page 214.
1. Staveley left Shanghai on 24 May to relieve Chia-ting, where
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provisions and ammunition were running short, and arrived at Nan- 
hsiang on the same day, where he was surrounded by a considerable 
force of Taipings, who were on their way to Ch'ing-p'u. "...the 
circumstances so convinced General Staveley of the imprudence of 
keeping any of his troops isolated in a city so easily cut off, 
that he determined on evacuating it at once. The garrison was 
accordingly ordered out, and the entire force returned to this 
place [Shanghai] shortly after. ... The authorities are much 
disappointed by the evacuation of Kading, and scarcely know what 
to make of it. The civil and military officers who had been 
placed in charge positively refused to leave the city, and had to 
be taken prisoners and forced to come away with the foreign 
garrison.•." B.P.P. Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.12.
A very prolix account of the event by Staveley follows, ibid. pp. 
14-15* For Li Hung-changfs comment on this, see Tsou-kao ch.l p. 19.
2. The Taiping attack on Ch'ing-p'u began on 28 May (TCl/5/1)*
3. The Taipings attacked Chia-ting on 28 May. The town was defended 
by local 'braves’ and by 1,500 of the 'Ever-Victorious Army'
(E.V.A.), as Ward's force was now called, under 'Colonel' Edward 
Forrester. Li Hsiu-ch'eng does not make it clear that two relief 
forces were sent, one on 29 May (see note 4, below) and one on 10 
June (see note 5* below).
4. This evidently refers to Ward's first attempt to relieve Ch'ing- 
p'u. "Colonel Ward went to Tsing-poo [from Sung-chiang] with
the intention of placing some ammunition in that town. I accompanied 
Colonel Ward with a view to ascertain [sic] the state of affairs 
at Tsing-poo. The expedition failed in consequence of the only 
gun that Colonel Ward could get into position bursting after the 
fourth round." Captain Montgomerie to Vice-Admiral Sir J. Hope,
June 7> 1862 in B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in 
China p.20. Li Hung-chang memorialized that Ward had gone to the 
relief of Ch'ing-p'u with two steamers, and on 29 May had begun 
to shell the tom; but after three rounds the cannon blew up.
Twenty-thousand rebels swarmed up, and Ward had to withdraw. See 
Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.l p.20a.
5. The second attempt to relieve Ch'ing-p'u was on 10 June, when 
"200 men of the 31st Regiment under Colonel Spence, the naval
brigade under Admiral Hope, and Ward himself with two steamers and 
some of his men, went up to relieve Singpoo and withdraw its 
garrison," See Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army' p.86. Ch'ing-p'u 
was abandoned at the insistence of Admiral Hope, although both 
Ward and Forrester were willing to hold on. It seems that the 
garrison might have made their escape unnoticed had not the order 
been given to fire part of the town in order to put up a smoke-screen.
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’’This gave notice to the Taipings that their enemies were 
retreating and they rushed the city. The retreat was turned 
into a running fight. In crossing the unbridged ditches and 
canals around Tsingpu, Wardfs men lost heavily. The confusion 
of the retreat was so great that no one knew just what was 
happening.” Cahill: A Yankee Adventurer p. 188.
6. According to the official record, Ssu-ching was taken by the 
Taipings on 5 June, before the recovery of Ch'ing-pfu, see
Kuo: Jih-chih p.905.
7. The Taiping attack on Sung-chiang began on 3° May. The stock­
ades outside the town, manned by Ch*ing troops, were taken on
2 June; see below, note 9*
8. The Chiu Ju T!ang Edition reads 'more than ten1.
9. An account of this engagement from the British side is quoted 
extensively below for the purpose of comparison.
Colonel Ward returned to Sung-keong on the afternoon of the 
30th ultimo [May]. On the morning of that day, about 5*30 a.m., 
the rebels attacked Sung-keong with considerable determination 
on the north-east side with a force of about 1,500 men, but 
were successfully repulsed by the ”Centaurfs” men, who were 
the only people on the wall at the time of the attack. One 
rebel succeeded in scaling the walls; he fired a double- 
barrelled gun at Robert Stephens, seaman, who shot him. To 
this man's conduct, and the quick manner the "Centaur's” men ? 
came to the walls, I attribute the success of the repulse with­
out casualties on our side, and a loss to the rebels of about 
100 men. Among the killed were two Europeans; three were seen.
The rebels were armed with rifles and gingalls. Their method 
of scaling was, two bamboos secured together at either end, 
about two feet apart, placed against the wall; the man coming 
up was assisted by two men below shoving him up the centre 
with another bamboo, the scaler helping himself with the 
uprights....
I visited Colonel Ward, on the 31st May, the Imperialist 
camps being formed on the creek leading to the river. On the 
following day, these camps were in a very defensible state, with 
guns in position and men tolerably well armed.
On the 1st June, owing to the near approach of large bodies 
of rebels, the suburbs were fired to a considerable extent round 
the walls. This work, was performed by men protected by covering 
parties outside and men on the walls.
On the 2nd June, about 3*30 P«ra*, I observed that the Imperial­
ists were driven out of their camps by the rebels, and shortly
431
Notes to pages 214 & 215
afterwards I made out that my second gig was in their hands, 
as also several of Colonel Vardfs gunboats, some of which were 
laden with muskets and kegs of gunpowder. A sortie party was 
formed; I took about *150 of his men, and went out by the south 
gate, proceeding to that part of the creek where the capture 
had been made. On our approach with a fire from the rifles 
and the field-piece as soon as it could be got into position, 
the rebels began to move away rapidly, and the boats were 
recaptured. The rebels, of whom several were killed and wounded,
were followed up a short distance. They dropped a considerable
number of captured muskets; they, however, succeeded in carrying 
off between 500 and 400 muskets out of 560, and 36 kegs of 
powder out of 218. Getting dusk, I returned to the city, 
keeping up a fire to the rear, as the rebels continued to fire 
on us. I could not find any trace of the gig's crew. About 
9 o'clock, I succeeded in getting all the boats into the city 
by the west Water Gate.
On the 3rd June I heard of the safety of the gig's crew and
some Europeans who were in the gun-boats.
On the 3^> 4th and 5th of June, several attempts were made
to storm the city, and a battery was thrice erected by the
rebels outside the West Gate, with which they opened fire in 
the morning, but on each occasion they were successfully destroyed
by guns from the city.
On the morning of the 5th June, Chung Wang sent a letter to 
Colonel Ward, demanding that the city might be delivered up to 
him, to which of course no answer was made....
In the evening, large bodies of rebels were observed moving 
northward in the direction of Su-keen.
See B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China, p.20 
Montgomerie to Hope.
Notes to Page 215»
1. At this time the British did indeed stop operations in the 
vicinity of Shanghai. The reason which Staveley gave to Hope 
was 'the utter inability of the Chinese authorities to provide 
garrisons for the town captured from the rebels - the principal 
condition on which our agreement [to clear the $Q mile radius] 
was based, and as the force at my command is Insufficient to hold 
them, even if assisted by out French allies, I shall confine myself 
especially, now that the hot season has set in, to the immediate 
defence of Shanghai.' (Staveley to Hope, Further Papers Relating 
to the Rebellion in China, p.29). But the Taipings were not alone 
in thinking that 'the foreign devils did not dare to do battle...'
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Tso Tsung-t’ang wrote to Tseng Kuo-fan, and the latter repeated 
to the court, that the foreigners1 withdrawal from Ch1 ing-p1 u and 
Chia-ting ’shows that they are just as frightened of the rebels 
as we are.’ See Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch. 16 p.9b. Li Hung-chang 
also commented that the foreigners dared not come out and fight 
the rebels, see Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.l p.20a.
2. At this time Li Hung-chang considered that Shanghai might be
held, but not Ch’ing-p’u and Sung-chiang, see Lo: Chien-cheng 
p.285.
5. The dates of the capture of these places by the Hunan Army are
as follo\\rs:- Wu-hu on 20 May 1862, Ch’ao-hsien on 18 April,
Wu-wei and Yiin-ts’ao about 24 March, Tung-liang-shan on 19 May 
(the day Tseng ICuo-ch’uan crossed the Yangtse), Hsi-liang-shan on 
22 April, T’ai-p’ing-kuan (i.e. Chin-chu-kuan in T’ai-p’ing-fu) 
on 19 May and Ho-chou on 20 April.
4. Tseng Kuo-ch1 iian took Mo-ling-kuan [see Map IV] (whose garrison
surrendered) on 28 May, and on 50 May, with a force of a little 
oyer 10,000 men, supported by the river force of the Hunan Army, 
began to fortify positions at Yu-hua-t’ai, about 4 li from Hanking; 
see Kuo: Jih-chih pp.902-5. The speed of this advance came as a 
surprise to the Taipings, according to Hung Jen-kan: Deposition 
p.854 in TPTK II, and Chu Hung-chang: Ts’ung-chun chi-lueh p.29b.
At this time the troops under Tseng Kuo-fan’s general command 
were as follows:-
(1) On the southern front: Tso Tsung-t’ang in Chekiang command­
ing a force of something over 10,000 men.
(2) Eastern front: Li Hung-chang, based on Shanghai, with 6,500 
Huai and Hunan Army troops, Kiangsu troops, and the E.V.A.
(5) Eastern ..front: four ying of the Hunan Army water force in 
Kiangsu, co-ordinating with Li Hung-chang.
(4) Centre: Tseng Kuo-ch’iian commanding between 10,000 and
20,000 (later rising to 50,000) besieging Hanking.
(5) Centre: the main Hunan Army water force in the Yangtse, 
supporting the siege of Nanking.
(6) Centre: units of the Hunan Army under Tseng Chen-kan (a 
younger brother of Kuo-fan), sent from An-ch’ing first to take 
Wu-hu and then join Tseng Kuo-ch’iian.
(7) Centre: Hunan Army units (called the T’ing Chun) under Pao 
Ch'ao in southern Anhwei, moving to attack Ning-kuo.
(8) Rear: Hunan Army units under Chang Yun-lan and others in 
southern Anhwei, to cut off Taiping relief for Nanking.
(9) Northern front: Hupeh troops under To-lung-ah attacking 
Lu-chou.
(10) Northern: Hunan Army units under Li Hsii-i in Northern Anhwei,
433
Notes to page 215
(11) Troops under Yuan Chia-san co-operating with To-lung-ah.
(12) Li Shih-chung’s troops holding Chiang-p'u.
(15) Tu-hsing-ah commanding the garrison at Yang-chou.
(14) Troops under Feng Tzu-ts’ai holding Chen-chiang.
The rapid advance of Tseng Kuo-ch1 iian to Nanking was made possible 
by the weakness of the Taipings in northern Anhwei after the 
departure of their Northern Expedition. Ch'en Yii-oh’eng was besieged 
in Lu-chou, (see note 8 to page 209). Miao P’ei-lin had gone over 
to the enemy and Chang Lo-hsing was not a serious threat. On the 
south bank, Huang Wen-chin, Liu Kuan-fang and Yang Fu-ch’ing were 
all held in check by Pao Ch’ao, as was Li Shih-hsien by Tso Tsung- 
t’ang in Chekiang. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was occupied with his campaign 
in the Shanghai region. See Ghien: Ch’uan-shih III pp.2185-2188 
and Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.135*
5. Tseng Kuo-fan presumably deleted the four characters
to avoid drawing attention to the fact that he frequently 
disobeyed imperial edicts.
6. On 17 June 1862 (TCI/5/21) Li Hsiu-ch’eng launched his third 
attack on Shanghai with fifty or sixty thousand men, but after
being defeated on 22 June, his army withdrew on the following day, 
both from Shanghai and from Sung-chiang, leaving only small 
garrisons at Chia-ting, T'ai-ts * ang and Ch’ing-p’u; see Chien: 
Ch’uan-shih III. p.2016.
7. According to Hsii Yao-kuang, Li Hsiu-ch'eng held a military 
meeting at Su-ehou on 22 June, which was attended by Ch'en Ping-
wen, T'an Shao-kuang, Kao Yung-k’uan, Hu Ting-wen, T’ang Cheng- 
ts’ai, Li Ming-ch'eng and others. Another meeting was held on 
6 August (TCI/7/11) > attended by Mo Shih-k’uei, Liu Kuan-fang, Ku 
Lung-hsien, Huang Wen-ehin, Fan Ju-tseng and Lu Shun-te. Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng implies in this paragraph that at the first of these 
meetings his plan for raising the siege of Nanking in two years' 
time was discussed. The second meeting was necessitated by the 
arrival of Hung Hsiu-ch’uan's messenger, Mo Shih-k’uei, and the 
plan for the immediate relief of the capital was drawn up. Hsii 
Yao-kuang mentions that a record of these meetings was published 
by the Taipings, with a preface by Li Hsiu-ch'eng. This is 
confirmed by Tseng Kuo-fan. Unfortunately, though Hsii saw the 
book, no copies have come to light. See Hsii Yao-kuang: T’an Che 
p.584; Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu .jih-chi TCl/9/20 p. 1431; Lo: Shih- 
liao k'ao-shih chi pp.88-90 and Kuo: Jih-chih pp.911-2.
8. In the tops margin at this point, Tseng Kuo-fan wrote, 'That is, 
Ma Jung-ho.' This refers to the centre column of the Taipings*
1862 Northern Expedition, led by Ma (see note 8 to page 209). But
Notes to pages 2$5 - 2J7
Li Hsiu-ch’eng was presumably referring more particularly to Ch’en 
Te-ts*ai, whom he had sent to the northwest to collect troops, see 
note 1 to page 210.
9. In the original: .. The Ohiu Ju T!ang Edition has
Notes to Page 216*
1. For j^il^readJ^t . Ho Shih-k’uei, the Pu Wang, was formerly 
a shih-wei (imperial Bodyguard). At this time he was head of
the Taiping Board of Punishments (#-] ), see Lo: Chien-oheng p.284.
2. In the original^/Cj7^ ;)!-, which is probably an error for
3. In fact Li Hsiu-ch’eng had, up to this poitft, only written
25,156 characters, see page 38•
4. The last two characters on this page of the manuscript do not,
as Lu Chi-i assumes (see Chung Wang Li Hsiu-ch’eng tzu-shu chiao- 
pu pen, typeset edition p.85) join up with the next page. Li Hsiu- 
ch’eng probably continued the sentence on the back cover of the first 
notebook, which may have been removed when the two sections were 
bound together. It is unlikely that anything very much is missing 
here, since Li Hsiu-ch'eng complained in this passage that his brush 
was ruined, and the next page was obviously written with a new brush.
5. For read ^  .
6. For read idj .
7* This is not entirely accurate, see above page 143*
8. For ^  read % -M)..
Notes to Page 217*
1. Perhaps this is the sense of the four characters written 
between the lines.
2. The plan for the relief of Nanking was that Li Hsiu-ch’eng 
himself should lead the main column in a direct attack on Tseng
Kuo-ch*iian*s positions; another column under Huang Wen-chin and
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other would attack Ning-kuo in order to immobilize Pao Ch'ao's 
army, while the third Taiping column under Ch'en K*un-shu, would 
march east from Ch'ang-chou, making for Wu-hu and Chin-chu-kuan, 
in order to cut communications between Tseng Kuo-ch*iian and Ning- 
kuo, See Mow An-shih; T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo p.359*
3* Particularly to T'an Shao-kuang and Ch'en Ping-wen.
No^ tes to Page 218.
1. This section, punctuated and not marked for deletion by Tseng 
Kuo-fan, was omitted in the printed edition, and overlooked by
Lii Chi-i.
2. The 8th Month in the Taiping calendar was from 12 September to 
11 October. In fact Li Hsiu-ch'eng set out from Su-chou on 14
September 1862 (TCl/8/21).
3. There are various estimates as to the size of the Taiping force 
in this operation. They are discussed in Chien: Ch'tian-shih
III p.2216. The most likely figure is about 200,000, which is the 
estimate most frequently given by Tseng Kuo-fan; see, for instance, 
Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao pp. 92, 93, 94. Hsii Yao-kuang;
T'an Che p.594, mentions the figure of 600,000. This refers to 
the whole force Li Hsiu-ch'eng could command for the relief of 
Nanking, and is probably exaggerated. Tseng Kuo-ch'iian' s force 
numbered about 30,000; see Wang K'ai-yun: Hsiang-chlin chih Y p. 15a.
4. Tseng Kuo-fan added after <+*■ . The Taipings established 
stockades between Fang Shan (T'ien-yin Shan) and Pan-ch'iao,
Chien; Ch'tian-shih III p.2217; their attack began on 13 October 
(TCl/intercalary 8/20) and lasted until 26 November (TCl/10/5) - 
about 45 days.
5. This presumably refers to bridges over the various moats which 
formed part of the 'besieging works'. These are described in
a report by C.G. Gordon on his journey up the Yangtse, summarized 
in Wilson; The "Ever-Victorious Army" pp.282-3. There was also 
a roadway about three miles long, made of brushwood and fascines, 
crossing a morass to the northeast of the city, according to Gordon,
6. That the Hunan Army was better armed at this time is not bom 
out by contemporary accounts. Tseng Kuo-ch'iian claimed that
20,000 of the Taipings were equipped with foreign muskets (or 
rifles), see his letter to Kuo K'un-t'ao, quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng
notes to page 218
p. 287. Tseng Kuo-fan went even further, and in several letters 
referred to a force of 200,000+ rebels, 'none of them without 
foreign arms' ($A9<. see Tseng ICuo-fan wei-k'an hsln-
kao pp. 100, 104, 106, or '...using entirely foreign guns [muskets 
or rifles] cannon and shell’ (ibis. p.97)- Both these claims 
would seem greatly exaggerated; but we do know that the Taipings 
had captured foreign weapons in considerable quantities (see note 
9 to page 214), and that they had been buying foreign arms for 
some time (see Fang-liieh ch.221 p.14a). As to the weapons of the 
Hunan Army, even in 1864 Gordon noted that 'the men looked well, 
strong and healthy, and seemed to be in good spirits, but were not 
well armed, spears and Chinese lances being far more numerous than 
muskets.* (Gordon's report of a journey up the Yangtse, 30 June 
1864. Manuscript in the British Museum).
7. This is hardly an adequate explanation for Li Hsiu-ch'eng's
failure in this campaign, in which the odds were so unequal.
The lack of winter clothes and supplies point to a deficiency in 
organization (since the Taiping supply lines were not long) which 
may have been connected with Li Hsiu-ch'eng's general lack of 
enthusiasm for the task which Hung Hsiu-ch'uan had obliged him to 
undertake. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this 
failure was symptomatic of the period of Taiping decline, in which 
huge rebel armies, no longer united and disciplined, were uhable to 
make headway against smaller and more determined enemy forces.
In this operation the Taipings had a numerical advantage of over 
six to one (see note 3 above). In fact this advantage was consid­
erably greater, since the Hunan Army in southern Anhwei was at this 
time severely stricken with the plague. In Tseng Kuo-ch'lion's army 
too three out of ten died of the plague, and half of the remainder 
were convalescent at the time of the Taiping attack; see Tseng Kuo- 
ch 'Iian*s letter to Kuo K'un-t'ao, quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng p.287, 
and Tseng Kuo-fan; Tsou-kao ch.l6 p.27a/b. Nearly ten thousand of 
Pao Ch'ao's men were down with the plague, see Tseng Kuo-fan wei- 
k'an hsin-kao p.92. But there is no record of the Taiping armies 
having been affected at this time. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was moreover, 
supported by an army under Li Shih-hsien, which set out on 7 October 
from Chekiang (Kuo: Jih-chih). The Taipings had the advantage of 
superior armament; they had the initiative in attacking an enemy in 
fixed positions, and in attacking both from Nanking and from outside. 
They had experience of previous sieges of this kind and must have 
known the territory much better than Tseng Kuo-ch'Iian, who had only 
arrived a few months previously.
The Taipings attacks were made by direct assault, concentrated 
mainly on the eastern and western flanks, and by mining in order 
to breach the Huan Army defence works. All their attempts were 
fruitless and the Taipings must have become thoroughly discouraged
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by the obstinate resistance of their enemy. On 3 November they 
suffered six or seven thousand casualties (the figure is Tseng 
Kuo-ch Mian's and probably exaggerated), and after* about 11 Novem­
ber, Taiping attacks during the daytime eased off, though they 
still tried to wear out the enemy at night by mining and skir­
mishing (see Tseng Kuo-fan wei-k'an hsin-kao p.100). It appears 
that at this time it was their intention to reduce the enemy by 
attrition, by attacking day and night for three months; see 
P'eng Yti-1 in's letter to Tseng Kuo-fan in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan 
shu-tu p.234, based on the reports of captured Taipings,
Li Hsiu-ch'eng evidently abandoned the campaign because of the 
defeat of his commanders (T'an Shao-lcuang, Ch'en Ping-wen, and 
Huang Tzu-lung) at Shanghai on 13 November. On 25 November Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng withdrew sixty or seventy thousand troops from Nanking 
and sent them back to defend his home base in the Yangtse delta; 
on the following day he abandoned the attempt to raise the siege 
of Nanking by direct assault. The official record claimed a great 
military victory for the Hunan Army on this day, but Chu Hung- 
chang, who was there, does not mention a battle (see Ts'ung-ohun 
chi-lueh).
It is clear from the tone of Tseng Kuo-fan's letters that he 
was extremely worried for the safety of Teng Kuo-ch'iian and his 
army, and at one time even urged his brother to withdraw to Wu-hu; 
see Hail; Tseng Kuo-fan and the Taiping Rebellion pp.273-4*
For a detailed description of the whole campaign, see Chien;
Ch'iian-shih III pp.2214-2226. Tseng Kuo-fan*s memorial reporting 
the attack is in Tsou-kao ch.17 pp.9b-llb.
8. The exact nature of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's demotion is not clear.
9- In spite of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's expressed unwillingness to under­
take this campaign, its fundamental concept does not seem to 
have differed greatly from his own belief that a direct confront­
ation with the siege force at Nanking should be avoided. Hung 
Hsiu-ch' iian's orders were for him to regain the rich rice-growing 
area of Wu-wei, Lu-chou and Ho-chou, while Li Shih-hsien was to 
attack Wu-hu, Chin-chu-kuan, in order to get the grain from the 
region of T'ai-p'ing and Ning-kuo; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao 
ch.18 p.8. At the same time the Taipings undoubtedly wanted to 
take advantage of the comparatively small government forces to the 
north of the Yangtse (ibid.ch.17 p*13b), and of the presence of 
their Nien allies and the Taipings troops on the Norther Expedition.
10, Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself did not cross the Tangtse until late 
March I863. Between the end of the 45-day battle to relieve 
Nanking (26 November 1862) and this date, little is known of his 
precise movements. He is said to have returned to Su-chou on 11
Notes to page 218
January, according to Kuo: Jih-chih, although Hake: Events in the 
Taeping Rebellion p.236, gives the date as 4 February. On 19 
January he went to attack Ch'ang-shu (Kiangsu), the Taiping command­
er of which, Lo Kuo-chung, had surrendered the town to the enemy on 
16 or 17 January. On 14 February he was at T'ai-ts'ang, where the 
1 Ever-Victorious Army' had just been defeated. Between 16 and 22 
February he was laying siege to Ch'ang-shu once more.
Notes to Page 219*
1. P'u-k'ou was taken by Wu Ju-hsiao and Huang Gh' ung-fa on 22 March 
I863 (TC2/2/4) and Chiang-pfu on 3 April (TC2/2/16). In fact
Li Hsiu-chfeng crossed after the capture of P'u-k'ou but before 
that of Chiang-p'u. According to Tu-hsing-ah, he had seventy or 
eighty thousand troops, see Fang-liieh ch.327 p*13££«
2. On 1 December (TCl/lO/lO) a Taiping force under Lin Shao-chang, 
Hung Ch1 un-yuan, Kao Yung-k'uan and Li Hsiu-ch'eng's son Jung-fa,
began crossing the Yangtse from Nanking to Chiu-fu-chou, where 
they remained hidden in the reeds until 8 December, and then launched 
an attack on Li Shih-chung (Li Chao-shou) fs positions at P'u-k'ou 
and Chiu-fu-chou. Taiping troops continued to cross while this 
attack was going on, and advanced towards Ch'ao-hsien. On 18 
December Hung Ch1 un-yuan took Han-shan, while Li Jung-fa attacked 
Chiang-p'u; on the following day Hung took Ch'ao-hsien and on 21 
December, Ho-chou. On the same day Li Jung-fa gave up his attack 
on Chiang-p'u and moved eastwards, On 27 December Hung Ch'un-yuan 
took T'ung-ch'eng-chia; on 29 December he attacked Yun-ts'ao and on 
13 January, Wu-wei. After this however, reinforcemeents were sent 
by Tseng Kuo-fan and Hung was beaten back, on on 9 February was 
forced to give up T'ung-ch'eng-chia.
Tseng Kuo-fan reported the number of Taiping troops involved in 
this campaign as fifty or sixty thousand; see Tsou-kao ch. 17 p. 17a; 
Tu-hsing-ah reported that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had crossed with seventy 
or eighty thousand (see note 1 above); Li Shih-chung reprted that 
the enemy was eighty or ninety thousand strong, see Tseng Kuo-fan: 
Tsou-kao ch.17 p.17b.
3. Before Li Hsiu-ch'eng's arrival on the north bank in March, he 
had sent another force across on 27 February under Ch'en K'un-
shu, V/u Ju-hsiao and Huang Ch* ung-f a. This force attacked Li Shih- 
chung's positions at Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou on 16 March, see note 
1 above. Li Hsiu-ch'eng arrived at Ch'ao-hsien on 31 March I863.
4. Vang Hung-chien was Li Hsiu-ch'eng's secretary before the capture
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of Su-chou, after which he was in charge of the administration 
of Wu-hsien. On this expedition he was responsible for supplies; 
see Lo: Chien-cheng p.290.
5. This implies that the despoiling was done by the previous 
occupants, the Hunan Army. There is evidence that this was the
case, and that here, as was often the case with other regions, the 
process of suppression was the most destructive part of the rebellion. 
The whole question of the responsibility for the very considerable 
destruction which resulted from the Taipings rebellion and its 
suppression, is discussed in Chien; Tien-chih t'ung-k'ao ch.17, and 
in Lo; T'ai-p'ing T'ien-kuo shih-chi tsai-ting miu-chi, Peking 1955 
pp.9-46. Both authorities conclude that Tseng Kuo-fan employed a 
'scorched-earth* policy, as does Ho Ping-ti; Studies in the Population 
of China, 1368-1953» Harvard 1959> P*237* a memorial of 
?C2/2727 (14 April 1863) Tseng Kuo-fan accused the Taipings of being 
to blame for the state of devastation in Anhwei, but his remarks 
give grounds for suspecting that the destruction may have been 
caused by those who benefitted from it: "When the rebels campaign 
in regions bereft of people, they are like fish in places where there 
is not water; when they occupy land where there is no [longer any] 
cultivation, they are like birds on a treeless mountain." See Tseng 
Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p.9a.
6, Shih-chien-pu was held by Hunan Army units "under Mao Yu-ming 
and Lu Lien-chien, The Taipings attacked on 18 April, according
to Tseng Kuo-fan, ibid. ch.18 p.lib.
7* They may have been infected with the plague which had previously 
ravaged the Hunan Army, see note 7 to page 218.
8. When Shih-chien-pu v/as cut off by the Taipings, Tseng Kuo-fan 
sent Pao Ch'ao to its relief, and Tseng KuC-ch'uan sent five
ying from Nanking; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch. 18 p. 11. Pao 
Ch'ao arrived at Wu-wei on 5 Hay I863 (TC2/3/16) and at Shih-chien- 
pu on the following day, By this time however, the relief force sent 
by Tseng Kuo-ch*Han, under P'eng Yu-chu and Hsian Ch'ing-yan, had 
arrived, together with units of the Hunan Army water force, and the 
garrison at Shih-chien-pu broke out of the Taiping encirclement, 
destroyed their stockades, and joined up with the relief force. Pao 
Ch*ao did not take part in this engagement, but re-embarked, intend­
ing to male© for Kiangsi; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 p. 15b.
An account of the Taiping siege of Shih-chien-pu, in Tu Ven-lan:
Tseng Chtieh Hsiang p'ing Yueh-ni chieh lueh (Chien-ohi I) p. 394, 
confirms that the Ch'ing troops were at first ordered to 'hold firm 
in their stockades and see what moves [the rebels] would make*.
9. Li Hsiu-ch'eng's advance guard arrived at Lu-chiang on 29 April
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(TC2/3/12), and the Taiping attack, which only lasted one day, was 
on 6 May (TC2/3/I9)* Shu-ch'eng was attacked on 8 May* Li Hsiu- 
ch1 eng1 s vanguard arrived at Liu-an on 10 May, the main army on 
the 11th, and the attack began on 12 May (TC2/3/25)*
10. When Tseng Kuo-fan heard that on withdrawing from Shih-chien- 
pu, Li Hsiu-ch’eng had not returned to Ch’ao-hsien, but had
moved on Lu-chiang, he hastily ordered Pao Ch’ao to the relief 
of the town. By this time Tseng Kuo-fan had acquired some Taiping 
despatches, from which he learned that it was Li Hsiu-ch'eng’s 
intention to go by way of Shu-ch* eng and Liu-an to Ying-shan, Ho- 
shan, Ma-ch’eng and Sung-pu, then to divide into two columns, one 
to attack Huang-chou and the other Hankow, in order to relieve 
pressure on Nanking; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.18 pp.l5b-l6a. 
Chao Lieh-wen gives slightly more detail of these captured Taiping 
documents, which were from Li Hsiu-ch'eng and Hung Jen-kan. In 
them this operation was called 'advancing in the north in order to 
attack in the south’ ;cj£>k>) • There was very little grain in
the capital, according to these despatches, and the Taiping 
intended to press on beyond Wu-han to Ching-chou and Hsiang-yang, 
for recruiting purposes. After the departure of this expedition 
the Taipings expected to be attacked at Ho-chou, Han-shan and 
Chiu-fu-chou; this did not cause much anxiety because Tseng Kuo*- 
fan’s troops were considered to be adequate in defence but weak 
in attacking. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.268. For Tseng Kuo- 
fan *s comment on this assessment, see Shu-cha ch.21 p.12
11. In his attack on Liu-an (begun on 12 May), Li Hsiu-ch’eng was 
joined by units under Ma Jung-ho and Chang Ch'ung, The attack
was abandoned on 19 May. For a description of the fighting, see 
Tu Wen^lan: Tseng Chueh Hsiang p'ing YUeh-ni chien-lueh p#395*
Notes to Page 220.
1. See note 1 to page 210.
2. On 19 May I863 (TC2/4/2).
3. In the manuscript this sentence reads %-h* In the
Chiu Ju T’ang Edition the character is replaced by ^  .
4. After their withdrawal from Liu-an, the Taipings were harassed 
by Ch’ing troops under Fao Ch'ao and Liu Lien-chien, and entered
the district of T’ien-ch'ang on 2 June.
On 12 June (TC2/4/27)» Tseng Kuo-ch'iian captured the stone forts
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at Yii-hua-t1 ai and outside the Chii Pao Gate of Nanking. Accord­
ing to Tseng Kuo-fan1s memorial of TC2/5/12, Kuo-ch'uan attacked 
these strongholds at the request of Li Hung-chang, who feared that 
Li Hsiu-ch'eng's whole force would attempt to relieve the pressure 
on Su-chou. Tseng Kuo-ch'iian himself hoped it would prevent Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng from attacking Yang-chou and penetrating Li-hsia-ho
"F ), the part of Kiangsu north of the Yangtse and east of the 
Grand Canal. The Tseng brothers were indeed surprised that he did 
not do so, and questioned him about it after his capture; see 
Appendix I, page 263* 2?or descriptions of the Taiping forts at 
Yu-hua-t'ai, see T'iao-fu tao-jen (Pseud.)s Chin-ling tsa-ohi 
p.633 and Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.262.
5. The Hunan Army recovered Tung-kuan in Wu-wei on 27 May, Ch'ao- 
hsien on 8 June. Hung Ch*un-yuan retreated to Ho-chou. On 10
June, Pao Ch'ao toolc Han-shan and on the following day (TC2/4/25) 
took Ho-chou, after the withdrawal of the Taipings.
6. Li Hsiu-ch'eng received this order at T'ien-ch'ang on 10 June 
I863, according to Kuo: Jih-chih, p.995*
7. P'u-k'ou was given up by the Taipings in the general panic 
following the loss of Ch'ao-hsien, Han-shan, Ho-chou and Yu-hua-
t'ai. The Taiping garrison at Chiang-p'u offered to surrender, 
but Pao Ch'ao and Liu Lien-chien feared a trick and attacked on 
24 June; -the garrison then fled. See Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chtieh 
Hsiang p'ing YUeh-ni ohieh-lueh p.398.
8. Chiu-fu-chou was normally flooded during the summer months.
9. Tseng Kuo-fan changed *Chiu-shuai' to 'General Tseng'; only
he, not his younger brother, could give orders to the river force.
10. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition this was changed to read: 'Just at
this time the river troops under Yang [Yueh-pin] and P'eng
[Yu-lin] came to the attack'.
11. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has, 'Hsia-lcuan was also taken by the 
water forces'. A.F.Lindley, who was near Nanking at the time,
wrote: "Luring several days preceding the arrival of the remnant
of the Chung Wang's troops, the enemy had maintained an incessant,
attack upon the batteries and forts commanding the passage of the 
river, and had particularly concentrated their efforts against a 
large fort on the opposite side, the capture of which would have 
paced the whole north bank in their hands, and would have cut off 
all retreat", see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.620. The decision 
to attack the Taiping positions at Hsia-kuan was taken 'because
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Chiu-fu-chou was in the midst of a torrential flood and the rebel 
fort would be very difficult to take by surprise1. The eight 
Taiping stockades at Hsia-kuan and Ts1 ao-hsieh-chia were taken 
on 28 June 1863. See Tu Wen-lan; Tseng Chiieh Hsiang p'ing Ylieh-ni 
ohieh-lueh p.398.
12. The following is P'eng Yu-lin's account of this debacle;
After the stone forts at Yu-hua-t'ai had all been taken, 
the rebels feared that the government troops would launch a 
big attack against the city [Nanking]; also, because of the 
loss of K'un-[shan] and Hsin-[yang], they feared that troops 
from Shanghai would lay siege to Su-[chou]. Li Hsiu-ch'eng and 
the other rebel wangs hurriedly changed their plans and decided 
to mount a relieving expedition from Chiang-pei, to relieve 
both nearby Chin-ling and distant Su-chou. Consequently the 
[rebel] sieges of T'ien-ch'ang, Liu-an and Lai-an were raised 
one after the other, and the mobs crossed over the the south.
The rebels who were stationed at Ch'iao-lin and Hsiao-tien, 
on the 5th Lay of the 5^h Month [20 June], seised boats in the 
pouring rain and dashed across, so that there was a constant 
clamour of shouting in the river. Hsiao Ch'ing-yen, judging 
that the rebel mobs at Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou were not very 
resolute, sent cavalry to attack them. Bat half-way there 
they heard that the rebels at P'u-k'ou had already given up 
the to¥n and fled. The rebels at Chiang-p'u sent a letter to 
the camp offering to surrender, but Pao Ch'ao and Liu Lien- 
chien suspected a trick, and on the 9th Lay [24 June], led 
their forces to the attack. Hsiao Ch'ing-yen came by way of 
Wu-chiang and joined up with the various river units, meeting 
Li Ch'ao-pin's river detachment from T'ai-hu, which was on its 
way to Shanghai and going past Chin-ling at the time. On the 
10th Lay [25 June], Li Ch'ao-pin sent his officers ¥u Kuei-fang, 
Li Chu-fa and Chiang Fu-shan to take boats and dash down-river, 
first to occupy P'u-k'ou and wipe out the remainder of the 
rebel Chung [Wang]'s force which had not crossed. Your Official 
Yii-lin took three ying... I names omitted] into the inner rivers, 
but unexpectedly, when the units reached Chiang-p'u [they found 
that] the rebels had got wind [of their approach] and had fled. 
Joining up with the infgntry, they then recaptured Chiang-p'u 
and P'u-k'ou, pursued and got in front of the fleeing rebels, 
who made for Chiu-fu-chou but were not admitted into the rebel 
fort on the island. Our gun-boats blocked the river and attacked 
them so that they could not cross. In fear they attempted to 
hide or escaped amongst the reeds, not knox^ing that in the 
thickest part of the reeds the water is ten feet or several tens 
of feet deep, because of the canal dug there in the Tao Kuang 
period [to defend] against the barbarians, and that dug by Chang
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Kuo-liang against the rebels, which criss-crossed [the island]. 
Men and horses rushing there were all drowned, their bodies 
amounting to the number of several myriad. On the 11th Day 
[26 June] the surviving rebels were moaning with hunger on the 
river bank. Cut Off by the new canals, they could not return 
to the north bank, and cut off by the Yangtse, they could not 
cross to the south bank. The water forces then landed and kept 
attacking them the whole day. Half of their number ran upon 
our swords and were killed, the remainder jumped into the water 
and were drowned. ... This is what happened at the capture of 
Chiang-p'u and P'u-k'ou on the 10th Day of the 5th Month [20 
June]. .
See P'eng Kang Chih ICung tsou-kao ch.l, quoted in Lo;Chien-cheng 
pp.292-3.
A.F.Lindley, who assisted the Taipings in this crossing, gives 
a vivid description of the event in Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.619-626. 
According to him, Li Hsiu-ch'eng's force had numbered 50»000 men, 
'while numberless refugees, prisoners, coolies, and others, far 
more than doubled these figures'; but only 15,000 'effective men* 
survived the attempted crossing.
Notes to Page 221.
1. This does not do the foreign mercenaries an injustice. A. E.
Hals©! Events in the Taeping Rebellion p.8 wrote:
They did not fight for country, for honour, for glory. They 
fought for money, plunder, loot, whatever they could get out 
of the scramble. If the rebel chief had offered them a better
price they would have taken it and fought on the other side
with pleasure. They had nothing to lose: their past would 
hardly bear minute inspection, and as for their future, they 
did not care for that. Few would have hoped for a decent death; 
and to many the prospect of a pair or gallows must have looked 
quite honourable and inviting.
But there was no need for them to join the Heavenly ICing 
[Hung Hsiu-ch'iian]. They had it all their own way. They attacked 
the outlying rebel holds, and when they had beaten out the enemy, 
they simply helped themselves: they grabbed anything and every­
thing they could lay their hands on, stores, treasures, provisions,
arms, even gongs and musical boxes. They desecrated the temples.
They tore the jewels from the idols, and kicked the fallen gods 
into the streets. And when they returned from a raid, they did 
not politely hand over these perquisites to their masters, they 
did not give them away. Not at all. They kept all they could, and 
sold the rest. And if there was anything over they burnt or threw 
it away.
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2. For % read$£
5. In the autumn of 186$, see page 227.
4. This was added by Tseng Kuo-fan.
5. According to information received by Li Hung-chang, there was 
only enough grain in the Taiping capital to last through the
1st. or 2nd. Months of TO 3 (i*e» until about the end of March 
1864), see Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.4 p.24a.
6. This proposal was made, according to Li Hsiu-ch'eng, in the 11th 
Month of the 13th Year, that is, between mid-December I863 and
mid-January 1864* Later in the deposition (see page 228), Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng referred to the loss of Su-chou (6 December) and of Wu-hsi 
(12 December), after which he returned to Nanking by night and 
petitioned on the following day, 21 December, in these terms. Nev/s 
of his proposal reached the government side, and Chao Lieh-wen 
recorded in his diary on TC2/11/19 (29 December) that Tseng Kuo- 
ch 'tian had informed him that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had strongly urged the 
T'ien Wang to give up ’their lair1 [Nanking] and go elsewhere; 
but Hung had refused. Li Hsiu-ch'eng then 'wanted to go off alone 
from the city, some say to start by attacking Chin-chu-kuan, some 
say that he intended to go to the Chien-p'ing, Kuang-te region in 
order to encroach upon the Anhwei-Kiangsi border; see Chao Lieh-wen: 
Jih-chi p.302. Tseng Kuo-fan reported that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had 
urged the abandonment of the rebel capital and commented that in his 
opinion Hung Hsiu-ch * iian was unlikely to agree, see Tsou-kao ch. 19 
p.27a. About this time also Li Hung-chang wrote to Tseng Kuo-fan, 
saying that the Na Wang Kao Yung-lc'uan, who had surrendered at Su- 
chou (see page 227) and the Ch'ao Wang Huang Tzu-lung, captured at 
Wu-hsi, had testified that Li Hsiu-ch'eng intended to go by way of 
Ning-kuo and Ch'ang yii-shan into Kiangsi, thence into Hupeh, in 
order to meet up with Ch'en Te-ts'ai; see Li Hung-chang: P1 eng- 
liao han-kao ch.4 p.24a.
The first of these accounts hints at, the second states clearly, 
that Li Hsiu-ch'eng intended to reach Hupeh and join up with Ch'en 
Te-ts'ai by taking the route south of the Yangtze. This presumably 
was a point of dispute with Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, who ordered Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng to take the northern route (see page 223). But from neither 
account can we tell what specific proposals were made if the Taiping 
capital was to be given up and a new base found. Lo Erh-lcang has 
equated the two proposals - that Nanking was to be given up and that 
a junction be effected with Ch'en Te-ts'ai - he has assumed that the 
new base was to be somewhere in the northwest and that the new plan 
mentioned by Li Hung-chang involved the abandonment of Nanking; see 
Lo Erh-kang: Chien-cheng p.294. There appears to be little 
justification for this. The possibility that the two questions may 
have been entirely separate is suggested by the fact that Hung Hsiu-
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ch'uan evidently agreed with the necessity of joining up with 
Ch'en Te-ts'ai, though by the northern route, and not wj.th the 
abandonment of Nanking.
A.P.Lindley, who claimed to have inside knowledge of Taipitig 
deliberations on the question (though this is open to doubt), 
wrote that,
But one impediment prevented the Commander-in-Chief [Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng] from acting with his usual brilliancy of 
conception and wonderfully successful rapidity of execution; 
it was the Tien-Wang, who refused even to listen to any proposal 
to abandon his capital.
Different people will view this ruinous obstinacy of the 
Ti-ping king in various ways* Some will look upon it as 
sheer, downright folly; others, as the useless, fanatical 
sacrifice of a bigot; wile some may consider that that great, 
heroic, noble-minded man, having once established the capital 
of his dominions and the centre of his religio-political 
movement at Nankin, did right and gloriously in meeting death 
rather than turning backwards on the grand path. If we 
ascribe to the Tien-wang motives partaking equally of the 
three traits - nobleness, fanaticism, and rashness - we 
shall probably be pretty near the truth.
At all events, the Tien-wang passionately refused to 
entertain the only plan by which the existence of the Ti-ping 
power, and the perpetuation of his dynasty, seemed possible.
All the court officers, cabinet ministers, and other high 
authorities of NankJln, we re blindly subservient to the will 
of their king, and equally infatuated with his religious and 
temporal command* Besides, many of those about him were of 
the Hung family, and, being nearly related to their chief, 
not only followed him implicitly, but formed themselves into 
a clique about him, to the prejudice and exclusion of other 
more capable and independent officers.
See Lin-Le; Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.772-3.
This would seem to be a fair judgement, though in recent discussions 
about Li Hsiu-ch’eng in China, in which there has been a marked 
tendency to denigrate everything he ever did, the view that Hung 
Hsiu-ch’iian was in any way to blame or that Li Hsiu-ch'eng had the 
interests of the Taiping movement at heart, has been questioned; 
see, for instance, Yu Ming-hsia: Kuan-yu Li Hsiu-ch'eng ti chan- 
chi p'ing-chia wen-t'i in Li-shih Yen-ohiu No.2 pp.38-40.
7. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to read 'great anger'.
8. Tseng Kuo-fan changed *Chiu-shuaif (A ) to 'General Tseng’
( t^ ) .
9. See note 4 to page 194*
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Notes to Page 222.
1. Read Ch1 i-weng-ch1 iao (>6 see note 5 to p*151*
2. In the original the first character being illegible.
The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has - 'the grain routes
were already cut.*
3. Omitted in Lu Chi-i's copy.
4. Hung Hsiu-ch'iian considered himself to be the younger brother 
of Jesus.
5. Left blank by Li Hsiu-ch'eng; Tseng Kuo-fan added the character
- 1 imp' or 1 demon *.
6. Hung Jen-ta was formerly the Pu Wang, later his title was changed 
to Yung Wang.
7. See note 2 to page 178•
8. For read^x. .
Notes to Page 223.
1. Li Hsiu-ch'eng omitted the character ^  .
2. Omitted in Lii Chi-i's copy.
3. For 4k read 4k .
4. New Year's Day for the 14th Year by the Taiping calendar was on
2 February 1864 (TC3/1/5)*
5. ForfI. \ja readt&asfc.
6. Notes 7, 8, 9 to page 196 give information on some of the previous 
activities of Tso Tsung-t'ang. He was sent with his army into
Chekiang from southern Anhwei in the middle of February 1862 in 
order to clear the province. His immediate task however, was to 
prevent the Taipings in Chekiang from coming to the relief of
Nanking, which Tseng Kuo-fan was then planning to besiege. Direct
confrontation with Li Shih-hsien's armies began early in March. By 
April Tso Tsung-t'ang was firmly' established in Cliu-chou, the base
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from which he intended to advance into the rest of Chekiang.
Fighting near Lung-yu began about 8 June, when Li Shih-hsien with­
drew to Chin-hua. Failing to attack effectively in Tso' s rear 
(at Sui-an), Li Shih-hsien then prepared for a long campaign and 
concentrated his troops in the region of Chin-hua, Lan-chi, Lung-yu 
and Wu-i. Tso Tsung-tfang attacked Lung-yu from 11 August onwards, 
but by the end of September had still not advanced further west 
than Ch'ii-chou. Afterwards, two events changed the situation- 
considerably: first, Li Shih-hsien left for Nanking on 6 October
(he had been summoned to the relief of the capital several months 
earlier, but had postponed his departure in order to deal with 
Tso Tsung-t'ang), and secondly, Tso Tsung-t'ang received a reinforce­
ment of 8,000 Hunan Army troops from Kwangsi. As a result of this, 
the balance of strength changed and the Taipings had to withdraw 
from Lung-yu on 2 March 1863 (TC2/1/12) and from Chin-hua, Wu-i 
and Wu-k'ang on the following day. See Chien: Ch'uan-shih pp.2101-2.
7. See above, page 200.
8. At Ning-po Consul Harvey complained with increasing bitterness 
of 'the withering and blighting institutions of Tae-pingdom'.
But from the beginning to the end of the Taiping occupation of 
Ning-po his reports are full of contradictory statements, and it 
is difficult to take seriously his earnest denials that he was 
prejudiced. (This point is well made in Lin-Le: Ti-ping Tien-kwoh 
pp.522-525). Until the middle of April however, an uneasy 
tranquility prevailed. Then, on 22 April, Commander Craigie of the 
'Ringdove', the senior British naval officer at Ning-po, complained 
that,
a little after 10 o'clock I heard a rifle shot fired from the 
wall abreast of the ship, and on using a glass observed three 
or four men armed with fire-arms, who took deliberate aim from 
the top of the wall and fired at the ship, one bullet falling 
close to the ship and another passing over her.
(See B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China 1862, 
p.44). To this complaint the Taiping commander, Huang Ch'en-chung 
replied on the same day that,
The conduct of those persons who fired on your ship, with 
the evident intention and desire of bringing about a breach 
in the friendly relations at present existing between our 
respective countries is detestable in the last degree...
On forwarding you this reply, I beg to assure you that, as 
soon as I have discovered the offenders, I will punish them 
very severely. I hope, then, that you will think no more 
about the matter.
(ibid.). On receiving news of this incident, and before waiting
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for a reply from the Taiping commander, Sir James Hope sent 
Captain Roderick Dew in the 'Encounter1 from Shanghai with 
instructions to answer the Taipings in a manner which can only 
he described as exceedingly arrogant and bellicose (ibid.pp.44>
45).
Dew arrived at Ning-po on 27 Arpil, and not considering 
the Taiping reply of the 22nd. (quoted above)as an adequate 
apology, addressed a communication to the Taiping commander 
demanding an ample apology and the removal of a battery fin 
the course of construction at a point outside the city wall,... 
[which] may be for the ptirpose of repelling attack on the city, 
but...will be equally ready to open fire on the foreign 
settlement, which it commands1. (ibid. p.46).
On the same day however, Dew received from Craigie two 
communications from the Taipings, one of which explained that 
the two bullets which had missed the 'Ringdove1 were due to 
an accidental discharge whilst firing a salute. To these 
letters Dew replied:
Doth these [communications] are so satisfactory, and 
tend so much to impress on us your wish to maintain 
friendly relations with the English and French, that 
we beg to inform you that we shall not insist on the 
demolition of the battery at the point, but we still 
do [insist] that you remove the guns, as the same 
lawless soldiers who fire musket-balls at us, may fire the 
great guns».*
The letter ends by stating that,
If any shots are fired from the walls on our ships, I 
shall immediately give orders to knock down with shell 
the portion whence the shots issued; but you will not 
look on this as an act of hostility, but rather as a 
punishment of those lawless men who provoke the attack, (p.48) 
A Taiping letter, also dated 27 April, though not in reply 
to the above, quoted the instructions the Taiping commanders 
had received from the T'ien Wang, that
...friendly relations having been concluded (between 
the respective countries), you must in every matter 
make a point of being respectful in your deportment 
(towards foreigners), and must not lose sight of good 
faith and right principles. Let their trade continue as 
formerly, but the people must revert to our rule (lit. 
it is our dynasty which must give peace and consolation 
to the people). Respect this! (ibid.p.47)- 
The Taiping leaders replied with some dignity to Dew's threats, 
though Harvey thought that 'the tenour of their letters was as 
bad and sarcastic as it was defiant1, (ibid.p.58). They wrote: 
With regard to that part of your letter having 
reference to a probable outbreak of hostilities (we
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would inform you) that we are not in the least degree 
concerned thereat, (lit. we are not apprehensive, nor 
do we take offence thereat); we could not bear to break 
the oath of friendship we have sworn. We cannot remove 
the fort or the guns; should you proceed yourselves to 
remove the same, then it is evident that you have the 
intention of quarrelling with us. You can if you please 
lead on your soldiers against this city; you can if 
you please attack us; we shall stand quietly on the 
defensive (lit. we shall await the battle with hand in 
the suff; i.e. we shall not strike the first blow). We 
shall certainly let you take the initiative before we 
commence operations against, and try conclusions (orig. 
Text, determine which is the male and which is the female 
bird) with you. (ibid.pp.46-47) •
This was not at all well-received. Harvey wrote,
...perhaps the most objectionably and inadmissible 
passage, and one showing particularly the animus of 
these men, was that having reference to this settlement, 
whieh they declared was theirs and not ours...
On receiving these plain and palpable intimations of 
bad faith and feelings towards us from the Tae-ping 
Chiefs, Captain hew thought it prudent to order at once 
all foreign ships to move down two miles below the usual 
anchorage, as a measure both of precaution and necessity; 
for, after the above declaration, it was really impossible 
to judge, or to tell, when we might not be attacked on 
our "concession1’, (ibid. p.36,Harvey to Bruce).
On 2 May hew wrote again to the Taiping commanders demanding, 
if they wished to avoid a blockade of the port,
1. an ample apology, 2. Removal of all guns from battery 
and walls opposite our ships, 3. That an officer shall 
be speedily appointed, and the proper measures, by means 
of guards, shall be taken to prevent anybody whatever 
coming on the wall opposite the ships or into the 
battery, (ibid. p.49)*
The Taiping leaders replied on 3 May to the effect that they 
had been unable to find the acthal offenders who had fired the 
two bullets, but that everyone had been cautioned. They wrote 
that the guns in the battery were meant for protection and 
would not be fired unless the Taipings were attacked by govern­
ment troops, but that,
under the circumstances stated by you, we agree to 
stop up the port-holes of all the guns bearing on 
Keang-pih-gau [the foreign settlement], and to remove 
all the shot and powder from thence, so as to manifest 
to you our desire for lasting amity.
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They pointed out that strict control was exercised and that 
no one but the men in charge of the guns was allowed on the 
walls (ibid.p.49)*
In this atmosphere of increasing tension, Consul Harvey 
received a request from the former Prefect of Ning-po, Chang 
Ching-ch’u, for British and French assistance as he was about 
to attack Ning-po.
This extraordinary, but fortunate coincidence, occurring 
just at the point when our correspondence with the Chiefs 
had become as angry as it could well be without our 
actually coming to blows, was deemed by us far too good 
an opportunity to be thrown aside and lost, as it might, 
by strengthening our hands, enable us to obtain our 
just demands, without being compelled to resort to force. 
(ibid.p.38t Harvey to Bruce).
When Chang Ching-ch’u visited the ’Encounter* on 6 May, he was 
informed by Dew that "in consequence of the rebels refusing 
certain demands we had made, I should have no objection to 
their passing up [the river to attack Ning-po], but that they 
were not to open fire till well clear of our men-of-war". 
(ibid. p.50). On 8 May therefore "about thirty heavy Imperial 
junks moved up to witftin two miles of the settlement", and 
Dew sent a final communication to the Taiping leaders:
This is to inform you, on the part of the English and 
French Senior Naval Officers, that had you agreed to 
their demands, and removed your guns from the walls, 
they should have felt bound in honour to have acted 
up to their promise, and have prevented an attack on you 
on the Settlement side by the Imperial forces, which in 
counties numbers and heavy-armed ships advance to attack 
you.
We now inform you that we maintain perfect neutrality, 
but if you fire the guns or muskets from the battery or 
walls opposite the Settlement, on the advancing Imperial­
ists, thereby endangering the lives of our men and people 
in the foreign Settlement, we shall then feel it our 
duty to return the fire, and bombard the city.
We would implore you, as your cause is hopeless, to 
leave Ning-po, thereby preventing much effusion of blood 
on both sides, more expecially of the harmless tillers 
of the soil, who on the one hand will lose their heads 
if they are not shaved, and on the other will lose them 
if they are shaved, (ibid. p.51).
Since the battery in question commanded both the Settlement,
’ and the reach of the river up which the Imperialists would 
have to advance1, (Wilson: The ’Ever Victorious Army* pp.97-S) 
the Taipings could not defend themselves from attack without
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firing ’guns or muskets from the battery or walls opposite 
the Settlement *.
A little before 10 oTclock on the morning of the 10th 
instant [May], a volley of musketry having been fired 
by the rebels from the city walls upon Her Majesty’s 
ship ’Encounter,’ anchored under those walls, the 
signal to clear for action was immediately given to 
all the ships, English and French, in the river, and 
a general bombardment of the city of Ning-po was there­
upon commenced. Shot and shell were poured into this 
large city, with very little intermission, for a period 
of five hours, by the combined fleet, at the end of 
which time the walls were scaled, and the Tae-ping 
forces were at once completely routed and dispersed, 
and entirely driven out of Ningpo. (ibid.p.39 Harvey 
to Bruce).
The government troops played a passive role in the operation 
until the British and French had smashed the defences of the 
town,
Apak [the ex-pirate Pu Hsing-yu] and Chang [Ching-ch’u], 
with their Imperialist war-junks, let down their anchors 
at the first shot, being satisfied with the honour of 
opening the ball. As the running spring-tide effectually 
prevented them coming up the river, the Kestrel was sent 
to tow them up; but this aid the steadily declined, 
urging paltry excuses, such as having no powder. (See 
Wilson: The ’Ever-Victorious Army’ p.99)*
9« Yii-yao was attacked at the end of July by a force consisting 
of the British gun-boat ’Hardy’, forty men from the 
’Encounter*, five hundred men of the E.V.A., the French steamer 
’Confucius’, four hundred members of the Franco-Chinese force, 
and fifteen hundred Cantonese ’braves* in a dozen armed junks 
which had been fitted out bu citizens of Ning-po. This force 
succeeded in taking the town on 3 August 1862, having suffered 
considerable losses, on the previous day. It was then garrisoned 
by the E.V.A. and the Franco-Chinese force; see Wilson: The 
’Ever-Victorious Army* pp. 105-107, and B.P.P. Further Papers 
Relating to the Rebellion in China. Harvey to Bruce p. 124.
The Taipings withdrew from Ch*eng-hsien on 26 November.
10. Shao-hsing was attacked towards the end of January 1863
by Le Brethon and a detachment of the Franco-Chinese force. 
Le Brethon, a French officer, was killed by an exploding gun* 
After this Dew sent some units of the Anglo-Chinese force which, 
on 19 February, suceeded in breaching the wall of the tom.
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But the attack was beaten off and the breach repaired during 
the night. The siege continued until 18 March, when the Taipings 
withdrew. See Wilson: The 1 Ever-Victorious Army* pp, 116-120.
Notes to Page 224.
1. ’Much money* was added in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition, It was 
usual at this time for the E*V.A. to receive between £15»000
and £20,000 for each city they captured, the sum being agreed in 
advance; see Wilson: The 1 Ever-Vic torious Army * p*129. This would 
be equivalent to 45>000 to 60,000 taels,
Foreign mercenaries were not involved in the capture of Ning- 
po. Only after the town had been taken did 400 men of the E*V.A. 
arrive from Shanghai to guard the gates. They did not remain 
long because *the temptation to squeeze the Chinese going in and 
out of the city was too great for Ward*s men, and sometimes even 
for his officers, to resist and at last French and English men-of- 
war*s men were placed at the gates, ibid* p*104. After the 
capture of Ning-po a force of 1,000 ’disciplined Chinese* was 
raised, ’the higher officers receiving £1,800 and £1,000 a year 
and the captains £100, which was an inducement to respectable men, 
and even to English officers, to serve1, ibid* p*114. The Franco- 
Chinese force was raised at the same time, with instructors from 
Shanghai.
2. Tseng Kuo-fan changed the character * * (embezzled) to 1 ^  ’
(had plenty of...).
3. The Taipings lost Chin-hua on 2 Maroh I863 (TC2/1/13); Lung-yu 
on 1 March; Yen-chou on 2 January IQ63. In the prefecture of
Wen-chou, the prefectural town, Yung-chia was never occupied by 
the Taipings (see note 11 to page 199), Lo-ch’ing-hsien was held 
by the Taipings from 8 March 1862 to 17 May I863, P 1 ing-yang-hsien 
from 4 January 1862 to 1 February 1862, and Yii-huan-hsien from 14 
December 1861 to 15 December.
In T*ai-chou Prefecture, the prefectural town, Lin-hai, was given 
up by the Taipings on 8 May 1862 (TCl/4/10), Hai-yen, Ning-hai, 
T'ai-p*ing and Hsien-chd were all lost in the first part of May 
1862. See Anon: T*ai-p1 ing-chun k*e-fu Che-chiang ke hsien ;]ih-piao.
4. Tso Tsung-t*ang attacked Fu-yang from 24 March 1862 to 20 
September 1862.
5. Fu-yang was finally taken on 20 September 1862 with the help of
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the Franco-Chinese force under Lieutenant de Vaisseau D* 
Aiguibelle; see Chien: Ch1uan-shih pp.2109-2X10 (Vol.III). Tso 
Tsung—t *ang* s memorial reporting the capture does not mention 
foreign assistance, see Fang-lueh ch.352 pp.l5b-18b.
6. Hsiao-shan was recovered by government forces on 20 March 1863 •
7. The character 1 * in the original is changed to f in the
Chiu Ju T*ang Edition.
Notes to Page 225*
1. Wang Hai-yang was formerly one of Shih Ta-kfaifs commanders.
He deserted Shih in Kwangsi in the autumn of 1859 and joined
Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s command; see note 6 to page 199. He was made 
Kkng Wang after the second capture of Hang-chou by the Taipings.
After the fall of Hang-chou Wang Hai-yang went north into Anhwei 
and then into Kiangsi. After the fe.ll of Nanking in 1864 he 
campaigned in Kiangsi and Kwangtung, where he was eventually 
killed on 1 February 1866, at Chia-ying. See Lo: Shih-kao pp.420-2
2. In the Chiu Ju T’ang Edition this was changed to read: ’Then 
the [Kiang]-su troops took the [foreign] devil soldiers to
attack.,,1
3.' Cha-p’u on 22 December 1863, P’ing-hu on 18 December and Chia-shan 
on 7 January 1864.
4. Su-chou on 6 December I863 (see below, page 227 )> T*ai-ts*ang 
(Taitsan) on 2 May I863, K’un-shan (Quinsan) on 31 May and
Wu-chiang on 29 July.
5. Omitted in Lii Chi-i’s copy.
6. Ward was killed on 22 September 1862 at Tz’u-ch’i in Chekiang. 
’Colonel* Forrester, his second-in-command, was then offered the
command of the E.V.A., but he refused. Henry Andrea Burge vine, 
an American adventurer, accepted. Burgevine however, did not get 
on with Li Hung-chang, who applied to Brigadier-General Staveley 
to have him removed and replaced by a British officer. This was 
not possible at the time because Staveley was -unwilling to intervene, 
and in any case, British officers were not allowed to serve under 
the Emperor of China as long as Britain maintained a policy of 
neutrality. A crisis blew up in January I863. The banker of the 
E.V.A., Yang Fang (called Ta-kee, see note 9 to page 188), prevar­
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icated about the payment of money due, and Burgevine broke into 
his house, slapped Yang Fang’s face and took the money. Li Hung- 
changd then dismissed Burgevine, and Captain Holland R.M. of 
Staveley*s staff was put in temporary command. Staveley recommended 
Captain C.G.Gordon R.E. to permanent command, on conditions that 
the British government would agree. Permission arrived in February 
I863 and Gordon assumed command of the E.V.A. on 24 March. See 
Wilson: The *Ever-Victorious Army’ pp.91-94, 125-126 and Spector:
Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army pp.61-62.
7. On 20 August 1863. Yin-tzu-shan, near Shang-fang-men, southeast 
of Nanking, was the site of one of the great forts established
by Yang Hsiu-ch’ing, who * built forts like toms and dug moats like 
rivers’, see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.19 p.lib. A Taiping force 
under Li Hsiu-ch’eng failed to recover it on 22 August (TC2/7/9)*
8. This sentence is interlinear.
9. This story is confirmed by a report given in a letter from Li
Hung-chang to Tseng Kuo-fan dated TC2/10/11 (21 November 1862).
Li Hung-chang had captured Taiping documents which included a
letter from the Secretary of Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s Board of Revenue 
(Li Sheng-hsiang), to the effect that Li Hsiu-ch’eng had been 
obliged to pay out 70,000 liang of silver before being allowed 
out of Nanking; see Li Hung-chang: P*eng-liao han-kao ch.4 p.20b.
In an earlier letter, dated TC2/6/16, to Tseng Kuo-ch*(ian, Li Hung- 
chang reported the sapture of * several hundred rebel documents *, 
the majority of which were plaintive appeals to Kiangsu and 
Chekiang for money and rice, ibid. ch.3 p.38a.
10. Li Hsiu-ch’eng returned to Su-chou from Nanking on 23 September
I863,
11. Kao-ch’iao-men, East of Nanking, was taken on 3 November I863.
It was one of the few remaining outer defences of the city.
The engagement is described in Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.19 pp.21a- 
22b.
Notes to Page 226.
1. The E.V.A. had at its disposal at one time or another, five or 
six steamers, the most useful of which was the ’Byson1, *.., a 
species of amphibious boat, which possessed the power of moving 
upon land as well as upon water, for she could drive over the bed 
of a creek upon her wheels when there was not sufficient water to
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keep her afloat'; Wilson: The ’Ever-Victorious Army* p.150. The 
next most useful was the firefly1, 502 tons, built in 1854.
Others were the ’Tsatlee* or ’Tsatlow*, under charter from Messrs. 
Russell and Co., the 'Kajow', the ’Cricket*. The ’Firefly’ was 
captured by A.F. Lindley and other foreign sympathizers and handed 
over to the Taipings on 13 November 1863; see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien- 
kwoh p.652ff., the 'Kajow* was also siezed, and the *Gretchen' (a 
silk steamer belonging to a Gernara firm), but these were recovered.
2, Wilson: The ’Ever-Victorious Army' pp.148-9 remarks that, 'Except 
in a few lines, there are no conveniences for transit by land
but narrow footpaths, where people can only go in Indian file; 
but the network of waters affords great facility for the movement 
of boats and small steamers'.
3. Gordon assumed command of the E.V.A. in March I863. After this, 
its first engagement was connected with the relief of Ch’ang-shu
(Chanzu), the Taiping commander of which had gone over to the 
government on 11 January, The Taipings then attacked Ch’ang-shu 
for about two months. The siege was raised \fhen government forces 
and the E.V.A. captured Fu-shan on 5 April (TC2/2/18). Then the 
E.V.A. helped in the recovery of T’ai-ts’ang on 2 May (see Chien: 
Ch'uan-shih III pp.2131-2), but was so demoralized by plunder 
that Gordon ordered the army back to Sung-chiang for reorganization, 
see Wilson: The 'EYer-Viotorious Army1 p.158.
The next operation was an attack on K'un-shan (Quinsan), '... a 
place of immense importance, being the key to Soochow, and a point 
the possession of which would completely protect both Sungkiang 
and Taitsan', (ibid). The attack on K ’un-shan was begun on 18 
May by detachments of Li Hung-chang’s troops under Ch’eng Hsiieh- 
ch’i (’General Ching'), who had formerly been a Taiping (see Hummel; 
Eminent Chinese pp.115-6), and the E.V.A. After several attempts 
to break the defences of K ’un-shan, Gordon cut the town’s communic­
ations with Su-chou by using the steamer ’Hyson' to take the town 
of Cheng-i (Chunye). K ’un-shan fell on 1 June. The Taipings had 
an arsenal there, run by two Englishmen, (See Wilson, p.163).
Li Hung-chang's plan was for an attack on Su-chou by three 
columns, the south column to attack Wu-chiang (Wokong) and P'ing- 
wang, thereby cutting Su-chou’s communications with Chekiang. The 
centre column (under Ch*eng Hsueh-ch’i) would make a direct attack 
on Su-chou from K'un*— shan; the north column would move on Chiang- 
yin (Kongyin) and Wu-hsi (Wusieh) from Ch'ang-shu to prevent relief 
from coming from Nanking; see Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.3 p.55. 
(J.C.Cheng: Chinese Sources for the Taiping Rebellion 1850-1864,
Hong Kong 1963, P*117 has a translation of the relevant passage).
Gordon's plan was to attack Su-chou by water, *...to isolate it 
from all possible assistance, to cut off and master all its 
communications and approaches. Ten miles south of it lies Kahpoo
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[Cha-p'u], where the rebels had two strong forts. These it was 
of especial importance to take; first, because they secured a 
good junction between the Grand Canal and the Taho [T’ai Hu], a 
lake some fifty miles across; and next, because they commanded the 
direct road from Soochow to the Tai-ping cities of the south. At 
Kahpoo, therefore, and at Wokong [Wu-chiang], three miles south 
of Hakpoo, and like it a key to the rebel positions, did Gordon 
resolve to strike a first blow.1 See Hake: The Story of Chinese 
Gordon pp.91-2. Cha-pfu was taken on 28 July, and Wu-chiang on 
the following day.
Taiping operations north of Su-chou failed because of dissension 
amongst the commanders (Li Shih-hsien, Lin Shao-chang, Ch'en K ’un- 
shu and Huang Tzu-lung),,who ceased to co-operate after 23 July; 
see Chien: Ch’uan-shih III p.2137, allowing Li Hung-chang to take 
Chiang-yin on 13 September and attack Wu-hsi.
On 28 September the E.V.A. took Pao-tai-ch'iao (Patachiaou), 
south of Su-chou, destroying by mistake twenty-six of the fifty- 
three arches of the bridge there; see Hake: The Story of Chinese 
Gordon p.104.
The bitterest fighting of the campaign took place outside the 
Lou Gate (Low Mun) of Su-chou, where on 27 November the E.V.A. 
suffered considerable losses attacking the Taiping forts and outer 
defences; they nevertheless succeeded in taking them the following 
day. After this there was little further fighting, and the city 
was taken by other means, see below.
4. According to Wilson: The 'Ever-Victorious Army* p. 187, Li Hsiu- 
ch*eng ’had 18,000 men stationed at Mahtanchiao [Ma-t’ang-ch’iao],
a place situated between Wusieh [Wu-hsi] and Soochow, and from which 
he could assist either city, and could also attack on the flank any 
advance made by the Imperialists on the Grand Canal, the only great 
water and road line of communication left to the Tai-pings'.
5. Gordon wrote of T'an Shao-kuang:
MOH WANG or Tan Shao-wang [sic], a native of Kwangsi, was 
thiry five years old when assassinated on 4th December, I863.
Of middle size, he was considered the most astute of all in 
Soochow, and though merciless to his Chinese followers, he 
was forbearing with foreigners; on one occasion when abused 
by Burgevine he took no notice of it (and continued to treat 
him well). Of an active disposition, he devoted all his 
energies to the defence of the city, and though disliked by 
Chung Wang, was much trusted by him. He was disliked by most 
of the other wangs for his harshness to their men and favouring 
those of his own province. (From a manuscript in the Gordon 
Papers, now in the British Museum).
According to Lo Erh-kang (Chien-cheng p.300), T'an was a native of 
Chin-t*ien.
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6. Gordon1 s notes on Kao Yung-k'uan (or Yiin-k1 uan), Wang An-
chun not ), and Chou Wen-chia (H) iL'ii not )
are as follows:
LAN WANG [Na Wang], whose family name was Kou Yuen-kuon [sic], 
a native of Hupeh, was thirty three years old at the time of 
his death in December, 186J, and had been a rebel for eleven 
years, and a Wang for three years, having command of fifty 
thousand men. He was about 5ft, 8in. high, had an olive 
complexion, a small black moustache, a very quiet, pleasing 
manner, and was always very polite,
KONG WANG [K ’ang Wang] or Wan Nan-tuen [sic], a native of 
Hupeh, was a Hebei for eleven years and a Wang for one year 
when executed at Soochow, aged twenty eight. A short, good 
looking man, but with a cast in his eye and a somewhat sinister 
expression, he was an opium smoker. With Sing [Ning] and Tai 
[?] Wangs he had a great share in the defection of Lar [Na]
Wang. These three had been disappointed in not rising to 
higher rank, thought they were neglected, and expected to 
become great men by passing over to the Imperialist side. Kong 
[ K1 ang I Wang] had been sent away from Nanking not long before 
his death, on account of fighting between his men and those of 
Kan Wang, the second in command at Nanking, who got a letter 
from the Tien Wang degrading Kong, though this was not put 
into force,
SING [Ning] WANG, or Che Wang-cha [sic], a native of Honan, 
was thirty five years old, when beheaded at Soochow, and had 
been twelve years a Hebei and one year a Wang, with the command 
of ten thousand men. A tall thin man with a rolling gait, he 
had a dreadful squint, which caused him to be known as Cockeye. 
He did not have the usual Chinese manners, for he talked in a 
loud voice, gesticulated a good deal, and seemed a harum-scarum 
sort of fellow. He was a very good leader, defended Shoahing 
[Shao-hsing] in Chekiang for three months, and when allusion 
was made to this, used to say that without foreign aid the 
Imperialists would never have won it,
(See Gordon Papers in the British Museum).
7. The eighth Taiping leader who surrendered at Su-chou, not 
mentioned by Li Hsiu-ch'eng, was the Pi Wang Wu Kuei-wen
(J£.;& see Lo: Chien-cheng p.300.
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Notes to Page 227*
1. Omitted in the Chiu Ju T’ang Edition and overlooked by Lu Chi-i.
2* The circumstances of this event were as follows: On 28 November
Ch*eng Hsueh-ch’i informed Gordon that certain Taiping leaders 
in Su-chou were willing to change their allegiance and give up 
the city. The negotiations had been started by Wang An-chtin, who 
had secretly met Ch’eng Hsueh-ch’i outside the city. It was agreed 
that when the Government troops and the E.V.A, attacked on the 
following day, and T’an Shao-kuang made a sortie, the gates would 
be closed to prevent his return and the city given up. This plan 
failed because Li Hsiu-ch’eng returned to Su-chou that night. On 
2 December, at Ch’eng Hsiieh-ch’i’s insistence, Gordon met Kao 
Yung-k*uan and told him that he should give up a gate, fight, or 
else vacate the city, but that neutrality was not enough because 
Gordon would not be able to prevent his troops from looting indis­
criminately once they entered the city. The following day Kao 
Yung-k*uan sent a message to Ch’eng Hsueh-ch’i and Gordon saying 
that the other commanders had agreed to surrender, that he himself 
only wanted to go home with his possessions, but that some of the 
others wanted to get commands of various kinds. At this time, 
according to Gordon, the arrangement was that T’an Shao-kuang was 
to be induced to go up on to the wall of the city, and from there 
he would be thrown down and handed over to Gordon as a prisoner*
But in the afternoon of 4 December, after a meal in his palace 
with the various commanders, T’an Shao-kuang in speaking to them, 
seems to have commented unfavourably on the loyalty of men from 
other provinces compared with that of the men of Kwangtung and 
Kwangsi. In the altercation which followed Wang An-chiin stabbed 
T’an Shao-kuang, who was then decapitated.
Gordon, having obtained a promise of one month’s extra pay for 
his men as compensation for being excluded from the looting of the 
city, ordered the E.V.A. back to K’un-shan, its headquarters; but 
himself remained at Su-chou. At about noon on 6 December, the 
eight Taiping leaders came out of the city to call on Li Hung- 
chang before giving up the city. Once in the Ch’ing camp they 
v/ere summarily executed. Gordon eventually discovered this and 
obtained custody of Kao Yung-k ’uan's son (or adopted son), a boy 
of eighteen, and, according to Gordon’s account, at the boy’s 
request, Kao Yung-k*uan*s head. Gordon then wrote to Li Hung- 
chang in a state of something near to hysteria, telling him that 
he should at once resign his post as Governor of Kiangsu and hand 
over his seals of office to Gordon until an Imperial edict arrived. 
Failing this the E.V.A. would take the field against him and 
restore to the Taipings all the places it had captured from them.
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With some difficulty Gordon was finally mollified, a process 
in which Robert Hart played an important part; but it was about 
two months before he was willing to take the field at the head 
of the E.V.A. again.
Long accounts of this affair are to be found in the following 
works: Lin-le: Ti-Ping Tien-kwoh pp.710-742 (which gives in full 
Gordonfs report and some newspaper accounts, and is strongly 
critical of Gordon); Hake: The Story of Chinese Gordon, pp.124-158; 
Wilson: The * Ever-Victorious Army1 pp. 195-208; D.C.Boulger; The 
Life of Sir Halliday Macartney K.C.M.G., London 1908 pp.92-122.
Li Hung-chang1s version of the affair and its aftermath may be 
found in his memorials and letters, the relevant pagsages of which 
are translated in Cheng: Chinese Sources for the Taiping Rebellion 
pp. 124-132. Other Chinese sources do not add very much to our 
understanding of the affair; some explain Gordon’s anger by 
attributing it to Li Hung-chang’s refusal to allow the E.V.A. to 
take part in the looting of Su-chou; see Shen Tzu: ?i-k*ou .jih-chi 
pp.285-6; Anon: ?fing-tsei ohi-lueh p.322; Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi 
PP.303, 505.
Li Iiung-chang’s ruthless action was undoubtedly motivated in 
part by fear of the power of these Taiping leaders if they were 
allowed to surrender and keep their military forces intact. Chfeng 
Hsiieh-ch’i, himself an ex-Taiping, may well have been determined 
to see the removal of powerful potential rivals.
3* Li Hung-chang admitted this in a latter to Tseng Kuo-fan.
’Since the execution of the rebel leaders after the recovery 
of Su-fchou] and [Wu]-hsi, the Yiieh rebels fight to the death with 
no thought of surrender. The rebel Hu [Wang, Ch’en K*un-shu] at 
Ch’ang-chou long wanted to surrender, but now he has assembled 
fierce confederates from Kwangtung and holds desperately on to the 
town*. See Li Hung-chang: P ’eng-liao han-kao ch.4 p.29b. At Wu- 
hsi the Taiping commander Huang Tzu-lung’s resistance was said to 
have been stiffened by the fate of the surrendered Taipings of 
Su-chou; see Anon: P ’ing-tsei chi-ltieh p. 383*
4. According to Tseng Kuo-fan (Tsou-kao ch.19 p.28a), when Su-chou
fell, Li Hsiu-ch’eng escaped with ’several myriad* of troops,
which he stationed at Tan-yang, Chu-jung, Lung-t’an and Shih-pu- 
ch’iao. Li Hung-chang in his memorial announcing the capture of 
Su-chou, reported that Li Hsiu-ch’eng left the city on 6 December 
on seeing the failure of morale, with ’over ten thousand of his 
troops’. See Li Hung-chang: Tsou-kao ch.5 p. 15b. But in a letter,
according to Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.303, Li Hung-chang had written
that *Li Hsiu-ch’eng left the city with no more than several 
thousand crack troops’.
5. Wu-hsi was under attack by government forces from 24 September
po
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I865 (TC2/8/12) until 12 December (TC2/11/2), when it fell.
According to A.P.Lindley, the Taipings abandoned the town because 
it was untenable after the loss of Su-chou and other places; see 
Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh p.677* According to another account, 
ten thousand Taipings surrendered or dispersed during the siege, 
and about a thousand were killed. There was considerable looting 
and destruction after the capture of the town by the government 
forces: 'When the town was recaptured seven or eight out of ten of 
the houses were still standing, but half of them were burned when 
the government troops recovered the town, and only two out of ten 
remain.1 See Anon: P'ing-tsei chi-lueh pp.505« 306. See also 
Hua I-lun: Hsi Chin t*uan-lien shih-mo chi p. 129 in T'ai-p'ing 
T'ien-kuo tzu-liao.
6. The implication here is that Li Shih-hsien suggested that they
desert the Taipings and take independent action, like Shih Ta-kfai.
Notes to Page 228.
1. ■% in the original.
2. Tseng Kuo-fan added in the margin here, 'This was in the 11th.
Month of the 13th. Year1, that is, between 13 December and
12 January 1864* According to Tseng's memorial of TC2/ll/27» Li 
Hsiu-ch'eng entered Nanking from Tan-yang on 20 December (TC2/11/10) 
\d.th several hundred cavalry; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.19 p. 
28a.
5. See note 6 to page 221.
4* Li Hsiu-ch'eng did apparently leave Nanking briefly; he was 
reported to have led an attack on Pen-niu-chen from Chin-t'an
and Li-yang on 15 January (TC2/12/7) in an attempt to relieve
Ch?ang-chou; see Kuo: Jih-chih p. 1044.
5. Ch'ang-chou came under direct attack from government forces on 
25 December I863 (TC2/11/15)* At this time the E.V.A. was in 
K*un-shan, pending the settlement of the political questions 
arising out of the Su-chou incident (see note 2 to page227 , above). 
Gordon was eventually persuaded to take the field again, after Li 
Hung-chang had issued a public statement absolving him from any 
responsibility for the execution of the Taiping wangs. (The circum­
stances are related in detail in Hake: The Story of Chinese Gordon 
pp.151-170 and in other biographies of Gordon). Gordon visited Li
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Hung-chang on 2 February 1864 and discussed the future operations 
of the E.V.A. It was decided that its main role would be to help 
to cut the communications between Nanking and Chekiang by attacking 
the towns of I-hsing (Yesing) and Li-yang to the west of T'ai Hu.
On 19 February the E.V.A. set out from K'un-shan to I-hsing by way 
of Wu-hsi. I-hsing had been under attack by government troops 
since January, without much effect. The E.V.A. arrived on 27 
February and by attacking Taiping positions outside the town made 
the garrison withdraw on 2 March (TC3/1/24). On 4 March the E.V.A. 
moved against Li-yang, where 15,000 Taipings surrendered and gave 
up the town on 8 March (TC3/1/24)*
During this time Ch'ang-chou was still being besieged. In the 
middle of March, other attempts to raise the siege having failed, 
the Taipings launched an attack on Ch' ang-shu (15 March) and took 
Fu-shan (18 March), turning the flank of the government forces 
attacking Ch'ang-chou. This made Li Hung-chang send for Gordon 
and the E.V.A., who had been attacking Chin-t'an since 15 March.
But Gordon did not dare to leave Chin-t'an lest the Taipings took 
heart, and launched a hasty attack in which his army was repulsed 
with considerable losses and Gordon himself was shot through the 
leg. On 24 March the E.V.A. was at Li-yang, from which Gordon 
left for Wu-hsi with a force of about 1,000, thence to the relief 
of Chiang-yin and Ch*ang-shu, which were threatened by the Taiping 
diversion intended to relieve pressure on Ch'ang-chou. At Hua-shu 
(Waisoo) on 31 March the E.V.A. was severely defeated and routed 
with considerable loss; but on 12 April it was able to inflict 
a defeat on the Taipings between Chiang-yin and Ch'ang-shu, after 
which Gordon joined up with the numerous government forces attacking 
Ch'ang-chou. The town fell on 11 May (TC3/4/6).
Lindley's account, based on contemporary China-coast newspapers, 
(he had left China by this time), confirms that the Taiping garrison 
fought virtually to the last man, and that the populace, numbering 
about 12,000 was massacred; see Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-Kwoh pp.757-6*
Li Hung-chang however, reported in his memorial that when his 
troops entered the town they found that there were so many rebels 
that it was not possible to execute them all; pardon was promised 
to all who prostrated themselves and gave up their arms, and sixty 
or seventy thousand rebels of all ages surrendered; see Li Hung- 
chang; Tsou-kao ch.6 p.46b. Hake; The Story of Chinese Gordon p.192, 
says, 'The garrison was 20,000 strong. The slaughter was proport­
ionately great.' Wilson; The 'Ever-Victorious Army1 p.240 says that 
only 1,500 men of the garrison of 20,000 were killed after the 
capture of the town.
After this, partly because most of Kiangsu except Nanking was now 
clear of Taipings and the Tseng brothers did not want any help in 
their siege, and partly because the withdrawal by the British govern­
ment of the Order in Council permitting British officers to serve
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under the Emperor of China, it was decided to disband the. E.V.A.
This was done in May 1864 at K'un-shan, (ibid. pp.241-2).
(This note is based on the sources cited above, and on Chien:
Ch1 iian-shih III pp.2166-2179)•
6. Tan-yang was abandoned by the Taipings on 13 May 1864 (TC3/4/8).
7. Chia-hsing was taken by Ch'eng Hsiieh-ch'i on 25 March 1864 
(TC3/2/13); Ch'eng was wounded at this time and died on 15 April.
8. According to the answer Li Hsiu-ch'eng gave in interrogation 
after his capture, this expedition into Kiangsi was made at his
order with the purpose of collecting grain; see Appendix I page 261, 
and Tseng Kuo-fan: Shu-cha (to Tso Tsung-t'ang) ch. 24 p.4a.
The Taiping advance was made by four columns 
The first, (under T'an Hsing, Li Jen-shou and Li Cheng-yang) 
entered Kiangsi at Yii-shan from Chekiang in March 1864 and took Nan- 
feng on the 26th. Thereafter this column seems to have engaged 
in desultory fighting on both sides of the Kiangsi-Fukien border 
until it disappears from the historical record in the summer of 1864- 
The second column, (under Ch'en Ping-wen, Wang Hai-yang, Chang 
Hsiieh-ming, T'ao Chin-hui and others) moved into southern Anhwei 
after the loss of Hang-chou on 31 March 1864, and into Kiangsi on 
22 April. During the summer, these Taipings were in the region 
immediately south of Po-yang Lake; in August the principal command­
er, Ch'en Ping-wen, surrendered to the government.
The third column, (under Li Shih-hsien, Lu Shun-te, Huang Ch'eng- 
chung and others) crossed into Kiangsi at Yii-shan from K'ai-hua 
(Chekiang) on 29 April, hoping to join up with the first column.
They took I-huang and Ch'ung-jen at the end of May, and then joined 
up with the fourth column.
The fourth column, (under Liu Chao-chiin, Chu Hsing-lung, Huang 
Tsung-pao, Li Jung-fa, Ch'en Ch'eng-ch'i and others) set out from 
Tan-yang on 7 May, and crossed into Kiangsi (Te-hsing) on the 18th. 
After being defeated at I-yang late in May, they joined up with the 
third column. After this the main fighting was in the region of 
Ch'ung-yang.
Because of this new threat to Kiangsi, Tseng Kuo-fan sent Yang 
Yiieh-pin and Pao Ch'ao's army to help clear the province. They 
arrived at Nan-ch'ang on 16 July and won their first victory at 
Hsii-wan (Fu-chou) on 5 August, after the fall of Nanking. See 
Chien: Ch*iian-shih III pp.2205-2209*
Notes to Page 229.
1. Interlinear, According to Li Hung-chang * s letter to Tseng Kuo-
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ch'uan, dated Tc2/6/l6 (31 July I863) in P *eng-llao han-kao ch.3 
p.38a, which was based on captured Taiping documents, Hung Hsiu- 
ch'uan had abdicated in favour of his son, and Li Hsiu-ch'eng had 
been made Commander-in-Chief, over all the other wangs. Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng1 s despatches addressed to Ch'en K !un-shu and to Huang Tzu- 
lung, dated TT13/9/29 (10 November I863) show that he was indeed 
chun-shih (’jj? ) or generalissimo; see TPTK XI pp. 764-5* But
T'ien Ch'ao ohueh-chih oh'eng-wei (TPTK II pp.700-702), written 
in 1862, lists eight chun-shiht including the 'Young Tung Wang*, who 
did not exist; but Hung Jen-kan was certainly a chun-shih (though 
not listed), see TPTK II p.727, so the number was still eight. Of 
them, the Young Hsi Wang, the Young Nan Wang and Hung Jen-kan 
probably took precedent over Li Hsiu-ch'eng. Li Hung-chang was 
therefore wrong in saying that Hsiu-ch'eng had just been made a
chun-shih; but it is probably true that he was in overall command,
in fact if not in theory.
2. This sounds as if Li Hsiu-ch'eng raised a personal army or
bodyguard in the capital, to which he had come with only a small 
force, see note 2 to page 228,
3* Between 13 December I863 and 12 January 1864.
4. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition several words were added, to make 
this sentence read, 'In the capital only the rich and powerful
and the soldiers had anything to eat; the poor...'
5. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote #  JJ , which Tseng Kuo-fan changed to#  , 
literally 'sweet dew'. If Hung Hsiu-ch'uan had biblical precedent
in mind,# VJ| is probably correct, this being the felicitous term 
used by Medhurst and Gutzlaff for 'manna' (Exodus xvi) in their trans­
lation of the Bible, which the Taipings used and partially reprinted. 
However, the Ming Famine Herbal Chiu-huang pen-ts'ao ),
compiled by Chou Ting-wang, lists as an edible root; see Hstt
Kuang-ch'i: Nung-oheng ch'tian-shu (Peking 1956 reprint) Vol.II p.1368. 
Read gives as S. Sieboldi Miq., Chinese artichoke (also called
orj| &  J^)> ®ee Bernard E. Read (with Liu Ju-ch'lang): Chinese 
Medicinal Plants from the 'Pen Tshao Kang Mu* A.D. 1596. Peiping 1937, 
p.289. If f  ^  was known as a famine food, and this is what Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng meant, Hung Hsiu-ch'uan was not so stupid as he thought.
Notes to Page 230*
1. This sentence was overlooked by Lti Chi-i.
2. For -fH-thread %  ; in Tan-yang-hsien, about JO li from Nanking.
Notes to page 230
This was an important point in the supply route of the Taiping 
capital, at which grain was unloaded from boats and transferred 
to Nanking by road. There was a Taiping garrison there to guard 
the grain stores; see Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao (letters 
to Tseng Kuo-ch'iian of TC2/7/3 and TC3/6/I6) ch,4 p.2a and Ch.3 
p.38a (quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng pp.308-9), also Ch'en Nai's 
letter to Tseng Kuo-fan of^C276/19 in Ch'ing Ch'ao kuan-yuan 
shu-tu p.245 in Chien-chi VI.
3. The character %  is missing here.
4. Chao Lieh-wen wrote in his diary on 6 September I863:
I saw two rebel proclamations from the city; one of them 
forbade rumour-mongering and disturbing the morale of the 
troops. It stated that members of officials' families in 
the capital were leaving for other places only in order to 
obtain grain, and that the brethren and sisters were not to 
be alarmed. The other proclamation stated that amongst the 
people in the capital there was inequality of wealth and 
poverty, and that the poor were ordered to come to his 
palace to collect the sum of ten string of cash, [or] two 
tan of rice, as capital for small businesses or grain-shops, 
to be repaid in one year. The proclamations were both in the 
name of the rebel Chung [Wang].
See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.284.
Ch'en Ch'ing-chia, who was in Nanking from May 1862 to Sept­
ember 1863 and wrote a series of poems about his enforced sojourn 
there, refers to the 'false benevolence' of 'the smiling cat Li 
[Hsiu-ch'eng] *, thanks to whom the road leading to the TMmg^chi 
Gate was crowded with people carrying back grain which they had 
bought. In a note, Ch'en Ch'ing-chia remarks that Li Tzu-ch'eng 
[sic] had 'at Hsieh-ch'i [sic, for Chieh-ch'i], Ilu-shu and other 
places, ordered the erection of mat sheds for grain markets, from 
which grain was taken to Nanking as capital for traders, who 
were also given loans of money; see Ch'en Ch'ing-chia: Chin-ling 
chi-shih shih p.404 in Chien-chi VI (quoted by Lo: Chien-cheng 
p.joe)".
After the establishment of the Taiping capital at Nanking no 
commerce was, allowed in the city. This seems to have been firmly 
enforced, and G.J.Wolseley, who visited Nanking in 1861, commented 
that:
It would appear almost as if they wished to abolish 
altogether the use of coin, and reduce society to that 
patriarchal state in which the people receive their daily 
food, clothing, etc., and have all the wants of nature 
supplied by the master under v/hose banner they served.
Such, at least, is the system now in practice within Nankin.
Notes to page 230
There are elevent kings, to one or other of whom every man 
is attached, the name of each man being duly registered at 
the public office, over which his king presides, and from
whom he receives a daily allowance of food No shops
of any sort whatever are permitted within the walls of 
Nankin, There are, however, one or two insignificant 
markets in the ruined suburbs, where a small quantity of 
vegetables and fish are daily exposed for sale.
See G.J.Wolseley: Narrative of the War with China in I860, London 
1862 pp.356-7.
The same year however, the British interpreter R.J.Forrest 
reported that:
We arrived at Nanking soon after an Edict had been passed 
prohibiting trade in the city. The reason given was, that 
as Tien-kiang [ T * ien-ching] was the Imperial residence, it 
should not be disturbed by the clamour of tradesfolk, and 
that bad characters had come in as traders. Fourteen 
unfortunates, who tried to make a little gain in spite of 
the Edict, were at once executed; a brisk trade has con­
sequently sprung up outside the several gates. The market 
at the south gate is particularly busy and crowded, nor are 
there houses enough in the suburbs to meet the demand.
See B.P.P. Correspondence Respecting the Opening of the Yangtze- 
kiang River to Foreign Trade p.28 (Report by ILc. "Forrest of 
Journey from Shanghae to Nanking).
The edict to x^ hieh Forrest refers, was not of course the first 
one prohibiting trade in the city, and was therefore made, one 
must assume, because trade had started in spite of previous orders. 
It is not possible to say how far this prohibition was enforced.
The missionary Lobschied, who visited Nanking in 1863» notes 
fa brisk trade carried on outside the city of Nanking1, but also 
mentioned that in the capital itself *new shops and fine build­
ings were in the course of erection*. See W. Lobschied*s letter 
to the Editor of the Daily Press, Hong Kong, 10 June I863, quoted 
in Lin-Le: Ti-Ping Tien-ICwoh p.602.
Li Ch'un believes that a very considerable trade had grown 
up inside the city during the final years of the Taiping regime, 
and that thousands of people who were let out of Nanking in the 
last year (see page 237) were those who had been dependent on this 
trade; see Li Ch*un: Tlai-pting T*ien-kuo chih-tu ch*u-tTan pp.^ OJj- 
506. If this is so, it would indeed point to a widespread and 
by no means sudden growth of private trade, which would have 
brought Nanking into line with other towns under Taiping control 
as far as this matter was concerned. However, the grounds for 
assuming that all or most of the people released from Nanking 
were small traders seems very flimsy.
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Notes to Page 231.
1. Interlinear*
2* San-ch * a-ho is south of Chu-jung, Lung-tu and Hu-shu are 
southeast of Shang-yuan-hsien, Hsi-ch'i is probably an error 
for Chieh-ch'i; see Lo: Chien-cheng p.309« This must refer to 
events before the summer of 1863, since Hung Ch*un-yuan was 
executed for the loss of Yu-hua-t'ai in June, see note 6 to 
page 166.
3* The character 0<. is added in this sentence by Tseng Kuo-fan 
in place of an illegible character (perhaps ).
4. jj&Mi in the original; Tseng Kuo-fan changed to .
5* This whole deleted passage was overlooked by Lti Chi-i.
Notes to Page 232.
1. Li Hsiu-ch'eng seems to have been mistaken as to the date of 
this new rule, which must in fact have been made in the spring
of 1861. Several Taiping edicts dated after TTll/2/17 (28 March 
1861), have the dedication 1 f.'Ji , see TPTK XI pp.676-686.
Wolseley wrote after a visit to Nanking, *,. .with even the small­
est matters, from 'the Heavenly Palace1 down to the very ink with 
which they write, all are called ^Heavenly,H; see Narrative of 
the War with China, p.344; see also Los Chien-cheng p.312.
2. This is not born out by existing evidence. A relatively large 
number of surviving Taiping documents, eighteen out of fifty four,
dating from the period after the beginning of 1861, do not carry 
this formula. This includes 4 documents emanating from Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng out of a total of ten which are dated. About half of the 
documents under the name of Ch'en Tu-ch'eng have the inscription, 
half do not. The only despatch under the name of Li Shih-hsien which 
survives (in translation only), does not use this formula; see 
B.P.P. Further Papers Relating to the Rebellion in China p.109. For 
other documents, see TPTK II, Shih-liao pp.129-184 and Chin-tai-shih 
tzu-liao No.34 1964 pp.1-6.
3. For %  ^ i.read
4. I have been unable to find any further information on Li Shih-
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hsienfs demotion.
5* i.e. religious arguments.
6. This may have been an attempt to counteract the divisive 
tendencies of the last years of the Taipings, when various 
commanders such as Li Hsiu-ch’eng, Li Shih-hsien, Ch’en K ’un-shu 
and others built up their own spheres of influence at the expense 
of Taiping unity.
Notes to Page 233*
1. In the passage which follows Li Hsiu-ch’eng complained of the 
proliferation of wangs; but he started by saying that the titles 
of the wangs were changed (sL ^  ). This may have some 
connection with the fact that Yang Hsiu-ch* ing had previously 
insisted, according to T*iao-fu tao-jen (pseud.): Chin-ling tsa- 
chi p.645> that there should be no more than the original seven 
wangs, and consequently Ch’in Jih-kang and Hu I-huang’s titles 
were changed from wang to chiieh. The subsequent appointment of 
wangs may have started when these two men’s titles were changed 
back to wang.
2. For Hung Jen-kan’s arrival at Nanking, see note 1 to p* 177•
This sentence was overlooked by Lii Chi-i.
3. See note 1 to page 229•
4. Hung Jen-kan was not the first to be made a wang after the 
internal strife of 1856. Hung Jen-fa and Hung Jen-ta were
given the titles of An Wang and Fu Wang that year, but their 
titles.were later taken away because of discontent at court; 
see Appendix I page 259. Hung Jen-kan arrived at Nanking on 22 
A^pril 1859 (TT9/3/13) and was made Kan Wang on 11 May (TT9/4/1), 
that is, just over half a month later. See Hung Jen-kan: Deposition 
in TPTK II p.846.
5. It is, of course, quite untrue that Hung Jen-kan did not 
produce any plans. The question of his contibution to military
planning is touched upon in note 1 to page 177 * Between 1859 and 
1861 Hung Jen-kan’s works include: Tzu-cheng hsin-pien (^ f ) -
A New Treatise on Aids to Administration, Li-fa-chih hsuan lun 
(<£. ^0^) - A Proclamation on the Enforcement of the Law, Ying-
chieh kuei-chen ) - A Hero’s Return to the Truth, Ch1 in-
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ting chun-tz'u shih-lu - Imperially Approved
Veritable Hecords of Military Campaigns, and Chu-yao chi-wen 
- Proclamation on the Extermination of the Demons. 
Parts of Tzu-cheng hsin-pien are translated in Cheng: Chinese 
Sources for the Taiping Rebellion pp.45~60* Por evaluations of 
Hung Jen-kan!s contribution to the Taiping cause, see Li Ch'un: 
Hung Jen-kan, Shanghai, 1957; Michael: The Taiping Rebellion 
pp. 134-1^6;^So Kwan-wai, E.P.Boardman and Chiu P'ing: Hung Jen- 
kan. Taiping Prime Minister 1839-1864 in Harvard Journal of 
Asian Studies XX (1957) pp.262-294*
6. Omitted in Lu Chi-i*s copy. The sentence is somewhat confuded.
7. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition 
has 'Pi&x '.
8. In the winter of 1859, see pages 173-4*
Motes to Page 234.
1. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to, '[even] observing from outside*.
2. Tseng Kuo-fan changed 'him* to 'the Ch'ing*.
3* i.e. 'Imperial Bodyguards'; there were 72 such officials attached 
to Hung Hsiu-ch'uan*s court; see Li Ch'un: T*ai-P'ing T'ien-kuo 
ohih-tu ch'u-t'an p.134*
4. The original is far from clear; I believe that it is 
the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition has
5* Overlooked by Lu Chi-i. Ma Yu-t'ang had been a Taiping officer;
on 23 October 1861 (HF11/9/20) his treachery enabled Tseng Kuo- 
ch'uan to take Wu-wei. Tseng had been able to contact him through 
his wife, who had been taken prisoner but not harmed, at Anking; 
see Chien: Ch*iian-shih III p. 1907* Ma Yu-t'ang was subsequently 
used by Tseng Kuo-ch'iian to contact Taiping leaders and persuade 
them to surrender; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.307. I do not 
know whether this is the same Ma Yu-t'ang who was given the rank 
of Prefect for work in suppressing bandits in Tibet in February 
1865; see Shih-lu (T'ung-chih) ch.195 P*54*
6. This is at variance with what Li Hsiu-ch'eng had written earlier 
in the deposition (see page 175 ): fIn T'ien-ching my mother and 
wife were held as hostages...' Lo Erh-kang, who has always insisted
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that Li Hsiu-ch'eng deliberately invented or exaggerated his 
disagreements with Hung Hsiu-ch'uan, believes that the second 
version - that Li's family was in P'u-k'ou - is the true one; 
see Lo: Chien-cheng pp. 109-110. His arguments are unconvincing; 
the contradiction might be explained by a mere slip of the pen, 
P'u-k'ou for T'ien-ching, in the second version.
7. See note 7 to page 175*
Notes to Page 235*
1. At the end of 1862 there were not more than about 15 wangs; 
but by the spring of 1863 there were more than 90; see Tseng
Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch. 18 p.9a. Eventually there were more than 
2,700 wangs, according to Huang Wen-ying's Deposition in TPTK II
p.857-
2. Por % ^  read^S ^ .
3. This might perhaps be translated 'other wangs'.
4. This passage, the grammar of which is unclear, was not deleted 
by Tseng Kuo-fan, who wrote beside it, 'Move these words to the
end, where he concludes [the theme]*. This was done in the Chiu 
Ju T'ang Edition.
5. This character was originally a replacement for the surname , 
which was prohibited; see Ch'in-ting ching-pi tzu-yang in
Yin-shu vol.XX. The exact order of precedence of the various 
wangs is not clear. The T'ien Ch'ao chueh-chih ch'eng-wei (Titles 
and Hanks of the Heavenly Dynasty), which is appended to the 
Ch'in — ting ching-pi tzu-yang, gives only two categories; 'special* 
(M jfe)» including the Young Tung Wang, Young Hsi Wang, Young Nan 
Wang, the I Wang, Chung Wang, Ying Wang, Shih Wang and Pu Wang; the 
Kan Wang was omitted presumably because he was the author; and 
'others' (f'j f§0, including the Young Yii Wang, and the Hu, Hsiang, 
T'ing, Mu, Lai, Na and Tsou Wangs.
Huang Wen-ying in his deposition (TPTK IX p.857) lists five 
grades of wang, but like the work quoted above, does not mention 
the rank of * ', or its place in the hierarchy. It is not clear
from Li Hsiu-ch'eng's remarks whether the use of the title ^  meant 
a further division of the lieh wang, or whether a new, lower grade 
was added. If Shen Mou-liang: Chiang-nan oh'un-men-an pi-chi p.454 
can be taken as reliable evidence (see note 5 to page 139)> the 
latter would seem to have been the case.
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For discussion of these questions, see Li Ch'un: T1ai-p'ing 
T1 ien-lcuo chih-tu ch'u-t'an, pp.233-237* and Chien: Tien-chih 
t'ung-k'ao I pp.36-44. All known wangs are listed in Kuo: Jih-chih 
(Appendix) and in Lo: Shih-kao ch.6.
6. in the original, a Kwangsi dialect expression. Tseng Kuo-
fan changed it to 1 1 •
7. This was noted by Li Hung-chang, who wrote to P'eng Yti-lin 
that because of the power of Li Hsiu-ch'eng, Li Shih-hsien and
Yang Fu-ch'ing, who did not co-operate with each other, the T'ien 
Wang had nominated many wangs, and this was the beginning of 
incurable discord; see Li Hung-chang: P'eng-liao han-kao ch.l p.44b. 
Tseng Kuo-fan made similar comments, see Tsou-kao ch.18 p.9a.
Someone in the Taiping capital wrote the following couplet mocking 
the proliferation of wangs, * ^ ^ A  % A, + ^
he was found out and executed; see Anon: Shih-wen ts'ung-lu, p.80 
in Chien-chi V.
Notes to Page 236.
1. Omitted in Lii Chi-i*s copy. In place of this deleted passage 
Tseng Kuo-fan added, 'The T'ien Wang formerly...'
2. • There is no mention of this in Ch'en Yu-ch'eng's
deposition (see Lo: Shih-liao k'ao-shih chi p.201); but it
is confirmed by Hsieh Ping: Chin-ling K'uei Chia chi-shih ltieh,
quoted in Lo: Chien-cheng p.314.
3. i.e. ^  KA
4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng was evidently mistaken as to the date when he 
began to use the name Hsiu-ch'eng. He is already referred to
by this name in a memorial by Sheng Pao dated BF8/7/23 (31 August
1858); see Lo: Chien-cheng p.314*
5. This passage was overlooked by Lu Chi-i.
6. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition this passage reads, 'The T'ien 
Wang formerly selected the men he employed; later, he brought
chaos. General Tseng's troops...'
7. The original reads ' sl ^  5? &'; the Chiu Ju T' ang Edition 
has 'jl*' % '.
Notes to pages 237 & 238
Notes to Page 237*
1. 1 ^ ''N'n 83^1 in the original, perhaps an error for ’ iS'fcfe'.
2. A Refugee Office seems to have been started early 
in 1864 near Nanking. A long letter from Ohao Lieh-wen to a
friend, dated TC3/3/6 (H April 1864) describes its operation, 
and the increase in the numbers of the refugees as the siege of 
Nanking tightened; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi pp.326-7 and Wang 
Yung-nien: Tzu-p1 in-kuan shih-ch1 ao, ch.l p.397 in Chien-ehi VI.
3. For Jf\ read /fee. .
4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng originally wrote *2? ^  1 (thirty or forty 
thousand). The character ~b was added later to make this
'a hundred and thirty or forty thousand’; but it is not possible 
to say by whom. The only reason for suspecting that it might 
have been added by someone other than Li Hsiu-ch'eng is that it 
is written to the left of the line in front of the character ; 
whereas all Li's additions in the manuscript are written to the 
right. If the character was added by someone else, it may have 
been done in order to confirm a previous report, perhaps exagg­
erating the number of refugees for the purpose of embezzlement.
5. Tseng Kuo-fan's memorials of TC3/2/27 and TC3/3/12 confirm 
that women and children and old people were let out of Nanking
by the west gates. The former memorial gives the figure of 'more 
than ten thousand' to that date, the latter gives no estimate; 
see Tsou-kao ch.20 pp. 6b, 7a* 9b. Gordon reported that 3*000 
women and children had been released, see note 4 to page 241*
It is difficult to see how Li Hsiu-ch'eng could have 'secretly* 
permitted such an exodus, unless there was a general conspiracy 
to conceal matters from the T'ien Wang. Wang Yung-nien: Tzu-p'in- 
kuan shih-ch*ao p.397 records that Li Hsiu-ch'eng petitioned the 
T'ien Wang to allow these people to leave.
6. The character Jt was added by Tseng Kuo-fan.
7. The original reads Tseng ICuo-fan changed this
to . The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition ' ^  ' - ' Use. '
is evidently a typographical error.
Notes to Page 238.
1. This was on 15 December I863 (TC2/11/5). Kuo: Jih-chih p.1039
Notes to pages 238 & 239
says that this attempt at mining the wall was at the Shen Ts'e 
Gate, on the north side of the city; this is contrary to Li Hsiu- 
ch'eng1 s version. The only other source, as far as I know, which 
gives the Shen Ts'e Gate as the location is Li Pin: Chung-hsing 
pieh-ohi ch.60 p.6a; but this too is a secondary source. Tseng 
Kuo-fan mentioned the incident, but not the location in his 
memorial of TG2/11/12 (see Tsou-kao ch.19 p.26b) and his letter 
of the same day to Tseng Kuo-ch'uan (Chia-shu ch.7 p.210, Shih- 
chieh Edition). Chao Lieh-wen however wrote quite a detailed 
account in his diary for TC2/12/2, according to which, the tunnel 
was located near the Chii Pao Gate (south of the city) and had 
been started about six months earlier. It had been completed 
during the second week of December, but had been discovered by 
the Taipings who had counter-tunnelled down to it. A subterranean 
battle, lasting a whole day, had then ensued. The government 
troops succeeded in driving the Taipings out by pumping in with 
the aid of bellows the smoke of burning capsicum. The Taipings 
responded by pouring water and filth into the tunnel, the mouth 
of which the government troops then blocked by stuffing it with 
huge quantities of bedding. Behind this defensive barrier they 
then dug a branch tunnel to a point under the city wall a little 
distance away, this was mined, and the explosion on 16 December 
(Tseng Kuo-fan gives 'the night of [the 15th]') knocked down a 
part of the wall. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.306.
2, This refers to the Ch'in-huai River, which flowed along the 
south side of the city, see Map II.
3. In the original^, A  ^  ©  . This reads in the Chiu Ju
T'ang Edition. For a discussion of the number of Taiping
troops in the capital at the time of its fall, see
4* A Taiping Traitor called Hsu Lien-fan, who tried to let the 
enemy into the city in April I863, was pounded to death in 
a stone mortar; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.317*
5. Hsiao Fu-ssu (|j| %  3$), the highest ranking officer under 
Tseng Kuo-ch'uan at Nanking.
6. For r e a d e r ; see Kuo: Jih-chih, Appendix p.24-
Notes to Page 239.
1. Added by Tseng Kuo-fan.
Notes to pages 239 & 240
2. Ch'en Te-feng was taken prisoner after the fall of Nanking.
When he was brought to the Hunan Army headquarters and saw
Li Hsiu-ch'eng, he knelt and paid obeisance to him. This was 
reported to Tseng Kuo-fan, and it was one of the reasons he gave 
the court for executing Li at Nanking rather than sending him to 
Peking. Tseng Kuo-fan expressed disgust at this demonstration 
of the loyalty which Li Hsiu-ch’eng could still command (M&'yjtM 
\£i and at his popularity with the people, shown by the 
revenge they took upon his betrayers; see Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou- 
lcao ch.21 p.3a. Ch’en Te-feng’s gesture possibly cost him his 
life.
3. The character ’ ^  1 is omitted in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition.
4. In the original 1 -Hr ’, sometimes called *t]^ e blue plume’, 
an honour conferred on officials below the 6th rank, Tseng
Kuo-fan changed this to 'the single-eyed peacock
feather’ (ort& ^  ); see Brunnert and Hagelstrom: Present Day 
Political Organization of China, Shanghai 1912 p.498• In the 
Chiu Ju T’ang Edition however, it is *, a ’crystal
button’. It is impossible to say which of these version is 
correct since we cannot identify the man.
5. I have not been able to find any identifiable reference to 
these particular negotiations from the Ch’ing side. Chao Lieh-
wen: Jih-chi p.351 mentions that a trusted Lieh Wang under Li Hsiu- 
ch’eng, called Fu Chen-kang (If ifo i\$\) was in secret communication 
with a secretary of Tseng Kuo-ch'uan’s staff called Ch’en Fang- 
hsien ). Fu Chen-kang was related to a Hunanese from Hsiang-
hsiang called Hu Yiieh-hsi This may have something to
do with the events which Li Hsiu-ch’eng mentions, though it is not 
possible to be sure without further investigation. A man who 
claimed to be Li Hsiu-ch’eng’s wife’s uncle was captured an 
executed on TCl/2/17 (17 March 1862); see Yao Chi: Hsiao-ts*ang 
sang-chi p.492 in TPTK VI.
Notes to Page 240*
1. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote nine characters in the margin here and 
then crossed them out; they read: ’^  ^  Sffj - ’active
and hard-working men in the Kingdom were formerly loyal to him'.
2. This may mean that Li Hsiu-ch’eng had established a temporary 
of emergency headquarters on the city wall.
Notes to pages 240 & 241
3. This whole passage was omitted in the Chin Ju T'ang Edition 
and was overlooked by Lii Chi-i. A revised version of it in that 
editioh (followed in all other editions) gave the date of Hung 
Hsiu-ch'uan*s death (by suicide) as the '27 th Day of the 5th 
Month' (see note 2 to page 241). There are two other contemporary 
sources which give the date of Hung's death, the deposition of 
Hung Yu-fu, the Young Sovereign, who said that his father died on 
the '19th Hay of the 4th Month (Taiping calendar), see TPTK II 
p.856. and Tseng Kuo-fan*s memorial of TC3/7/7 (Tsou-kao ch.20 
p.28a), which gives the date as the f27th Hay of the 4th Month'.
We have therefore four versions:
i. Li Hsiu-ch'eng: TT14/4/21 = 5 June
ii. Hung Yu-fu: TT14/4/19 “ 1 June.
iii. Tseng Kuo-fan: TC3/4/27 « 1 June.
iv. The Chiu Ju T'ang Edition gives 'the 27th of the 5th Month.
By the lunar calendar this would be 29 June, or by the 
Taiping calendar, 9 July. But both dates are impossible, 
being after the fall of Nanking. Since additions to the 
deposition would be made in accordance with Tseng Kuo-fan*s 
version, we may assume that this is a simple error for
TC3/4/27 - 1 June,
Hung Yu-fu was presumably in a better position to know the exact 
date of his father's death than Li Hsiu-ch'eng, so we may take 
1 June as the correct date.
Hung Hsiu-ch'uan's death was known outside Nanking as early 
as 9 June, and Chao Lieh-wen recorded in his diary that according 
to intelligence reports Hung had died of illness; there was no 
mention of suicide; see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.353. It is 
possible however, judging from information given after the fall of 
Nanking, that rumours were rife and that some said that the T'ien 
Wang had taken poison (see Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.372, giving 
Ch'en Te-feng*s information). In any case, possibly assuming that 
he would give more pleasure to the court in reporting the 
ignominious suicide of the rebel king, Tseng Kuo-fan chose to 
report that Hung had died by his own hand; see Tsou-lcao ch.20 p.27a. 
The changes made in the deposition of Li Hsiu-ch'eng were in order 
to make it agree with previous reports.
Notes to Page 241.
1. Tseng Kuo-fan changed ^ #1 1 to The former was
his correct name, but on his official seal the two characters 
1Jl ^  ' (the true Sovereign) were misread on the government side 
as ' ', and he was consequently known as Hung Eu-chen; see
his deposition in TPTK II p.860.
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2. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition this section (starting from the 
end of the third sentence in the final paragraph on page 240)
reads:
Because General Tseng’s troops were everywhere tunnelling 
towards the city, the T'ien Wang was very worried. He 
became more anxious every day and on the 27th of the 5th 
Month he took poison and died. After the T'ien Wang had 
died, General Tseng's troops we re pressing us hard and we 
were in a desperate plight. Then the T'ien Wang's eldest 
son Hung Eu [sic] ascended the throne in order to put all 
the people at their ease. General Tseng made many 
tunnels.•.
3. According to Tseng Kuo-fan (Tsou-kao ch.20 p.26a), more than 
thirty unsuccessful tunnels had been dug. Some of these
probably failed for technical reasons, but most of them were 
destroyed by the Taipings. When the tunnels were long there 
was a strong probability that the Taipings would be able to 
locate them, partly by watching for abnormal activity, or 
sometimes when the vegetation directly above the tunnels (which 
cannot have been very deep) turned yellow; see Chao Lieh-wen: 
Jih-chi p.367* But after the capture of the Taiping fort at 
Ti-pao-ch'eng on 3 July, which was only about 100 feet from 
the city wall, the task of tunnelling was made much easier.
Not only because the distance was very short, but because Tseng 
Kuo-ch'iian placed a hundred cannon on the side of Lung-po-tzu 
Shan, which kept up a barrage of fire day and night for ten 
days. This kept the Taipings off the wall and allowed the 
tunnellers to work undisturbed. The two successful tunnels 
were completed in only 5 days. See Tseng Kuo-fan: Shou-shu .jih-
chi p.1845*
4. Li Hsiu-ch'eng should have written 'by the 5 ^  Bay...', that 
is, July 18th, the day of the final sortie. Nanking fell
on 'the 6th Bay', 19 July. C.G.Gordon, who visited the Nanking 
siege works a month earlier described them in a report:
Chinkiang [Chen-chiang] was left on the 16th in the 
Revenue S.S. "Elfin", and after anchoring south-west off 
Nanking for the night, moved alongside the landing place 
the next day. There we met a Titu [Provincial Coramander- 
in-Chief], who had been three days awaiting us, and had 
chairs and. ponies ready to take us to Tseng Kuo-tsuen, Futai 
of Chekiang and brother of Tseng Kuo-fan, who commands all 
the troops around Nanking. Starting at 10.00 am., \\re passed 
along for three miles a road constructed through a morass, 
in itself a wonderful work and which, according to our 
escort, was daily visited wet or fine by Tseng Kuo-tsuen
Notes t) page 241
during its construction. His house is on a hill behind the 
Porcelain Tower Hill, and to his house, some two miles from 
the end of the road, the route was lined with troops who 
occupied the very numerous stockades here. The men looked 
well, strong and healthy, and seemed to be in good spirits, 
but were not well armed, spears and Chinese lances being 
far more numerous than muskets.
Tseng Kuo-tsuen met us at the entrance to his stockade; 
he is about forty two years old, apparently active, and had 
a pleasing manner, but did not seem very clever. We dined 
with him and he told us that sixteen galleries were being 
-driven towards the city wall around the city in different 
places, that he hoped to have them loaded and tamped in ten 
days, and that by a simultaneous explosion and attack on 
all sides to carry the city. Two months previously he had 
had a mine exploded, but it had had only a partial effect, 
owing to which, although the troops got in, they could not 
maintain themselves, and were driven out with the loss of 
four hundred men. He also said that the rebels countermined, 
and on the previous day broke into one of his galleries, 
killing eight or ten men. He seemed quite satisfied with the 
position, saying when asked why he did not get more muskets, 
that his men did not know how to use them, and when asked 
if he would not get three or four small field pieces to take 
into the city, that another attempt would be made in their 
own way, and if that failed, they would soon take the place 
by famine. The Rebels, he said, were very badly off; some 
months before they had sent out some three thousand women 
and children whom he had put in stockades, and allowed the 
country people to take as wives any who so desired. It may 
be remarked here that it was in this way that he took Anking 
by starving it. He seemed very anxious to be informed of 
the qualifications of the various Kiangsu military mandarins 
personally known to him, and also showed that he was well 
acquainted with what had been occurring in Kiangsu and 
Shanghai, but it was evident, in spite of efforts to convince 
him, that he neither wanted nor saw any advantage to be gained 
by any change in his method, or by improving the arms of his 
men. We therefore ceased to press him on the subject, and 
left him at 3*00 pm., arranging to visit the [siege] works 
the next day.
Accordingly, accompanied by Tseng*s orderly, a start was 
made at 9*00 a.m. for the hill above the Porcelain Tower, 
which is now a heap of ruins* This hill, which is not more 
than seven hundred and fifty yards from the [city]wall, 
commands a splendid view of the city and of the siege works; 
on it is a very large stone fort captured last year after
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several repulses. It is a marvel that it was taken, and 
the untiring way in which it was managed is extraordinary; 
it seems that stockades and breastworks were constructed all 
around it and thus, by isolating it, the Rebels were caused 
much annoyance as to compel its evacuation. The hill and 
fort have the name E-fan-tay [lii-frua-t *ai], and are held by 
two titais, with whom some conversation was held. Their 
feelings and desires for improvement were found to be the 
same as those of Tseng Kuo-tsuen; young men, twenty five 
to twenty six years old, better things might have been 
expected of them, and they showed that they were jealous 
of the reputation the late General Ching [Chfeng Hsueh-ch!.i] 
had gained, and abused him for having been a rebel.
From the summit of the hill Nanking can be seen to 
perfection, the palaces being plainly distinguishable, and 
the back of the wall for a great distance. The quantity 
of waste ground if very large and, strange to say, the Rebels 
do not seem to have any stockades inside. For miles the 
wall is deserted entirely, only here and there is a single 
man seen, miles from any support; the houses in the city 
are good, but there seems to be a deathlike stillness hanging 
over it; there is not a flag visible or anyone cultivating 
the waste ground, as might be expected if the Rebels were 
pressed for food.
The wall is some forty feet high and thirty feet thick, 
revetted on the inside, and should the Imperialists place 
their charges tinder its centre, a clear breach through would 
be made. It was to the left of E-fan-tay that the old breach 
was made, and it appears that the charge took effect in the 
face of the wall, and merely blew off the outer skin. The 
Imperial stockades are not a hundred yards from the wall at 
this point; four or five Rebels were let down by a rope, 
while we were present, and gathered a sort of lentil between 
it and the ditch, quite unmolested by the Imperialists who 
were not more than eighty yards from them,
Erom E-fan-tay the besieging works can be seen for miles; 
they consist of a double line of breastwork connecting a 
hundred and twenty to a hundred and forty mud forts, spaced 
at a distance of from five hundred to eight hundred yards, 
and each containing five hundred men. The front breastwork 
faces the city, the rear one looks back, with an intervening 
space of three hundred yards between them; in some places 
the mud forts are nearer each other, and the breastwork is 
triple or even quadruple; it looked neglected, but there 
were parties working on it, Tseng Kuo-fan*s arrival being 
evidently expected. Both the forts and the breastwork were 
much inferior to those constructed by the late General Ching,
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and especially where the Tayan [Tan-yang] road emerges, 
the line is very weak. The forts are surrounded with sutler 
shops, and there did not seem to he any sentinel posted, 
a general picnic appearance being presented.
The Ming Tombs were then visited, and there we met Titai 
Wu Ming-liang, in charge of the mining operations at this 
section. Here there is no ditch and we went down to the 
mines and found a gallery driven a hundred and fifty yards 
fifteen feet below the ground, four to five feet wide and 
about seven feet high5 it then divided into branches twenty 
yards from the wall, and had small shafts at intervals for 
ventilation. The gallery was framed with wooden supports 
and brushwood, some fifteen feet being driven each day. Two 
or three Rebels were looking over the top of the wall, and 
must have known what was being done by the earth thrown up 
from behind the stockade from which the gallery started.
(From a manuscript now in the British Museum, Gordon Papers).
5. "during the night of the 15th [of the 6th Month: 18 July] at 
the 4th watch [1*3 a.m.], while the tunnel was being charged
with explosive, and Tseng Kuo-ch1 uan and Li Ch'en-tien were 
discussing matters at the entrance to the tunnel, the rebel 
chief Li Hsiu-ch'eng made a sudden sortie with several hundred 
determined followers, from the foot of the wall at the T'ai-p'ing 
Gate, and made straight for the large stockade where the tunnel 
started. Several hundred others, in the uniforms and with the 
banners of government troops, came out from the eastern corner 
at the Gh'ao-yang Gate. Their incendiary shot set fire to the 
gun-emplacements and to reeds and brushwood nearby. The govern­
ment troops were tired and [the rebels] took advantage of this 
and of the deep night, fortunately [officers' names given] ... 
held firm on the left, killing innumerable rebels, while [other 
names[ blocked the right and also captured and executed many, 
and fortunately protected the entrance to the tunnel11. See 
Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch.20 p.25b.
6. Changed in the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition to, "The troops had no 
rest all day and all night".
7. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition: "...and at dawn they all went 
back to barracks".
8. The final attack began at down on 18 July near the T'ai-p'ing 
Gate. The mined tunnel went off at noon, blowing up some
two hundred feet of the wall opposite Ti-pao-ch*eng, and a Hunan 
Army assault force fought its way with considerable losses into
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the city. Once inside, some of the Hunan Army units, under 
Ohu Hung-chang, fought their way towards the T'ien Wang1 s 
palace, others towards the Shen-tsfe Gate to meet up with the 
troops from outside, who scaled the wall ivith ladders. These 
troops, haying joined up, took control of the Ch'ao-yang Gate 
and the Hung-wu Gate, after which Taiping resistance began to 
crumble. The Chu-pao Gate and the T'ung-chi Gate were taken 
from the outside, and attacks were launched on the Shui-hsi 
and Han-hsi Gates; see Tu ¥en-lan: Tseng Chileh Hsiang pfing 
Yueh-ni chieh-lueh p.409*
Notes to Page 242.
1. For ^  read ^  .
2. For ifch read jkh .
3. This is a hill inside the city, near the Ch'ing-liang Gate on 
the west side. Li Hsiu-ch'eng presumably used this as an
assembly point, from which one could see what was happening and
decide on an escape route. According to Tu Wen-lan: Tseng Chiieh
Hsiang p'ing Yueh-ni chieh-lueh p.409, Li Hsiu-ch'eng and a
band of *determined rebels1 attempted to charge out by the Han-hsi
Gate, but were beaten back and returned to Ch'ing-liang Shan.
The Young Sovereign stated.]in his deposition that,
On the 6th Day of the 6th Month [19 July] at the 5th Watch 
[3-5 a.m.] I dreamed that the government troops had blown 
up the wall and charged into the city. After mid-day I was 
with four young queens [his wives] watching from a tower, and 
saw the government troops enter the city. I tried to run 
away but the young queens would not let me go. I said I was 
going down to have a look and would come back at once, and 
then I ran straight to the Chung Wangfs palace. The Chung 
Wang took me to several gates but we were not able to charge 
out of any of them. At the first watch however, we dressed 
as government troops and charged out through the breach with 
only a thousand men or so.
See TPTK II p.856.
4. For read
5. For read .
6. For ^ vk read ^  .
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Notes to Page 243*
1. For read •
2. Originally Li Hsiu-ohfeng had written that the break-out was 
made at *the first watch1 (4/7 that is 7-9 P-m., but
the character * y£7 ' was written over the character f 4/7 * in 
black ink, making it *the fourth watch*. It is not possible to 
say who made this change, but it does not look like a correction 
made by Li Hsiu-ch* eng himself and we are probably justified in 
assuming that this was part of the falsification of the deposition.
Which version is the true one? Chao Lieh-wen, who was at 
Nanking at the time, wrote in his diary that:
At the end of the Hsii Hour , 7-9 p.m.] I saw firing
from Lung-po-tzu and as far as Hsiao-ling-wei, and knew 
that rebels had broken out. ... At the fourth watch ifet $4- 
1-3 a.m.] a report came from north of the city that two 
hundred rebel cavalry and several thousand infantry, wearing 
government uniforms and accompanied by women and children, 
had charged out through the breach.
See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi p.370. The Young Sovereign (Hung 
Yu-fu) in his deposition, also stated that the break-out had 
taken place at the first watch; see TPTK II p.856. The falsific­
ation was made in order to make the deposition agree with the 
official report, to conceal the fact that the preoccupation of 
the Hunan Army with looting had virtually destroyed all their 
discipline and vigilance. It was also connected with the early 
return of Tseng ICuo-ch,uan to his camp before the satisfactory 
completion of the capture of the rebel capital, see pages 46-7*
3. Omitted in Lii Chi-i*s copy.
4. In fact he did get away, but was captured on 25 October 1864 
near Shih-ch*eng in Kiangsi, and executed; see Shen Pao-chen*s
memorial in TPTK II pp.861-2.
Notes to Page 244.
1. This was at Fang Shan (see Map IV). The villagers who 
appeared were from Chien-hsi-ts *un 44) according to
Hsueh Fu-ch*eng: Yung-an pi-chi ch. 2; but Lo Erh-kang was told 
by a local man in 1953 that people from the two villages of Ting- 
ts*un ("T 44) and Ohien-tung-ts*un were involved; see Lo: Chien- 
cheng p.325.
481
Notes to pages 244 & 245
2. Perhaps because he had been wounded at the fall of Nanking, 
according to (Tseng Kuo-fan: Wei-k’an hsin-kao p. 254
Notes to Page 245*
1, The Taipings of course wore their hair long, so the first 
step in concealment was to shave it off. But this was often
not enough, and many ex-Taipings were executed because, although 
their heads were shaven, the sun had not yet had time to bronze 
their scalps, the whiteness of which betrayed their recent 
allegiance,
2. In the original ^ ^ Ijt/fSu.’, which I take to mean something 
like ’in that case there is nothing I can say [and having a
shaved head could not do me any harm]’. The Chiu Ju T!ang editors 
evidently had difficulty as well in deciphering the sentence, and 
changed it to - fI would not be able to live again1,
which means approximately the same in the end.
5* For % read 1jL*
4. The sentence was deleted by Tseng Kuo-fan and added later, 
after ’not by anyone else1, which was cut.
5. For read j .
6. For S  ®  read 1% 1® .
7. In place of this deleted sentence Tseng Kuo-fan added, ’and
was captured by General Tseng’s troops who were sent in pursuit*. 
Chao Lieh-wen recorded in his diary on TC5/6/20 (25 July) that 
Tseng Kuo-ch’uan had ’ordered a letter to be written to Chung 
T’ang [Tseng Kuo-fan] saying that Hsiao Fu-ssu had pursued [Li 
Hsiu-ch’eng] and made the capture. In fact it was the local 
people of Fang Shan who had taken him ’. See Chao Lieh-wen: Jih-chi 
p.575* Later he noted that a man called T’ao Ta-lan had taken 
Li Hsiu-ch’eng bound to Bsiao Fu-ssu*s camp. But Hsiao claimed 
that troops he had sent had made the capture. Since Tseng Kuo- 
on1 iian did not enquire into the matter, the local people got no 
reward at all. Worse still, Hsiao Fu-ssu ’suspecting that he 
[T’ao Ta-lan] had hidden the rebel chief’s property in his home, 
sent troops who arrested his whole family and brought them to 
camp. The neighbours were also implicated. They were interrogated so 
oppressively about hidden treasure that everyone went into hiding, 
leaving the village deserted’, (ibid. p.576).
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Hsueh Fu-ch*eng: Yung-an pi-ohi oh.2, Li Hsiu-ch’eng pei-ch’in 
chi, gives a somewhat different version: T’ao Ta-lan, the man
who had detained Li Hsiu-ch’eng, had a relative in Li Ch’en-tien’s 
force outside the T'ai-p’ing Gate, and was on his way to report 
his capture when he stopped at Hsiao Fu-ssu’s camp' at Chung 
Shan to rest. Here he was indiscrete enough to mention his 
achievement to a cook whom he knew, and the news was quickly 
passed on by one of the bodyguards to Hsiao Fu-ssu himself.
Hsiao ordered T’ao to be entertained with food and wine, and 
secretly sent a hundred of his personal troops to Chien-hsi-ts’un 
to bring Li Hsiu-ch’eng back.
Another claimant for the credit for taking prisoner the Chung 
Wang was Chu Hung-chang, who wrote much later that when the 
rebels broke out of the unguarded breach in the wall of Nanking he, 
as \^ rell as Tseng Kuo-ch’uan, had sent troops in pursuit of them.
His men, he claimed, had chased the rebels as far as Hsing-huang- 
chen, and had captured Li Hsiu-ch’eng. See Chu Hung-chang: 
Ts’ung-chun ohi-lueh pp.49&,b. I know of no other evidence to 
support Chu’s claim.
Notes to Page 246.
1. In the Chiu Ju T’ang Edition the words ’for surrender’ ) 
were added after ’assemble’ (H51 ^  ).
2. This whole section was overlooked by Lii Chi-i.
Notes to Page 247*
1. This sentence is interlinear and .the sense is somewhat obscure. 
The original reads ’45 ^   ^%■ -th> ’. The Chiu
Ju T’ang Edition reads which means,
’I cannot defend the Heavenly Kingdom, and moreover allow my
troops to molest the people - these are my crimes.’
2. For read .
5. In the original this sentence reads ’^ 45 $£<^4^
4# @ 5^’• The Chiu Ju T’ang Edition has ’ Hkffi
't/3 'f'f IJQ .
4. Tseng Kuo-fan added 1 ’ - ’if. The original is ’
JtohfcJ.J
Notes to pages 247 &
&  * • The Chiu Ju fang Edition has;
*£f % x / $ M A % M 3 k  Q W  * *.1 (* If the Grand 
Secretary does not "believe that I have the ability to do this,
then keep me locked up and let me write letters which can be
sent..,*).
5. For read M> .
6. In the Chiu Ju T'ang Edition the following words are added
after '...both sides of the river': 1 I request the Grand
Secretary to express his opinion on this.1 The edition ends 
with Tseng Kuo-fan*s colophon (4fcb'i&), which reads:
The above was all written by Li Hsiu-ch'eng himself in 
his prison cage between the 27th Hay of the 6th Month 
[30 July] and the 6th Hay of the 7th Month [7 August]. 
Every day he wrote about seven thousand characters. The 
wrongly written characters have been corrected, his 
flattery of the Ch'u [Hunan] Army has been expunged, idle 
words and repetitions have been cut, his specious pleading 
for life and requests to [be allowed to] expiate his 
guilt by obtaining the surrender of the various rebel 
[bands] in ICiangsi and Hupeh, together with the ten 
requests concerning this surrender and the ten disasters 
leading to the defeat of the rebel Hung, have all been 
cut. The remainder, though it is ungrammatical, and not 
in accordance with the facts, has not been cut, in order 
to preserve its authenticity.
Recorded by Governor-General of Liang-chiang, Tseng.
Notes to Page 248*
1. , in the original. &  is an error for X, .
2. For 4^1 read 4% .
3. Li Shih-hsien had been refused admittance to Li-yang by his 
own second-in-command, Wu Jen-chieh, when Li-yang was
threatened by government forces and the E.Y.A. On 8 March
Wu surrendered the town. "Just as Major Gordon was going into
the city he was called back by some rehels to a large boat where 
the She [Shih] Wang's mother, a woman of seventy, his wife, a 
woman of twenty-five, his aunt, and son, a small boy of seven 
years old, were kept prisoners, and whom the rebels wanted to 
kill, as the She Wang had been very cruel to them in many ways,
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and in which he had been aided and abetted by his mother. ...
Kwosingling [Kuo Sung-1in] wanted to take the family and send 
them to the Futai [Li Hung-chang], but Major Gordon would not 
allow it, and gave them over to General Li [Heng-sung ?] to send 
down to Quinsan for safety. The old lady was very obstreperous 
and violent". Hake: Events in the Taeping Rebellion p.422.
When eventually this part of Li Hsiu-ch*eng's deposition was 
sent to the court, this remark about Li Shih-hsien's family 
provoked an enquiry from the Grand Council to Li Hung-chang, 
who replied that the Shih Wang's mother and elder sister had 
since died, his wife had been sent back to her native place; 
see Shih-lu ch.128 TC4/1/30 (25‘ February 1865 ) p.44a. Tso Tsung- 
t'ang however, reported on TC4/3/29 (24 April I865) that he had 
taken prisoner an American called^ % (Ward?), who had been 
sent to Shanghai by Li Shih-hsien to bring back his family; see 
Lo: Chien-cheng p.329*
4. At the end of TC2 (I863) Ch'en Ping-wen was said to be 
contemplating surrender to the government; see Chang Erh- 
chia: Nan-chung chi p.641 in TPTIC VI. He did so in August 1864, 
not long after the execution of Li Hsiu-ch'eng. His letter to 
Pao Ch'ao offering to do so is in TPTK II pp.772-774.
Notes to Page 249*
1. In fact he did not do so when Ch'en Ping-wen surrendered, see 
note 1 to page 225*
2. Chu Hsing-lung surrendered in I865 at Chia-ying-chou in Kwang- 
tung; see Lo: Shih-kao p.87. Lu Shun-te was seized by a
Taiping traitor at Ch'eng-lo-hsien in Kwangtung in the autumn
of I865 and handed over to the government; ibid. p.408.
3. I have followed Tseng Kuo-fan's interpretation in translating 
this sentence. The original reads:
Tseng Kuo-fan's edited version reads: -
4. The question of Li Hsiu-ch'eng's opinion as to the fate of
the Young Sovereign is discussed in Chapter VIII pp.
5* For Ma Yii-t'ang see note 5 to page 234* I know nothing of Chao
Chin-lung.
Notes to pages 250 & 251
NoteB to Page 250*
1. Huang Wen-chin took charge of the Young Sovereign at Kuang- 
te after the latter* s flight from Nanking, and took him to
Hu-chou. Huang died of illness near Ning-kuo on his way into 
Kiangsi in the summer of 1864; see Lo: Shih-kao p.425.
2. The character -I? is missing between a n d . For %t read
5. For ifo read 'kin, .
4. For read ^  .
5. Changed to *9* by Tseng Kuo-fan, who had deleted the whole 
of Li Hsiu-ch*eng1s ninth request.
6. The five characters *, were deleted at this point.
The sense is not clear; but Li Hsiu-ch*eng probably meant
that messengers should be sent to all parts like monks (fa* ) on 
their travels.
Notes to Page 251*
1. This phrase is unintelligible - *|f *3#V * is 
probably an error for 1 M  *.
2. In the original 9^ fe. *. Compare page 185 top paragraph,
where the original reads * *jj £. *.
5. The significance of this passage is discussed in Chapter V
pp. 61-2 *
4. Tseng Kuo-fan changed this to * 91•
5. The Taipings Northern Expedition, commanded by Lin Feng-hsiang,
Li K'ai-fang and others, (Chi Wen-yuan was probably an Important,
some suggest, the main commander; see Ma T*ien-tseng: Wen-t*i 
chieh-ta in Shih-hsueh yueh-k * an 1957 No. 5 p*55)» set out from 
Yang-chou on 8 Hay 1855 with a force of about 20,000. After 
taking P*u-k*ou on 15 May, they went northwest into Honan, taking 
Kuei-te on 15 June. They then intended to cross the Yellow River 
to the north, but being unable to obtain any boats there were 
obliged to move westward along the river, through K*ai-feng and
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Cheng-chou to Ssu-shui. Here they found boats and started the 
crossing on 28 June. But they had already lost 22 valuable days 
by failing to cross at Kuei-te. Then, because of government 
resistance at Huai-ch*ing in August, they had to pass into 
Shansi, making a long detour before re-entering Honan at Wu-an.
By mid-October they were 60 11 from Pao-ting and there was 
consternation in Peking. Thirty thousand people left the capital 
and the Emperor was on the point of fleeing. But instead of 
continuing to advance north the Taipings thought to take advantage 
of the reported weakness of Tientsin, and moved to attack it.
They reached a point about 50 11 the city but were prevented
from advancing further by flood water. The Taipings then dug in 
and prepared to spend the winter, having possibly miscalculated 
the strength of the resistance which their proximity to the 
capital would produce. There followed a desperate campaign 
which lasted for three months. The Taipings suffered considerably 
from the cold and from shortage of supplies. Their numbers, 
augmented by recruits made on the march, were now about 40,000.
On 4 February their food supplies ran out and they began to 
withdraw down the Grand Canal, hoping to meet up with the 
relief force which had been sent (see note 7 below), too little 
and too late. Lin Feng-hsiang was defeated and captured at Lien- 
chen on 7 March 1855; H  K'ai-fang, besieged at Kao-t'ang-chou, 
broke out with only 800 men and was captured on 51 May.
The fundamental reason for the failure of the Northern Exped­
ition was that the Taipings, having sent out the Western Exped­
ition and having at the same time to protect their capital, did 
not have the means to support such a deeply penetrating expedition 
to the north, which posed considerable problems of supply and 
reinforcement. (This note is based mainly on Mou: T1ai-p1ing 
T *ien-lcuo pp. 129-159).
6. His formal name was Hsu Tsung-yang
7. According to Huang Sheng-tsfai, he himself was the senior
commander of this relief expedition; see his deposition in
Shantung chin-tai-shih tzu-liao pp.5-11. The force, which 
consisted of ^ ril^ 7,^ 00 men (ibid. p. 18, Yueh-fei nan-pei tzu-.jao 
chi-liieh), set out from An-ch'ing, entered Honan, then crossed 
into Kiangsu near Feng-hsien and passed into Shantung. Li-ch'ing 
was occupied on 12 April 1854; but the retreating government 
forces had destroyed all food supplies and the Taipings were 
unable to remain there. When they withdrew they were defeated, 
on 27 April. Tseng Li-ch'ang and Chfen Shih-pao were killed,
Huang Sheng-ts'ai was taken prisoner. Only Hsu Shih-pa (Hstt 
Tsung-yang) returned to Nanking, where he was imprisoned for his 
part in the debacle. Nothing is known if him after the internal
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dissension in the Taiping capital.
This relieving force was very small, hut was augmented by 
recruits enlisted on the march, whose indiscipline seems to 
have contributed to the failure of the campaign.
Notes to Page 252.
1. According to TCHT p.50> Oh*in Jih-kang was sent to the relief 
of the Northern Expedition after the defeat of the first
relief column; but he complained to Yang Hsiu-chfing that the 
government troops were too numerous in the north. On this pretext 
he turned back from the region of Feng-yang and Lu-chou, and was 
defeated by militia forces at Yang-chia-tien, between Shu-ch*eng 
and Liu-an. See Lo: Chien-cheng p.332
2. The Taipings1 Western Expedition began in May 1853 with the 
capture of Ho-chou and An-ch1 ing. Part of the force then
crossed into Kiangsi, and from 24 June laid siege to Nan-ch1 ang 
until 24 September, when they desisted. After capturing Chiu- 
chiang [Kiukiang], this force divided into two columns, one under 
Shih Hsiang-chen and Wei Chih-chun went along the Yangtze west­
wards from Chiu-chiang, the other column (under Hu I-huang and 
Tseng T'ien-yang) campaigned in northern Anhwei. Shih Hsiang- 
chen's column thrust into Hupeh and in October occupied Han-yang 
and Han-k'ou; but withdrew the following month because of 
government pressure on Yang-chou. After the victory at San-chfa- 
ho, they came back to Hupeh with additional troops and more 
commanders, including Lin Shao-chang, who was at that time ch'un- 
kuan yu-fu oh!eng-hsiang. On 16 February 1854, the Taipings 
once more occupied Han-yang and Han-kfou, and leaving garrisons 
there, went into Hunan, taking YUeh-chou on 27 February, Ch'ing- 
kang on 7 March, intending to gain control over the outlying 
districts of Chfang-sha in order to isolate the city. But they 
were pushed back and forced to withdraw from Hsiang-yin on 19 
March and from Yueh-chou on 21 March, After this however, the 
Taipings brought up reinforcements, recovered Yueh-chou on 4 
April, and once again moved on Ch,ang-sha. As before, they did 
not intend to make a direct assault, and while Shih Hsiang-chen 
held Chfing-kang, Lin Shao-chang took Hsiang-tfan on 24 April.
Here he was immediately attacked by land and v/ater by units of 
Tseng Kuo-fanfs newly formed Hunan Army, and severely defeated 
between 28 April and 1 May 1854 (HF4/4/2-5)* Taiping losses 
were said to have been about ten thousand killed, and many times 
that number scattered; see Wang Ting-an: Hsiang-ohun chi,oh.2 p.7a*
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The remnants of the Taiping force retreated into Kiangsi. Lin 
Shou-chang was cashiered (see page 161); Li Hsiu-ch’eng said 
in interrogation that he ’did not have much ability, but could 
withstand much hardship;1 see Appendix I page 257). This was 
the first major defeat for the Taipings and the first major 
victory for the Hunan Army.
The main reasons for the Taiping failure were: first, their
forces were somewhat scattered, Shih Ta-k’ai in the region of 
Ching-kang, Tseng T’ien-yang in Hupeh. Tseng Kuo-fan on the 
other hand, realized the importance of Hsiang-t’an and concen­
trated his forces there. Secondly, Lin Shao-chang was an 
incompetent commander and lost the initiative. Tseng Kuo-fan 
remarked that in each of the ten or more engagements, it was the 
Hunan Army which took the initiative. Once defeated, the 
Taipings would not undertake a strategic retreat. Thirdly, the 
Hunan Army, especially the water force, made good use of foreign 
cannon (according to Tseng Kuo-fan).
As a result of this defeat the Taipings were not able to take 
Ch'ang-sha and were prevented from meeting up with the reinforc­
ements (mainly members of the T'ien Ti Hui) from Kwangtung and 
Kwangsi. The opportunity was lost for smashing the Hunan Army, 
which was only about two months old at this time.
(This note is based mainly on Chien: Ch'uan-shih III pp.1093- 
1102).
3* See pp.141-2.
4. In the original *. Tseng Kuo-fan changed fip to Aft ;
but Lu Chi-i considers that it ought to be .
5* See p. 142.
6. ibid.
7. See pp.233
8. In place of Li Hsiu-ch*eng*s final point which, together with the 
sentence summing up the disasters, was circled for deletion
by Tseng Kuo-fan, the following sentence was written between the 
lines: ’[The tenth] disaster was that [we] should not have concent­
rated on defending T’ien-ching by withdrawing troops from other 
parts’, ^  ). A reproduction of the whole
page can be seen on page 507, above; a comparison of handwriting is 
made on page 7 b , and this interpolation is dicussed in Chapter VI, 
page 75*
Notes to pages 252 & 253
9. Kuo Mo-jo believes that the sentence |0 ®  ^
ii5 'I'jk should read *‘t^  ID M  4* 3S.;
in both cases being an error for &  , and the last character 
but four being ‘h^  not '[jk . I see no reason for supposing that 
is an error for p\, , since nowhere else in the deposition does 
such an error occur, and in any oase, -£f still makes sense. But 
Kuo Mo-jo’s theory about the character seems reasonable, since 
the other examples of the character M  on the same page bear 
a close resemblance to . (See Kuo Mo-jo’s preface to Chung 
Wang Li Hsiu-ch’eng tzu-shu chiao-pu pen).
Notes to Page 253*
1. In the original . TLis perhaps an error for^k .
2. Li Hsiu-ch'eng wrote: *1^  . Lu Chi- i gives
as his reading % tk k T . Tseng Kuo-fan wrote beside 
this sentence, ' ^2 'M ®3j*.. .', which gives his understanding
of what Li Hsiu-ch'eng meant. I have followed the general sense 
of these interpretations.
3. In the original, ®  }!L *. For Ju read . Tseng
Kuo-fan added the character %  at the end.
4. Lo Erh-kang seems to take this story more or less at its face 
value, regretting only that Li Hsiu-ch'eng did not specify
which ’barbarians’ offered to share the empire with the Taipings 
and when. He quotes three contemporary sources (a letter from 
Chou Sheng-hu to Tseng Kuo-fan, Chao Lieh-wen’s diary, and Huang 
Wan [Wang T'ao]'s letter to Liu Ch'ao-chtln), presumably as 
corroboration of Li Hsiu-ch*eng’s story; but in fact none of them 
do more than tell us that Sir James Hope and Harry Parkes visited 
Nanking because of the unsatisfactory state of relations between 
the British and the Taipings. See Lo: Chien-cheng pp.335-6 (Lo's 
note on this question was first published in Li-shih Yen-chiu 
1956 No.3 p.26). Hope and Parkes visited Nanking in late 
December 1861, but there is nothing in the official record to 
suggest that they demanded to share China with the Taipings; nor 
is there anything in official Taiping replies to British communic­
ations which refers to such a demand, (see B.P.P. Papers Relating 
to the Rebellion in China and Trade in the Yangtze-kiang River, 
pp.97-104). This is not surprising, since such a demand was not 
in accordance with British policy towards the Taipings, for which 
see J.S.Gregory: British Intervention against the Taiping Rebellion, 
in Journal of Asian Studies xix 1959-60 pp.11-24, and the same
Notes to pages 253 & 25$
authorfs unpublished thesis, British Attitudes and Policy towards 
the Taiping Rebellion in China, (185*0-1864TT"
Searching for the germ from which this rumour grew, the only 
suggestion I can make is that the British demands, reiterated by 
Hope and Parkes in Hanking in 1861, that the Taipings should 
not approach nearer than 100 li. (30 miles) to the treaty ports, 
was misunderstood, or became garbled by repeated rumour into a 
territorial demand.
5. Tseng Kuo-fan added the character^' .
6. This was preaching to the converted. Tseng Kuo-fan had been 
getting foreign cannon from Canton for several years, and
even attributed the first victory of the Hunan Army at Hsiang-t'an 
to the foreign cannon with which his water force was armed, see 
Tseng Kuo-fan: Tsou-kao ch. 3 P*3&* He had received at least 
100 cannon from Canton three months earlier, see Tseng Kuo-fan: 
Chia-shu (HF4/4/21) ch.10 p.7*
Notes to Page^254.
1. The sense of this phrase is somewhat obscure; Tseng Kuo-fan 
presumably deleted it because he found it unintelligible. The
original reads, * fig 4^ %  %£ ® &J %\ "OWo® i %  *.
2. For read \%\ .
3* It is not clear whether Li Hsiu-ch*eng meant that Tseng Kuo- 
fan should employ ex-Taipings, or merely that Chinese be found 
who had the necessary skill.
Notes to Page 255*
1. The sense is obscure. The original reads: ^
M I f  [Tseng Kuo-fan added: ]
Tseng Kuo-fan wrote in the top margin at this point -
fThis suggestion can be adopted*.
2. Or *jingal* (^£^0* a heavy musket fired from a rest.
3. Li Hsiu-ch*eng wrote *4 1 - the modem term for a pistol;
but I assume that he meant rifles (or muskets) as opposed to
gingals.
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4. The manuscript breaks off at this point, at the end of a 
line and at the end of a page. The sentence at least was 
presumably finished, but it is not known how much more Li Hsiu- 
ch* eng wrote before his execution, see page 36.
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